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Файл:Сравнение социальных моделей Европы. Социальная и трудовая политика в Европе. Монография
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5. The transfer of production to Saarlouis
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
Almussafes
7.8
7.8
6.2
7.9
5.8
6.5
Saarlouis
5.8
6.4
1.1
6.4
1.0
4.7
3
4
Meanwhile, at Ford-Saarlouis, the company and the union had agreed to
establish a third shift and to work 15 Saturdays and 16 Sundays between
September and December. Ford had also decided to manufacture a new
small vehicle in Saarlouis.
That is how things stood when, on the orders of the company’s international headquarters, the Ford Spain management gave an ultimatum to the
Almussafes plant unions. Either they sign an agreement with the company
by 25 September or production of the Focus would be transferred to Cologne. The company insisted on the production of 30,000 more vehicles per
year. It had already taken steps to switch production and had taken ten vehicles to Cologne to study how to assemble them there3. Even so, during the
negotiation of the collective agreement, IG Metall sent a message to the
Almussafes works council stating that no agreement had been reached with
Ford and, furthermore, the Saarlouis plant had reached the limit of its production capacity.
Table 1.
Labour costs. Annual percentages - production line workers
tions lasting 20 hours, the two sides reached a preliminary agreement which
was then ratified by workers at a mass meeting. In the end, it was surprising
how quickly agreement was reached given the extent and social impact of
the dispute. However, the company also announced that 68,000 Focus vehicles would not be produced at the Almussafes plant4.
of the two sides on certain issues, but also how much closer they were on
others. Rather than setting out the details of the agreement here, I will focus
on the issues of flexibility and job creation. In relation to job creation, the
Cinco Dias, 25 September 1998.
La Vanguardia, 2 November 1998.
Source: Ford. Spain, quoted in Cinco Diets, 17 September 1998
6. Agreement on flexibility and the effect on jobs
Finally, on 30 and 31 October 1998, after tense and protracted negotia-
The agreement highlighted important differences in the initial positions
91
agreement represented a compromise whereby temporary workers currently
1995
1999
UGT
14
15
CC.OO.
13
7
CGT
6
5
SPV
3
3
PUT
3
3
FAMIF
2 2 Total
41
35
employed by the company were to be incorporated into the workforce as the
situation returned to normal and production increased. So the 430 temporary
workers will continue working at the plant, with Ford finally agreeing to
renew the contracts it had already terminated. However, the temporary contracts were not converted into permanent contracts as the unions would have
liked.
Anyway, Ford will recruit 250 new workers in exchange for the unions’
agreement to convert collective ten-minute breaks into individual breaks.
This will allow the production of another 330 Focus vehicles per day. The
next step in the direction of creating more jobs will be the creation of a third
shift to run at full capacity.
With regard to working time flexibility, which was one of the main reasons for the dispute, the two sides agreed on voluntary Saturday working on
the basis of ten Saturdays per worker per year, to cope with fluctuations in
demand. Workers were to be compensated by overtime pay or through a
mixed formula including additional holiday. The agreement postponed the
reduction of the working week to 36.5 hours until the 2001 collective
agreement.
After the dispute ended and the collective agreement was signed, the union elections were finally held. The results strengthened the position of the
UGT: it obtained one more delegate on the Works Council. CC.OO. were
punished by the electorate and suffered a severe setback, losing six delegates. The CGT also lost a delegate. In other words, the unions that took a
radical position in the dispute lost ground in the elections, except the minority unions, who held their positions.
Table 2.
Composition of the Works Council. Number of delegates
92
7. Conclusions
5
This agreement, reached after a long process of conflict and negotiation,
illustrates the difficulties of negotiating increases in production and job creation.
Globalisation and the imbalance of power
This dispute highlighted the enormous advantages that globalisation
gives to multinational companies. It allows them to play workers and unions
in different countries off against each other as each set of workers tries to
keep and increase the number of jobs at their own plant. Big Brother Ford
put pressure on the Spanish workers by threatening first to transfer production of the Focus to Saarlouis in Germany, and later to close the plant.
Flexibility compared
It is paradoxical that most Focus production has ended up in Saarlouis
where the labour costs are higher5. It seems that labour costs are not always
the determinant factor in deciding plant location issues. Other forms of flexibility related to work organisation, workforce participation, vocational
skills and multi-skilling could have influenced the transfer of production.
These factors are influential in creating a more “flexible” labour system, one
which is more participatory in terms of company decision-making and even
in the organisation of production.
Wages and work organisation
The dispute highlighted the need to maintain similar pay levels and employment conditions at the various European plants, a task that the European
Works Council (EWC) should tackle if it wants to avoid workers being
blackmailed by the multinationals. It also highlighted the need to develop
common criteria for work organisation, modernisation and labour flexibility.
It was these issues that the company used to back up its main arguments and
to emphasise the comparative advantages of different plants.
Employment and flexibility
The final agreement showed how it is possible to create jobs and increase production (from 1,560 to 1,870 cars per day) through tighter work
organisation and intensive exploitation of fixed capital. The replacement of
ten-minute collective breaks by individual breaks eliminated the need to
stop production. Another 250 jobs were created to maintain this increased
In 1997, the labour costs per worker hour were 47.2 Marks in Germany and 25 Marks in
Spain. José Maria Alvarez, "Las Lecciones de la Ford" (Lessons of Ford), El Periódico, 2
November 1998.
93
rhythm of production. The establishment of a third shift will provide even
more jobs. However, the radicalisation of the unions’ position in the dispute
lost the chance of converting 430 temporary jobs into permanent ones.
Flexible working time is on the increase in the automobile industry. It
was agreed to work ten Saturdays on a voluntary basis in exchange for extra
pay and an extra holiday.
Fragmented representation
The dispute also highlighted the difficulties created by fragmented trade
union representation during negotiations. Six unions were competing in the
elections and, although there was a formal attempt to maintain a certain level of unity of action, their strong internal differences slowed progress and
even blocked negotiations altogether. The dispute also highlighted the wear
and tear inflicted on the unions by the electoral contest and the way elections can exacerbate divisions. But that is inevitable.
Public subsidies
Ford management should remember that the Almussafes plant received
thousands of millions of pesetas from public funds, including before it was
built more than 20 years ago. Receipt of such funds should be accompanied
by a moral and social commitment to the region's society on the part of the
company
Abbreviations
СC.OO. - Comisiones Obreras / Workers’ Commissions
UGT - Union General de Trabajadores / General Workers’ Union
CGT - Confederación General de Trabajadores / General Confederation of
Workers
FAMIF - Sindicato de Cuadros, Técnicos y Administrativos de Ford / Technical and Administrative Staff Union
SPV - Sindicato de Progreso Valenciano / Valencia Progressive Union (a
splinter from the CC.OO.)
PUT - Plataforma Unitària de Trabajadores / Unitary Platform of Workers
(a splinter from the CC.OO.)
94
European policy on immigration
Carlota S.
Spain, Barcelona, UAB
Summary
This article deals with European immigration control and integration policies as public policies. Control and integration are the two main drivers of
immigration policy. From a comparative perspective, the distinction between economic and political migration is made and the occupational and
labour situation for northern and southern European countries is presented.
Some of the differences between European countries in the interplay of control and integration policies are analysed in relation to transnationalism and
the construction of a European identity.
Introduction
In Spain, immigration policies considered as public policies, in other
words as government action programmes together with the actions and
measures that are implemented in society as a consequence of them, follow
two clear directions: the control of immigrants on the one hand, and their
integration on the other. This article concentrates on economic immigrants
from countries outside the European Union rather than non-economic immigrants from within the EU (people retiring abroad or moving abroad for
lifestyle reasons, etc). The article also adopts the distinction drawn by
Reyneri (1994) between legal and illegal immigrants on the basis of whether
or not they have entered the country legally and are legal residents, and between regular and irregular immigrants on the basis of whether or not they
work in the formal sector of the economy.
Policies aimed at controlling immigration are understood to be preventive and repressive public actions at state, regional or municipal level. Policies aimed at integration are social policies which in western European societies are closely linked to the welfare state. These involve sectoral actions
(labour policy, public health, social welfare, housing, etc) and their ultimate
goal is to integrate the human and cultural elements of immigration with
those of the host society in order to maintain social cohesion and prevent
conflict from the ethnocentric and insiderist perspective of the host society
(Solé 1981: 14-16).
Policies aimed at control can be divided into two main types: policing
policies, i.e. border control policy, and policies aimed at legalising or controlling illegal and/or irregular immigrants. Integration policies are much
95
less developed in the countries of the European Union, including Spain.
They are geared towards helping immigrants find work in the host country's
labour market and within its occupational structure, and they use grass-roots
organizations as an intermediate system for representing immigrants' interests in order to promote and, up to a point, ensure their inclusion in participative and political institutions. Social immigration policies aimed at integration are designed to avoid the exclusion of particular social groups.
Immigration in Europe
Migration is a historical phenomenon, and throughout history population
movements have been driven by the desire of human beings to have a good
or better life. Nevertheless, in today's world such movements are more
transnational and global than ever before (Pries 1999). Networks comprising
several different countries form units of production and redistribution on a
worldwide scale and in real time (Castells 1997). At the same time this
causes suspicion, uncertainty and indeed outright rejection on the part of the
people living in these countries. The phenomenon, which is linked with conflict, and, in public opinion, with crime, both globally and nationally, is
causing concern among the governments of many Western countries. The
'negative' impact of immigration on the host societies is magnified by its
coverage in the media, and this, together with the institutional framework
and actual circumstances in these countries, reinforces the subordination of
immigrants in the labour market and their social exclusion (Sole et al.
2001).
It is possible to draw a distinction between European countries which are
traditional destinations for immigrants and countries where the phenomenon
is more recent. This distinction is based not only on differences in the point
or period in history at which immigration flows have taken place, but also
on the different patterns with regard to the numbers, type and country of
origin of the immigrants, the way in which they settle in the host country,
their sociocultural integration and the extent of their political participation.
In general, the traditional immigrant destinations are the countries of northern Europe where workers and refugees from southern Europe and from war
zones have been arriving for more than 50 years. The more recent immigrant destinations are the countries of southern Europe which 50 years ago
were exporters of labour but have recently turned into a destination for economic migrants.
Keeping in mind the semantic and conceptual distinction made by both
scholars and public opinion between immigrants (defined in terms of their
96
ethnic group and country of origin, invisible to the local population, and
equated with people who are poor and not from the West) and foreigners
(who share the same race and culture as the local population and are equated
with Westerners), both the traditional and the more recent forms of immigration are opposed for two connected but distinct social reasons: the economic and the political (Criado 2001: 16). As far as the economic rationale
is concerned, the scarcity of resources, especially jobs and welfare benefits,
means that people are anxious to keep down the demand for these resources.
The more competition there is with immigrants for jobs or social services,
the more this is the case. It is for this reason that the social groups most vehemently opposed to immigration are the groups which are most directly
affected by it in a polarized and segmented labour market (Solé and Parella
2001: 43) and the groups which are least integrated in sociocultural terms.
As for the political rationale, in addition to the economic threat posed by
immigration, it is important to take into account what it means to be an alien
and not to be a citizen of the host country at a symbolic level and in terms of
identity (Criado 2001:19).
Migration flows began to increase after World War II. In the 1950s and
1960s, there was a rise both in the flows within European countries and in
immigration from former colonies (Algerians migrating to France, Indonesians to the Netherlands and Indians and Pakistanis to Britain, etc). Since
the 1980s we have also increasingly seen immigration into the European
Union from non-EU countries. In this context, a distinction can be drawn
between countries which have received a constant flow of economic and
political migrants from southern Europe and war zones since the end of
World War II (Germany, France, the UK, Scandinavia and the Netherlands)
and southern European countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece, which
have gone from being exporters of labour to destinations for immigrants.
Portugal is a special case, since it is both a source of immigrants to northern
Europe and a destination for immigrants from its former colonies. Since the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the South-North immigration flows from
North and West Africa have been supplemented by flows from eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union and its political catchment area. While much of the migration has been from eastern Europe to
Germany, other destinations include Austria, Scandinavia and central European countries with emerging economies such as Poland and the Czech Republic. Over the last 12 years, more or less, the ease with which it is possible to leave and re-enter many parts of central Europe has led to circular
97
flows through countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Russia of migrants seeking to earn a living as street traders, itinerant salesmen or beggars (Sassen 1999: 113-177; see also Tonnelli, in this issue).
In the 1980s it was relatively easy to distinguish between economic and
political migrants in terms of the countries they migrated to and the period
during which they did so. Southern Europeans looking for work migrated to
countries at the heart of Europe (Germany, France, the UK), whereas Scandinavia was the preferred destination for political refugees or asylumseekers from countries outside what was then the European Economic
Community and later became the European Union. However, this distinction is no longer so clear-cut. Economic migrants from outside the European
Union are now heading for countries in every part of Europe, irrespective of
whether they are in the North, Centre or South. In some countries such as
Germany, controls have recently been introduced on the numbers of political immigrants (asylum-seekers) since in many cases requests for asylum in
fact disguise what is in reality economic migration.
This fact is particularly significant with regard to immigrant employment. While in the 1980s immigrants were thought of as people in transit or
'guest workers' (Gastarbeiter), at the start of the new millennium they are
seen as potentially permanent residents who intend to enter the host society's job market for life. This has an impact on the continuity of illegal and
irregular immigration. Unlike the traditional immigrant destinations, the
migrant flows in countries which have only recently become destinations
consist mainly of people without residence or work permits since these can
only be obtained once an immigrant has entered the country as a result of
frequent legislative initiatives (regularisation initiatives) and ad hoc
measures. Huge numbers of this type of immigrant entered Italy in the
1970s, Spain in the 1980s and Greece and Portugal in the 1990s.
Bureaucratic inefficiency and a lack of experience with the phenomenon
of immigration make it impossible to come up with a realistic figure for the
total number of immigrants. Accurate figures are only available for legal
immigrants, since new permits are slow to be recorded and in many cases
permits which have expired are not removed from the official records. There
is also a lack of reliable statistics on the number of deportations of immigrants arrested by the police which have actually been carried out in practice, and on the numbers returned to their country of origin. Furthermore,
the statistics do not distinguish between new permits and renewals. Finally,
as Baganha and Reyneri point out, ' ... in the countries which have only re-
98
cently become immigrant destinations, workforce surveys are currently of
little use, since they only take account of households registered with the local authorities and hence they only cover the few immigrants who are already registered together with their wives and children, while failing to record immigrants who have come to the country on their own and are not registered, even if they have a valid residence permit" (Baganha and Reyneri
2001: 57-59). Nevertheless, it is possible to estimate the real numbers on the
basis of regional and local surveys and qualitative data on the settlements
where the majority of immigrants live.
Immigrant settlements are unevenly distributed throughout the countries
of southern Europe. Notwithstanding these differences between countries,
there are clear similarities between Italy and Greece with regard to the massive influx of Albanians and women from the Philippines in the 1990s, and
between Italy and Spain in the case of North African women who migrate to
these countries on their own for similar reasons. In Italy and Spain there are
a large number of temporary immigrants the majority of whom have migrated with the intention of sending as much money as possible back to their
country of origin as soon as they possibly can. There is also a minority of
young people who want to live in a less repressive and more modern society, i.e. who are attracted to the Western lifestyle. However, Italy and Spain
differ in terms of the percentage of total immigrant numbers coming from
North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. In Spain, for example, the proportion
of Moroccans is lower than in Italy, and the vast majority are joined by their
families once they have settled in Spain.
In southern European countries such as Portugal, Italy and Greece, it is
highly likely that refugees and asylum-seekers who initially arrive because
they are fleeing a war in their country of origin will later turn into economic
migrants. As a rule, migration flows into the countries of southern Europe
are characterised by being motivated by the economic, social and cultural
pull factors advertised through different communication channels, from migration chains to the media. In the case of economic migration, the decision
to emigrate is influenced by the image that the immigrants have of the host
society, irrespective of whether or not this image is based on fact (Baganha
and Reyneri 2001: 105-106).
99
Job market structure and the informal economy
Certain aspects of the structure of the job market in terms of economic
sectors and activities are different in traditional European immigrant destinations compared with countries where immigration is a more recent phenomenon. Industrialisation began later in southern Europe than in central
and northern Europe and never took root so deeply or spread as widely. The
percentage of jobs and people employed in industry is lower, and industrial
development did not last for as long. At the same time there has been a decline in the number of people employed in agriculture in southern Europe,
whereas in central and northern Europe the percentage of the working population employed in agriculture has remained constant at around 4% for several years, particularly in France. This explains why in the 1990s the service
sector grew more rapidly in southern Europe than in the rest of the European Union (Bagahna and Reyneri 2001: 132-134).
There are also differences between traditional and more recent immigration destinations in terms of the relationship between employment and social policies aimed at combating exclusion (Rodriguez Cabrero 2002: 115-
121). In accordance with the classic model of welfare state regimes described by Esping-Andersen (1990), there are three distinct regimes in the
traditional European immigrant destinations: 1) the liberal Anglo-Saxon
model (United Kingdom and Ireland), 2) the social democratic or Scandinavian model (Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands) and 3) the
corporatist continental model (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg). These regimes differ from what could be described as the fourth or
Mediterranean regime which is found in the more recent immigrant destinations in southern Europe (see Parella, in this issue). In these countries, the
welfare systems are less developed, although this has started to change since
the 1990s, and employment policy is not very active. The institution of the
family plays an important role by providing economic and social support in
the absence of comprehensive welfare policy measures.
With the exception of Portugal, which receives immigrants from African
countries where Portuguese is the official language, immigrants are faced
with the risk, known to them before they migrate, of repeatedly finding
themselves in an illegal situation, either on entering the host country or if
they decide to stay there. While in Portugal many immigrants have relations
or friends in the host society, this is much less likely to be the case for people migrating to Spain, Italy or Greece which have not been immigrant destinations for as long as Portugal. The risk of becoming an illegal immigrant
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