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Учебный год 22-23 / The Enforceability of Promises in European Contract Law.pdf
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326 the enforceabilit y of promises

estate agency promised in writing to pay 4 per cent of the proposed price of a house just for the work of the agency and without regard to its success. The court held that the formalities of § 313 had to be complied with because the economic pressure on the client demanded the protection that these formalities were supposed to afford.25 An agency like Homes can claim its expenses (as distinguished from its fee) only if the contract expressly so provides (§ 652 II of the Civil Code26). As a compensation for these disadvantages, agencies like Homes are not under a legal obligation to find a buyer. They are not even obligated to make any efforts to do so.

greece

A brokerage contract such as this one is governed by arts. 703–8 of the Civil Code. The provisions of the Civil Code concerning brokerage are basically dispositive law. For certain categories of brokerage contracts there are special laws (for example, L 308/76 on brokers of civil contracts).

A brokerage contract is related to the contract of agency or mandate,27 but it is entered into for remuneration. In such a contract, which establishes a fiduciary relationship, the broker (who corresponds to the mandatary) promises to the other contracting party (the mandator) to find him an opportunity to conclude a contract that is in his interest in return for a fee promised to the broker (art. 703 of the Civil Code).28 The fee must be paid only if the contract is actually concluded as a consequence of the actions of the broker (art. 703 of the Civil Code). If a contract is not concluded but a promise to enter into one has been made, half the fee is due. The parties may agree, on the contrary, that the fee is due for the actions of the broker even if a contract is not concluded.29 The broker can also claim his expenses if the other party has agreed to reimburse him for

25BGH NJW 1971, 93.

26The agency (Makler) has a claim for expenses only if this was especially agreed. This is so even if the proposed contract is never agreed upon.

27The leading opinion in theory and in the case law considers brokerage as a mandate. P. Zepos, Law of Obligations (1965), Special Part, vol. II, 43–8; EfAth 2319/56 NoB 5, 258; AP 474/1979 NoB 27, 1473. However, some commentators believe that brokerage differs from mandate. Karasis in Georgiadis and Stathopoulos, Civil Code, art. 703.

28Article 703 of the Civil Code comes from art. 413(1) and (3) of the Swiss Code of Obligations and from § 652(1) of the German Civil Code. Kafkas, Law of Obligations, vol. A, art. 703. As far as procedural law is concerned, if the broker has been legally appointed then any disputes between him and the mandator are governed by art. 667 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In any other case the regular procedure is followed. Karasis in Georgiadis and Stathopoulos, Civil Code art. 703.

29AP 687/80 NoB 28, 2014; AP 180/66 NoB 14, 1017.

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them. In that event, reimbursement is due even if a contract was not concluded (art. 703(2) of the Civil Code).

The mandator is free to recall his mandate at any time without giving a reason (art. 186 of the Civil Code). In that event, the mandator does not owe the fee unless the parties agreed otherwise. The revocation of the brokerage relationship is valid ex nunc. This means that the broker cannot earn his fee after revocation by taking an action that leads to a contract unless the mandator agrees to pay one and so enters into a new brokerage contract. The fee is payable if the actions of the broker before revocation lead to the conclusion of a contract.

Claude, then, had the right to revoke. Nevertheless, if he did so in a way that is contrary to good faith or bonos mores or the social and economic purpose of the right (art. 281 of the Civil Code) or if he did so negligently (art. 914 of the Civil Code), he must pay damages to the broker which would include the brokerage fee. For example, he would be liable if he revoked during a crucial period of negotiations with the intention of frustrating the broker’s rights when a contract is about to be concluded.30

In a brokerage contract, the mandator of a brokerage contract is free to employ other brokers unless the parties agree otherwise. An agreement for exclusive brokerage is valid.31 If the brokerage is exclusive, all the requirements that we have analysed above must also be fulfilled. Usually in this kind of brokerage it is agreed that the mandator is not free to revoke his mandate for a limited period unless he can prove that the contrary was understood (art. 288 of the Civil Code). He would still have the right to revoke on serious grounds. If the mandator employs other brokers or if he revokes his mandate before the time agreed or he revokes it in a manner contrary to good faith, he must compensate the broker for the damages suffered. These include the loss of the opportunity to earn the fee because the mandator violated his agreement. The broker could receive the same fee if he could prove that his actions would have led to the conclusion of the contract if the agreement had not been violated.32

scotland

The Scottish courts would approach this problem from a contractual standpoint. The solution will therefore depend on whether the terms of

30Karasis in Georgiadis and Stathopoulos, Civil Code, art. 703, no. 16.

31Ibid., art. 709, no. 21; Varthakokoilis, Analytical Interpretation, art. 703; Athens Court of First Instance 4029/82, Dni 25/849.

32Karasis in Georgiadis and Stathopoulos, Civil Code, art. 703, no. 21; N. Farmakidis, The Brokerage Contract (1989), 64–5, 90–1.

328 the enforceabilit y of promises

the contract permit Claude to withdraw from it without penalty. If the contract is silent on this matter, it would appear that Claude is in breach and will have to pay damages. If the agreement allowed him to list the house with other agencies, then it would seem clear that he was free to withdraw from his contract with Homes at any time without penalty: to allow him to list with other agencies would suggest that since the original agency was non-exclusive, he was free to withdraw.

The problem could also be analysed from the viewpoint that Claude makes a promise sub conditione. If this were the case then Claude would be liable if he changed his mind within a reasonable time as he would then be acting in such a way as to prevent the promisee fulfilling (purifying) the condition, as in Petrie v. Earl of Airlie33 (defender held to his promise to provide a reward for the detection and conviction of a criminal, even though conviction failed: this was because the defender refused to cooperate in the proceedings, leading to the case against the accused being dropped). The promise need not be constituted in writing as it is nongratuitous since Claude will receive a benefit if the condition is purified.

england

It is reasonably clear in English law that if Homes has not found a buyer then, even if Homes has incurred expenses, Claude is free to withdraw his offer and is not liable for either 5 per cent of the sale price or Homes’ expenses.

As discussed in the previous answer, in the case of Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper34 the court held that an agent who had found a requested buyer for the defendant’s house was not owed the £5,000 that the vendor promised would be his on completion of the sale when, as happened, the vendor refused to go through with the sale. We noted that this decision appeared to turn largely on the court’s understanding of what the normal expectations and understandings of such an arrangement are in the relevant business community. In Lord Russell’s words: ‘No general rule can be laid down by which the rights of the agents or the liability of the principal under commission contracts are to be determined. In each case these must depend upon the exact terms of the contract in question, and upon the true construction of those terms.’ As the arrangement in Case 15, and the context in which that arrangement arose, appear similar to Luxor, it can be assumed that the same result would be reached. And of course in

33 [1834] 13 S 6.

34 8[1941] AC 108.

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Case 15 the vendor’s position is stronger because no buyer has yet been found. Finally, courts have generally construed terms strictly against real estate agents in such cases.35

Regarding a claim for expenses incurred, a principal, such as Claude, is in general under no obligation to continue in business (which in this case means to continue trying to sell his house) for the sake of his agent (here Homes), but if on the true construction of the contract the principal has given such an undertaking, then he can be held liable in damages for breaching that undertaking.36 It is not clear from the facts whether Claude gave such an undertaking, but it would not be normal in such a contract (since the agent cannot force the vendor to agree to a sale, there is little point in forcing the vendor to continue offering the property for sale).

Would it matter if Homes had an exclusive listing? In Luxor, it appeared that the agent did not have an exclusive listing, but no weight was placed on this point there or in other cases. Arguably, in a non-exclusive listing the possibility that the agent may not earn a commission, even if he finds a willing buyer, is more evident from the start, but I do not think that great weight would be placed on this factor.

Claude’s position if Homes has found a buyer depends, again, on the precise terms of Claude’s offer. If Claude offered to pay Homes merely for finding a willing buyer, then he must pay if a willing buyer is found, since Homes has fully performed the requested condition. Courts require clear language before finding such an intention.37 The phrase ‘if it found a buyer’ is ambiguous (must a ‘buyer’ actually buy the house?), and the fact that the commission in the example was ‘5 per cent of the sales price’ would probably be taken as indicating that payment was, as in the Luxor case, conditional on an actual sale being completed. If so, then the Luxor ruling would again be applied. Note that it is clear from Luxor that it does not matter why Claude did not go through with the deal. There is no doctrine of good faith in English law that could be applied to a case such as this. The situation is unchanged if Homes is appointed a sole agent, except that if Claude sells through a different agent before the expiry of the agreement with Homes, then Homes can recover damages for breach (which damages would be calculated, it appears – though the law here is not much developed – by the amount of commission promised).38

35 Treitel, Contract, 658 and cases cited therein.

36 Turner v. Goldsmith [1891] 1 QB 544.

37Fairvale v. Sabharwall [1992] 2 EGLR 27.

38Hampton & Sons Ltd v. George [1939] 3 All ER 627.