in English law as to whether estoppel is an alternative to consideration for the enforcement of promises or whether it is a non-contractual doctrine concerned solely with protecting people who have been induced to rely upon representations, whether promissory or otherwise, and hence closer to tort.24

It is generally assumed that if the latter interpretation is correct, then the remedy should be limited to compensating the representee to the extent that he has relied. The English cases are not clear on what remedy

– reliance or the value of the promise – is appropriate where estoppel has been raised. Thus, while I think it is clear that, because of the strong similarity between the example and High Trees, Realty will be unable to claim back any of the remainder, it is possible that were similar facts put into a different setting Travel might be limited to enforcing Realty’s promise only to the extent that it had relied on that promise.

Case 12 would almost certainly be decided using estoppel, but it should be mentioned that in light of the ruling, in Williams v. Roffey Bros. & Nichols (Contractors) Ltd (discussed in Case 9),25 that performance of a pre-existing legal duty is good consideration if of practical benefit, Travel could also argue that, by not breaking the lease, it provided consideration for Realty’s promise (see Case 9). If this argument were successful, Realty could enforce the variation as a binding contract.

ireland

Realty will be unable to recover the extra amount of rent from Travel, despite the absence of consideration for its promise to accept half the agreed rent for the duration of the recession. This result flows from the doctrine of promissory or equitable estoppel which has been endorsed by the Irish courts.

In the case of Hughes v. Metropolitan Railway Company26 Lord Cairns stated that where a promise by a contracting party has the effect of leading the other party to suppose that the strict legal rights arising out of the contract will not be enforced and will be kept in suspense, the party making the promise will not be allowed to enforce those rights where it would be inequitable, having regard to the dealings which have thus taken place between the parties. In Central London Property Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd27

(hereinafter ‘the High Trees case’), Denning J stated obiter that he would