- •1 The concept of promise
- •1. What is a promise?
- •(a) A definition of promise
- •(b) Promise: objectively existing phenomenon or human construction?
- •(c) Testing component elements of the definition of promise
- •(i) A promise is more than merely an internal mental process: promises as speech acts demonstrating commitment
- •(ii) A promise is a commitment to a performance of the promisor
- •(iv) A promise must relate to the future
- •(v) A promise must state a commitment in favour of another party
- •(vi) Things which are not components of the definition
- •2. Three crucial qualities of relevance to promises: gratuitousness, conditionality, unilaterality
- •(a) Gratuitousness
- •(b) Conditionality
- •(c) Unilaterality
- •3. Acts having some similarity to, but which are distinct from, promises
- •(a) Vows
- •(b) Oaths
- •(c) Threats
- •(d) Donation (gift)
- •(e) Warranties (guarantees)
- •(f) Agreement
- •4. Promise as a culturally universal and significant idea
- •5. Preliminary conclusions
- •2 Promises as obligations: morality and law
- •1. Introduction: promise as a type of obligation
- •2. Taxonomies of obligations in morality and law
- •3. Promises as moral obligations: the practice of promising
- •(a) Promising as moral, immoral, or amoral?
- •(b) Source of the morality of the practice of promising
- •(i) Promising as a virtuous act; the natural law tradition
- •Scripture
- •The canon law
- •Objections to the morality of promising as having a natural law/virtue basis
- •(ii) Promising as an act of the will: respect for personal autonomy
- •(iii) The ‘contract theory’ of promising
- •(iv) Consequentialism (utilitarianism)
- •(v) Reliance theory
- •A more limited role for reliance
- •(vi) Conclusion on the competing theories of the moral value of promises
- •4. Powers and sanctions relevant to breach of morally binding promises
- •3 The historical development of promissory ideas in the law
- •1. Roman law
- •(a) Formal contracts: the stipulatio
- •(b) Informal contracts
- •(c) Conclusion on Roman law
- •2. Medieval contract law
- •(a) Continental legal thought
- •(b) English law
- •(i) Debt
- •(ii) Covenant
- •(iii) Unilaterality and bilaterality in early English contract law
- •(iv) Assumpsit
- •(v) The doctrine of consideration
- •3. The Northern natural law school
- •(a) Hugo Grotius
- •(b) Samuel von Pufendorf
- •(c) James Dalrymple (Viscount Stair)
- •4. Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Scots law
- •(c) Civilian systems
- •(i) German law
- •(ii) Robert Pothier
- •5. Contract theory and practice in the twentieth century
- •6. A revitalised will theory
- •4 Formation of contract
- •1. Wasted pre-contractual expenditure following termination of contract negotiations
- •(a) A Common law solution to the problem of pre-contractual expenditure: promissory and proprietary estoppel
- •(i) Promissory estoppel: promissory or reliance-based principle?
- •(ii) Promissory estoppel and failed contractual negotiations
- •(iii) Proprietary estoppel and failed contractual negotiations
- •(iv) Conclusion on estoppel and pre-contractual expenditure
- •(b) A civilian solution to wasted pre-contractual expenditure: culpa in contrahendo and bad faith termination of contractual negotiations
- •(c) A mixed legal system solution to wasted pre-contractual expenditure: liability from an implied assurance that a valid contract exists
- •(d) Other solutions to the problem of pre-contractual liability
- •(e) Conclusion on pre-contractual liability
- •2. Pre-contractual duties of disclosure
- •3. Offer and acceptance
- •(a) Offer and acceptance as conditional promise
- •(b) The traditional offer and acceptance model as a unilateral dictation of terms
- •(c) Distinguishing offer from conditional promise
- •(d) Problem cases for a promissory analysis of offer and acceptance
- •(e) Conceiving of offers as binding
- •4. Enforcement of auction/tender conditions
- •5. The firm or irrevocable offer
- •(a) Characterising the firm offer
- •(b) Promises of reward
- •6. Options
- •7. Letters of intent and preliminary contracts
- •(a) An intent to contract
- •(b) A preliminary contract, envisaging a further contract
- •(c) An expectation of a formal contract
- •(d) An expression of intention to do something other than contract
- •(e) A genuine unilateral promissory intention
- •8. Error in formation of contract
- •(a) Choosing the policies which inform the rules on error
- •(b) Constructing workable classifications which implement the policies chosen
- •(i) Roman Law
- •(ii) The Common law
- •(iii) The mixed legal systems
- •(iv) German law
- •(v) An ideal approach to promissory error?
- •9. Extortion in the formation of contract
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Conclusion on extortion
- •10. Implied terms
- •11. Consideration
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •12. Requirements of form: unwarranted restrictions on promising?
- •5 Third party rights
- •1. The challenge to third party rights in contract
- •2. The historical legal background
- •3. Third party rights in modern contract law
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •(e) Conclusion on third party rights under contract
- •4. Assignment
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •5. The problem of transferred loss
- •(a) English law
- •(b) The mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •6. Conclusion on third parties
- •6 Contractual remedies
- •1. The ‘interests’ protected by remedies
- •2. Mutuality of promises and withholding of performance
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •3. Specific performance
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •4. Perfect or substantial performance of contractual promises
- •(a) Contracts for services
- •(b) Sales of goods
- •5. Injunction (interdict)
- •6. Damages
- •(a) Contractual damages and interests other than the performance interest
- •(b) Damages for mere breach of contract, or for fault?
- •(c) English law
- •(d) Mixed legal systems
- •(e) German law
- •(f) Model law
- •7. Liquidated damages: penalty clauses
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •8. Termination of contract for non-performance
- •(a) Historical origins of the right to terminate
- •(b) English law
- •(c) Mixed legal systems
- •(d) German law
- •(e) Model law
- •9. Restitution following termination for non-performance
- •(a) English law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •(d) Model law
- •10. Good faith and contractual remedies
- •7 The renunciation of contractual rights
- •1. Terminology
- •2. Bilateral or unilateral renunciations
- •3. Characterising undertakings not to enforce contractual rights
- •4. Express contractual or promissory renunciation of rights
- •(a) The Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(c) German law
- •5. Forbearance, promissory estoppel and personal bar
- •(a) The Common law
- •(i) Forbearance at common law
- •(ii) Forbearance in equity: promissory estoppel in English law
- •(iii) Promissory estoppel in American Common law
- •(iv) Conclusion on promissory estoppel in the Common law
- •(b) Mixed legal systems
- •(i) South Africa
- •(ii) Louisiana
- •(iii) Scotland
- •(c) German law
- •6. Model Law and renunciations of rights
- •8 The future of promise in contract law
- •1. The restricted role of promise in the modern law
- •2. Future possible development of the law
- •(a) General remarks
- •(b) The Common law
- •(c) The mixed legal systems
- •(d) German law
- •(e) The development of supranational model law
- •3. Conclusion on the future of promise
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would seem to be to allow a wide discretion to a court in assessing a damages claim in cases of error: it might conceivably be a claim for expenditure wasted in preparing to perform (classic restoration interest damages) or it might be a claim for lost expected profit (classic performance interest damages), given that both such types of loss could be said to flow from reliance on the validity of the declaration of the other party.
Though the foregoing gives only a flavour of the complex subject of the German law of damages, when taken with the stress in German law placed upon performance, the law can be said to be generally supportive of the performance measure (even if the duty to pay default damages cannot be said to rest upon the promises of the parties). Even where a claim under §282 for wasted expenditure is permitted, it is limited to expenditure in reliance on the expected performance. The high regard for the performance pledged by a promisor is clear. On the other hand, the theoretical barrier of demonstrating fault before damages can be claimed is a devi ation from the high respect given to promises, as it fails to differentiate between strict promises to achieve a result and fault-based promissory duties.
(f) Model law
Under the DCFR, the right to damages is available for ‘loss caused by non-performance of an obligation’.213 The stipulation of loss as the basis of damages clearly excludes gain-based damages being claimed under this provision.
There is no hint in the DCFR provisions on damages of Lord Goff’s radical view that loss in breach of contract cases means loss of the right to performance. Instead, without the idea of loss being exhaustively defined, it is clear from the statements in Article III.-3:701(3) that loss for nonperformance of an obligation includes economic and non-economic loss, and that economic loss includes loss of income or profit, burdens incurred, and a reduction in the value of property. The traditional view is taken that it is a demonstrable and measurable effect upon the patrimony of the claimant by which the value of economic loss is to be judged. As to the measure of damages, Article III.-3:702 grounds this firmly in the performance measure by stating that the ‘general measure’ of damages is ‘such sum as will put the creditor as nearly as possible into the position
213 Art. III.-3:701(1).
Contractual Remedies |
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in which the creditor would have been if the obligation had been duly performed’.214 This commendably clear statement is evidently highly supportive of contractual parties’ promises. The choice of the phrase ‘general measure’ is, however, suggestive of the fact that another measure may in exceptional circumstances be appropriate, though what such alternative measure might be is not specified.215 It seems reasonable to suggest that such measure might, in an appropriate case, be the restoration (or status quo ante) measure, in terms of which recovery of wasted expenditure undertaken in preparation for performance might be sought. It would, however, have been useful to have seen an explicit statement in the text of the DCFR that such an exceptional claim is permissible.
Damages are available for all failures to perform an obligation unless ‘the non-performance is excused’.216 Does this impose a fault-based requirement upon damages claims? To answer that question, regard must be had to Article III.-3.104 which concerns excuses for non-performance due to impediments. The Article provides that ‘impediments beyond the debtor’s control’ which the debtor ‘could not reasonably be expected to have avoided or overcome’ 217 excuse the debtor from performance. An impediment so described is evidently one in relation to which the debtor cannot be at fault, as one cannot be responsible (and thus at fault) for events beyond one’s control. So, the DCFR damages provision, taken together with the provision on impediments, means that non-performance due to matters beyond a party’s control excuses the duty to pay damages. That does not mean, however, that the general regime of damages under the DCFR is in consequence fault-based, as there are many circumstances
214By focusing on the creditor’s position, and taking into account the way in which loss is measured, this statement of the general measure of damages would seem to exclude transferred loss claims. Special provision is made for cases where, following termination for non-performance, the creditor undertakes a replacement transaction to cover for such non-performance: the measure of damages is the difference between the two contract prices (Art. III.-3:706).
215The Official Commentary to the DCFR notes that certain provisions on damages resulting from circumstances other than non-performance give rise to a right to reliancebased damages designed to restore the party prejudiced to the position it was previously in (the status quo ante position), Art. II.-7:204 being an example of such a provision. The Commentary does not, however, give any further information as to when such damages might apply under Art. III.-3:702, save to note somewhat cryptically that the Article leaves open the possibility that ‘a rule relating to a particular kind of obligation could provide for a special measure of damages’ (Comment E to Art. III.-3:702).
216Art. III.-3:701(1).
217Though where the impediment is permanent, the obligations is extinguished: Art. III.-3:104(4). This describes what in Common law terms would be called frustration.