no new information of relevance for the choice was provided and yet it did a ect the choice.

5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks

In the experiment we performed, incompatible information i.e., a change of focus, was shown to a ect revealed preferences for uncertain alternatives which we interpret as distraction a ecting beliefs (rather than preferences). Because the two projects are classical objects our results are not consistent with rationality. When Receiver processes information about a classical object as if it was a quantum system, she is mistaken. But as amply evidenced by Kahneman’s best selling book “Thinking Fast and Slow” [11], information processing is not always disciplined by rational thinking when the brain processes information quickly. Moreover a learning process adapted to the quantum-like world may be appropriate when you are interested in actions/decisions produced by other people as they would also have a quantum-like representation of the world. So, while fast quantum-like information processing is inappropriate when dealing with simple decision involving classical objects, it may be suitable in many situations involving human beings. We believe we should not dismiss quantum-like information processing as overly irrational.

Finally, we do not believe that the quantum approach is an alternative to all other behavioral theories. Instead we believe that it provides rigorous foundations to a number of them as argued for instance in [15].

Acknowledgements. We would like to thank Jerome Busemeyer for a very valuable suggestion on the design of the experiment.

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Are Decisions of Image Trustworthiness

Contextual? A Pilot Study

Peter D. Bruza(B) and Lauren Fell

School of Information Systems,

Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia

p.bruza@qut.edu.au

Abstract. This article documents an empirical pilot study conducted to determine whether decisions of image trustworthiness are contextual. Contextuality is an active area of investigation in quantum cognition, however there has been little compelling evidence of its presence in human information processing. A Bell scenario experimental design was employed which manipulated both content and representational features in order to minimize the di erence in marginal probabilities across experimental conditions. In addition, participants were subjected to time pressure in order to promote more spontaneous decisions. Results revealed no significant di erences in marginal probabilities, however, no evidence of contextuality was found. The study revealed a tension between the requirement for minimizing the di erence in marginal probabilities and the need to produce the strong correlations required to empirically ascertain contextuality.

1 Introduction

Understanding of trust is pivotal in today’s environment characterized by claims of fake news and deliberate digital misdirection [15]. It is from concerns regarding the edge of what is acceptable or not acceptable that reputed organizations with image archives such Getty Images (www.gettimages.com) and Reuters (http:// www.reuters.com/) have a zero tolerance policy on photo manipulations. A photographer who modified a golfing image to remove a background bystander was terminated by Getty Images in accordance with this policy [12]. Similarly, a Pulitzer prize-winning photographer was fired after he had admitted to altering an image of the conflict in Syria by photoshopping a camera out of the image. In both cases the stance taken is that an image must be a totally true and accurate depiction of reality. Naturally, much hinges on how accuracy is interpreted and where a human subject sets the threshold for an image being “accurate enough” to be judged trustworthy. For example, a human subject might still judge the Pulitzer prize winner’s photograph as trustworthy, knowing the camera had been photoshopped out, simply because the object erased did not influence the photograph’s resemblance to an actual war scene in Syria. This example attempts to demonstrate that judgments of image trustworthiness are cognitively situated. It turns out that visual fluency is an important factor.

c Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

B. Coecke and A. Lambert-Mogiliansky (Eds.): QI 2018, LNCS 11690, pp. 39–50, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35895-2_3

40 P. D. Bruza and L. Fell

Visual fluency is based on the principle that any visual stimulus requires cognitive resources to process; the more work required, the less fluent the process. Cognitive work is determined by perceptual processing of image clarity, contrast, etc. [17], and is also determined by the evaluation of aspects of content, resemblance to what is expected, representation (e.g., geometric and artistic depictions), etc [16]. Images that cohere with background beliefs on any of these factors are more visually fluent than properties that surprise or confuse us. The amount of cognitive work can be measured by the speed and accuracy of visual processing as well as the reported ease or di culty of visual judgments [8]. As a consequence, manipulated images are less detectable the more they conform to largely unconscious rules of visual fluency. Ease of visual processing results in an illusion of accuracy, perhaps because perceptual fluency elicits a feeling of familiarity, and hence trust. For example, [13] found that people are more likely to say that they ’liked’ a person shown in an image, if that image was high in visual fluency. Conversely, raucous interruptions to visual fluency are sometimes deployed in image manipulations in order to generate humor, or shock. Recent experimental findings show evidence that both the subject of the image as well as its representational features (features of the image itself as a representation of the subject) were involved when subjects judge the trustworthiness of images such as that of a smiling Vladimir Putin [7]. Although participants in this study were specifically instructed to judge the trustworthiness of an image itself, a dichotomy appeared between participants who were making a deliberative decision based on the content of the image (e.g. Vladimir Putin), and participants making a decision based on representational features of the image, which could be explained in terms of visual fluency. Due to the uncertainty experienced in evaluations of trustworthiness, as well as the potentially high processing di - culty associated with images that were low in visual fluency, the employment of ‘Hot’ processing was likely in play in this experiment. This system is described as one half of Dual Process Theory, which posits that humans employ two distinct systems for information processing [9]. System 1, or ‘Hot’ system, is intuitive, fast, and prone to cognitive biases. System 2, or ‘Cold’ system, is deliberative, slow, and requires significant cognitive resources. The Hot system is often relied upon in circumstances where cognitive resources are sparse [1], uncertainty is present [10], and where a time pressure exists [11].

A conventional way to model the preceding situation is to develop a fusion model whereby an assessment of trust in the content of an image is fused with an assessment of trust in the image as a representation of the content into a single overall assessment of trust. However, is such a reduction into disparate content and representational subsystems valid? This article aims to address this question by determining whether decision making is contextual.