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Файл:Цифровизация общества и будущее христианства к вопросу о трансформации ценностно-нормативной системы общества. Материалы VII Между народной научной ко
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Чурсанов С. А. Антропологические начала христианской культуры...
ствования своей индивидуальной сложной природе, соучаствуя при
этом в определении состояния всего сотворенного мира, включая
все те информационно-коммуникативные сообщества, в деятельность которых он вовлекается.
Ключевые слова: цифровизация, информационно-коммуникатив-
ные технологии, общение, единство в различии, личность, логос.
Keywords: digitalization, information and communication technolo-
gies, communion, unity in diff erence, person, logos.
Библиография
1. Доброхотов А. Л. Философия и христианство // Сборник до-
кладов конференции «Христианство и философия» (27 января
2000 г.). М.: Отдел религиозного образования и катехизации Рус-
ской Православной Церкви, 2000. С. 5–21.
2. Григорий Богослов, свт. Собрание творений. В 2 т. М.: Свято-
Троицкая Сергиева лавра, 1994. Т. 1. 684 с.; Т. 2. 601 с.
3. Иванов М. С. Церковное и социальное измерение личности //
Богословский вестник. 2020. № 4 (39). С. 48–65. DOI: 10.31802/
GB.2020.39.4.003
4. Иоанн (Зизиулас), митр. Бытие как общение: Очерки о личности
и Церкви / пер. с англ. Д. М. Гзгзян. М.: Свято-Филаретовский
православно-христианский институт, 2006. 280 с.
5. Иоанн (Зизиулас), митр. Общение и инаковость: Новые очерки
о личности и Церкви / пер. с англ. М. Толстолуженко и Л. Кол-
кер, М.: Библейско-богословский институт св. апостола Андрея,
2012. XII, 412 с.
6. Лосский В. Н. Кафолическое сознание: Антропологическое при-
ложение догмата Церкви / пер. с фр. В. А. Рещикова // Богосло-
вие и боговидение: сборник статей / под общ. ред. В. Пислякова,
М.: Свято-Владимирское братство, 2000. С. 568–580.
7. Лосский В. Н. Очерк мистического богословия Восточной Церк-
ви / пер. с фр. В. А. Рещикова // Очерк мистического богосло-
вия Восточной Церкви. Догматическое богословие. М.: Центр
«СЭИ», 1991. С. 8–199.
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Цифровизация в антропологической перспективе
8. Софроний (Сахаров), архим. О молитве: сб. статей. Толешант
Найтс: Свято-Иоанно-Предтеченский монастырь; Сергиев По-
сад: Свято-Троицкая Сергиева лавра, 2003. 224 с.
9. Софроний (Сахаров), архим. Подвиг богопознания. Письма
с Афона (к Д. Бальфуру). Толешант Найтс: Свято-Иоанно-Пред-
теченский монастырь; М.: Паломникъ, 2001. 368 с.
10. Софроний (Сахаров), архим. Рождение в Царство непоколе-
бимое. Толешант Найтс: Свято-Иоанно-Предтеченский мона-
стырь, 1999. 224 с.
11. Софроний (Сахаров), архим. Таинство христианской жизни. То-
лешант Найтс: Свято-Иоанно-Предтеченский монастырь; Сер-
гиев Посад: Свято-Троицкая Сергиева лавра, 2009. 272 с.
12. Флоровский Георгий, прот. В мире исканий и блужданий // Фло-
ровский Георгий, прот. Вера и культура: сб. статей. СПб.: Русский
Христианский гуманитарный институт, 2002. С. 122–164.
13. Флоровский Георгий, прот. Спор о немецком идеализме // Путь.
1930. № 25. С. 51–80.
14. Яннарас Х. Церковь в посткоммунистической Европе / Пер.
с англ. свящ. Г. Завершинский и Ю. А. Вестель, // Церковь и вре-
мя. 2004. № 3 (28). С. 81–106.
15. Burrow R. Jr. Personalism: A Critical Introduction. St. Louis, Mo.:
Chalice Press, 1999. XVI, 301 p.
16. Gregor von Nazianz. Die fünf theologischen Reden / J. Barbel, Hrsg.
Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1963. 301 s.
17. John (Zizioulas), metr. The One and the Many: Studies on God, Man,
the Church, and the World Today / Fr. Gregory Edwards, ed. Alham-
bra. Calif.: Sebastian Press, 2010. 443 p.
18. Staniloae Dumitru, archpr. The Experience of God. Vol. 1: Revelation
and Knowledge of the Triune God / I. Ionita and R. Barringer, trans.
and ed. Brookline. Mass.: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1994. XXVIII,
280 p.
Moral and ethical foundations of society
in the light of digitalization
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Andrew Tsz Wan Hung
Dr. of Phil., Professor, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, PRC
Эндрю Цзы Ван Хунь,
д-р филос. наук, проф.
Гонконский политехнический Университет, Китай
Ellul, Taylor and Digitalization
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Digitalization is the digital transformation of society. It represents the prevalence
and the advancement of computing technology which has penetrated our daily
lives. However, Jacque Ellul argues that human reliance on technology has made
our society a technological society in which autonomous technology is taking
over traditional society, suppressing individual freedom, in order to produce a
monolithic culture of effi ciency. Charles Taylor also argues that one of the malaises
of modern society is the primacy of instrument reason because of technological
advancement. This has suppressed our serious moral deliberation and imposed
a great loss of freedom. For Ellul, the remedy to resist the pressure of technique
is to fi nd out our freedom in Christ. And for Taylor, we must retrieve the moral
sources underlying modernity and emphasize the signifi cance of enfl eshment in
the network of agape in the age of digitalization.
Цифровизация — это цифровая трансформация общества. Она выражается в распространении и развитии компьютерных технологий, которые
проникли в нашу повседневную жизнь. Однако Жак Эллюль утверждает,
что зависимость человека от технологий превратила наше общество
в технологическое, в котором автономные технологии берут верх над традиционным обществом, подавляя индивидуальную свободу, чтобы создать
143
Морально-нравственные основы общества в свете цифровизации
монолитную культуру эффективности. Чарльз Тэйлор также утверждает, что одним из недостатков современного общества является примат
инструментального разума, возникший из-за технического прогресса. Это
подавило наши серьезные морально-нравственные размышления и привело
к большой потере в плане свободы. Для Эллюля средством противостояния давлению техники является обретение свободы во Христе. А согласно
Тэйлору мы должны восстановить источники морали, лежащие в основе
современности, и подчеркнуть важность включения в сеть Любви в эпоху
цифровизации.
Digitalization and Technological Culture
igitalization has three meanings. First, it means the conversion of
analogue material into a digital format. Second, it also means the
D
widespread use of digital technology (computer and mobile devices). And
third, more important, it refers to broader changes. In addition to implementing digital technology, it also requires far-reaching and cross-domain
organizational changes. It means that a series of diff erent projects make
changes at the same time, thereby aff ecting the entire society [11, pp. 2–3].
Thus, digitalization can be defi ned as “the digital transformation of society and the economy. It describes the transition from an industrial age
characterized by analogue technologies to an age of knowledge and creativity characterized by digital technologies” [8]. According to this defi nition,
digitalization can be understood as further advancement of technology
and its widespread application in modern society. And in the following,
I will explore and compare the philosophical-theological refl ections of the
culture of technique by Jacques Ellul and Charles Taylor. I will show that
both of them are aware of the tendency of the dominance of technological
consciousness; both stresses that we should resist such pressure and refl ect
how Christian faith can help us to respond to the prevalence of technological consciousness. While Ellul stresses our freedom in Christ to resist the
pressure of technique, Taylor emphasizes the signifi cance of moral articulacy to recover the original moral motivation underlying modern culture. I
will show that both Ellul’s and Taylor’s theories can be mutually complementary.
144
Andrew Tsz Wan HUNG. Эллюль, Тэйлор и цифровизация
Ellul’s Criticism of the Culture of Technique
Jacques Ellul was one of pioneer scholars in refl ecting and reframing
the culture of technology in moral problematic terms. Ellul used the French
“technique” (German “Technik”, English “technics”) in a broad sense. It
does not refer to certain particular technologies or machines. Rather it refers to “the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute
effi ciency… in every fi eld of human activity” [3, p. XXV]. On the surface,
Ellul seems to refer to the technique as the entire predetermined complex of
standardization of methods [1, p. 44]. However, I agree with David Lovekin that technique for Ellul is more than methods or procedures, it is talking about “a mentality, a form of intentionality, embodied in the modern
world” [12, p. 82] or “a unique mode of consciousness” [13, p. 254]. Or as
what Taylor says, it is a kind of modern social imaginary. It has formed a
part of modern cultural history.
For Elul, technology is not only applicable to the economy or politics,
but also to leisure activities, bodily conditions, psychology, management
and organization, technology and information, etc. Ellul argues that one
of the distinctive features of modern civilization is that nothing can escape
technique today in which means have become ends [3, pp. 19–22].
Ellul distinguishes between “technical operations” and “technical phe-
nomenon”. Technical operations refer to activities performed in accordance
with a specifi c method for a defi ned purpose. It may require concentration
for learning but it soon becomes a natural routine. And throughout technical operations in modern techniques, the technical phenomenon manifests.
Consciousness and judgment arise when the worker focuses on searching
for a better method of achieving the task and thus, he is led to an improvement of the tool based on numerical calculation [3, pp. 20–21]. This requires us to objectify reason and to neglect all individual diff erences by objectifying individual subjectivity. With such distinction, Ellul argues that
there are seven features of the modern phenomenon of technology.
1. The fi rst is rationality (rationalité). It refers to the fact that every in-
vention of technique entails certain conscious analysis that excludes spontaneity and creativity; it is in eff ect “a reduction of facts, forces, phenomena, means, and instruments to the schema of logic” [3, p. 79]. It means
that the method for all activities must be quantifi able or reducible to an
abstract logic mode.
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Морально-нравственные основы общества в свете цифровизации
2. The second is artificiality (artificialité). As technique is opposed to
nature; it is inevitably artifi cial. Because of the technical intervention, the
world becomes more and more the product of human construction; and
human beings are more and more responsible for the maintenance of the
living environment. For Ellul, technique “destroys, eliminates, or subordinates the natural world, and does not allow this world to restore itself or
even to enter into a symbiotic relation with it” [3, p. 79).
3. The third is Automatism of technical choice (automatisme du choix
technique). With a technical mind, all choices are decided automatically
based on maximum effi ciency [3, p. 83]. Indeed, maximum effi ciency is
the aim of the technique. Human beings no longer make decisions based
on one’s religious view, philosophical refl ection or aesthetic insight. All
values are conceived based on usefulness; there are no longer any intrinsic
values. As Toly, Schuchardt and Greenman [19, p. 25] state, “the erosion
of reasoned human judgment and choice is central to Ellul’s concern and
that the result is a loss of a basic human freedom by the imposition of a new
social convention.”
Ellul states, “The individual is in a dilemma: either he decides to safeguard his freedom of choice, chooses to use traditional, personal, moral,
or empirical means, thereby entering into competition with a power against
which there is no effi cacious defense and before which he must suff er defeat; or he decides to accept technical necessity, in which case he will himself be the victor, but only by submitting irreparably to technical slavery.
In eff ect he has no freedom of choice” [3, p. 84]. This shows Ellul’s thesis about the human dilemma between freedom and technical necessity to
make a decision about matters in our daily life.
4. The fourth is Self-augmentation (auto-accroissement). As culture be-
comes more and more integrated into the technical process, the worker’s
mind becomes the same as the function of machines. The worker becomes
an abstract element in the overall means of production and a completely replaceable part. And technical development has become a necessary
direction in all fi elds, thus increasing the complexity and proliferation of
technical development. The growth of technical phenomena becomes selfsustaining [3, pp. 86–93].
5. The fi fth is Monism or Indivisibility (unicité or insecabilité). The ele-
ments of technological systems become “ontologically tied together; in it,
use is inseparable from being” [3, p. 95). Theory and practice are indivisible. Only those that are usable are conceivable. As Lovekin [12, p. 168] ar-
146
Andrew Tsz Wan HUNG. Эллюль, Тэйлор и цифровизация
gues “Government grants, in the main, are only awarded to scientists who
are working on theories with immediately practical results. Theory is no
longer restricted morality… Instead, use has become a moral command.”
And all these developments of technology have both good and bad eff ects
(e.g nuclear technology); we have accepted both good and bad eff ects; they
are indivisible [3, p. 99].
6. The sixth is Technological universalism (universalisme technique). It
refers to the tendency for the technique to expand geographically, to become universally adopted, to absorb all civilizations through trade, transport, communications, the export of technical labor, and even war. The
technique becomes dominant over all fields and activities and leads towards
homogeneity of civilizations. It is particularly manifested in globalization.
As Helena Mateus Jerónimo, José Luís Garcia and Carl Mitcham [9, p. 5]
states, “modern technology has become synonymous with the world as
a whole, because the influence of technological forces reaches the whole
planet, so that the former historical situation in which civilizations followed diff erent paths, changes to one in which all are on the same pathway,
moving in the same direction, albeit at diff erent points or stages.”
7. The seventh is Autonomy (autonomie) Technique is autonomous
with respect to economics, politics, morality, and religion. These other
social institutions find it more and more difficult to exercise their own independent principles [3, pp. 133–134]. And it is Ellul’s idea of autonomy
that leads to the criticism of “technological determinism” (Wilkinson)
[3, p. XVIII].
For Ellul, such primacy of technique has social as well as spiritual consequences. The autonomy of technique creates its own world with its own
law by denying all values and traditions [3, p. 14]. It “renders technique at
once sacrilegious and sacred” [3, p. 141]. The imposition of technical consciousness “destroys the moral framework, desacralizes men and things,
explodes social and religious taboos, and reduces the body social to a collection of individuals... technique is the destroyer of social groups, of communities (whatever their kind), and of human relations” (3, p. 126]. While
technique denies sacred, mystery and spirituality, human beings transfer
their sense of the sacred to the very thing which has destroyed its former
object: to technique itself” [3, p. 143].
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Морально-нравственные основы общества в свете цифровизации
Taylor’s Criticism of Primacy of Instrumental Reason
Basically, Charles Taylor can agree with Ellul’s criticism that the intellectual of the modern era is dominated by the sovereignty of technology. According to Taylor, one of the malaises of modernity is the primacy
of instrumental reason. Instrumental reason is the kind of rationality that
concentrates on calculating the most economical application of means or
the most effi cient way to a given end [16, p. 5].
Furthermore, there is a strong moral view in modern culture, that is the
ideal of self-determining freedom, which emphasizes that we are free if we
can control the situation that aff ects us, if we can remake the conditions of
our own existence. As Taylor states, these ideas help “to lend even greater
importance to technological control over our world; it helps to enframe
instrumental reason in a project of domination, rather than serving to limit
it in the name of other ends. In fact, it has contributed to neutralize some
of the limits that still existed to runaway technological devastation of the
environment” [16, p. 101].
As modern society no longer considered as corresponding to sacred
structure, the social arrangement and modes of actions no longer grounded
in the sacred order or the will of God, they can be redesigned with the
consequences for the happiness of individuals as our goal. The criteria applied then is that of instrumental reason. The widespread unease is that the
meaning and value of our lives would be eclipsed as a result of all things
determined in terms of effi ciency or “cost-benefi t” analysis rather than the
independent ends that guide our lives. One facet of the primacy of instrumental reason is the prestige of technology which makes us believe that we
should always seek technological solutions even when something very different in nature. We can see this in the realm of political and social issues;
the government usually tries to fi nd certain technological solutions to control the mass society. In the realm of medicine, the technological approach
in medicine has often sidelined the kind of care that involves treating the
patient as a whole person with a life story, and not as the locus of a technical problem. The dominant place of technology is also thought to have led
to the narrowing and fl attening of our lives, something solid and lasting
objects that served us in the past are being set aside for the fast, shoddy,
replaceable commodities [16, pp. 6–7].
According to Taylor, the primacy of instrumental rationality and technology is not just a kind of unconscious orientation, we are not just tempted
148
Andrew Tsz Wan HUNG. Эллюль, Тэйлор и цифровизация
into such living style, but the powerful mechanism of social life indeed
presses us in such direction. We fi nd ourselves pushed to give it a large place
in our lives. For example, in a large and complex technological society or
large-scale units, such as big fi rms and public institutions, the common affairs must be managed according to principles of bureaucratic rationality.
“A bureaucrat, in spite of his personal insight, may be forced by the rules
under which he operates to make a decision he knows to be against humanity and good sense” [16, p. 7].
Taylor points out that many human-potential movements in contemporary society are aimed at the goal of self-fulfi llment by occupying instrumental reason. We are off ered techniques, based on supposed scientifi c fi ndings, to achieve psychic integration or peace of mind. All these are
fi nding the quick fi x technique to achieve the goal of self-fulfi llment. They
appeal to ideals of authenticity which breed a mode of anthropocentrism
that justify ignoring whatever transcends the self, such as religion, our history, demands of citizenship or duties of solidarity. They see all these values
as purely instrumental to individual self-fulfi llment. It leads to the idea of
atomism that indeed is a self-stultifying travesty [16, pp. 21–22].
Loss of Freedom & Ethics of Inarticulacy
Nevertheless, Taylor argues that the primacy of instrumental reason
indeed causes a great loss of freedom, whether it is the social decision or
individual lifestyle, they are also shaped by these forces. The diffi culties in
tackling the problem of global warming and the thinning ozone layer are
obvious examples in contemporary society [16, pp. 8–9].
Therefore, Weber calls these impersonal mechanisms “the iron cage”,
no matter in the public or private spheres, we must operate under the instrumental rationality, and it seems that we are utterly helpless in face of
such force of giant mechanism unless we totally dismantle the institutional
structures [16, pp. 6–8, 97]. This has severely restricted our choice. It forces societies, as well as individuals, to stick to instrumental rationality that
we should never do in serious moral deliberation. And this also leads to the
problem of the ethics of inarticulacy.
Some pessimistic people fi nd that the coming of technological civilization as a kind of decline. It makes us lose contact with the earth, and
its rhythms that our ancestors had, even losing contact with ourselves and
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Морально-нравственные основы общества в свете цифровизации
our own natural being. However, Taylor disagrees with the view that the
technological society is a kind of iron fate. First, Taylor reminds us that the
connection between technological civilization and norms of instrumental rationality is not unidirectional. It is not just that the social institution
breeds the philosophy, the institution with no support from intellectual or
ideological preparation would hardly be sustained too. Atomist and instrumentalist outlooks had begun to spread among at least the educated classes
of Western Europe and America before the Industrial Revolution. Thus,
Taylor rejects Marxists idea of historical materialistic determinism. The
advancement of technology cannot therefore determine human lifestyle.
Second, it is true that the atomist-instrumental outlook has preempted in
our world, it is still facing many resistances, no matter from Romanticism
or environmentalism, and that these resistances are constantly being generated. All these movements stand as a partial refutation of any iron law
of technological society. These resistances usually stand against the vast
majority, demanding a sacrifi ce in development, in the name of Nature
and minority interest. Therefore, it is not totally hopeless, it seems that the
predicament can alter once we can come to be a common consciousness
[16, pp. 100–101].
Ellul’s Theological Response
Many scholars criticize Ellul’s theory as off ering an all-encompassing
theory of the world which elevates technique to an exalted role standing
above all human activities; and we are therefore deeply constrained by social technological structure [1, p. 46; 14, p. 42]. However, Ellul’s theological writings exactly show that he rejects the kind of fatalistic view of culture
of technology. For Ellul, the modern intellectual characteristics are linked
to the sovereignty of technique, because human reason become identifying
itself with technological thinking [10, p. 3]. However, it does not mean Ellul rejects the idea of human freedom and supports the idea of technique
fatalism [3, p. xxix]. This is because, Ellul argues, the course of history may
be changed by (1) a destructive war, (2) a large number of people become
aware of the threat of the technique posed on human freedom and spiritual
life and determine to assert their freedom by defeating the course of this
development, or (3) God’s intervention in history which saves human freedom [3, p. xxx]. As he states,
150
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