For several years JNFL have been disposing of LLW at Rokkasho without major problems and are currently proposing to site an ILW repository in the area. Consequently, more jobs and economic benefits to the local economy will result. It is possible to argue that the economic benefits for the Rokkasho area are proving to be very persuasive in terms of public confidence and acceptance of geological disposal of waste. For some, such benefits can be seen as bribery – for others they are seen as proper compensation for the national responsibility of hosting the repositories.

The two approaches for HLW and L/ILW in Japan provide some interesting messages for other countries. Involvement of the public in the siting of a proposed deep geological repository is essential and must be undertaken in a clear, transparent manner. However, the economic and social benefits of such a project must also be clearly recognised and not brushed under the carpet. Whether such benefits are seen as ‘‘compensation’’ or ‘‘bribery’’ depends on the viewpoint of the parties concerned.

9.4.3. Examples of communication styles in other countries

This section presents some approaches to confidence-building, particularly in relation to local communities and residents, in Finland, Sweden, France and the United Kingdom.

Attempts have been made in all these countries to communicate radioactive waste disposal issues in the context of site selection – whether for a URL or for a potential repository site. Success in terms of confidence-building can be evaluated by examining the progress of the respective waste management programmes.

The framework for communication activities has usually been defined via a legislative process in each country; in general, this process has recently stipulated that local people be involved in the decision-making process to a greater or lesser extent. In this way, legislation forces the agencies responsible for waste disposal to communicate their plans to all involved, with the expectation that progress will be made towards implementing a disposal system.

The styles of communication in the countries discussed in this section can be split into two general patterns (cf. styles of site selection in Chapter 4):

Inform-Review-Decide – a pattern currently followed in Scandinavia;

Decide-Announce-Defend – a pattern used in the past in France and the UK.

A summary of overall communication styles and systems is also given in Table 9.1.

9.4.3.1. Finland

Finland has nuclear power plants at two sites (Olkiluoto and Hastholmen) which have been in operation since the 1970s and generate around 25 per cent of the country’s electricity requirements. Posiva was established by the power companies in 1995 and has responsibility for disposal of SF (no reprocessing is undertaken in the Finnish programme). For L/ILW, shallow repositories have been constructed at the two power plant sites; these facilities have been in operation since 1992 and 1998, respectively, and have met with very little opposition at either site.

Decision-making on nuclear issues in Finland is based on the provisions of the Nuclear Energy Act of 1957 (with subsequent amendments), which states that construction of a nuclear facility requires a decision-in-principle by the government that the project is in line with the overall good of Finnish society (Avolahti and Vira, 1999;

Posiva initiated communication with four potential siting communities for a SF repository in 1997. Confidence-building activities included sponsoring of local organisations and events, production of information materials and interaction with local people, providing direct input for Posiva’s EIA report. This was backed up by press announcements and opinion polls. Despite the efforts to bring openness to the process and involve the local people, participation remained limited. There was some evidence that people became passive and tired of the EIA process and all the meetings, hearings and consultations it entailed (cf. voter apathy in the Wellenberg case). There was also some feeling that Posiva was not entirely committed to this new type of communication, particularly as Olkiluoto (which already had a nuclear facility) emerged rapidly as the preferred siting option (Kojo, 2001).

In 1999, Posiva submitted an EIA report and an application for a decision-in-principle for construction of a repository at the Olkiluoto site (Posiva, 1999). The public response to the EIA report clearly showed that municipalities that already hosted a nuclear facility were less suspicious and there even appeared to be an element of competition between such communities for the repository, which was seen as bringing economic benefit. In the reaction to the final disposal project at Olkiluoto, around 50 per cent of the local people felt that their views had been taken into account, while around 50 per cent of policy-makers felt that there had been sufficient opportunity for people to express their views. Ultimately, the local council approved proposed siting of the repository by 20 votes to 7 (Litmanen, 1999; Vaatainen, 2000; Seppala, 2001).

The significance of the Finnish experience can be summarised as follows:

The decision-making process is defined by legislation, requiring an EIA and an application by the implementing organisation for a decision-in-principle by the government;

The EIA requires social impacts to be assessed at candidate sites, forcing the implementer into proactive communication with local people;

The need for local involvement is strengthened by the power of municipalities to veto involvement in the siting process;

Final selection of the Olkiluoto site for the decision-in-principle was based on expected social impact, i.e., social acceptability was the final criterion for site selection (cf. list of siting criteria noted in Chapter 4).

Social acceptability is more readily achieved in communities with experience of nuclear facilities.

9.4.3.2. Sweden

Sweden has 12 nuclear power plants and a basic policy of phasing out nuclear power, although there are no deadlines. SKB began research into the geological disposal of SF in the 1970s. In the 1980s, several sites were investigated but none was considered suitable and local opposition tended to be strong. SKB then introduced the concept of ‘‘voluntariness’’, whereby communities throughout Sweden were invited from 1992 to volunteer for feasibility studies (no actual field work). Finally, following a lack of response, existing nuclear sites were encouraged and invited to volunteer and, in 1995, eight municipalities then showed an interest. Dialogue with the public was seen to be a crucial part of these feasibility studies and a local SKB information office was set up in each municipality. The municipalities responded by setting up their own feasibility study group to handle contacts with SKB. Public meetings and debates were held, SKB personnel visited schools and

workplaces, study visits were arranged to other SKB facilities and to the SF transport ship MS Sigyn (Andersson et al., 1998; SKB, 2000a,b, 2001).

No discussion of confidence-building in Sweden would be complete without a reference to the ‘‘Oskarshamn model’’ (Ahagen et al., 1999; Carlsson et al., 2000, 2001). The Oskarshamn community has a long association with the nuclear industry, hosting both a reactor and the CLAB facility for storage of SF. In 1992, the site was considered by SKB for a SF encapsulation plant. The municipality then attached two conditions to any discussions of the project: (1) municipality participation in discussions should be paid from the Nuclear Waste Fund and (2) SKB and the licensing authorities would accept formation of a Forum for Environmental Impact Assessment (Westerlind and Hedberg, 2000). These requests were met and the EIA Forum started work in 1994; a project office (LKO Local Competence Building) was also set up with a full-time project manager. Its activities involved the local population, as well as neighbouring municipalities. The EIA process in this case has proved to be an appropriate and effective framework for public involvement as it allows stakeholders to participate, while maintaining their independence for future decisions. The Forum is not simply fed with information by government or implementer and the public and environmental groups are considered to be key players in the process. This model was also applied following SKB’s request to the Oskarshamn community in 1995 regarding hosting of a SF repository.

In brief, the philosophy of the Oskarshamn model is:

Complete openness and participation, with the public being aware that their involvement will have a real influence on decision-making;

The local municipality council is the reference group, giving local politicians an opportunity to increase their knowledge and to prepare for coming decisions;

The regulators (SKI) are involved early in the EIA process and act as the peoples’ experts;

SKB’s working environment has to be sufficiently demanding to allow questions coming from different angles to be answered. This is termed ‘‘stretching’’ experts and allows their authenticity to be evaluated.

The significance of the Swedish experience can be summarised as follows:

Communication in Sweden follows the overall line of the Oskarshamn model;

The EIA Forum is the focus for communication activities (although SKB does have its own communication programme), providing a vehicle for delivering and debating information;

The communication process is proactive, with information being actively sought and evaluated by stakeholders;

Public and environmental groups are seen as resources in the EIA process.

9.4.3.3. France

France has an extensive nuclear programme, which includes reprocessing of SF for overseas customers. The programme started in the 1940s to create nuclear weapons capability, with the first reactors being built for production of weapons-grade plutonium. The industry developed in the 1950s with the construction of reactors for domestic and commercial use. Compared to countries like Sweden and Finland, France’s massive nuclear programme generates around 75 per cent of its total electricity requirement (ASN, 2000).

Andra, the implementing organisation, was founded in 1979 and began a search for sites for URLs for research on HLW disposal. This search was based on technical considerations, with little public involvement. The resulting strong opposition to Andra’s activities led to a realisation that public acceptance was a criterion of equal importance similar to technical considerations and, consequently, to a change in approach at the beginning of the 1990s, when the situation was evaluated by a Member of Parliament, Christian Bataille, who made a call for ‘‘democracy’’ in the French programme. This was followed in 1991 by the Nuclear Waste Act, which stipulates construction of at least two underground laboratories, involvement of the local population and politicians in site investigations and the establishment of Local Information Committees (LIC), thus marking a shift from an authoritarian approach to one that recognised the importance of dialogue. A fifteen-year time frame was allocated for the work. Three candidate sites for a URL were identified and Andra adopted a strategy of ‘‘friendly neighbourhood communication’’ as demonstrated by:

The formation of local agencies with Andra staff recruited and living in the area, including trained public relations personnel intended to act as an interface with local people;

The establishment of local visitors’ centres;

Sponsoring of local groups;

Production of materials for local information.

This change in approach acknowledged that building confidence was no longer a luxury but a necessity and marked a distinct change from Andra’s earlier approach, where technical considerations alone drove programmes (see comments in Chapter 4). Ultimately, however, the somewhat formalised LIC communication system that had seemed so promising proved to be fairly fragile, in that it was not flexible enough to channel and contain conflict outside the LIC mechanism.

In 1998, the government designated only one site, Bure, for a URL but, at the same time, the government stipulated that a second site should be sought in granite (‘‘Mission Granite’’). This requirement was never transparently explained and met with fierce opposition – effectively marking a reversal in style and a return to the top-down communication approach. As a result, the ‘‘Mission Granite’’ was recalled in 2000 (Barthe and Mays, 2001).

The significance of the French experience can be summarised as follows:

France has effectively changed its approach to confidence-building three times in the past 20 years, moving from little effort in the 1980s to the procedure defined by the Nuclear Waste Act and then, more recently, back to the top-down approach.

The system set up by the Act proved to be somewhat controlling and inflexible, with groups not included in the Local Information Committee process causing controversy outside the system. In addition, even groups within the system were at times refused access to certain reports as they were deemed to be too sensitive (e.g., for defence reasons).

The reversal in style in the late 1990s, when a granite site was sought for a URL, probably caused a loss of confidence in the legislative process and in Andra’s activities.

More recently, Andra submitted information on the possibility of constructing a HLW repository in clay or granite in 2005 and the government oversight committee, CNE,