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- •Preface
- •Acronyms
- •Introduction
- •Background and objectives
- •Content, format and presentation
- •Radioactive waste management in context
- •Waste sources and classification
- •Introduction
- •Radioactive waste
- •Waste classification
- •Origins of radioactive waste
- •Nuclear fuel cycle
- •Mining
- •Fuel production
- •Reactor operation
- •Reprocessing
- •Reactor decommissioning
- •Medicine, industry and research
- •Medicine
- •Industry
- •Research
- •Military wastes
- •Conditioning of radioactive wastes
- •Treatment
- •Compaction
- •Incineration
- •Conditioning
- •Cementation
- •Bituminisation
- •Resin
- •Vitrification
- •Spent fuel
- •Process qualification/product quality
- •Volumes of waste
- •Inventories
- •Inventory types
- •Types of data recorded
- •Radiological data
- •Chemical data
- •Physical data
- •Secondary data
- •Radionuclides occurring in the nuclear fuel cycle
- •Simplifying the number of waste types
- •Radionuclide inventory priorities
- •Material priorities
- •Inventory evolution
- •Assumptions
- •Errors
- •Uncertainties
- •Conclusions
- •Acknowledgements
- •References
- •Development of geological disposal concepts
- •Introduction
- •Historical evolution of geological disposal concepts
- •Geological disposal
- •Definitions and comparison with near-surface disposal
- •Development of geological disposal concepts
- •Roles of the geosphere in disposal options
- •Physical stability
- •Hydrogeology
- •Geochemistry
- •Overview
- •Alternatives to geological disposal
- •Introduction
- •Politically blocked options: sub-seabed and Antarctic icecap disposal
- •Sea dumping and sub-seabed disposal
- •Antarctic icesheet disposal
- •Technically impractical options; partitioning and transmutation, space disposal and icesheet disposal
- •Partitioning and Transmutation
- •Space disposal
- •Icesheets and permafrost
- •Non-options; long-term surface storage
- •Alternatives to conventional repositories
- •Introduction
- •Alternative geological disposal concepts
- •Utilising existing underground facilities
- •Extended storage options (CARE)
- •Injection into deep aquifers and caverns
- •Deep boreholes
- •Rock melting
- •The international option: technical aspects
- •Alternative concepts: fitting the management option to future boundary conditions
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Site selection and characterisation
- •Introduction
- •Prescriptive/geologically led
- •Sophisticated/advocacy led
- •Pragmatic/technically led
- •Centralised/geologically led
- •Conclusions to be drawn
- •Lessons to be learned (see Table 4.2)
- •Site characterisation
- •Can we define the natural environment sufficiently thoroughly?
- •Sedimentary environments
- •Hydrogeology
- •The regional hydrogeological model
- •More local hydrogeological model(s)
- •Crystalline rock environments
- •Lithology and structure
- •Hydrogeology
- •Hydrogeochemistry
- •Any geological environment
- •References
- •Repository design
- •Introduction: general framework of the design process
- •Identification of design requirements/constraints
- •Concept development
- •Major components of the disposal system and safety functions
- •A structured approach for concept development
- •Detailed design/specifications of subsystems
- •Near-field processes and design issues
- •Design approach and methodologies
- •Design confirmation and demonstration
- •Interaction with PA/SA
- •Demonstration and QA
- •Repository management
- •Future perspectives
- •References
- •Assessment of the safety and performance of a radioactive waste repository
- •Introduction
- •The role of SA and the safety case in decision-making
- •SA tasks
- •System description
- •Identification of scenarios and cases for analysis
- •Consequence analysis
- •Timescales for evaluation
- •Constructing and presenting a safety case
- •References
- •Repository implementation
- •Legal and regulatory framework; organisational structures
- •Waste management strategies
- •The need for a clear policy and strategy
- •Timetables vary widely
- •Activities in development of a geological repository
- •Concept development
- •Siting
- •Repository design
- •Licensing
- •Construction
- •Operation
- •Monitoring
- •Research and development
- •The staging process
- •Attributes of adaptive staging
- •The decision-making process
- •Status of geological disposal programmes
- •Overview
- •Status of geological disposal projects in selected countries
- •International repositories
- •Costs and financing
- •Cost estimates
- •Financing
- •Conclusions
- •Acknowledgements
- •References
- •Research and development infrastructure
- •Introduction: Management of research and development
- •Drivers for research and development
- •Organisation of R&D
- •R&D in specialised (nuclear) facilities
- •Introduction
- •Inventory
- •Release of radionuclides from waste forms
- •Solubility and sorption
- •Waste form dissolution
- •Colloids
- •Organic degradation products
- •Gas generation
- •Conventional R&D
- •Engineered barriers
- •Corrosion
- •Buffer and backfill materials
- •Container fabrication
- •Natural barriers
- •Geochemistry and groundwater flow
- •Gas transport and two-phase flow
- •Biosphere
- •Radionuclide concentration and dispersion in the biosphere
- •Climate change
- •Landscape change
- •Underground rock laboratories
- •URLs in sediments
- •Nature’s laboratories: studies of the natural environment
- •General
- •Corrosion
- •Cement
- •Clay materials
- •Degradation of organic materials
- •Glass corrosion
- •Radionuclide migration
- •Model and database development
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Building confidence in the safe disposal of radioactive waste
- •Growing nuclear concerns
- •Communication systems in waste management programmes
- •The Swiss programme
- •The Japanese programme
- •Examples of communication styles in other countries
- •Finland
- •Sweden
- •France
- •United Kingdom
- •Comparisons between communication styles in Finland, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom
- •Lessons for the future
- •What is the way forward?
- •Acknowledgements
- •References
- •A look to the future
- •Introduction
- •Current trends in repository programmes
- •Priorities for future efforts
- •Waste characterisation
- •Operational safety
- •Emplacement technologies
- •Knowledge management
- •Alternative designs and optimisation processes
- •Materials technology
- •Novel construction/immobilisation materials: the example of low pH cement
- •Future SA code development
- •Implications for environmental protection: disposal of other wastes
- •Conclusions
- •References
- •Index
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Research and development infrastructure |
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Fig. 8.6. GMT: construction of the 1:10 scale concrete silo. The engineers in the hole are standing on the bentonite/sand buffer between the silo and the host rock (image courtesy of Nagra and RWMC).
seal weld, given that very high reliability is a necessity and, because of the high radiation field, the task will need to be done remotely. Only recently was friction stir welding finally chosen over electron beam welding as the preferred technique for further development (SKB, 2005).
8.3.2. Natural barriers
8.3.2.1. Geochemistry and groundwater flow
As noted in Chapter 3, the main safety functions of the geosphere are to:
isolate the wastes to avoid inadvertent human intrusion or malevolent use of the waste;
protect the engineered barriers i.e., provide an environment in which the engineered barriers can perform as required; and
contain the radionuclides in the waste by providing natural barriers such as low groundwater flow, sorption onto the surrounding rocks, etc.
The first of these functions is simply achieved by placing the wastes at such a depth that they are, and will remain, beyond the reach of most human actions.
The second function – protection of the engineered barriers – mostly relates to the compatibility of the engineered barriers with the geochemistry of potential sites. The proposed use of copper canisters for the containment of spent fuel in the Swedish and Finnish disposal concept provides a classical example. The containment function of the canisters will persist for at least one million years with respect to corrosion resistance provided that the copper is not exposed to high levels of dissolved oxygen or sulphide in the groundwater. These requirements, derived from the relevant R&D, are used to inform siting decisions. However, there is ongoing R&D to explore the situation whereby future
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A. Hooper |
glaciations could force oxygenated water to the depth of a repository, where chemically reducing conditions exist today, or whereby other natural occurrences such as earthquakes could compromise the integrity of the containers emplaced in a repository. The output from such R&D is fed directly into the SA for such a concept.
Similarly, the required performance of the bentonite buffer in the most HLW disposal concepts in providing a low-permeability, diffusion-controlled, barrier can be compromised by degradation of the clay by high potassium-containing or highly saline groundwaters. Again the results of R&D are used to direct siting decisions and to provide the information necessary to model the deterioration of the buffer in SAs.
For cementitious repository concepts, another compatibility issue is the interaction of hyperalkaline leachates with the mildly alkaline to neutral host rock. There is now a significant body of data which indicates that that the secondary minerals that form due to the reaction of the plume with the host rocks have the general tendency to seal up the system (e.g., Linklater, 1998; Smellie et al., 2001; Ma¨der et al., 2004).
The general point to be made is that the geochemistry of the chosen site and the engineered barriers need to complement each other and this can generally only be decided following extensive R&D.
The third safety function of the geosphere, containment of radionuclides, is primarily achieved by low-groundwater flow through the repository and by retardation of radionuclides in the surrounding rocks which, again, is primarily a function of the local geochemistry.
Many radionuclides may be retarded during their migration through the EBS and the host rock by a range of chemical processes that are generically termed sorption (Fig. 3.6). To represent this, most safety assessment models use a factor, known as a Kd value, which represents the equilibrium distribution of radionuclide between solid and liquid phases. In the past, assignment of reliable Kd values or distribution coefficients has been problematic and based on observation from equilibrium sorption experiments and empirical corrections. This is discussed in reviews of the use of sorption data in safety assessments for crystalline rocks (Nagra, 2002a,b) and clays (Mazurek et al., 2006). In recent years, however, sufficient advances have been made in understanding chemical sorption mechanisms that Kd values used in assessments can now be supported by more mechanistic modelling specific to the materials and groundwater conditions that are being represented (NEA, 2001a, 2005a,b).
The results of the NEA Sorption Project Phase II show that the conceptual and methodological tools for characterising, interpreting and justifying Kd values provided for SA needs are largely available (NEA, 2005b). The final report recommends that future R&D efforts should be focussed on the development and demonstration of an optimised approach to experimental characterisation and interpretation of radioelement sorption on complex materials, guided by thermodynamic sorption modelling.
8.3.2.2. Gas transport and two-phase flow
As noted above gas will be produced in the EBS and it could lead indirectly to a radiological hazard if the gas flow were sufficient to disturb the natural groundwater flow pattern and cause contaminated groundwater to reach the surface more quickly than it would do otherwise. This has been the subject of a number of experimental and modelling studies (e.g., Nirex, 1996) and is still the subject of significant R&D effort. For example, in the (Gas Migration Test (GMT)) project at Grimsel, RWMC of Japan