- •1 The concept of promise
- •1. What is a promise?
- •(a) A definition of promise
- •(b) Promise: objectively existing phenomenon or human construction?
- •(c) Testing component elements of the definition of promise
- •(i) A promise is more than merely an internal mental process: promises as speech acts demonstrating commitment
- •(ii) A promise is a commitment to a performance of the promisor
- •(iv) A promise must relate to the future
- •(v) A promise must state a commitment in favour of another party
- •(vi) Things which are not components of the definition
- •2. Three crucial qualities of relevance to promises: gratuitousness, conditionality, unilaterality
- •(a) Gratuitousness
- •(b) Conditionality
- •(c) Unilaterality
- •3. Acts having some similarity to, but which are distinct from, promises
- •(a) Vows
- •(b) Oaths
- •(c) Threats
- •(d) Donation (gift)
- •(e) Warranties (guarantees)
- •(f) Agreement
- •4. Promise as a culturally universal and significant idea
- •5. Preliminary conclusions
- •2 Promises as obligations: morality and law
- •1. Introduction: promise as a type of obligation
- •2. Taxonomies of obligations in morality and law
- •3. Promises as moral obligations: the practice of promising
- •(a) Promising as moral, immoral, or amoral?
- •(b) Source of the morality of the practice of promising
- •(i) Promising as a virtuous act; the natural law tradition
- •Scripture
- •The canon law
- •Objections to the morality of promising as having a natural law/virtue basis
- •(ii) Promising as an act of the will: respect for personal autonomy
- •(iii) The ‘contract theory’ of promising
- •(iv) Consequentialism (utilitarianism)
- •(v) Reliance theory
- •A more limited role for reliance
- •(vi) Conclusion on the competing theories of the moral value of promises
- •4. Powers and sanctions relevant to breach of morally binding promises
- •3 The historical development of promissory ideas in the law
- •1. Roman law
- •(a) Formal contracts: the stipulatio
- •(b) Informal contracts
- •(c) Conclusion on Roman law
- •2. Medieval contract law
- •(a) Continental legal thought
- •(b) English law
- •(i) Debt
- •(ii) Covenant
- •(iii) Unilaterality and bilaterality in early English contract law
- •(iv) Assumpsit
- •(v) The doctrine of consideration
- •3. The Northern natural law school
- •(a) Hugo Grotius
- •(b) Samuel von Pufendorf
- •(c) James Dalrymple (Viscount Stair)
- •4. Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Scots law
- •(c) Civilian systems
- •(i) German law
- •(ii) Robert Pothier
- •5. Contract theory and practice in the twentieth century
- •6. A revitalised will theory
- •4 Formation of contract
- •1. Wasted pre-contractual expenditure following termination of contract negotiations
- •(a) A Common law solution to the problem of pre-contractual expenditure: promissory and proprietary estoppel
- •(i) Promissory estoppel: promissory or reliance-based principle?
- •(ii) Promissory estoppel and failed contractual negotiations
- •(iii) Proprietary estoppel and failed contractual negotiations
- •(iv) Conclusion on estoppel and pre-contractual expenditure
- •(b) A civilian solution to wasted pre-contractual expenditure: culpa in contrahendo and bad faith termination of contractual negotiations
- •(c) A mixed legal system solution to wasted pre-contractual expenditure: liability from an implied assurance that a valid contract exists
- •(d) Other solutions to the problem of pre-contractual liability
- •(e) Conclusion on pre-contractual liability
- •2. Pre-contractual duties of disclosure
- •3. Offer and acceptance
- •(a) Offer and acceptance as conditional promise
- •(b) The traditional offer and acceptance model as a unilateral dictation of terms
- •(c) Distinguishing offer from conditional promise
- •(d) Problem cases for a promissory analysis of offer and acceptance
- •(e) Conceiving of offers as binding
- •4. Enforcement of auction/tender conditions
- •5. The firm or irrevocable offer
- •(a) Characterising the firm offer
- •(b) Promises of reward
- •6. Options
- •7. Letters of intent and preliminary contracts
- •(a) An intent to contract
- •(b) A preliminary contract, envisaging a further contract
- •(c) An expectation of a formal contract
- •(d) An expression of intention to do something other than contract
- •(e) A genuine unilateral promissory intention
- •8. Error in formation of contract
- •(a) Choosing the policies which inform the rules on error
- •(b) Constructing workable classifications which implement the policies chosen
- •(i) Roman Law
- •(ii) The Common law
- •(iii) The mixed legal systems
- •(iv) German law
- •(v) An ideal approach to promissory error?
- •9. Extortion in the formation of contract
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Conclusion on extortion
- •10. Implied terms
- •11. Consideration
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •12. Requirements of form: unwarranted restrictions on promising?
- •5 Third party rights
- •1. The challenge to third party rights in contract
- •2. The historical legal background
- •3. Third party rights in modern contract law
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •(e) Conclusion on third party rights under contract
- •4. Assignment
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •5. The problem of transferred loss
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •6. Conclusion on third parties
- •6 Contractual remedies
- •1. The ‘interests’ protected by remedies
- •2. Mutuality of promises and withholding of performance
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •3. Specific performance
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •4. Perfect or substantial performance of contractual promises
- •(a) Contracts for services
- •(b) Sales of goods
- •5. Injunction (interdict)
- •6. Damages
- •(a) Contractual damages and interests other than the performance interest
- •(b) Damages for mere breach of contract, or for fault?
- •(c) English law
- •(d) Mixed legal systems
- •(e) German law
- •(f) Model law
- •7. Liquidated damages: penalty clauses
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •8. Termination of contract for non-performance
- •(a) Historical origins of the right to terminate
- •(b) English law
- •(c) Mixed legal systems
- •(d) German law
- •(e) Model law
- •9. Restitution following termination for non-performance
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •10. Good faith and contractual remedies
- •7 The renunciation of contractual rights
- •1. Terminology
- •2. Bilateral or unilateral renunciations
- •3. Characterising undertakings not to enforce contractual rights
- •4. Express contractual or promissory renunciation of rights
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •5. Forbearance, promissory estoppel and personal bar
- •(a) The Common law
- •(i) Forbearance at common law
- •(ii) Forbearance in equity: promissory estoppel in English law
- •(iii) Promissory estoppel in American Common law
- •(iv) Conclusion on promissory estoppel in the Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(i) South Africa
- •(ii) Louisiana
- •(iii) Scotland
- •(c) German law
- •6. Model Law and renunciations of rights
- •8 The future of promise in contract law
- •1. The restricted role of promise in the modern law
- •2. Future possible development of the law
- •(a) General remarks
- •(b) The Common law
- •(c) The mixed legal systems
- •(d) German law
- •(e) The development of supranational model law
- •3. Conclusion on the future of promise
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(c) German law
The BGB contains a cluster of provisions86 entitled ‘the promise of performance to a third party’ (Versprechen der Leistung an einen Dritten). This title would seem to suggest that the nature of the relationship with the third party is that someone (one or both of the contracting parties) promises a performance to him, given that it speaks of a promise of performance ‘to a third party’ (an einen Dritten). But is this description justified by the substance of the articles which appear in the title or by the jurisprudence relating to the articles?
The words promise, promisor (der Versprechender), or promisee (der Versprechensempfänger), appear in various sections under this title of the BGB, but in §331, for instance, the reference to promising is clearly conceived of as being a promise made by one of the contracting parties to the other:
§331(1): If the performance for the third party is to occur after the death of the person to whom it is promised, the third party acquires the right to the performance, in case of doubt, upon the death of the promisee.
Promisor and promisee here signify the principal contracting parties, and not the third party. So, under this section, a contracting party is taken to make a promise to the other (which is just as the English legislation describes the situation). But this tells us nothing of the nature of the right in favour of the third party. In fact, the other articles use promissory language in precisely the same way, that is to say they never do so in relation to the third party.
The provisions allow for termination or alteration of the third party’s right . §328(2) states that, in the absence of a provision governing the matter, it is a matter of inference from the circumstances, in particular the purpose of the contract, ‘whether the power is to be reserved for the parties to the contract to terminate or alter the right of the third party without his approval’. Does this suggest that the third party’s right cannot be promissory in nature? Not necessarily. As discussed above, a stipulatio alteri can be made revocable in Scotland, where the third party’s right has nonetheless traditionally been understood in promissory terms.
In fact, as a whole, the text of the relevant sections of the BGB do not shed any light on what the relationship is between the principal contracting
86 Book 2, Division 3, Title 3, comprising §§328–35.
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parties and the third party, whether it is to be understood as contractual, promissory, or as having some other nature.
The views of academics are also inconclusive as to the understanding of the nature of the third party’s right. Markesinis has remarked that in German law ‘it is generally agreed (but not expressly stated) that the acquisition of a right by the third party depends upon the intention of the promisor and the promisee’.87 But this still does not tell us what the nature of the third party’s right to performance is. A view has been advanced that the relationship between promisor and third party is ‘quasi-contractual’ (vertragsähnlich),88 by which it seems is meant a right akin to a contractual one (rather than one arising under unjustified enrichment).
The uncertain position which prevails today need not have been the case. The codal provision concerning the rights of third parties was originally suggested to be an example of a unilateral promise in favour of the third party, but this approach did not win out. This approach had been promoted by von Kübel, the editor of the contract portions of the draft of the BGB. Von Kübel saw the third party’s right as arising without any involvement on the part of the third party, by virtue of a unilateral promise in its favour. He rejected the view that the third party should be seen as being the recipient of an offer, one which it would be required to accept before liability on the promisor’s part could arise. Von Kübel’s promissory approach was however not maintained as the drafting process continued. This resulted in the promissory link between promises of reward (which did make it into the BGB as rare examples of an enforceable unilateral promise) and the right of a third party under a contract being lost.89 Nor, however, was the final position that an acceptance by the third party was required: no such acceptance is needed, though the third party is entitled to reject the benefit.90
The loss of von Kübel’s position, which would clearly have defined the nature of the third party’s right in German law, means that the most that it seems possible to say about the right of a third party under a contract in German law is that it is a right which, though not that of a contracting party, arises under contract.
As to the uses to which German law puts third party rights in contract, Markesinis has identified eleven fact situations which have commonly
87Markesinis et al., German Law of Contract, p. 197 (the authors’ italics).
88See Hallebeeek and Dondorp, Contracts for a Third Party Beneficiary, p. 156.
89For a summary of the relevant history, see Zimmermann, ‘Vertrag und Versprechen’, pp. 473–4.
90BGB §333.
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been held to fall under the regime of contracts in favour of third parties.91 Some of these would also clearly be treated as enforceable third party right scenarios in Britain. Thus, widows’ insurance schemes and workers’ retirement schemes, insurance contracts stipulating for performance to a third party, and travel contracts where family members are to benefit as well as the contracting party, would be so categorised, under a mixture of common law (in Scotland) and statute (in Scotland and England).92 Others, however, would be less likely to fall within a third party rights regime: most cases concerning medical treatment are regarded as tortious/delictual, as they concern treatment by agents of the National Health Service with whom no contract will normally arise, though private medical contracts for the treatment of a third party might conceivably give rise to an enforceable third party contractual right; consignees of goods which are damaged in transit also fall within the German regime, whereas in the UK, while such parties might recover their losses indirectly at common law under the principle of ‘transferred loss’ discussed below,93 that is not an independent third party claim as such.94
Whatever the nature of the right in favour of the third party in German law, it seems clear that another institution often discussed alongside it, that of the contract with protective effect for third parties (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte, or ‘VSD’ for short), cannot be characterised as arising out of promise, except if one were to say that contractual promises are being extended for policy reasons to offer protection for third parties.95 But essentially this aspect of German law uses contract to perform what would be dealt with tortiously/delictually (with one notable exception, discussed below) in other legal systems. So, a major tranche of the cases under the VSD doctrine relate to personal injury or physical damage caused by a contracting party to third parties or their property. The VSD operates here to supplement a very narrow provision of the BGB relating
91Markesinis et al., German Law of Contract, p. 187.
92Many cases are now dealt in England under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. However, more specific statutes govern certain factual cases, including the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, s. 1(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930, s. 47 of the Law of Property Act 1925, and s. 148(7) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
93See further below at pp. 320ff.
94In German law, the relevant law is found in Book 4, Part 4 (§§407–75h) of the Commercial Code (HGB), the contract of carriage being seen as a contract for the benefit of a third party.
95For a summary of the relevant law, see Markesinis et al., German Law of Contract, pp. 204–14.
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to vicarious liability for the torts of employees.96 The other major tranche of cases dealt with under the VSD relates to pure economic loss, and was developed from the 1960s onwards, beginning with a famous case imposing liability on a notary towards disappointed beneficiaries of a testator (and thus similar to White v. Jones) referred to as the Testamentfall case.97 These cases were developed to overcome the exclusion of liability for negligently inflicted pure economic loss under §823(1) BGB. The notable exception to the fact that the VSD covers cases that would normally be classified tortiously elsewhere is the exclusion clause conceived in favour of a third party. This is treated in German Law as a type of contract with protective effect for third parties,98 mirroring the contractual (and not tortious) treatment meted out to such clauses in England (under the 1999 Act) and Scotland (at common law).
(d) Model law
Principle 4 to the DCFR explains that the DCFR takes what Common lawyers would style contractual privity for granted: it is said to be ‘selfevident that parties can contract only for themselves, unless otherwise provided, and that contracts, as a rule, regulate only the rights and obligations between the parties who conclude them’. The DCFR spells out exceptions to this position, one of these exceptions being the stipulatio alteri. Article II.-9:301(1) provides that the
parties to a contract may, by the contract, confer a right or other benefit on a third party. The third party need not be in existence or identified at the time the contract is concluded.99
This article does not spell out positively the nature of the third party’s entitlement(aspromissory,suigeneris,orwhatever).Infact,ArtII.-9:301(2) adds that the ‘nature and content of the third party’s right or benefit are determined by the contract’. This would suggest that parties may, if they want, confer a right which is in the nature of a unilateral promise on a third party. That possibility seems to be confirmed by Article II.-9:302, which provides for the default position, applicable in cases where one of the contracting parties is required to render a performance to the third party, that (in the absence of anything to the contrary in the contract)
96 §831. 97 BGH NJW 1965, 1955.
98See Markesinis and Unberath, German Law of Torts, p. 540.
99The provisions notably include both right and benefit conceptions of a third party’s right: see earlier discussion at n. 1 to this ch.