Добавил:
ivanov666
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз:
Предмет:
Файл:Цифровизация общества и будущее христианства к вопросу о трансформации ценностно-нормативной системы общества. Материалы VII Между народной научной ко
.pdf
0,-!%",ƒ=ц,
" =…2!%C%л%г,че“*%L Cе!“Cе*2,"е
Digitalization
in an anthropological perspective
Armin Grunwald,
Dr. of Phil., Prof. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany
Армин Грунвальд,
д-р филос., профессор, Институт технологии Карлсруэ, ФРГ
Digitalization as a challenge to human
self-understanding
0,-!%",ƒ=ц, *=* "/ƒ%" чел%"ече“*%м3
“=м%C%…,м=…,ю
The increasing infl uence of digitalization on virtually all areas of human life and
the natural environment motivates the big question: Who are you, human being?
Who are you in view of robotics and artifi cial intelligence, of genetic editing and
fantasies of technological immortality? Who do you want to be in an increasingly
highly technological world? How do you want to maintain and exercise your
freedom, responsibility, and creativity? What will become of you given the
continuing acceleration of technological progress? In this talk, these questions
will be examined with reference to posthumanist hopes for redemption through
digitalization.
Растущее влияние цифровизации практически на все сферы человеческой
жизни и природную среду вызывает большой вопрос: кто ты, человек? Кто
ты с точки зрения робототехники и искусственного интеллекта, генетического редактирования и фантазий о технологическом бессмертии? Кем
ты хочешь быть во все более высокотехнологичном мире? Как ты хочешь
сохранить и реализовать свою свободу, ответственность и творческий
потенциал? Что станет с тобой, учитывая продолжающееся ускорение
технического прогресса? В этой статье данные вопросы будут рассмотрены со ссылкой на постгуманистические надежды на искупление через
цифровизацию.
91
Цифровизация в антропологической перспективе
Technology: a means to an end or an
eschatological category?
n recent decades, a radically diff erent perspective has emerged alongside
the familiar view of technology as a means to an end. This is not about
I
technology as a means of coping with life and “securing” [11] ends set by
humans, but about humans possibly being replaced by technology, feared
by some and hoped for by others. In particular, American futurists such
as Ray Kurzweil, the movement of transhumanism, and some digital visionaries from Silicon Valley are reversing the perspective: Technology is
being reinterpreted from serving as a means to becoming the actual end,
to being the telos of history, at least as the next stage of evolution after humans, whatever that may be. A technically perfect civilization is, according
to posthumanists, supposed to replace the imperfect human one. Technology is elevated to the rank of an eschatological category if it is expected
to provide “liberation” or even “redemption” from the defi cits of human
existence, including mortality.
The motif of salvation as a result of technology has recurred since the
late nineteenth century, occasionally being associated with designating engineers as the priests of the technical age. In many mass media and on the
internet today, digital visionaries are regarded as prophets of the future.
New digital devices are repeatedly presented in a temple-like setting, as if
in a religious liturgy, with their protagonists appearing with the bearing of a
messiah bringing the redeeming technology to the waiting faithful.
Redemption is usually understood as liberation from the tribulations
and limitations of human life. In part, this is in line with the tradition of the
European Enlightenment, in which scientifi c and technological progress
was an important element in the emancipation of humans from nature and
culture. However, this tradition is abandoned when quasi-religious or eschatological expectations of redemption are included. These expectations
are what this paper is about.
The eschatological view of technology, i.e., the expectation of redemption as a result of technological progress, sounds attractive to many for one
particular reason: in this way people themselves could produce redemption. In their need for redemption, they would not be dependent on the
grace of a God. Such dependence does not fi t in with Homo Faber, who is
accustomed to being successful and taking things into his own hands. With
92
Армин Грунвальд. Цифровизация как вызов человеческому самопониманию
digital technology, according to some visionaries of digitalization, people
could create a paradise of perfect technology themselves.
In the digitalization debate, visionaries see the future of humans in
their disappearance in favor of the technology they themselves have created. In a “Great Singularity” [1], technology will take over the continuation
of civilization on the basis of digitalization. Through ever better algorithms,
artifi cial intelligence, and robots, humans would become superfl uous and
thus their “technical improvement” ultimately obsolete.
In view of these developments, ethics is no longer enough to shape digitalization in a humane way, however necessary it may be. For behind the
many concrete ethical questions about technological and medical progress
lies one big question: Who are you, human being? Who are you in view of
robotics and artifi cial intelligence, of genetic editing and fantasies of technological immortality? Who do you want to be in an increasingly hightech world? How do you want to exercise your freedom, responsibility, and
creativity? What will become of you given the continuing acceleration of
technical progress? Anthropological challenges to the changing self-image
of man in view of technological progress are waiting for analysis and refl ection.
These questions address philosophy, but also religions since, in
addition to many individual questions related to the humane shaping of
the world, the religions are also concerned with the whole human being
in his relationship to God, to the world, and to himself. In their scriptures
and traditions, they have answered the question of man in diff erent ways
and created overarching contexts of meaning. The latter are being visibly
and massively challenged by technological progress and by its visions of the
future. To organize a world of more and more technology and technical
thinking in a human-friendly way requires us to actively deal with these
challenges.
Negative human images of digitalization
The rapid successes of digitalization have motivated various protagonists of a transition from a human to a technical civilization to expound
ideas that are no longer about technical improvement and a gradual transition to a technically perfect civilization, but about the direct replacement
of humans by digital technology. They are based on the now widespread
observation that digital technology is in many ways better than humans.
93
Цифровизация в антропологической перспективе
Algorithms can do many things better and faster than humans; as early as
1995, a chess program defeated the reigning human chess world champion
Boris Kasparov for the fi rst time, and progress continues. Huge amounts
of data can be linked together in seconds to identify patterns that humans
would not be able to fi nd even after a long search. With artifi cial intelligence, digital technology has even become capable of learning, albeit so
far only in rudimentary form. It is thus taking over what was previously the
preserve of humans and perhaps the primary prerequisite for their rise to
become the dominant force on planet Earth.
Accordingly, many people worry that humans may ultimately lose out
to robots, algorithms, and artifi cial intelligence, e.g., in the labor market,
but also in shaping the world. Questions such as “Will robots take our
jobs?” are headlines in newspaper reports following the publication of
new studies on the future of work, and titles such as “When will machines
take over?” adorn books [19]. Often, the question of “if” is no longer even
asked, but only “when,” and sometimes not even this, but “how”, when we
read “How artifi cial intelligence is taking over politics and disenfranchising us” [13]. There is widespread concern that algorithms could ultimately
even develop self-confi dence and a will to power and, due to their superiority, take control out of people’s hands. In the context of the so-called
Great Singularity [18], artifi cial intelligence would take over and a global
superintelligence [1] would emerge, with humans serving as mere extras or
executive organs. Despite the highly speculative nature of these narratives,
they have become an established part of mass media communication and
shape many people’s expectations of the future by raising fears of humans
becoming superfl uous in the face of the superiority of their own creations.
Individual stories that repeatedly appear in the media illustrate this way
of thinking [7, p. 64]. For example, (1) human teachers could be replaced
by digital ones. The digital teacher, due to its high computing capacity,
would manage to talk to thirty students at the same time without saying
the same thing to all of them, as a human teacher would, but by talking
with each one individually. It would have access to the knowledge available
worldwide and would thus be omniscient, so to speak. His patience with
each individual student would be limitless, his grading incorruptible and
objective. Analogously, digital judges are said to have split-second access
to all the mountains of fi les in legal history, all the trials and all the data of
the people involved [7, p. 180]. They would not be capricious and would
express neither sympathy nor antipathy toward the parties to a confl ict, but
94
Армин Грунвальд. Цифровизация как вызов человеческому самопониманию
would serve the law impartially and incorruptibly, objectively and rationally. An AI-supported policy automaton authorized by the Bundestag [7,
p. 172] could have access to all of society’s data. It could analyze upcoming
problems by evaluating this data on the basis of ethical guidelines and of
decision-making criteria oriented to the common good as specifi ed by the
Bundestag, calculate the best of all possible solutions in a few seconds, and
implement them incorruptibly and objectively in laws and ordinances.
Admittedly, these narratives about digital teachers, judges, or politicians miss the essence of teaching, law, and politics by far [7]. Nevertheless, they reveal the basic pattern of digital replacement narratives: (1) People, e.g., teachers, judges, and politicians, are fundamentally attributed bad
qualities, while the world of algorithms appears positive. (2) From the fact
that algorithms are already better than humans in many respects and are
getting better all the time, the extrapolation concludes that they will soon
be better at everything and will then even become perfect.
In view of the insurmountable defi cits of humans that they have diagnosed, digital visionaries and transhumanists see the mission of mankind
precisely in making themselves superfl uous through technological progress. Instead of human imperfection, artifi cial intelligence is to access all
the data of this world and thus create an “optimized” world. In this technoeschatological perspective, the envisaged end of mankind is reason for rejoicing: for with this transition, according to the aforementioned futurists,
mankind would have fulfi lled its evolutionary mission and taken account of
the meaning of history. Thus they claim to be able to assume the epistemic
perspective of an omniscient God and to have objectively recognized the
meaning of history.
As the above examples of teachers, judges, and politicians have already
made clear, the human representatives of these professions are mostly assigned negative attributes such as being unfocused and capricious, subjective and egotistical, and aggressive and inconsistent. Algorithms and robots,
on the other hand, are talked about in the light of technical perfection.
They are said to be objective, omniscient and just, incorruptibly committed
to their mission, tireless, and always ready to serve, without self-interest or
sensitivities. This does not merely portray them as better, even ideal, people. Attributes such as omniscient and just also represent classic attributes
of God, which makes the exaltation of the capabilities of digital technologies particularly clear. The juxtaposition of humans and algorithms often
includes the following points [7]:
95
Цифровизация в антропологической перспективе
(1) People are selfi sh. They often subordinate everything else to their
pride and ambition. Instead of making relevant decisions, they satisfy their
ego to the point of abuse of power and corruption. Algorithms, on the other
hand, supposedly have no need for this, but emotionlessly do what they
have been programmed to do. Thus they provide security, prosperity and
health.
(2) People are trapped in the past. Neighborhoods are characterized
by centuries of enmity, for example between Serbs and Kosovars or Sunnis
and Shiites. Algorithms, on the other hand, belong to neither tribe, religion
nor clan and are supposedly unencumbered by the past.
Vice versa, technical systems, especially robots, are described as better
or ideal humans. An example of the projection onto robots of ideals desired
in humans is that of “artifi cial companions,” which are to be used, for instance, to entertain lonely people:
Technical systems of the future are companion systems — cognitive
technical systems, with their functionality completely individually adapted
to each user: They are geared to his abilities, preferences, requirements and
current needs, and they refl ect his situation and emotional state. They are
always available, cooperative and trustworthy, and interact with their users
as competent and cooperative service partners [26, S. 89].
These “companions” are supposed to have all the advantages of hu-
mans, but not their weaknesses and disadvantages, because either these
qualities have been programmed away from them or the companions
themselves are supposed to learn to make them disappear. Given this
view of robots as the “better humans,” it seems somehow almost plau-
sible not only to believe that the self-abolition of humans is possible,
but also to actively demand it and work towards it.
In the context of work, quite diff erent advantages of robots are occasionally mentioned. Robots and algorithms have no right to take a vacation.
At most, they have to go for maintenance or to the repair shop to see the
software repairman. Robots do not get pregnant and do not go on maternity leave. They do not get sick, but at most break down. There are no costs
for health insurance, social security, or retirement benefi ts. Robots do not
enjoy labor protection, but are allowed to work a hundred hours or more a
week without further ado. If they have to learn something new, they are not
sent to expensive training courses, but instead are given a software update.
96
Армин Грунвальд. Цифровизация как вызов человеческому самопониманию
Robots are not protected against dismissal, have no workers’ co-determination rights, are not involved in trade unions, and do not go on strike.
Now all of this may seem strange and curious, perhaps even outlandish.
Nevertheless, the replacement narratives get media attention and thus have
consequences for many people’s perception of technology and the future.
Our attention in analysis and refl ection is therefore of practical relevance.
The human being as a digital machine
The question of who is better, humans or algorithms, reduces humans
to technical systems with specifi c capacities. It also presupposes that humans are the sum of the characteristics of these capacities, which can be
technically measured and consequently also improved. Humans are then
described by and only by what they perform in measurable categories, because only then can their performances be compared with technical performances. An “ableism” [28] is characteristic of this image of human beings.
Algorithms and robots on the one hand and humans on the other are compared on the same level in terms of their respective performance, namely as
machines. The comparison is conducted like one between two cars with a
fi nite number of measurable performance parameters. It only works if the
human being were considered a digital machine, a kind of computer on
two legs.
Indeed, the successes of digitalization have motivated a digital image of
man: as a data-processing machine with the brain as a computer, memory
as a hard drive, sense organs as sensors, and nerves as data lines. Insofar as
these are models of man for specifi c purposes alongside other models for
other purposes, one would not speak of technicalization. This only sets in
when what is modeled (here: the human being) is equated with the digital
model [15], e.g., when the brain is not modeled as a calculating machine
but is seen as being a computing machine, and when this view of human
beings gains dominance. In a fully technicalized perspective of humans,
nothing else would remain aside from computing algorithms based on data
collected by sensors.
This technical view of people is the basis for the entire argument that
digital technology is better than people in many respects and soon in all.
Obviously, it is precisely this view of human beings that underlies the digital replacement narratives (Section 2). For if humans are ultimately also
only digital machines, they are naturally inferior to digital technologies
97
Цифровизация в антропологической перспективе
optimized for specifi c purposes, e.g., calculators, computers, and apps controlled by artifi cial intelligence. In technological progress, this evolution
will continue. If the categorical diff erence between humans and technology
in digital images of humans is fl attened, the perspective for posthumanist
digital visionaries to replace current images of humans becomes plausible.
It is possible that everything that is interpreted in terms of a technical comparison can at some point be done better by algorithms and robots than by
humans. The argumentation of the transhumanists and digital visionaries
would be justifi ed if being human were not something categorically diff erent from being technological, but were exhausted by the performance of
technical functions. Far beyond ethical considerations, the major anthropological questions of the next few years will revolve around whether and
in what respects the underlying digital image of man will prevail or disappear again.
Critical queries about “perfect” digital technology
Looking at the history of technology, it is appropriate to give more than
a critical look at such expectations.
(1) The expectation of a technically feasible paradise collides with the
historical experience of at least the last two hundred years. In this time,
technical progress has proven to be deeply ambivalent in itself (Jonas 1979).
This ambivalence has been made more than clear in the unintended and
often unforeseen side eff ects that have occurred, of which climate change,
loss of biodiversity, waste of resources, and misuse of technology bear
witness among many other eff ects. Almost cynically, it is sometimes said
that further technological progress is necessary primarily to overcome the
unintended consequences of older technology. However, this is likely to
lead to new unintended consequences. Whoever claims that technological
progress can or should lead out of this cycle and to some kind of redemption must say how the ambivalence of technology is to be fundamentally
overcome. However, there are no indications of this yet.
(2) The frequently invoked superiority of digital technology in the face
of human weaknesses (Section 2) is ultimately something trivial in terms
of the philosophy of technology. Human history is full of technological inventions that can do something that humans cannot do or cannot do as well
without technology: smelting iron, moving heavy loads with cranes, transporting large quantities of goods with railroads, overcoming long distances
98
Армин Грунвальд. Цифровизация как вызов человеческому самопониманию
in automobiles, computing quickly with computers, or precisely inserting a
new hip [7]. The aim of technological progress is precisely to develop technology that can do some things better than humans. The fact that digital
technology, such as a chess computer, is better than humans is therefore
trivial and as such a cause neither for exaggerated expectations nor for fears.
Every technology is better than people in certain respects.
(3) The supposed objectivity of algorithms (Section 2) is a fi ction,
based on techno-deterministic ideas about technological progress. The
public debate is dominated by the impression of a dynamic that appears
inherent in the development of digitalization and which is thus quasi-objective and whose direction cannot be infl uenced. However, this ignores
the fact that digital technology and the services or functions based on it
also have to be made by people. Every single line of program code is written by people. Software runs on hardware, which is also made by humans.
Algorithms, robots, digital services, business models for digital platforms
or areas of application for service robots are invented, designed, manufactured, and deployed by people [7], just as search engines, big data technology, and social media are. These “makers” of digitalization usually work
in companies, institutions, or intelligence agencies. They pursue certain
values, have assessments and interests, follow a corporate strategy, political
guidelines, military considerations, etc. No mysterious teleological force
drives technological progress; interests and values do. There is no basis for
assuming that subjective people with values and interests can generate algorithms that work objectively.
(4) The eschatological view of technology operates with the ideal of
technical perfection, according to which digital technology in particular is
superior to the fundamentally imperfect human, or in religious language,
man in need of redemption. The ideal of perfect technology accompanies
the history of technology, but has so far remained an illusion. Not only
the unintended consequences (see above), but also goals only partially
achieved, systemic errors, and the gradual degradation of technical components make the idea of an “intrinsically” perfect technical world appear
to be a mere illusion.
Without claiming to be exhaustive, these points of criticism provide
reasons to oppose techno-eschatological fantasies. The loss of religious
ties in many industrialized world religions has presumably left a vacuum
into which, among other things, technical visions are spreading. Thus the
proportion of religiously bound people among transhumanists is decidedly
99
Цифровизация в антропологической перспективе
small. Salvation through technology, however, is an illusion. Technology
remains a means to ends determined by humans even if it infl uences, via a
form of co-evolution [2], the behavior of humans, including forcing them to
adapt. Accordingly, digital technology is n ot a competitor for people and their
future, but rather a means to the end of favorably shaping the analog world.
Final remark: Technicalization of the human being?
Technicalization of humans would take place, as has been shown in connection with other but likewise eschatological visions of technology [10],
primarily via technomorphic images or models of man. A technical modeling of man does not lead to technomorphization as long as such technical
images of man remain in their respective context of meaning and function
and are recognized and taken into consideration within the restrictions imposed by their respective purposes. Thus, technical models of man are of
great use in medicine. Technicalization of man only occurs when a technomorph is detached from its context and generalized into an image of man,
especially as technical interpretations of man become increasingly prevalent. Technicalization as a process would reach an end in a purely technical
description of man if the latter became dominant and were no longer subject to competition or supplementation by other, nontechnical descriptions
of man (e.g., as a zoon politicon, as a social being, or as a participant in a
communication community). There would then be no room left for aspects
of humanity that could not be captured in this machine view of man.
The question now, however, is whether and to what extent a comparison between humans and digital technology based on technical performance criteria (Section 3) is legitimate, how exhaustive it is, and how
far the conclusions that can be drawn from it extend. It leads to the question of what is nontechnical about humans. Nontechnical in humans is by
defi nition exactly where a performance comparison with (digital) technical systems does not make sense (which of course depends on the concept of technology, cf. e.g. [9; 14]). An ethics algorithm would presumably
categorically miss the core of ethics as a discipline of refl ection, because
it would not refl ect on the distinction between being and ought; an AIsupported automatic judge would miss the essence of law, which consists
precisely not in executing rules, but in carefully weighing them in order to
do justice to the individual case in the face of the rules. Digital technology
cannot lead debates on the meaning of complex concepts such as justice
100
Соседние файлы в предмете [НЕСОРТИРОВАННОЕ]