Добавил:
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз: Предмет: Файл:
Учебный год 22-23 / Kieninger_-_Security_Rights_in_Movable_Property.pdf
Скачиваний:
0
Добавлен:
14.12.2022
Размер:
2.98 Mб
Скачать

418 s e c u r i t y r i g h t s i n m o va b l e p r o p e r t y

Discussions

g e r m a n y

(a)Under German law, an all-monies clause, such as the one used in the present case, is valid. This is another reflection of the liberal attitude of German law towards non-possessory security interests in general. After the buyer has paid for the goods to which the specific contract relates, retention of title is simply transformed into security ownership. A has, therefore, security ownership of the 1,000 toasters that remain on B’s premises. The toasters form part of the insolvency estate, in the sense that the administrator is entitled to realise their value. A is, however, entitled to preferential payment out of the proceeds of such realisation.1

If contained in general conditions, all-monies clauses may be invalid pursuant to § 307 BGB.2 Yet, there is a general presumption of invalidity only in contracts between consumers and businesses; in contracts between non-consumers, all-monies clauses of the type used in case 9 are generally considered valid.3 The problem of the collateral’s value exceeding that of the secured claim, which used to be given as a reason for invalidating all-monies clauses, is now avoided through the use of an implied waiver of the creditor’s rights.4

(b)As stated under part (a), the wording of the clause used in this case will secure the seller to a sufficient extent.

(c)All-monies clauses are extremely common. Usually, the parties use a so-called Kontokorrentvorbehalt, by which the goods delivered under retention of title (often with a combined products and proceeds clause) secure all claims of the seller resulting from the business relationship with the buyer. Another kind of all-monies clause is the so-called Konzernvorbehalt. The term Konzern signifies a group of companies. Through this type of retention of title clause, the seller seeks not only to secure the claims against his immediate contract partner (company X), but also claims against other contract partners who are members of the same group

1 As to the procedural rules, see supra, German report, case 7(d).

2§ 307 BGB (prior to 1 Jan. 2002: § 9 AGBG) transposes article 3 n. 1 of the Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 Apr. 1993 on unfair contract terms in consumer contracts (O.J. No L 95/29 of 21 Apr. 1993) into German law.

3Cf. Wolf/Horn/Lindacher/Wolf § 9 AGBG nn. E 33 and E 36. Note that, in contrast to the above-mentioned directive, the German rules on unfair contract terms in general also apply to non-consumer contracts (§ 310 n. 1 BGB).

4 See infra, German report, case 11(d).

c a s e 9 : t o o m a n y t o a s t e r s

419

of companies as X. This type of clause is now void, according to the new section 2 of § 455 BGB, introduced in 1999 together with the new Insolvency Code (InsO).5

a u s t r i a

(a)According to Austrian law, goods sold under a retention of title clause secure only the seller’s claim arising from the contract of sale of those goods. Only to this extent does Austrian law accept a non-possessory security right. An agreement according to which ownership of the goods should pass to the buyer only if the other claims of the seller are discharged (erweiterter Eigentumsvorbehalt, an all-sums clause) is therefore ineffective under Austrian law. In so far as it purports to extend retention of title to other claims, the clause in the contract of A and B is therefore invalid.

It is not clear, however, how these rules apply to case 9. The author would analyse the situation in the following way. Of the 1,000 ‘old’ toasters, 50 per cent did belong to A due to retention of title. As they are a homogeneous set of items, it does not matter whether or not it can be ascertained which particular toasters were paid for by B. The 500 toasters delivered on 1 June must be added to this, meaning that A owned 1,000, or two-thirds, of the total amount of toasters delivered to B (1,500). Of this set, 500 were sold by B. Of the toasters sold, some, all or none could have belonged to A. A could thus own any amount between 500 and 1,000 of the remaining toasters. The question is thus who should bear the risk arising from the fact that the ownership of the remaining toasters is indeterminate? Here the writer would argue that A must bear the risk. The extent of real rights must be definite (Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz, the principle of specificity). A’s security rights can only exist, therefore, to the extent that they are clearly identifiable. A can therefore vindicate 500 toasters.

(b)A’s problems arise as a result of a poorly drafted retention of title clause. They lie in the fact that it is not clear which toasters were sold, those which B had acquired ownership of through payment or those which remained the property of A. To remedy this problem, it would be necessary to find a mechanism that would have ensured that B would first sell the toasters for which he had paid, e.g. separate storage.

5 See further Bülow, DB 1999, 2196.

420 s e c u r i t y r i g h t s i n m o va b l e p r o p e r t y

(c) Such clauses are commonly used, although they do not have any legal effect.

g r e e c e

(a)--(c) If the ownership of the remaining 1,000 toasters cannot be ascertained, then A and B become co-owners of the goods. Their respective shares are determined by the value of the toasters belonging to each party at the time of commingling: viz. 33.3 per cent for B and 66.6 per cent for A (articles 1059, 1058 para. 1 A.K.). Only 33.3 per cent of the remaining toasters fall into the insolvency estate. This solution does not depend on any other clauses, just simple retention of title. All-sums clauses have not been discussed by Greek authors; they are not commonly used in Greece.

f r a n c e

(a) The question is whether A will to be able to claim title to the 1,000 remaining toasters, or assert a claim to the proceeds of the sale of the 500 toasters. He will be competing with the insolvency administrator, who will want all that property to form part of the insolvency estate. The toasters are fungible goods, because they are identical. Until the reform to the law in 1994, the seller could only vindicate those goods which he could clearly establish remained unpaid for. In a decision of 5 October 1993, the Commercial Chamber of the Cour de cassation held that, in the context of successive sales between the seller and the buyer (as part of an exclusive distribution contract), should the buyer become insolvent without having paid all sums due to the seller, the return of the goods could not be allowed unless it was established that the supplies still in the hands of the buyer were those which had not been paid for.6 The company’s books did not provide enough evidence that the goods remaining in stock corresponded to the unpaid goods, and thus the supplier was unable to claim their return.

Since the 1994 reform, article 121 para. 3 IA 1985 (now: C. com, article L. 621-122, para. 3)7 provides that the creditor can claim rei vindicatio of fungible assets, when assets of the same quality and nature as those he delivered to the debtor can be found on the buyer’s premises. The seller

6 Bull civ IV, No 316, D 1993, IR, 234.

7It should be noted that following consolidation in 2001 of various laws into a new renumbered Commercial Code, the IA 1985 has been transposed into C. com, articles L. 611-1 to L. 628-3. The substance, however, remains unchanged.

c a s e 9 : t o o m a n y t o a s t e r s

421

does not need to establish that these particular assets were the ones he delivered.8 In sum, in so far as fungible goods are concerned, there is no need to establish that the goods remaining are exactly those goods which are still unpaid for. Two recent cases illustrate the operation of the new rules. Both concerned pharmaceutical products found in the stock of an insolvent company. They were classified as fungible goods as they appeared to be interchangeable in their type, nature, origins, packaging and trademarks. A rei vindicatio brought by the unpaid seller was upheld by the court, despite the fact that he was not the company’s only supplier of pharmaceutical products. The other supplier had been paid and was not claiming the goods.9 Another case, where the fungible character of the goods (again, medicines and pharmaceutical products) was not contested, rejected the argument of the defendant that rapid turnover meant it was unlikely that the present goods would actually be the ones unpaid for.10 On this basis, A can claim rei vindicatio of the 1,000 unpaid-for toasters remaining on B’s premises. If the 1,000 toasters could no longer be vindicated because they had been resold, A would have a preferential claim to the outstanding proceeds of such sub-sales (C. com, article L. 621-124: see cases 7 and 8). The fact that the sold toasters were only of the same species as, but not necessarily identical to, the unpaidfor ones does not prevent real subrogation into the proceeds.11

(b)Despite the preceding analysis, it should be noted that this type of retention of title clause, the ‘all-monies clause’, is unusual in France, and was, until 1994, inefficacious.12 Now, so long as the supplied goods are fungible, title can be retained over those found on the buyer’s premises. It must be noted, however, that there is to date no decision of the Cour de cassation confirming this position.

(c)Although there is no evidence, it is to be assumed that these clauses are fairly uncommon in France. When used, there remains the risk that the test of fungibility will fail.

8 Pérochon, Les Petites Affiches 1994, No 110.

9Rouen, 4 Apr. 1996, RJDA 1996, No 1543; Paris, 26 June 1998, D affaires 1998, 1401, obs. A.L.

10Paris, 3 Apr. 1998, D affaires 1998, 845, obs. A.L.; RJDA 1998, No 1017; RTDC 1998, 709, obs. Bandrac and Crocq. See also Paris, 22 Jan. 1999, D affaires 1999, 340, obs. A.L.

11Com 14 Jan. 1997, D 1997, IR, 52.

12The Cour de cassation (Chambre commerciale) declared invalid a clause according to which identity between unpaid-for goods and goods still in possession of the buyer would be presumed (Com 9 January 1990, D 1991, 130, note Virassamy; Bull civ IV, No 8).

422 s e c u r i t y r i g h t s i n m o va b l e p r o p e r t y

b e l g i u m

(a)First of all, the effectiveness of a framework agreement covering all future purchases is questionable. Article 101 Bankruptcy Act is interpreted to mean that reservation of title must be established in a document relating to each sale. A framework agreement may however be useful in proving that the clause was accepted in the documents relating to the subsequent sales. Furthermore, reservation of title is only effective to secure the unpaid balance of a particular sale. It cannot be extended in order to provide a security interest for unpaid balances relating to other sales, or for other sums owed by the buyer to the seller. Finally, the rights of the unpaid seller will be lost when the goods have been mixed with goods of the same species. Most authors accept, however, that, when all the goods have been sold by the same person, the seller can vindicate those goods sold under reservation of title notwithstanding the mixing.13

(b)Article 101 Bankruptcy Act marks the boundaries of the security interests available to the seller. Any extension beyond those limits will be regarded as a fiduciary transfer for security reasons, which does not bind third parties.

(c)Clauses of this type are not commonly used.

p o r t u g a l

(a) Under Portuguese law, it is possible to provide that reservation of title will subsist not only until the payment of the purchase price, but also until the occurrence of any other event (article 409C.C.). It would, therefore, be possible to provide for reservation of title until the payment of all sums owed by the buyer to the seller. In this case, as B has not yet paid all the sums he owes to the seller, he would not acquire ownership of the toasters delivered to him. So A would be considered the owner of the 1,000 toasters in question. As the clause was stipulated in an act under private signature before the delivery of the goods, it is effective as against the insolvency administrator (article 155, n4 CPEREF). Therefore, the toasters do not form part of the insolvency estate.

13 Dirix, RW 1997--98, 481 (499--500) n. 31.

c a s e 9 : t o o m a n y t o a s t e r s

423

(b)No.

(c)In Portugal, reservation of title clauses such as the one described are not common.

s p a i n

(a)A may claim reservation of title in respect of 1,000 toasters. A can vindicate the 1,000 toasters on the basis of the all-sums clause. Such an all-sums clause might be set out as follows: ‘The current framework contract binds both parties to the reservation of ownership clause in favour of the seller with regard to the goods sold, as well as to those which may be sold in the future and which are of the same make and model.’ A may vindicate the toasters if B becomes bankrupt, preventing them from forming part of the insolvency estate. Thus, since the toasters would not form part of the insolvency estate, A does not have a preferential right of payment from the proceeds of sale.

(b)A cannot obtain a better right. Given these circumstances, it is in A’s best interests to maintain a rei vindicatio against the toasters.

(c)Such clauses are frequently used in commercial practice.

i t a l y

(a)A will have no real rights in the remaining toasters, nor will he obtain a preferential entitlement to the proceeds of their sale. The toasters will form part of the insolvency estate.

(b)and (c) The retention of title clause in question is seldom seen in Italy. In any case, on the facts of case 9, it will be ineffective, since it is contained in a framework agreement, rather than in each contract of sale concluded between A and B. Under the current interpretation of articles 1523 ff. c.c., concerning reservation of title in instalment sales, such clauses are effective only if they form part of each contract of sale between the same parties.14 The framework agreement between A and B does not purport to be a sale. In Italy, A’s acceptance of B’s order will

14 See Italian report, case 5.

424 s e c u r i t y r i g h t s i n m o va b l e p r o p e r t y

constitute a sale. Hence, that is the agreement which should contain the relevant clause.

Assuming that the clause had been inserted in each sale, and that the formal requirements for its validity vis-à-vis B’s creditors were satisfied,15 it remains unlikely that such clause would provide effective protection of the seller’s claim to the purchase price in circumstances such as those of the present case.

Under Italian law, an ‘all-monies’ contractual clause, purporting to retain title to all the goods that the vendor sells to the same purchaser through a number of discrete transactions, will probably be held to be oppressive and therefore void and of no effect. Article 1525 c.c. provides that, in instalment sales, the buyer’s failure to pay a sum which is equal to or less than one-eighth of the entire contract price does not entitle the seller to terminate the contract. There is no doubt that article 1525 c.c., which bars an action by a seller to claim the goods sold whenever the outstanding debt is 10 per cent or less of the contract price, applies to sales under reservation of title. In case 9, it is certain that one-third of the goods that A sold to B have been paid for. Yet, according to the agreement between A and B, all the remaining goods are still to be owned by the seller, as a security for what the buyer owes him.16 In this respect, the ‘all-monies’ clause seems to circumvent the mandatory provision of article 1525 c.c.; as such it may be held void under article 1344 c.c., which attacks fraudulent evasions of mandatory rules of law.

Finally, several judgments and some scholars hold that there cannot be a successful rei vindicatio of fungible goods unless the plaintiff asserting title to them proves that the goods claimed are the very goods he owns.17 Although this argument has no direct bearing on the present case, given that the relevant contractual clause purports to reserve title

15See Italian report, case 5.

16Note that the current, expansive, interpretation of article 2744 c.c. (dealing on its face only with forfeiture clauses in pledges and hypothecs!), dating from the cases which established the invalidity of sales for security purposes (Cass. 3 Apr. 1989, n. 1611, Foro it., 1989, I, 1427, obs. Mariconda, Realmonte; Corr. giur., 1989, 522, obs. Mariconda; Giust. civ., 1989, I, 1569, obs. Canessa; Giur. it., 1990, I, 1, 104, obs. Pellegrini; Cass. 21 April 1989, n. 1907, Giust. civ., 1989, I, 1821, obs. Costanza; Foro it., 1990, I, 205, obs. Valcavi), holds that the transfer of ownership of movables (and immovables) for security purposes is void (on this issue, in a critical vein, see Bussani, Il problema del patto commissorio 203 ff.; Anelli, L’alienazione in funzione di garanzia 420 ff.). Hence it would be useless to try to construe the all-monies clause as an alienation for security purposes to the seller of the goods that the buyer has acquired.

17Italian report, case 1(b).

c a s e 9 : t o o m a n y t o a s t e r s

425

to all goods until B pays to A the outstanding sums owed, it demonstrates the hostility of most Italian judicial decisions, and of many scholars, towards the idea of using a reservation of title clause as a means of obtaining security over a changing mass of goods. This hostility is traditionally grounded in the following dogma, i.e. an argument that real rights have a determinate object, or that a vindicatio of movables requires their precise identification. However, it is fair to say that none of the objections to such wider use of the concept of retention of title rest purely on logical premises.18 In the field of financial instruments law, for example, these dogmatic statements have been challenged successfully, to enhance the level of protection for investors.19 There is little sign, however, that similar developments will take place in the commercial context, where reservation of title clauses such as that mentioned in the present case are still unknown in Italy.

t h e n e t h e r l a n d s

(a) In all probability, A would still be the owner of all the remaining toasters. None of the toasters would form part of B’s insolvency estate.20 As to the validity of the ‘all-sums’ clause, retention of title may not be extended so as to serve as a security for all debts owed to the supplier. A retention of title for ‘all sums owed for whatever reason to the seller’ would be invalid.21 It must serve in principle as a security for credit given for the purchase. However, the Code does not restrict retention of title to claims arising from simultaneous contracts of sale. Suppliers may agree on a retention of title clause not only for claims arising from the delivery of the goods sold at that time, but also for those arising

from deliveries already made and from deliveries yet to be made.22

18Hence, in related subjects, such as revolving pledges, there are significant concessions to the idea that a real right can be created over changing assets by party autonomy: Gabrielli, Rotatività della garanzia, Digesto sez. civ., XVIII, 102; Cass. 27 Sep. 1999,

n. 10685, Foro it., 2000, I, 528; Giust. civ., 2000, I, 1459, obs. Carozzi; Corr. giur., 2000, 1226, obs. Dabormida; Fallimento, 2000, 775, Finardi.

19Cass. 14 Oct. 1997, n. 10031, Foro it., 1998, I, 851, obs. Crisostomo and Macario; Giur. comm., 1998, II, 299, obs. Di Maio; Fallimento, 1998, 391; Dir. fall., 1998, II, 459. See now: Regolamento recante norme di attuazione del decreto legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n. 58 e del decreto legislativo 24 giugno 1998, n. 213, in materia di mercati, arts. 46, 54 (adopted by the Commissione nazionale per le società e la borsa).

20It may be noted that the risk that the Dutch revenue services may attach third-party property found on the premises of the debtor, as discussed in case 3, does not exist with respect to stock-in-trade.

21 Article 3:92(2) BW.

22 Ibid.

426 s e c u r i t y r i g h t s i n m o va b l e p r o p e r t y

Where, as in this case, a framework agreement exists between parties, on the basis of which several separate sales and deliveries are to be made, a retention of title clause can validly be extended to cover them all.

Stipulating an ‘all-sums’ clause of this kind provides the supplier with important advantages. First, retention of title normally ends when the goods are either processed (specificatio) or resold. An ‘all-sums’ clause, however, enables the supplier to invoke his or her retention of title clause to goods delivered and paid for, if the buyer uses goods for resale or manufacturing that have not been paid for. Secondly, as a procedural matter, the supplier is protected against the commingling (confusio) of paid-for and unpaid-for goods. If the retention of title clause only related to the purchase price owed from separate deliveries, he or she would often be hard pressed to show which of the goods delivered were not yet paid for and thus still his or her property, and which were paid for. Under Dutch law, the inability to do so would necessarily result in the buyer (detentor) becoming the owner of the goods by reason of confusio.23

(b)In so far as A seeks to secure claims arising from past and future deliveries under the framework agreement, a retention of title clause would provide effective security for the seller.

(c)The use of retention of title clauses extending to multiple deliveries is very common in practice. In fact, the draft provision of the Civil Code governing retention of title did not allow for this type of clause at all. The omission was heavily criticised by practising lawyers, who argued that, because of the difficulties that would be encountered by traders in showing exactly which delivery had not been paid for, traders would become very reluctant to continue extending credit on the same conditions or at the same price.24 It was in the interest of the business community that the relevant clause was included in the final draft.

e n g l a n d

(a) ‘All-monies’ clauses are effective in English law. Where the seller’s goods are mingled with other fungible stock supplied by the seller and in the buyer’s possession, it is as a practical matter very difficult for the seller to enforce his claim against an insolvency administrator or against a receiver acting for a secured creditor of the buyer. (‘Show me the

23 See generally, Reehuis, Eigendomsvoorbehoud 14.

24 Ibid., 13.

c a s e 9 : t o o m a n y t o a s t e r s

427

goods you supplied. Prove that they have not already been consumed.’) In the case of the seller who supplies the same kind of goods regularly, the seller’s difficulty in proving that the particular goods in the buyer’s possession have not yet been paid for can be avoided by the expedient of an ‘all-monies’ clause. According to this clause, which is not treated as a registrable charge,25 the seller retains title to all goods supplied until all outstanding bills have been paid. It would therefore not matter if the buyer has already consumed goods for which payment has not yet been made and is still in possession of goods for which the seller has already been paid. The seller can transfer the obligation to pay for the consumed goods to the unconsumed goods still in the buyer’s possession. The Sale of Goods Act permits the seller to stipulate for the passing of property to take place on any event:26 the payment of all sums owed to the seller can be just such an event.

To the extent that the seller exercises its rights under the all-monies clause and recovers in full the amounts owed, leaving a surplus, then it is likely that the buyer, or the buyer’s insolvency administrator (liquidator or trustee-in-bankruptcy), would have a restitutionary claim for the balance.27 In the case of a seller who repossesses and resells the goods without terminating the contract (surely a very rare case indeed), an implied term of the contract of sale would oblige that seller to account to the buyer for any surplus over the amount owed.28

An all-monies clause adds nothing to the discussion in case 8 above on the seller’s rights in respect of the money proceeds of goods sold on by the buyer.

(b)The all-monies clause is effective in respect of the goods covered. The seller’s rights in respect of money proceeds, in the light of specially drafted clauses, is dealt with in the same way as the seller’s rights under any other type of extended reservation of title clause.

(c)All-monies clauses are commonly used.

i r e l a n d

(a) ‘All-monies’ retention of title clauses are used in Ireland to get around the particular factual difficulties highlighted in this problem -- in other

25

Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG [1991] 2 AC 339 (Scotland).

26 Ss. 17--19.

27

Clough Mill Ltd v Martin [1985] 1 WLR 111 (Robert Goff LJ).

28 Ibid.

428 s e c u r i t y r i g h t s i n m o va b l e p r o p e r t y

words, so as to overcome identification difficulties. With an ‘all-monies’ clause a supplier retains title not only until the goods which form the subject matter of the particular contract of sale have been paid for but until all indebtedness arising between seller and buyer has been discharged. All-monies clauses have been upheld both in Ireland and in the United Kingdom.

Nevertheless, there is a degree of ambiguity in the case law. In many cases the expression ‘all sums due’ is used and it is not clear whether this refers only to indebtedness arising under the contract of sale or, alternatively, encompasses extraneous indebtedness. An example of such ambiguity occurred in Frigoscandia (Contracting) Ltd v Continental Irish Meat Ltd,29 where the relevant clause provided: ‘Until all sums due to the seller have been fully paid to it, the plant, machinery and materials supplied by the seller herein shall remain the seller’s personal property . . .’ The provision was held to be effective, with the judge saying:30

A difficulty which arises with regard to clauses of this nature is that they are included in the contracts to secure the payment to the vendor of the price of the goods and therefore it may be said . . . that the goods once delivered, are intended to be held by the purchaser as security for such payment and that the transaction is in the category of a mortgage in that the vendor, although retaining ownership or an interest in the goods, cannot take possession of them provided that the specified instalments are paid, and that this leads to the conclusion that such a clause must be treated as creating a mortgage or a charge over the goods. In my opinion such a conclusion can have no general application to these clauses and each case must depend on its own facts. The parties to a contract can agree to any terms they wish and, amongst others, they can agree that the property in the goods shall not pass to the purchaser until all the instalments of the purchase price have been paid.

In other Irish cases what is unmistakably an ‘all-monies’ retention of title clause has been judicially validated. A leading case is Re Interview Ltd,31 where an Irish firm agreed to import electrical goods from a German company subject to a clause which stated: ‘The product supplied shall . . .

remain the property of the supplier until all debts owing to the supplier or to be created in the future and arising from the business connection with the purchaser have been paid in full.’ The clause was upheld. It should be noted that while the contract was explicitly stated to be governed by German law there was no suggestion that Irish law on the point was any different. While the issues have not been dealt with at

29 [1982] ILRM 396.

30 Ibid., at 398.

31 [1975] IR 382.

c a s e 9 : t o o m a n y t o a s t e r s

429

any length in the Irish case law, there is statutory support for ‘all-monies’ clauses in the Sale of Goods Act. Section 19(1) of the Act provides that a seller may reserve ownership in the goods supplied until the conditions specified in the contract of sale as to the time of passing of ownership are fulfilled. Section 17 states that parties to a contract are free to agree when ownership of the goods supplied is to pass and consequently can agree that it will not pass until the buyer pays the seller all sums due. It should perhaps be noted that similar arguments based on equivalent UK wording found favour with the House of Lords in Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG.32

In this particular example, if the ‘all-monies’ clause is effective, A will acquire real rights in the remaining toasters and the toasters will not form part of the insolvency estate. There is however some ambiguity about the facts of the example. The ‘all-monies’ clause forms part of a general framework agreement but it is not expressly stated whether each delivery is the subject of a separate contract of sale and whether the retention of title clause has been incorporated into these individual contracts. If it has not been incorporated and there are separate contracts of sale, then title to the goods supplied thereunder will, prima facie, pass on delivery.

(b)Further to the answer to the previous question, A could get a ‘better right’ by endeavouring to ensure that the ‘all-monies’ clause is incorporated in each separate contract of sale.

(c)‘All-monies’ clauses are used in Ireland quite commonly to get around identification difficulties that spring from the use of ‘simple’ clauses. Take the situation where generic goods are supplied subject to a simple retention of title clause and there have been many different deliveries -- all subject to a separate contract containing the same simple clause. Some consignments have been paid for but others have not. If the buyer becomes bankrupt with some of the goods supplied still in its possession it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the seller to link these goods with a particular unpaid invoice. If, however, ‘all-monies’ clauses have been used the seller can say to the buyer: ‘The goods remaining are mine and I will take them back. You have acquired title to none of the goods because all of the claims have not been paid.’

32 [1991] 2 AC 339.

430 s e c u r i t y r i g h t s i n m o va b l e p r o p e r t y

s c o t l a n d

(a)Retention of title for all claims owed by the buyer to the seller is lawful. It is based on the fact that ownership can pass only if both parties so consent. If the agreement is that ownership will not pass before all claims have been paid, it follows that, until all claims have been paid, the requirements for the passing of ownership have not been met. This view of matters was, indeed, a matter of some controversy at one time, but is now settled.33 In the present case, therefore, A is owner of all the toasters that are in B’s possession.

Since the toasters belong to A, they do not form part of the insolvency estate of B. B’s contractual right to the toasters, however, does form part of the insolvency estate. But that is a point of limited importance.

(b)A could not get a better right than retained ownership.

(c)Such clauses are commonly used in practice.

s o u t h a f r i c a

(a) So-called floor plans (master or framework agreements) are known to South African commercial practice in the motor industry. In the case of the sale of other stock (for example, the toasters and coffee machines of the present case), there would have to be a clear reference to or incorporation of the framework agreement in each sale before it would be acceptable to South African courts. If this was done, the manufacturer would retain ownership of each shipment of toasters until the purchase price for the batch was paid. The difficulty here is that the new batch of toasters has been mixed with 1,000 other toasters, some of which have been paid for. This means that at least some of the remaining toasters have become the property of B. The fact that these toasters have been mixed with the 500 (identical) new toasters will have resulted in B having acquired ownership (of the 500 and perhaps of all the remaining toasters) by commingling. There is no evidence in South African law that a reservation of title would exclude the effects of commingling. A has, therefore, neither a real nor a preferential right to the remaining toasters. The toasters form part of B’s insolvency estate.

33Armour v Thyssen Edelstahlwerke AG 1990 SLT 981 ([1991] 2 AC 339 (Scotland)). For the controversy see Gretton and Reid at 1985 SLT (News) 329 and at 1989 SLT (News) 185.

c a s e 9 : t o o m a n y t o a s t e r s

431

(b)A could try to obtain a stronger legal position by including a clause in the framework agreement excluding the consequences of commingling. This has, however, not been tested by the courts.

(c)Not in the context of toasters and such like items.

d e n m a r k

(a)When the buyer has a right to resell the goods a retention of title clause is not valid unless the buyer has to settle with the seller when the goods have been resold. The clause in this case does not fulfil this condition. (For a fuller discussion, see case 4.) Therefore, A has no right to the remaining toasters.

Even if a valid retention of title clause was stipulated in a credit consignment contract, A could claim no right to the toasters. In Danish law it is a general rule that a person who claims a right to an asset must be able to identify the specific asset on the basis of the contract. Because the toasters which have not been paid for are stored together with toasters which have been paid for it is impossible to point out the precise toasters to which A would assert a right. The toasters will form part of the insolvency estate and A cannot claim any right to the toasters nor claim preferential payment from the proceeds of their sale.

(b)If the contract contained a valid retention of title clause, the contract should also state that B had to keep those toasters in which A could claim a right separated from those toasters already paid for. If A checked that B acted according to that contract, A could claim a right to the toasters remaining on B’s premises which had not been paid for. It is important that the process of separation is conducted in such a way that no doubt arises as to which toasters A can claim a right to.

(c)It is probable that almost all credit consignment agreements contain a clause which states that the goods delivered under the contract shall be stored separately from other assets of the same or similar sort.

s w e d e n

(a) The retention of title clause is void, because the buyer has been entitled to dispose of the goods prior to full payment (see case 4). Below, this

432 s e c u r i t y r i g h t s i n m o va b l e p r o p e r t y

restriction is disregarded and attention is devoted to the other problems, especially commingling.

Pursuant to sales law, more precisely the Hire Purchase Act (lagen om avbetalningsköp) amended in 1953 and its successors, a seller may not in relation to the buyer make a valid reservation of title to goods X for the payment of goods Y under some other contract of sale.34 Since such reservation is already void as between the parties, it cannot have any effect against the creditors of the buyer. In the instant case, it appears that there are two different sale agreements, although they are governed by the same framework agreement, and therefore the reservation of title by A to the toasters delivered on 1 June is valid only in respect of the toasters delivered on that day, for the claim arising from that purchase. Leaving aside the hurdle presented by the hire-purchase restrictions, a clause giving A security in goods X for claims arising from contract Y would sit uneasily with the denial of non-possessory and unregistered securities in movables in Swedish law.35

Thus, A may vindicate the 500 toasters delivered on 1 June to satisfy only those claims relating to those toasters. However, these toasters cannot be identified in the remaining stock of 1,000 toasters. If the sold toasters are apportioned in proportion to the quantity of toasters owned by A and B, B remains the owner of 250 toasters. It is a general principle of, or at least a point of departure in, property law that real rights can exist only in specified objects36 and that it must be possible to identify these objects, especially in relation to objects belonging to the debtor,37 when it comes to insolvency and execution. Hence, in principle, there could be no right of separation for the seller, A, because of both the hire-purchase legislation and the general requirement of identification in property law. However, one might argue that an exception should be made when commingling has taken place in respect of fungible goods (i.e. goods of the same character), when creditors would not be harmed irrespective of whether object X or object Y was separated, provided that the commingled quantity has never dropped below the quantity claimed

34The seller is entitled to reserve a right of rescission only for the payment of purchase monies for the actual goods (and for their repair).

35A security (X) perfected within three months prior to the application to commence insolvency proceedings, but with delay in relation to the extension of the credit (for Y), would also be avoidable pursuant to chapter 4 s. 12 of the Bankruptcy Act.

36NJA 1910, 216.

37If one seller’s goods were commingled with goods belonging to another seller, they would become co-owners of the whole and would have a right of separation in proportion to their contributions, NJA 1959, 590 and Entrusted Money Act.

c a s e 9 : t o o m a n y t o a s t e r s

433

for in separation in insolvency (the lowest balance principle). That question has arisen in a couple of cases. In NJA 1976, 251, containers had been delivered under different hire-purchase contracts each with reservations of title (although not linked to the other contracts). Some instalments had been paid. Protection from execution against the containers still in place was denied, because the parties had not separated the different sales in their payments for delivery, with the effect that the balance for each contract could not be established,38 and because the remaining containers were not referable to specific contracts. In a subsequent case, NJA 1994, 506, A had deposited corn (possibly for grinding and return of flour) with a miller, who commingled the corn with corn of the same kind owned by himself. It was assumed that the miller had not been entitled to let the total quantity of corn fall below the quantity A had deposited and that the total quantity had not, in fact, fallen below that quantity. Therefore, it was held that A was co-owner, with a right to separate the quantity39 that he had deposited. The latter case demonstrates that the requirement of identification is subject to (wide) exemptions and that the ‘principle of lowest balance’ debated in the literature, at least in some situations, applies to fungible goods.40 This principle, however, has not so far been applied to commingled money.41

(b)It follows from the answer to part (a) that the seller must prescribe that all deliveries fall under the same purchase agreement and that the relevant goods can be identified in the buyer’s possession. However, it seems difficult to treat all deliveries as made under one agreement of sale, if both parties are not prepared prospectively to agree on the total quantity and the total price.

(c)All-monies clauses appear sporadically, but they are probably not common.

38Pursuant to other cases (e.g. NJA 1958, 117), the creditor would, in this situation, be entitled to decide from which debts the deductions should be made.

39If the total quantity decreased because of a cause extraneous to withdrawals by B (e.g., if it had been eaten by rats in circumstances that B could not have prevented) and not only by withdrawals by the miller B, it is open to question whether A would have been entitled to separate all the deposited quantity.

40See Håstad, Sakrätt rörande lös egendom 173 ff. and 333 ff.

41In NJA 1995, 367 II the Supreme Court found instead that minor commingling (a few deposits and withdrawals) could be overlooked. In NJA 1998, 275 the principle simply was not applied to money, without any discussion.

Соседние файлы в папке Учебный год 22-23