power of veto over site selection procedures. This has meant that their needs have widely established the modus operandi of communication procedures. Indeed, this style has ensured that progress towards site selection and implementation is well underway in both Finland and Sweden, suggesting that confidence has effectively been built in the local host communities. This can be compared to the slower progress being made in France and the UK. If the progress of a waste management programme is to be the criterion for judging the success of communication and confidence-building efforts, it is clear that the more open ‘‘Scandinavian’’ approach has met with much more success.

9.5. Lessons for the future

If there was a simple way to build confidence and trust, there would be no need for the continuing debate on the problem and waste management would not be a contentious issue. But clearly the problem still exists. However, in the light of the experience from the different programmes described in this chapter, some broad conclusions and suggestions for ways forward can be made.

Technical experts (especially industry ‘‘insiders’’) often forget that waste disposal is an emotional issue and it cannot be addressed simply in a dry technical manner. Feelings run strong and scientists have to learn to address the issues of concern in a more engaging manner. In this sense, a waste disposal programme is like a sporting event such as figure-skating: while technical merit and an ability to perform the technical components of the programme to the required standard are essential, artistic impression is equally important in convincing people to ‘‘vote’’ in favour of a proposal.

Clearly, building confidence in the nuclear industry’s ability to safely dispose of waste must be put in the context of an overall communication strategy which identifies the key concerns of the different technical and non-technical groups. As can be seen from the programmes discussed in this chapter, an inclusive, flexible, open approach is optimal, but there must be a clearly defined purpose. The overall strategy should demonstrate the honesty, openness and high-level technical competence of all involved organisations, including implementer, regulator, non-governmental organisation, opponent, etc. It should also show consistent policy and the use of technical arguments, which both recognise the concerns of all groups and acknowledge the importance of dialogue. There must also be clearly defined messages. The question of whose confidence is being built is also relevant. The technical experts must have sufficient confidence in what they are promoting. Without this, it will be impossible to communicate confidence to a wary public. Technical reliability and safety have to be fully endorsed by the experts. Thus, again using the sporting analogy, the ‘‘technical merit’’ aspects of waste disposal programme must gain full marks when it is judged.

Continuing the sporting theme, artistic impression is where waste disposal programmes usually lose marks. People cannot appreciate or understand the significance of the technical work and have little or no confidence in it as there is often no positive emotional connection. In terms of building confidence, and the obstacles to be overcome, some of these negative concerns and emotions are generic and can be viewed on an international scale (fear of radiation, mistrust of authorities, the NIMBY syndrome). In this respect, groups such as the NEA’s Forum on Stakeholder Confidence provide a valuable setting for exchange of experience. However, there are definite national

differences and caution should be exercised when applying experience from one country to the situation in another. Lessons have to be tailored to each programme’s experiences and culture. Along the same line, the phenomenon of group memory or perception also plays a strong role. People’s perception of a project, and their confidence in it, are necessarily affected by what has gone before and this is particularly programme-specific. Project timescales are also an important factor affecting group perception. Waste disposal projects are inherently long-term in nature, but this can lead to problems if things ‘‘drag on’’ for too long. For example, after almost eight years of intensive campaigning on the part of supporters and opponents at Wellenberg, not even an exploratory drift was constructed. People do become tired of an issue and may eventually reach the stage where they simply ‘‘wish it would go away’’. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that many programmes score so badly where ‘‘artistic impression’’ is concerned.

Closely associated with the issue of confidence-building in the nuclear field is the concept of risk. This is probably the most difficult aspect to convey as, in general, many societies are becoming risk-averse, with people wishing to avoid exposure to any perceived threat. This is illustrated by recent health panic involving the outbreak of SARS in Asia, which caused a severe drop in airline passenger traffic, bird flu (again in Asia) and ‘‘mad cow’’ disease (predominantly in Europe), resulting in an ongoing crisis in confidence in the food industry. Where health is linked to science, individuals become increasingly worried about risk. For example, the issue of genetically modified food crops is hugely emotive, particularly in Europe where they are often termed ‘‘Frankenstein foods’’. With people becoming increasingly conservative and risk-averse, it is important to show that the benefits of a project will outweigh the disadvantages. What benefit is there in a repository? Unlike other engineering projects such as roads and bridges, and even nuclear power plants, there is nothing inherently attractive or beneficial about a waste disposal facility, other than perhaps the compensation payments involved. Relying on people’s wider sense of responsibility – to the nation as a whole or to future generations – is simply not enough.

9.6. What is the way forward?

It is clear that confidence-building and communication activities can no longer be a oneway process of simply providing information, however open and transparent this may be. It must be a two-way process – a dialogue – which considers both technical and nontechnical groups as a resource and provides them with the opportunity to be involved in decision-making processes at a stage where they feel they do have some influence. Unless people can identify with a project and it becomes part of their ‘‘landscape’’, they will not have confidence in it. Similarly, the concept of compensation should not be presented as simply a payment for accepting a facility that no one else wants. Talk is now of outreach and co-existence, which, although containing a financial element, are much more about integration with a community in a way that people can identify with.

This involvement of people mirrors the United Nations Rio Declaration of June 1992 on the Environment and Development, where Principle 10 states that ‘‘Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have . . . the opportunity to participate in

decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available’’. Indeed, legislation at all levels is now increasingly calling for people to be involved in decision-making and it is now acknowledged that such involvement is a necessity rather than a luxury. However, observing the letter of the law and simply paying ‘‘lip-service’’ to such requirements is not enough. The spirit behind the provisions also has to be observed. Legal requirements should not result in situations that are excessively rigid or formalised. Rather than one single system for public involvement, there should be the possibility to adapt and enhance processes to achieve the best results. Public participation is not simply about building confidence in this respect, but is also about making better decisions, with the public being seen as a resource.

Finally, there has been a tendency in recent years to make waste disposal the ‘‘big issue’’, particularly when using it as a weapon to argue against nuclear power. There is also a view that the nuclear industry should have tackled the problem from the very beginning. However, irrespective of when the efforts begin, the bottom line is that the waste exists and it has to be disposed of appropriately. Projects will ultimately have to be implemented. In this respect, it is important to strike a balance; while confidence and trust are a sine qua non of any programme, so too are technical credibility and demonstrated safety and the mechanisms required to implement radwaste repositories without undue delay.

9.7. Acknowledgements

This work is published with the permission of the Executive Director of the British Geological Survey (NERC). The authors would also like to thank Heinz Sager (Nagra, Switzerland) for brain-storming sessions and Dr. Charles McCombie (McCombie Consulting, Switzerland) and Dr. Hideki Sakuma (JAEA, Japan) for their helpful comments.

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