Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011

∙performs surveillance of NM accounting and control systems at organizations;

∙oversees physical protection and other aspects of the safety and security

of nuclear materials and installations;

∙inspects nuclear facilities;

∙takes disciplinary actions (injunctions, fines) if licensing conditions or safety rules are violated.

8.In some cases, plans for siting and building nuclear installations caused negative sentiments in certain groups of population. For this reason, the Law has special provisions as to who makes such decisions and on what grounds they are made. In particular:

∙a decision on building a nuclear installation is taken by the RF Government;

∙a decision on siting a nuclear installation is taken jointly by the RF Governments and the local administration;

∙a decision on siting and building a nuclear installation is made considering the need for such a facility and the conditions required for its siting.

9.The Law defines the main requirements to be met by Operators, i.e. the organizations declared fit for handling nuclear materials. An Operator should be licensed to carry out nuclear activities, should have sufficient resources for fulfilling its functions, and is fully responsible for the safety of NM handling, providing:

∙records of individual exposure of the site personnel;

∙protection of personnel and population in case of an accident at the nuclear facility;

∙NM accounting and control;

∙physical protection of facilities and materials;

∙radiation monitoring;

∙recruitment, training and retraining of the site personnel.

∙Unauthorized public events, such as meetings or strikes, are banned on nuclear facility sites and in their control areas.

10.In areas of NM handling, e.g., storage and processing, reliable radiation protection measures should be provided for the site personnel, local residents and environment. During transportation of such materials, they are equated to cargo of particular hazard.

11.Physical protection of nuclear facilities is provided by their Operators and specially appointed authorities, or by crews if they are shipborne.

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Security requirements are established by the rules for physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Operation of a nuclear installation or use of nuclear materials are prohibited if no measures are taken for their physical protection (Articles 49, 50).

Limited rights of persons found on nuclear sites. For the sake of physical protection of a nuclear facility, the site personnel and visitors as well as their belongings and vehicles may be inspected, for which purpose special equipment may be used.

Admission to work. Persons may be admitted to work on a nuclear site, if they are properly qualified and have a clearance for work associated with state secrets.

Persons with health problems identified in a special list of medical contraindications, will not be permitted to work at a nuclear facility.

12.Operators bear liability for losses or damage caused by radiation impacts within certain limits. The scope of liability should be financially provided for by combination of in-house funds of the organization, its insurance policy, state guarantees, etc. Documentary evidence of such financial provisions is a prerequisite for granting a license to the applicant organization.

Russian Government will pay damages on account of radiation impacts in amounts exceeding the scope of liability of the operating organization.

13.Responsibility of officials. Violation of the RF Law on the Use of Atomic Energy entails disciplinary, administrative or criminal responsibility. Such violations include:

∙infringement of requirements for physical protection of a nuclear facility;

∙infringement of the order of NM accounting and control;

∙theft, illegal purchase, storage and sale of NM;

∙infringement of rules and regulations for nuclear energy uses;

∙violation of the license terms;

∙acceptance of a nuclear facility for operation without taking measures for protection of personnel and local population;

∙failure to fulfill their duties by the site personnel;

∙unauthorized absence from the workplace at the facility;

∙admission to work at the facility granted to personnel without appropriate qualification documents, having certain medical contraindications, and to persons under 18;

∙direct or indirect coercion of personnel to break the operating procedure or job instructions;

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∙assignment of personnel to work in high-exposure areas;

∙unjustified release of radioactive substances to the atmosphere, to water or underground environment;

∙concealment of the fact of an accident;

∙refusal to provide information, or distortion of information concerning the facility safety;

∙facts of putting into use products contaminated by radioactive substances;

∙infringement of the export and import order.

14.Export and import of nuclear installations, equipment, technologies and materials are carried out in compliance with the international agreements and obligations assumed by Russia for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Export and import are subject to special licensing.

Spent nuclear fuel is taken in to the RF territory from foreign countries in a way dictated by the Russian legislation and international agreements of the RF. If such an international agreement establishes rules other than those set by the Law on the Use of Atomic Energy, the rules of this international agreement will prevail (Articles 64, 65).

5.2. Regulatory framework for accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials

The regulatory framework for NM management appears in the form of the rules laid down for such activities. Accounting and control of nuclear materials are covered by a series of regulatory documents at the international and national levels.

1.The IAEA recommendations for development of a state’s system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials (SSAC) [2].

2.The concept of a state system for accounting and control of nuclear materials (NM A&C) [3].

3.General rules for accounting and control of nuclear materials [4].

The concept of such a system adopted in Russia takes into consideration

practically all the international recommendations. It treats NM accounting and control as an important element in management of nuclear energy uses by the state. This document defines the hierarchy of objectives and the key operating principles of the State NM A&C system.

The objectives, arrangement and operation principles of NM A&C systems are discussed at greater length in the general rules for accounting and control of nuclear materials (NP-030-05), which is the key regulatory document where the requirements and criteria for A&C are determined.

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These requirements are mandatory to all legal and natural persons involved in NM management.

NP-030-05 contains a list of nuclear materials subject to accounting and control and specifies their threshold quantities. The basic principles of accounting and control identified in this document are those of continuity of knowledge, categorization, and measurable material balance.

Accounting and verifying measurements

It is only objective data, i.e. the results of quantitative measurements, that may serve as a basis for NM accounting and control in the new regulatory system. A principle central to this system is that of regular NM measurements, which naturally leads to a sharp increase in the extent of such operations. That is why measurements are differentiated according to their purpose: they may be aimed either at getting new information, as is the case, for instance, at facilities that fabricate NM-containing articles, or at verifying the existing NM data. Hence, measurements may be either of accounting or of verification nature.

Accounting measurements determine NM parameters in a batch, and their results (together with the measurement error) are entered in accounting documents as certification values. Every subsequent measurement cancels the result of the previous one. Such measurements cover all nuclear materials (100 % sampling).

Verifying measurements determine NM parameters in a batch or NM attributes to confirm the previous accounting data. The accuracy requirements for such measurements may be lowered.

Data verification if regarded as positive if the difference between its results and the accounting data is within the limits of allowable statistical straggling. As a rule, such allowable straggling in measurement results is determined by a 99 % confidence interval. If the discrepancy is found to be outside this interval, a new accounting measurement is to be made.

Access control equipment

The General Rules reflect the trend towards greater reliance on instrumentation in NM control. The Rules emphasize the importance of equipment for control of access to nuclear materials. Such equipment should be used wherever nuclear materials are found. Its purpose is to confirm the validity of previously measured NM quantities and attributes or to detect tampering with the materials. Though not providing NM security per se, this equipment will reveal attempted access to materials or will

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prove absence of such attempts. In the latter case, the previous measurement results may well be used, with the measurement costs reduced thereby.

Thus, instrumental methods of detecting and deterring attempts at tampering with nuclear materials are indispensable elements of modern NM A&C systems.

Sampling of nuclear materials

Sampling for verification is permitted if a nuclear material has undergone no changes and if it has been kept under instrumental access control. The extent of such measurements should be set to ensure the specified confidence probability of detecting an off-normal condition (anomaly). This probability depends on the extent of access control applications. An anomaly is detected by judging against the following values of threshold NM quantities:

a)for materials of Categories 1, 2 and 3, the threshold quantities are:

∙3 kg for plutonium and uranium–233;

∙8 kg for uranium–235;

b)for uranium enriched to less than 20 % (Category 4), the threshold quantity is 70 kg of U–235.

If nuclear materials appear as encased articles whose integrity is ensured by their design, they may be checked upon by sample measurements. The sampling extent is determined in a way similar to that of materials fitted up with tampering indication devices.

In-house measurement programs

Every organization develops a measurement program for the purpose of NM accounting and control, including:

∙measurement procedures, which are subject to governmental qualification. Measurements are made by destructive and nondestructive methods, each having its intrinsic advantages and disadvantages. Every method has its own preferred applications and, on the whole, they are complementary to one another;

∙a list of key measurement points, with instrumentation employed at each;

∙arrangement and description of measurement procedures;

∙measurement accuracy requirements, etc.

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Measurement quality control

If an organization has good instrumentation at its disposal and its own metrological service, it does not necessarily mean that the NM measurements it makes are of a high quality. Practice has shown that good measurement quality necessitates a special quality control process and appropriate record keeping. These may be summed up as a measurement quality control program. Such a program provides for steps to determine the capabilities of measurement instrumentation in terms of attainable accuracy and to develop procedures for keeping its performance within tolerance limits.

The General Rules for Accounting and Control call for setting up such a measurement quality control program that will allow using measurement results in the A&C system. Such programs are being introduced and operate already at many organizations and companies in Russia.

A principle central to measurement quality control is that of continuous checking for errors caused by instrumentation and measurements techniques. Such continuity is made possible, first of all, by regular (weekly, daily or several times a day) calibration of equipment against various reference specimens: mass specimens containing uranium of known enrichment, plutonium specimens of known isotopic composition, etc. Thus, a measurement quality control program includes, as its essential components, certified NM specimens to be used for calibration and verification of secondary standards, and measurement control methods.

Measurements against reference specimens allow:

∙estimating errors in individual measurements;

∙calculating random and systematic components of measurement errors and, if possible, correcting the latter;

∙calculating the control limits of instrumentation performance; if measurement results exceed a certain emergency limit, the instrument is taken out of operation.

∙In order to speed up introduction of measurement quality control programs on nuclear sites, it is recommended:

∙to use programs requiring a minimum extent of measurement verification;

∙to set tolerances at a level of practical necessity;

∙to integrate measurement control procedures into measurement procedures.

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Accounting procedures

Special attention is paid in the General Rules to the main accounting procedures including NM measurements, i.e., to NM transfer and physical inventory-taking. Their proper fulfillment (following the Rules, among other things) can largely ensure successful operation of an A&C system.

The requirements of the General Rules apply also to the A&C information system, including accounting and reporting documents. These requirements unify the information formats and facilitate transition to computerized information support of A&C, which is known to enhance hugely the A&C capabilities.

In subsequent chapters of this book, we shall repeatedly refer to the General Rules with the aim of more detailed discussion of various requirements placed on nuclear material accounting and control systems.

A regulatory framework is of great importance to physical protection of nuclear materials. It embraces documents of various levels.

1.International level:

∙INFCIRC /225/ rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear facilities (IAEA);

∙INFCIRC /274/ rev. 2, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (IAEA).

2.Russian documents of the federal level:

Rules for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Material Storage Facilities, approved by Governmental Decree No. 264, of 07.03.97.

3.Russian documents of the departmental and interdepartmental levels (a package of documents).

4.Russian documents of the site level (a package of documents). Physical protection of nuclear installations is provided by operating

organizations and specially authorized governmental agencies, following the requirements laid down in the Rules for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Material Storage Facilities. These rules are based on the RF legislation for safety management in nuclear activities and were drawn up with regard to the international obligations of Russia and to the IAEA recommendations for physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear installations and nuclear material storage facilities. The Rules apply to nuclear sites on the whole territory of the RF and are binding upon all legal entities involved in nuclear activities irrespective of the forms of ownership, funding sources and departmental affiliation, as well as upon

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the federal executive bodies responsible for coordination and supervision of nuclear activities.

This document regulates the relations arising in the process of safety management during nuclear activities. In accordance with these Rules, no nuclear activities may take place unless physical protection is provided for nuclear materials, nuclear installations and nuclear material storage facilities.

The subjects covered in this document include: the functions of federal executive bodies and physical protection organizations; the key requirements for organization of physical protection during transportation of nuclear materials and nuclear installations; state supervision of and departmental control over provision of physical protection; the procedure for bringing facts of unauthorized actions to the notice of appropriate authorities. It is a most important objective today to make the key ideas of those documents clear to each employee of a nuclear enterprise so that they become an effective and reliable link in the system of special management of nuclear materials.

The issues of physical protection on nuclear sites were comprehensively addressed in Minatom Order No. 550 of 01.09.2001 on Approval of the General Requirements for Physical Protection Systems on Nuclear Sites of Russian Minatom. This departmental regulatory document defines the order of arrangements made for physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear installations and nuclear material storage facilities within the Minatom framework, and sets forth the basic functional requirements for physical protection systems and their structural elements.

The General Requirements were developed in line with the Federal Law on the Use of Atomic Energy and other federal laws clarifying the issues of site safety and security; with the Rules for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Material Storage Facilities, approved by Governmental Decree No. 264 of 07.03.97; with the Regulation on the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy, approved by Governmental Decree No. 392 of 05.04.97. Besides, this document was developed with due regard to the international obligations arising from the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and other regulatory acts dealing with physical protection.

The General Requirements for physical protection of nuclear sites establish:

∙ the order of organizing and supporting physical protection activities at the departmental level;

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∙the directions of work to develop the regulatory framework for physical protection at the departmental level;

∙the list of the main regulatory documents on physical protection at the site level;

∙the goals, objectives and principles of PPS arrangement;

∙the criteria for and the order of categorization of nuclear sites and objects of physical protection;

∙the procedure for analyzing the vulnerability of nuclear sites;

∙the PPS structure;

∙the functional requirements for structural elements of PPS equipment and utilities;

∙the general requirements for the equipment of areas guarded by a PPS;

∙the requirements for building and upgrading a physical protection system;

∙the requirements for planning and management of physical protection activities;

∙the requirements for operation and maintenance of PPS equipment and utilities;

∙the requirements for physical protection of NM during transportation;

∙the requirements for organization and conduct of exercises to try out and practice interactions within the PPS framework;

∙the requirements for the PPS personnel, their training and retraining.

The General Requirements for physical protection of nuclear sites specify the provisions of the Rules for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations and Nuclear Material Storage Facilities, as applied to management of physical protection activities within the Minatom framework, the physical protection systems of nuclear sites and their structural elements.

The site-specific requirements for PPSs and their structural elements are based on the General Rules for physical protection of nuclear sites, taking into consideration the results of site vulnerability analyses, the category and operating features of specific sites, and the PPS efficiency assessments. These requirements serve as a basis for PPS development, operation and upgrading.

The requirements for quantitative characteristics of PPS equipment and utilities are set in regulatory standardization documents of the federal or departmental level.

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The General Requirements are meant for use by the management and personnel of nuclear sites, as well as by other departmental organizations involved in the following activities:

∙organization of work on physical protection;

∙development and upgrading of a PPS;

∙support of PPS operation;

∙control of PPS compliance with the official requirements.

The requirements of this document apply to physical protection of nuclear sites belonging to Minatom of Russia, as well as to physical protection of nuclear materials and articles containing them during transportation. The requirements and provisions of this document are used as a basis for developing new or updating the current regulatory documentation on physical protection of the departmental and site levels.

Regulation No. 3 of the Federal Agency for Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor), dated 16.01.2002 deals with approval and enactment of the federal regulations and rules in the field of nuclear energy uses, referred to as the Rules for Physical Protection of Radiation Sources, Storage Facilities, and Radioactive Material.

This regulatory document was prepared on the basis of Federal Laws on the Use of Atomic Energy and on the Radiation Safety of Population; on the General Rules for Radiation Safety; Rules for Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Nuclear Installations, and Nuclear Material Storage Facilities, as well as on the IAEA Recommendations for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC\225\Rev/4).

The Regulation explains: the requirements for physical protection of radiation sources, storage facilities, and radioactive material; the procedure for determining the composition of and requirements for the system of physical protection of radiation sources, storage facilities, and radioactive material; the procedure for reporting unauthorized actions involving radiation sources (RS), storage facilities (SF), and radioactive material (RM).

The Regulation addresses: the organizational aspects of physical protection; the documents dealing with organization and provision of physical protection for RS, SF, and RM; the requirements for utilities and equipment of a PPS; the requirements for actions of the guard forces; the RS, SF and RM classification according to their potential hazards.

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