англ тэк
.pdfтических вод» и «Закон о рыбном хозяйстве». В результате наличия такого количества законов может возникнуть затруднение относительно того, какой закон следует применять в случае значительного разлива нефти в районах Севера. Скорее же всего, по ряду причин, будет применяться закон «О добыче нефти и газа». Соответственно, принципы и подходы к наложению финансовой ответственности на компании за причинённый их деятельностью ущерб следует рассматривать, исходя из практики применения именно этого закона.
Закон Канады «О добыче нефти и газа» регулирует деятельность нефте- и газодобывающих компаний в рамках юрисдикции федерального правительства. В Статье 2.1 говорится, что целью Закона является
обеспечить, при ведении разведки и эксплуатации нефтяных и газовых месторождений,
(а) безопасность деятельности, особенно путём стимулирования нефтегазоразведчиков и нефтегазодобытчиков к поддержанию
безопасного режима работы;
(б) охрану окружающей среды;
(в) рациональное использование нефтяных и газовых ресурсов;
(г) условия для совместной добычи.
Этот закон, регулируя «разведку и бурение на нефть и газ, а также их добычу, рациональное использование, переработку и транспортировку» в районах канадского Севера как на материковой части, так и на континентальном шельфе, также применяется и к потенциально богатым залежам нефти и газа в море Бофорта и в районе дельты реки Маккензи.
Метод привлечения к финансовой ответственности, предусмотренный настоящим Законом, достаточно прямолинеен. По Закону, разлив нефти является противозаконным деянием: в Законе Канады «О добыче нефти и газа» говорится, что «запрещается кому-либо совершать либо допускать разлив нефти на или с территории, находящейся под юрисдикцией данного Закона». В случае разлива, Закон требует, чтобы операторы в
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районе разлива приняли все доступные меры по предотвращению нанесения дальнейшего ущерба и ликвидации последствий уже нанесённого ущерба. В случае, если власти посчитают, что принимаются не все необходимые меры, они могут взять под свой контроль деятельность той компании, которая допустила аварию, и добиться выполнения всех необходимых работ. В этом случае виновная компания будет обязана по закону оплатить правительству стоимость работ по ликвидации последствий разлива.
Здесь важно отметить, что компания обязана оплатить государству стоимость работ по ликвидации последствий аварии не только в случае, если виновны компания или её сотрудники. Закон Канады «О добыче нефти и газа» налагает на компанию «абсолютную» финансовую ответственность за аварию «без предъявления доказательств её вины или халатности сотрудников» так как основной целью положений Закона является не определение виновного за разлив, а обеспечение того, чтобы минимизировать нанесённый ущерб путём принятия незамедлительных и эффективных мер по ликвидации последствий аварии.
Как уже указывалось, финансовая ответственность компании является абсолютной: если разлив произошёл в результате деятельности компании, компания несёт полную финансовую ответственность за работы по ликвидации независимо от того, насколько технически правильно она вела все работы по добыче. Разница заключается в размерах финансовой ответственности: её сумма не ограничена, если доказана вина или халатность сотрудников компании. В остальных случаях, по Закону, размер финансовой ответственности компании может быть ограничен определённой суммой.
Одно дело наличие закона о финансовой ответственности за ликвидацию последствий аварии, другое дело — наличие самих денег в нужный момент: Закон Канады «О добыче нефти и газа» требует, чтобы к моменту выдачи компании лицензии на любые виды работ по нефти и газу, она представила доказательства наличия у неё финансовых инструментов, достаточных для оплаты чрезвычайных работ, таких как ликвидация по-
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следствий разлива. Компания должна «предоставить доказательства возможности выполнения таких финансовых обязательств либо предъявив аккредитив, либо банковское поручительство или чек, либо любой иной финансовый инструмент, удовлетворяющий Министра, на сумму, удовлетворяющую Министра». Это требование закона вовсе не означает, что нефтяная или газовая компания, подав заявку на осуществление какого-либо вида деятельности (например, бурения скважины), должна будет немедленно внести на счёт правительства какиелибо деньги: компания обязана лишь доказать государству, что она способна немедленно собрать и выделить необходимую сумму денег в случае аварии. Другим важным требованием этого положения Закона является то, что предъявленные компанией финансовые обязательства (банковское поручительство или аккредитив) должны сохранять свою юридическую силу на весь период проведения работ по выдаваемой лицензии.
По сложившейся практике, компания до начала какихлибо буровых работ обязана предъявить «финансовые обязательства» на сумму в 500 миллионов канадских долларов.
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ТЕКСТ № 12
FI>A>CIAL LIABILITY
FOR E>VIRO>ME>TAL DAMAGE11
Introduction
It has always been understood that oil and gas operations carry with them the risk of environmental damage. It has also been understood that such damage can be particularly significant when it occurs in the North or offshore. However, when the Exxon Valdez ran aground off the coast of Alaska in 1989 spilling 11 million gallons (about 262,000 barrels, or 41,900 cubic metres) of oil, that appreciation intensified. It has been estimated that clean-up of the Exxon Valdez spill cost in the order of $2 billion (US). The Canadian public, governments and especially northern aboriginal peoples have wanted to ensure that should such a spill or similar accident occur in Canada, the oil and gas companies whose operations led to the damage would be under a legal obligation to clean it up.
The Legal Framework a. In the 9orth
There are several federal laws that impose a legal obligation on the oil and gas operator to clean-up damage that has been caused by its activities in the Canadian North. They are the «Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act», the «Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act» and the «Fisheries Act». Some confusion has resulted from the fact that more than one law could be applied were a major spill in the North to occur. However, for a number of reasons the «Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act» is the law most likely to be applied. Accordingly, the approach taken in Canada to imposing financial li-
11 This paper was prepared by Janet Keeping, Research Associate and Director of Russia Programs, Canadian Institute of Resources Law, Calgary, Alberta, Canada. It is based in part on papers for earlier seminars prepared by George McCormick, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.
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ability on companies for damage caused by their operations will be explained assuming the application of this law.
The «Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act» applies specifically to oil and gas operations under federal government jurisdiction. Section 2.1 states that the purpose of the statute is to promote, in respect of the exploration for and exploitation of oil and gas,
(a)safety, particularly by encouraging persons exploring for and exploiting oil or gas to maintain a prudent regime for achieving safety;
(b)the protection of the environment;
(c)the conservation of oil and gas resources; and
(d)joint production arrangements.
This statute applies to the «exploration and drilling for and the production, conservation, processing and transportation of oil and gas» in the Canadian North, both onshore and offshore, and thus to the potentially rich deposits in the Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie Delta region.
The method used for imposing financial liability through this statute is quite straightforward. The Act makes it illegal to allow an oil spill: the «Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act» says that «No person shall cause or permit a spill on or from any area to which this Act applies.» Should a spill occur, the Act requires that those in the vicinity of the spill take all reasonable measures to prevent further damage and to remedy the damage that has already occurred. If government officials are of the opinion that the necessary steps are not being taken, then they can take control of the operations from which the spill emanated and ensure that the necessary work is done. If this occurs the company, from whose operations the spill originated, is legally obligated to repay the government for the costs of clean-up.
It is important to note that the obligation to pay for clean-up costs incurred by government on the company's behalf does not de-
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pend upon whether the company, or its employees, has done anything wrong. The «Canada Oil and Gas Act» makes the oil and gas company «absolutely» liable for the costs of cleanup «without proof of fault or negligence». The main purpose of these provisions of the Act is not to assign blame for the spill but to ensure that any resulting damage be minimized by requiring a quick and effective response to the accident.
As just discussed, the Act makes clear that a company's liability is absolute: if a company's operations were the origin of the spill, then that company is financially liable for the costs of clean-up, no matter how well it conducted its operations. However, it does not follow that the amount of that liability is unlimited. The amount is unlimited only where fault or negligence can be established. In other cases, the Act makes clear that the company's financial liability can be limited.
It is one thing for a law to state that a company will be responsible to pay for the clean-up of a spill. It may be quite another to ensure that funds be available when they are needed to pay for such a clean-up. This issue is addressed in the «Canada Oil and Gas Act» through the requirement that, before a company will be given permission to carry out any kind of oil and gas work, it must prove that it would be capable of paying for contingencies, such as clean-up of a spill. It must «provide proof of financial responsibility in the form of a letter of credit, a guarantee or indemnity bond or in any other form satisfactory to the Minister, in an amount satisfactory to the Minister». This is not a requirement that the oil and gas company, at the time it is seeking approval to do work (for example, drill a well) pay the government anything at all. Instead, it is a requirement that the company demonstrate to the government's satisfaction that it could come up with the necessary amount of money should an accident occur. Another significant point is that the proof of financial responsibility provided (for example, the guarantee or letter of credit) must remain in force for as long as the work in question is being carried out.
Current government practice is to require, prior to any drilling, that a company provide evidence of «financial responsibility» in the amount of $500 million (Can.). Recent discussions between gov-
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ernment and industry have addressed the possibility that this amount might be increased to $800 million.
b. In the Eastern Offshore
Oil and gas operations offshore eastern Canada fall under a different legal and administrative regime. For example, the primary statute applicable to the Hibernia development offshore Newfoundland is the «Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act». As its name suggests, this statute gives legal effect to the 1985 agreement reached between the Canadian federal government and the province of Newfoundland regarding the management of oil and gas offshore Newfoundland. Although oil and gas operations offshore Newfoundland are administered through different agencies, much of the substance of the law applicable to the area is the same as that applicable in the Canadian North. The provisions regarding the oil and gas operator's financial responsibility for environmental damage are a case in point. They are very similar to those in the «Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act». At this point, the maximum amount for which financial responsibility may have to be proved in the eastern offshore is $390 million (Can.). As is true with government officials who administer this system in the North, those who administer the eastern offshore regime are very careful about the use of insurance policies for these large amounts. Some of the preferred financial instruments are letters of credit, guarantees and indemnity bonds.
c. A Complicating Factor — Agreements with Aboriginal Peo-
ples in the 9orth
The settling of land claims between the Canadian federal government and aboriginal groups in the North has provided an opportunity to address a number of issues related to oil and gas exploration on aboriginal lands. Some of the more controversial of these issues relate to companies' legal liability, and demonstration of financial responsibility, for environmental damage. The Inuvialuit Final Agreement illustrates how these issues have been handled in one modern Canadian land claims agreement.
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The Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) became law in 1984, following six years of negotiations between the Inuvialuit people and the federal government. The area covered by the agreement is vast and includes the Canadian portion of the Beaufort Sea as well as the delta of the Mackenzie River. As a result of the IFA, the Inuvialuit gave up their claim to aboriginal ownership of a considerable portion of the Canadian arctic in exchange for a package of benefits.
One of the benefits received by the Inuvialuit was the right to conduct their own environmental assessments of developments proposed for the region covered by the IFA. One of the goals of the IFA is to prevent wildlife losses and to restore wildlife and its habitat where damage occurs as a result of development. The Agreement seeks to prevent wildlife losses by requiring that every proposed development that is «likely to cause a negative environmental impact» be examined by a screening committee composed of government and Inuvialuit representatives, as set up under the IFA. This committee must determine whether the proposed development, «could have a significant negative impact on present or future wildlife harvesting». Proposed developments that are of concern to the committee may then be referred to the Inuvialuit Environmental Impact Review Board (EIRB), also established by the Agreement, for an environmental impact assessment.
Upon completion of its assessment, the EIRB is required to make recommendations to the government body responsible for the regulation of operations regarding two matters. The EIRB must recommend «terms and conditions relating to the mitigative and remedial measures that it considers necessary to minimize any negative impact on wildlife harvesting» that would be caused by the proposed development. It also must make a recommendation regarding «an estimate of the potential liability of the [operator], determined on a worst case scenario…» The government is not required to abide by recommendations made by the EIRB. However, it cannot issue approvals allowing a project, such as a drilling program, to proceed until the environmental assessment recommendations issued by the EIRB have been addressed.
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The Agreement recognizes that, in order for these environmental protection measures to be effective, an operator whose proposal is approved subject to certain conditions must be financially in a position to satisfy those requirements. Accordingly, the Agreement requires that before projects be approved the «financial responsibility» of the operator must be demonstrated. Government is authorized by the Agreement to require the relevant company or companies to show that sufficient funds will be available if damage does occur. A variety of financial instruments may be used: «a letter of credit, guarantee or indemnity bond or any other form satisfactory to the government authority».
In 1990 the Inuvialuit Environmental Impact Review Board (EIRB) reviewed a drilling program proposed by Gulf Canada for the Beaufort Sea. The Board recommended that this drilling program not be approved, in part because Board members believed they did not have sufficient information to estimate the financial liability that would accrue to industry in the event of an oil well blowout. Without an estimate of financial liability, approval for the drilling program could not be given. Although this result was not welcomed by industry, it has had little practical effect. Oil prices had already dropped to the point that offshore operations in the Canadian North were not profitable.
For the time being, Gulf and the other companies that have been active in the Canadian North are not interested in pursuing work in the area. But when industry interest in the North is revived, the Inuvialuit's concerns about environmental damage, and the financial ramifications of those concerns, will once again have to be addressed: because aboriginal rights are protected by the Canadian Constitution, all provisions of the IFA, including those regarding proof of financial responsibility for environmental damage, have priority over other laws.
More recent land claims agreements in the Canadian North have handled the issue of assessing the amount for which oil and gas companies could be responsible in case of a spill differently. They have avoided the situation encountered under the IFA where an aboriginal board has, in effect, the power to set the amount of financial liability. Instead, these later agreements concede that federal
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laws may provide for matters such as the limit of an operator's financial liability for environmental damage and any other matters that are not inconsistent with them. It is possible that assessments of potential financial liability will proceed more smoothly for work in the areas covered by these agreements than in the area covered by the IFA. However, there is still a heavy obligation (which is referred to in Canadian law as a «fiduciary duty») on the federal government to protect the aboriginal interest in environmental protection of the Canadian North. In late 1994 and early 1995 the federal government issued exploration rights in two of the aboriginal areas south of that covered by the IFA. In both cases, the financial liability of operators will be issues that have to be addressed before work can commence on those lands.
Conclusion
One of the most difficult tasks facing Canadian policy makers is simultaneously to nurture a healthy economy and to protect the environment. Nowhere is that task more difficult than in the two most important areas for offshore oil and gas development — the North and the eastern offshore. One of the measures that has been implemented in the attempt to meet both these demands is that which makes oil and gas companies financially responsible for environmental damage that results from their operations. Government and industry are still in the process of setting appropriate limits to that potential liability.
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