Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011

References

1.Ядерное нераспространение / Под ред. В.А. Орлова. В 2 т. М.:

ПИР Центр, 2002. Т. II.

2.IAEA Safeguards: Guidelines for States’ Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials. – IAEA/SG/INF/2, IAEA, Vienna (1980).

3.Концепция системы государственного учета и контроля ядерных материалов: Постановление Правительства РФ от 14 октября 1996 г.

№.1205.

4.Основные правила учета и контроля ядерных материалов. НП-030-

05.Утверждены постановлением Ростехнадзора России от 26 декабря 2005 г. № 19, Москва, 2005.

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CHAPTER 6

HUMAN FACTOR IN NUCLEAR MATERIAL

ACCOUNTING, CONTROL AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION.

AC&PP CULTURE

6.1. Present-day threats to safe management of nuclear materials and systems of counteraction

The main threats to a nuclear facility analyzed are:

∙theft of nuclear materials and NM-based products, or of information about nuclear materials and technologies;

∙acts of terrorism or sabotage at a nuclear installation or a NM storage facility;

∙nuclear blackmail;

∙anomalies in the processes of onsite NM handling or storage.

An anomaly is a discovered discrepancy between the physical material inventory and the accounting records in a material balance area. Anomalies include:

∙NM shortage (excess);

∙mistakes in accounting or reporting documents;

∙damage to NM-containing products or tampering indication devices (TID);

∙infringement of NM use or handover procedure;

∙inventory difference (ID) values gone beyond the permissible limits.

The above threats may be carried into effect by various perpetrators. A perpetrator is a person who has committed or is trying to commit an unauthorized action, or an accomplice to such an action. Nuclear sites will normally be protected against perpetrators of two types: outsiders and insiders. The latter are particularly dangerous as they may not only know the vulnerable points of a facility and its physical protection system, but may also have access to such points and to the related information.

The above threats can have severe consequences, including production of nuclear explosive devices and their unpredictable subsequent uses. NM AC&PP systems are means of counteracting threats coming from both outside and inside perpetrators. The importance of such systems on nuclear sites has grown dramatically in the face of the rising activity of terrorist organizations in the world.

A special case is a perpetrator unaware of the offense he commits. This category includes:

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∙nuclear site personnel negligent of their duties;

∙employees who are not competent enough to fulfill their duties, etc.

Such perpetrators are not motivated for unauthorized action, the adverse effects of which may be none the less serious.

Human factor and site security

The notion of ‘human factor’ refers to the integral characteristics of man and machine manifested under specific conditions of their interaction in the form of man–machine interface, which will function as dictated by the objective set for it. Personnel are responsible for operation of systems, they tend and control them, respond to the signals generated by them, and make decisions on allocation of resources for NM AC&PP. Such strong dependence on human factor leads to certain risks. Analysis of the reasons for failure at the man-machine interface shows 30 to 60 percent of all malfunctions to be caused by site personnel. Moreover, it is an unquestionable fact that the probability of an operator’s error will grow once an off-normal situation or an emergency arises.

Even specialists will not always realize the extent of incidents and problems accounted for by human factor. The truth of this statement, though, is supported by statistics. In 2001, 16 cases of failure caused by human errors were reported by Russian NPPs. Analysis of the events at nuclear plants in 2001 showed inadequate safety culture to underlie all those occurrences. The failures were attributed to:

∙flaws in or absence of administrative and operating regulations;

∙unsatisfactory distribution of duties and responsibilities;

∙imperfect site systems for personnel training and retraining.

6.2. The concept of nuclear safety culture

Analysis of the Chernobyl catastrophe led to a revised attitude towards the issues of safe operation of nuclear plants all over the world. Human factor was pointed out by the IAEA experts as the most important one among all possible risks. That is why the IAEA names safety culture as the crucial condition for nuclear power development [1]. The principles of safety culture are applicable to all nuclear facilities.

According to the IAEA definition, “Safety Culture i s that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance”.

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Safety culture manifests itself, first of all, in such a working atmosphere in which assurance of nuclear facility safety becomes the key purpose as well as an inherent need of every individual, leading to self-control, concentration and a feeling of responsibility for any safety-related activities.

Thus, safety culture as applied to every employee of a nuclear site implies:

∙qualifications and psychological fitness for handling nuclear material and equipment;

∙strict compliance with operating rules (working discipline).

∙As applied to site personnel as a whole, safety culture implies creating:

∙an atmosphere of attention to safety issues and support of related initiatives (safety awareness);

∙an atmosphere in which personnel will not be afraid to speak openly about their mistakes and will be encouraged to report the facts that may impair safety (critical attitude);

∙an atmosphere of outspokennes owing to which any information related to the facility safety will be easily accessible to all (communicativeness).

Safety assurance in operation of a nuclear facility is the primary objective shared by all specialists involved in the activities on the site. This means that safety culture should be shown at all levels, i.e., at organizations with different positions in the administrative hierarchy, such as ministry/department, operating organization, enterprise/company, etc., as well as in behavior of every individual.

6.3. Development of the NM AC&PP culture

To study the culture of NM AC&PP as a specific aspect of safety culture, it is necessary first to have it defined in a way consistent with the above.

NM AC&PP culture may be interpreted as a combination of attitudes and values of organizations and individuals, which demands that NM AC&PP issues, as those of high priority, should receive the attention dictated by their significance.

The IAEA experts suggested that the final document of the associated Technical Meeting should include a definition to the effect that:

Safety culture is a combination of qualities, principles, relations and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutes that serves to support and improve nuclear safety.

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The concept of culture embraces a whole number of factors, such as availability of highly qualified personnel; a well-developed organizational framework, etc. The objective of culture development (with the role of human factor reduced) is only attainable by taking a comprehensive approach, including, inter alia, formation of an organizational infrastructure, education and training.

Principles of nuclear safety culture

∙Responsibility – AC&PP activities are most effective if every specialist assumes personal responsibility for the system operation, as well as for his/her actions in fulfilling working duties.

∙Guidance – AC&PP activities are most effective if management of all levels daily manifest in word and deed their commitment to ensure security of nuclear materials.

∙Motivation – personnel will show high performance if they see reasons for excellence, including motives introduced by management and colleagues.

∙Professionalism and competence – AC&PP systems show optimal performance where personnel are highly qualified and have knowledge and skills sufficient for good work in all its aspects, for correct and prompt response to all off-normal occurrences and emergencies.

∙Training and improvement – the probability of incidents may be reduced and high performance attained by improving the personnel qualifications, their general education level and intellectual abilities, by applying advanced practices and the knowledge previously gained.

Improvement of the national legal framework for nuclear material managemen

Practically all articles of the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy are based on the idea of safe development of the Russian nuclear industry. The effect of human factor on the safety of nuclear facilities is expressed by the Law in its provisions for the rights and duties of individuals, organizations and office bearers.

The Law provides legal regulation of nuclear activities in various forms, with some of them imposed as mandatory actions. These include physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials.

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Improvement of the national regulatory framework for nuclear material management

The Law provides for development of general federal regulations and rules to establish requirements for safe nuclear energy uses. Based on this law, federal rules for accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials were elaborated and brought into effect. This framework allows regulating NM management activities in a way safe for the public.

It is highly important today to make every employee of a nuclear site aware of the key ideas of the above documents so that they could become an effective and reliable link in special management of nuclear materials and in implementation of the non-proliferation safeguards.

Education of specialists in the spirit of high professional culture

The philosophy of safe NM handling should be an integral part of professional culture shared by all workers of the nuclear sector. Such conscientious attitude leaves no room for complacency in matters of NM security and suggests willingness to contribute to improvements in NM handling procedures.

Training of specialists taught to seek safety as a first priority is an objective to be attained by the national education system as well as by special instruction programs.

Promotion of the non-proliferation ideas among the public

The effectiveness of non-proliferation measures in a country depends on the awareness of this vital problem in all social strata. Such awareness in society, including the authorities, sets the problem high on the list of public priorities and dictates the level of resources allocated for its resolution. It is therefore highly important to promote the non-proliferation ideas among the country’s population.

Activities along these lines are carried out by a number of organizations, including the Nuclear Society of Russia and the Center of Political Studies. They publish magazines and books, hold scientific conferences and workshops, inviting representatives of broad public circles to take part in these events.

NM AC&PP culture at Rosatom enterprises

The program for accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials has made significant progress in reducing the risk of proliferation

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of nuclear weapons. All Russian nuclear facilities are equipped with physical protection systems and use new technologies of accounting for nuclear materials. However, the required security level will not be maintained by equipment and technology alone. The availability and effectiveness of NM AC&PP systems depend largely on human factor.

The importance of human factor is universally recognized and there are a number of programs aligned for instruction of personnel in subjects of safety improvement in NM handling, including enhancement of professional culture of NM AC&PP personnel.

An important part in the Russian program for NM AC&PP development belongs to the NM AC&PP Culture Project, aimed at the greatest possible reduction of the risks attributable to human factor in NM handling and at improving the NM AC&PP culture at enterprises and organizations of the nuclear industry.

This project pursues the following objectives:

∙to improve the awareness of the NM AC&PP implications among site personnel as well as their understanding of the responsibility for maintaining high standards of culture in this sphere;

∙to enhance the attention of management to NM AC&PP issues and to the contribution their organization can make in this area;

∙to minimize the events and problems in NM AC&PP attributable to human factor.

One of the main problems associated with the NM AC&PP culture is the absence of special infrastructure (organization, personnel, technologies, or well-established practices) for enhancement of this culture on the sites. This fault is planned to be corrected by the NM AC&PP Culture Project. Employees (coordinators) responsible for NM AC&PP culture will act as links in the said infrastructure.

References

1. Safety Culture: Report of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) // Safety Series, No 75-INSAG-4, МАГАТЭ, Вена, 1990.

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CHAPTER 1

STATE SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL

OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (SSAC)

Accounting of nuclear material is determination of NM quantities, as well as preparation, filing and operation of accounting records and reports. Accounting relies on results of measuring NM quantitative characteristics. NM accounting allows:

∙use of earlier NM measurement results where confidence thereof has been confirmed by the appropriate condition of the access controls employed and respective changes;

∙use of calculation techniques based on prior measurement and experimental research results.

Therefore, quantitative characteristics of NM at respective locations and of NM flows both within and between enterprises are subject to careful accounting. This is so because information on NM forms the basis for up- to-date control and security systems at all levels of nuclear material handling.

This chapter looks into how state accounting for and control of NM is organized and is evolving in Russia.

1.1. Objectives, tasks and structure of the SSAC

The state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material is part of the state system for management of atomic energy and is intended to:

a)ensure control of nuclear material handling;

b)ensure integrity, early detection and avoidance of loss, unauthorized use and theft of nuclear material;

c)provide the Russian Federation state authorities, atomic energy management bodies, government nuclear power safety regulation agencies and other federal executive power bodies concerned with information on the presence and movements of nuclear material, including transborder shipments into or out of the Russian Federation, these may require for exercising their respective powers;

d)determine the quantities of nuclear material at respective locations;

e)ensure necessary conditions for employing the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as for implementing bilateral agreements on control of nuclear material.

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The state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material includes:

∙Systems of accounting for and control of NM at three levels. These are primarily control authorities that support its operations at the federal national level. The second level is formed by operators which handle nuclear material. The third level is formed by the NM balance areas within the operator sites;

∙legal regulatory support for accounting and control of nuclear material;

∙informational and analytical support for the system operations, as well as for processing and transfer of information on the presence and movements of nuclear material;

∙nuclear material accounting and control systems of organizations which handle nuclear material;

∙control and supervision of the state of the art in accounting and control of nuclear material.

The state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material should ensure:

a)update of the system of measurements that supports obtainment of data on the quantity and composition of nuclear material;

b)occupational training and retraining of personnel in the field of accounting and control of nuclear material;

c)restrictive access to the information in the field of state accounting and control of nuclear material for ensuring the protection of national security and restricted official information.

Regulatory, legal and organizational basis of state nuclear material accounting

Legal framework of state NM accounting. Russia adopted the atomic energy law in 1995. We did not have an earlier atomic energy law so, before the law was adopted, all aspects had been governed subject to resolutions of the Ministry for Medium Machine Building (now Rosatom). Since 1995 therefore, the atomic energy law (Part I, Chapter 5) has been the underlying document in Russian nuclear energy with all nuclear material handling based on the articles thereof.

Organizational framework of state NM accounting. The atomic energy law calls for a state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) to be formed to enable accurate and highly reliable accounting of NM disposition and transfer data. To this end, the Russian Government shall define the manner in which SSAC to be established, as

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