100 the enforceabilit y of promises

Cook44 (claims discharged in bankruptcy), Limitations Act 1980, s. 29(7) (statute of limitation – barred claims). Case 3(c), the promise to make good a debt unenforceable by reason of minority, is however still a valid exception to the consideration rule: see, for example, Williams v. Moor.45 There is no well-accepted explanation for why obligations incurred by minors are treated in this special way, nor for why English law once allowed a relatively large number of exceptions to the rules regarding past consideration.46

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The principle of past consideration again applies here (see Case 1). Although Ian now promises to pay the debt once owed by him to Anna, she must show that some form of consideration was provided by her or that a deed under seal was executed to this effect.

In Case 3(a), where Ian’s debt had been discharged in bankruptcy and Ian is now no longer legally bound to Anna, his subsequent promise to pay the debt is not legally binding as this subsequent promise is not supported by consideration (see Case 2).

The same principles apply in Case 3(b) where the debt is barred by the passage of time. In addition, s. 56 of the Statute of Limitations 1957 provides that where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt and the person liable therefor acknowledges the debt, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment. However, s. 58(1) of the Statute provides that every such acknowledgment shall be in writing and shall be signed by the person making the acknowledgment. Accordingly, an acknowledgment for the purposes of satisfying s. 56 of the Statute of Limitations 1957 has not been made and so no right of action has accrued to Anna under the statute to recover the debt.

Again, in Case 3(c), Ian is not contractually bound by his later promise to pay the debt where the debt was incurred when Ian was too young to be bound by his contract. Section 2 of the Infants Relief Act 1874 provides: ‘No action shall be brought whereby to charge any person upon any promise made after full age to pay any debt contracted during infancy or upon any ratification made after full age of any promise or contract made in infancy, whether there shall or shall not be any new consideration for such promise or ratification after full age.’