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- •Contents
- •General editors’ preface
- •Contributors
- •Table of legislation
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Ireland
- •Italy
- •Netherlands
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •Spain
- •Abbreviations
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Ireland
- •Italy
- •The Netherlands
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •Spain
- •Other sections
- •1 Some perennial problems
- •I. The architecture of contract law
- •B. Common law
- •II. The questions
- •2 Contemporary solutions
- •Case 1: promises of gifts
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •General principles:
- •Exceptions
- •Case 2: promises of compensation for services rendered without charge
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 3: promises to pay debts not legally due
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 4: a promise to come to dinner
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 5: promises to store goods without charge
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 6: promises to do a favour
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 7: promises to loan goods without charge
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 8: a requirements contract
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 9: promises to pay more than was agreed I
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 10: promises to pay more than was agreed II
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 11: promises to do more than was agreed; promises to waive a condition
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 12: promises to take less than was agreed
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 13: options given without charge
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 14: promises of rewards
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •Case 15: promises of commissions
- •Case
- •Discussions
- •FRANCE
- •BELGIUM
- •THE NETHERLANDS
- •SPAIN
- •PORTUGAL
- •ITALY
- •AUSTRIA
- •GERMANY
- •GREECE
- •SCOTLAND
- •ENGLAND
- •IRELAND
- •Summaries
- •Preliminary comparisons
- •3 Comparisons
- •I. Gifts and favours
- •A. Promises of money or property
- •1. Obstacles to giving gifts
- •2. Exceptions for meritorious gifts
- •3. Protecting reliance
- •B. Favours that need not entail expense
- •1. Favours that can no longer be performed costlessly
- •a. Promises to loan goods
- •b. Promises to take care of goods
- •2. A broken promise to do a service
- •3. A note on the ‘intention to be legally bound’
- •C. What is left of Roman contract law?
- •1. Promises to perform contractual obligations that are legally unenforceable
- •III. The absence of commitment
- •A. Open terms and options
- •B. Locus poenitentiae
- •IV. Epilogue
- •A. The results
- •B. The doctrines
- •C. The search for solutions
- •1. Gifts and favours
- •a. Promises of money or property
- •b. Favours that need not entail expense
- •3. The absence of commitment
- •a. Open terms and options
- •b. Promises conditional upon success
- •Index by country
- •Austria
- •Belgium
- •England
- •France
- •Germany
- •Greece
- •Ireland
- •Italy
- •Netherlands
- •Portugal
- •Scotland
- •Spain
- •United States
- •Index by subject
1Some perennial problems
A basic difference between modern civil law and Roman law is supposed to be that in modern law, in principle, contracts are enforceable upon consent. In Roman law, when they were enforceable depended on the type of contract in question. A basic difference between the modern common law and civil law is supposed to be that the common law requires a contract to have ‘consideration’. The civil law does not. This study is concerned with the extent to which these characterizations are true, and how these and other differences affect the enforceability of promises.
The method is that of the Trento Common Core of European Private Law Project. Experts from different legal systems have been asked how their law would resolve a series of hypothetical cases. Because of the larger purposes of the Project, and because one has to draw the line somewhere, the legal systems are those of member states of the European Community. Sometimes, the expert’s opinion about a case is conjectural, and the experts were asked to note when it is. In these instances, admittedly, another expert from the same legal system might decide the case differently. But the value of the expert opinions is not that they tell us how the case will come out. It is that they tell us which cases are clear, which are troublesome, the reasons why they are troublesome, and the doctrines that might be applied to resolve the difficulties. That is all one can hope to know, and enough for us to see how different legal systems approach the same problems.
This method focuses less on rules and doctrines than on the results that are reached by applying them. The reason for doing so is not scepticism about whether rules and doctrines matter. They do. Courts look to them for guidance and use them to explain what they are doing. Nevertheless, when the courts of different legal systems reach similar results, it may be that their underlying concerns are the same even though they are
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