Стратегія співпраці сша з україною

Дякую панові Голові за запрошення виступити на цій представницькій конференції, я хотіла б сьогодні виступити як американська громадянка, а не як офіційний представник. Я буду говорити про Балто–Каспійський регіон як про певне цілісне утворення, що знаходиться в центрі уваги тих, хто думає про майбутнє розширення Європи. Я хотіла б розказати вам про формулювання американської національної стратегії безпеки і оборони: як ця стратегія збігається з ситуацією в регіоні та якою є роль України в цьому регіоні. США мають намір і далі працювати з Україною, поглиблюючи євроатлантичне співробітництво, бо Україна сприймається нами як дуже важливий елемент євроатлантичних структур, хоча вона теоретично продовжує підтримувати зв’язки зі Сходом.

Американська стратегія збігається з тими заявами, які виголошував пан Кучма в Ялті минулого року. Ми говорили, що нам потрібна велика Європа без розподільних ліній, і наша політика повністю збігається з нашим баченням цієї Європи. Я хотіла б процитувати те, що сказав президент Рузвельт 1944 року: Ми навчилися тому, що ми не можемо жити у світі поодинці, ми навчилися тому, що наш добробут залежить від інших країн, які можуть знаходитися дуже далеко від нас. Я думаю, що це справедливо для країн регіону. І міжнародна, і американська спільнота добре розуміють, які ризики та загрози стоять перед цими країнами. Зі свого особистого досвіду ми розуміємо, як важко протистояти таким проблемам, як порушення прав людини, розповсюдження зброї, як важко боротися з організованою злочинністю. Я хотіла б підкреслити, що ці проблеми не є монополярним колом, діалогом, що стосується тільки національних стратегій у період після холодної війни. США розробили нову національну стратегію за часів президентства Клінтона, її головна мета — розширення безпеки США та розвиток економічних реформ й підтримка боротьби за збереження прав людини в інших країнах.

Я вважаю, що пан Шер вже сказав те, що я зараз хочу сказати. Ми чудово розуміємо, що досягти нашої мети можна передусім через розвиток відносин між військовими і цивільними. Ідеєю безпеки мають займатися дійсно експерти, які змогли б оцінити її. Ми бачимо три загрозливі сценарії. Перший — це великомасштабна агресія міжнародного характеру, другий — невеликі, локальні конфлікти, на зразок Балканського, третій — асиметричні загрози (під ними я розумію нетрадиційні змови, тобто без використання звичайного озброєння). Ми вважаємо, що до 2015 року в нас буде ще складніша картина загроз і ризиків, що можуть виникнути у майбутньому. Але після 2015 року ми все ж таки сподіваємося побачити згуртованішу, безпечнішу Європу.

Особливу увагу я хотіла б приділити нашому співробітництву з Україною, оскільки стратегія НБ — це те, чим ми всі займаємося, і яка передбачає роботу і над військовою стратегією, і над воєнною доктриною. Усі розуміють, що настав час реструктуризації, реформування збройних сил з тим, щоб мати можливість оперативної сумісності з військами країн НАТО за проведення спільних операцій. Я вважаю, що для України дуже важливо продовжувати працювати над її воєнною доктриною і добиватися чіткішого визначення того, що є необхідним для нових Збройних Сил України. Я знаю, що над цим працюють у Міністерстві оборони України. Хочу сказати, що тут є три моменти: чисельність, реагування і готовність. Від чисельності залежить структура збройних сил, які, зрештою, мають бути готові швидко реагувати та діяти відповідно до майбутніх сце-наріїв.

Варто сказати про воєнну участь США у подіях у цьому регіоні. Ми дуже хочемо бачити в країнах регіону надійних партнерів і добиваємося цього через наші двосторонні відносини, програму ПЗМ, структури в межах ЄС. Але я вважаю, що межі цієї інтеграції залежать від того, чи допомагатимемо ми державам досягти запланованого ними рівня власного розвитку. Країни регіону зараз орієнтуються на євроатлантичну інтеграцію та прямують у європейському напрямі. Президент Кучма також сказав, що Балто–Каспійський регіон і відновлення Великого шовкового шляху є дуже важливими для України. Я також підтримую цю ідею і вважаю дуже важливим, щоб країни були не «споживачами безпеки», а мали вплив на формування системи цієї безпеки.

За такого підходу країни регіону, по–перше, мають орієнтуватися на євроатлантичну інтеграцію, пріоритети та цілі відповідних структур та організацій. По–друге, потрібна економічна рівність за допомогою донорів (Балтійський регіон — яскравий приклад такого партнерства). По–третє, країни регіону повинні мати дуже чіткі цілі, реальні для виконання в конкретних часових рамках.

У співробітництві з Україною та іншими країнами ми сподіваємося виробити принцип верховенства права, допомогти розбудувати ринкову економіку, створити громадянське суспільство, забезпечити цивільно–військові відносини. Мене досить часто запитують, що таке відносини між цивільними і військовими, особливо в цьому регіоні. В Україні, принаймні на конституційному рівні, ця проблема включена до відповідних документів. Проте між пересічними громадянами, недержавними організаціями, що займаються цим питанням на громадських засадах, та тими, хто реалізує цю політику на рівні уряду, існує дуже слабкий практичний зв’язок. Те саме можна сказати й щодо питань реагування в надзвичайних ситуаціях. Ми вважаємо, що розвиток демократії у Балто–Каспійському регіоні відіграє ключову роль при демпфіруванні певних конфліктів на етнічному грунті. На мій погляд, Росія (як зазначав мій колега з цієї країни), територія якої охоплює весь регіон, може відігравати конструктивну роль не лише в програмі ПЗМ, а й у роботі інших організацій безпеки. Я читала звіт Інституту дослідження питань миру в США, в якому висловлено ідею (добру чи погану — не знаю) щодо ключової ролі трикутника: Європа — Росія — США. Всередині цього трикутника вирішуються всі питання, у тому числі верховенства права і захисту навколишнього середовища. Цей діалог має бути відкритим і чесним.

На завершення я хотіла б все ж таки розглянути окремо Балтійський регіон. Я вважаю, що Балтійський регіон являє собою приклад євроатлантичної інтеграції. І Балтійська асамблея, і Рада міністрів працюють у цьому напрямі. Ви, мабуть, знаєте і про оборонні інституції, які також працюють на всіх рівнях. Програма допомоги Балтійським країнам з питань безпеки об’єднує 14 країн світу. Кожна держава має право на колективну та індивідуальну оборону, право захищати свої кордони, незалежність і цілісність території.

Щодо України, то я згодна з д–ром Шером, що це ключова одиниця в Балто–Каспійському регіоні. Ми повністю підтримуємо євроатлантичну інтеграцію України. Коли Україна та інші країни переглядають свої стратегії національної безпеки, їм слід мати чіткі пріоритети та орієнтири. Плани мають бути реальними для виконання в конкретних часових рамках і орієнтувалися на міжнародне співробітництво. Тільки це допоможе вам успішно інтегруватися в євроатлантичну спільноту.

Carlo BELLINZONA, Italy

PARTICULARITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY OF ITALY

Let me first of all thank the organisers of this important initiative for the kind invitation, on behalf of the Italian Military Centre for Strategic Studies and myself.

It is a pleasure to intervene in front of such a distinguished audience and I am confident this occasion will help strengthening the ties between our countries. I would like to offer my personal view, coming form my direct experience as a scholar living in the Italian reality; therefore, I am personally responsible of the ideas expressed in this contribution, that should not be considered as an official point of view.

I do believe in the role of strategic study centres or so called «think tank» in conceiving ideas and opinions and in easing the discussion.

Having this in mind, last year I kept in contact with this Centre and other Ukrainian ones in order to ease a wider, reciprocal knowledge and a deeper discussion on security items.

Ukraine has become an increasingly important partner for Italy and the European Union and the debate on Ukraine’s National Security Strategy should not be limited to internal policy makers, since it is of European interest.

Therefore, I would like to stress the importance of the beginning and development of ongoing activities of cooperation, thus improving the reciprocal knowledge between Italy and Ukraine, in particular in the field of education. For our country the geopolitical scenario in which Ukraine operates has special links in a present and future view. Therefore, let me introduce some Italian security aspects in a general perspective.

An outline of Italian perspective on security policy

Eleven years after the fall of the Berlin wall are a very short time. However, the impact of events and their connections stimulate today a completely new vision and dimension of the international reality.

One particular issue of this period, which is particularly difficult to define, is that each Country is requested to become an active player of its own security, a «security producer», because there is not anymore a potential external umbrella offering a shelter from crisis and emergencies. Talking about security policy, we must consider the responsibility of each country in order to act in a new and complex architecture of security, thus sharing the new international duties.

This means relying on international organizations in which Italy is strongly involved, in order to maintain peace thanks to a vision that considers all countries as equal.

It is critical therefore to underline that Italy is the fourth contributing country to the United Nations budget and the fifth for involvement in ongoing missions in the United Nations rankings. All these considerations testify the relevance of our contribution.

Until 1989, Italy had developed a liaison role between the Atlantic Alliance and NATO’s southern chessboard, also because of the fragile sixty kilometers of border with Yugoslavia.

Once again the Kosovo campaign has confirmed Italy as the pillar of NATO’s strategy in the region. Italian participation (from 1993 on) in demanding peacekeeping missions out of national borders, qualifies the assumption of responsibility and the will to develop, together with other nations, a primary role in prevention and management of crisis.

Through the difficult and complex activity in Somalia (UNOSOM — better known as operation «Ibis»), and the less known operation ONUMOZ in Mozambique, called «Albatros», Italy took clear and consistent charge of military tasks.

Since the end of 1995, the year of the Dayton Agreements, Italy has acted in the context of IFOR in Bosnia—Herzegovina and our soldiers, patrolling «Snipers Alley», were guarantors of a turning point in a terrible inter—ethnic war.

This was the very beginning of new tasks and new commitments for the Italian Army abroad.

SFOR is the continuation of the mission in Bosnia—Herzegovina and the Italian presence, slightly reduced as the other contingents, still continues without a predictable end.

In Sarajevo there’s a continuous rotation of the Projection Force’s five Brigades; at the same time, Italy is committed to KFOR. At the present time, more than eight thousand soldiers are deployed out of the country.

In relation to this point, Italy is the second country after the United States of America for amount of soldiers overall deployed on the territories of former Yugoslavia.

A particular mention goes to the operation INTERFET, developed in East Timor, under the UN patronage and the leading role of Australia to accomplish a humanitarian mission. It has been a relevant experience for a small contingent of about six hundred men, highly qualified and appreciated.

I’m referring to the paratroopers battalion, but also to the aircraft transport component, which operated with great efficiency in the small runways of Timor, and to the Navy personnel that has made afflux and presence in the area possible.

Last but not least, I personally think that is important to talk about the operation «Alba», which has allowed to stop a serious crisis in Albania in 1997 and brought a thirteen Nation’s contingent to act with a MPF (Multinational Protection Force) formation, led by Italy, in an extremely delicate situation that could have developed into an internal conflict. The relevance of the Italian military commitment on the field strongly qualifies its international duty.

This effort is an element that must be emphasized because it has been realized in connection with a reform of the military service, not yet completed (the law that create a fully professional military service is being discussed by the Parliament).

The Army has been able to enrol thirty thousand volunteers (in 1993 there were only five thousand volunteers), and has achieved an high level of operational standard.

The KFOR Italian Brigade has been responsible up to now for the Sector of Pec and Italy will be in charge of the next KFOR command; this demonstrate that the army has acquired attitude to out–of–area operations and the capacity of holding very consistent turn–over rhythms, satisfying also contemporary commitment in different theatres (e.g. SFOR/IFOR/INTERFET missions).

Italian policy in Ukraine’s area of interest

The core issue of my presentation comes from the fact that I believe that in the present situation this area is of real interest for European security. We do believe that the region has got a role in itself for its historical background and the cultural heritage of the population.

Furthermore, Central Eastern Europe is a bridge to the neighboring areas, allowing to connect Western Europe to Central Asia natural resources.

Given this scenario, many different International Institutions, both regional and Euro—Atlantic, operate in this area; to this extent, we should immediately refer to the importance of the Partnership for Peace initiative, which means the involvement of the main regional security organization (NATO) in the area.

To a NATO founder as Italy is, the commitment and reliance of many Central European countries in the cooperation with the Alliance confirm the validity of the values of freedom and sovereignty defended by NATO since 1949.

To this concern, the cooperation with Ukraine in the partnership is an important example of positive interaction between Central Eastern Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.

In parallel with the PfP, we should stress the valuable bilateral cooperation between NATO members in building peacekeeping forces; Ukraine has a long–lasting commitment in NATO–led stabilization operations in the Balkans.

We live in a period in which security is becoming increasingly global and we must widen our strategic approach in order to monitor unstable areas, strategically close, but geographically far away.

To this concern, we are pleased to recall the close cooperation of Italy and Ukraine in preserving peace and security, also in the critical region of south Lebanon, that is a strategic area for the whole Mediterranean security.

Regional cooperation does not refer only to NATO and it involves not only security, but also a broader dimension, in particular the economic one.

The economic partnership with the European Union, albeit obstructed by a restrictive vision on economic interests, has become a main factor in the relations between EU nations and Central Eastern European countries. In this sector, the multilateral cooperation could be easily completed by bilateral cooperation and common investment projects in the sector of highest strategic value.

In both cases, namely protection of security and economic growth, it is a clear Italian interest to have a European continent free from crisis and confrontations.

A possible solution to protect such interests is to sustain and enhance the role of regional organizations, which are an effective tool in order to link different countries united by common interests and goals.

As far as the Baltic area, in which we are not directly involved, is concerned, we are pleased by every cooperative posture towards the region, that could contribute to soften tensions. The build up of multinational units ensures the openness and sharing of common goals of the security policy. But more easily, the economic cooperation related to EU framework should diminish the worries of the countries of the region. In the area of Black Sea and Caspian, we welcome the GUUAM initiative, aiming at solidarity between different countries that share a common goal of development and cooperation.

On the other hand, we would be worried by the growth of coalitions willing to affirm particular interests against general ones. No more new walls in Europe!

We believe it is not enough to have possible areas of conflict far away from our borders. It is critical for us to have no more troubles in the continental political and economic domains and to have again new great political unsteadiness. We are not unrealistically thinking to a single European reality under a political and economic point of view, stretching to the end of the continent’s geographical borders. This is a long term scenario, probably outside the reach of our generation.

Different areas will probably come into being where cooperation will be more intense and where the economic and security relations will be more integrated. Other areas, will experience less rigid forms of cooperation. This doesn’t mean we must abandon the objective of aiming to a general co operation including all the countries of the Euro—Atlantic community.

The reality of economic interests encourages us to examine the Caucasus and Caspian as areas strictly bound to Europe.

It is well–known how Italy is dependent on the raw materials which are also supplied by this region. This is particularly true in relation to the energy resources.

The national industry’s involvement in the exploitation and transportation of these resources in Asia and elsewhere is equally well recognized.

From a political point of view, this implies the defense of our national interests which involve a special attention on our side to the stability of the area and to any other aspect guaranteeing the most efficient and peaceful co operation towards the common economic progress.

We are thus ready to support any cooperation where our national technological and financial input is directed towards the advantage of both, including the one of other economic partners.

There is no need to remember that economic profitability cannot violate our compliance with international laws and fair mutual relations. We do not accept for example the use of force through the threat or the actual use of military assets in areas beyond national boundaries. Thus we cannot encourage a strategic system relying on the commercial interests alone. On the contrary, every and each time tensions or crises arise in areas that, because of their position, are of strategic prominence for the continental actors, the community shall intervene in time, in a cooperative form, to re–establish peace. In this effort, the measures of crisis prevention are essential. We cannot think, in principle, that peace–keeping experiences conducted, for instance, in the area of Eastern Mediterranean cannot be repeated in the areas of tension in Caucasus and Central Asia.

Of course, this entails a bigger effort to improve the means for action in the European countries. This is why we deem vital that everyone take part in such an effort of appeasement and dialogue.

Moreover, the earlier our crisis prevention activities will be, the lighter our engagement.

With reference to this crucial aspect of crisis prevention, I feel compelled to stress the role of Russia, which I have not mentioned so far, as I was focusing on the conference main subject. Nevertheless, it is essential to consider Russia as a fundamental player in European security, enjoying an extremely high priority in the relationships with NATO in the consultation^ow. Acting as lecturer in some Italian universities, I have often recalled the historical image of IFOR’s command structure in which the Russian Brigade presence was not only a novelty, but a milestone of the new European security dimension. In relation to this fundamental point, only dialogue and a continues interaction could allow co operation in Europe to be truly effective. I have already mentioned the positive experience of Alba operation, conducted by an international coalition, with a mandate from the United Nations.

Such operations of support to Institutions in countries that are threatened by insurrections of different nature can be successfully repeated, on condition that it is built a stable international context of reference, based on United Nations’ capability of quickly taking and imposing decisions.

Lastly, we must underline the security dimension that came to the stage in these later times. I am referring to the threat that comes from activities of the international organised crime, the real negative actor of our times. An attitude of maximum cooperation in this field is only dutiful among European governments, because facing a crime that does not know borders the only actions that can effectively oppose it come from cooperation at an international level.

Short Conclusions

My country has been directly involved in peace–building activities for several years. It also sustained highly costly efforts.

Furthermore, Italy has proposed a substantial reform of the United Nations Security Council, in order to improve real effectiveness and capability to fastly intervene at the beginning of crisis world wide. Also, Italy wishes to maintain in the NATO framework strong relations with Ukraine as it plays a crucial role in the security architecture of Europe. However, everybody has to accept that in the international relations field only a formula could be a winner: «consultation and cooperation»

Розділ IІ

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТА ПРІОРИТЕТИ ПОЛІТИКИ І СТРАТЕГІЇ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ КРАЇН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЇ ЄВРОПИ

Mr. Ratal DOMISIEWICZ, Poland

PARTICULARITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY OF POLAND

It is a great honour to be able to speak before the gathering of such distinguished guests. As a representative of the National Security Bureau, which oversees the work of the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine, I wish to emphasise the strong commitment of the President of Poland to cultivating the strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine. This commitment arises from the fundamental tenet of Poland’s raison d’etat that there cannot be an independent and sovereign Poland without an independent and sovereign Ukraine. My gracious hosts need not be reminded that Poland was the first country to recognise the independence of Ukraine. Having become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and a candidate for accession to the European Union, Poland welcomes and supports the Euro–Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine I am convinced that the strategic relationship between our countries will constitute one of the foundations of European security in the future.

The agreement to dissolve the Soviet Union, signed by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus on December 1991, accelerated the radical transformation of the international security environment. Freed from the constraints of the Warsaw Pact. Poland regained an opportunity to shape its destiny. Guiding the direction of the Polish state’s international development into the post–Cold War era, the new foreign policy agenda, as outlined in 1991 by the then Polish Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, envisioned Poland’s participation in the creation of a new cooperative pan–European security system centred on a reformed OSCE and incorporating other security organizations, notably the North Atlantic Alliance. The emphasis on a cooperative security framework evidenced Poland’s early and thereafter consistent support for the following basic principles of a national security strategy as well as a new European security order: solidarity, integration, and cooperation. These principles lie at the basis of Polish security policy, the cardinal objective of which is ensuring the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful and democratic development of the Polish state.

Solidarity — borne out of the experience of Poland’s opposition movement to communism — adds an ethical imperative to international relations: the international community cannot shrink from the responsibility for resolving internal conflicts in which violations of human rights occur. Poland too would have to participate in the international community’s safeguarding of security. Thus, there has arisen a consensus that the security policy of the Polish state would not be renationalized. Setting out to become a constitutive component of a new European security system, Poland would have a security policy that is consistent with the security strategy of the international organizations tasked with security management, most importantly the UN, OSCE and NATO.

Integration has become a strategic imperative for overcoming the Yalta–sanctioned division of the European continent, and, in effect, for in building and cooperating Europe. In 1992, our post–Cold War national security policy declared Poland’s membership in the European Union and NATO as the priorities of our foreign and security policy. What is more, we have believed from the start that the expansion of the Euro–Atlantic structures must not limited to the area west of the Bug River. On the contrary, integration — based on the willful participation of the states involved — must encompass all of Europe Let it be clear to all: this process cannot be reversed.

In parallel with the drive for entry into the Euro–Atlantic political and defence structures, Poland has launched bilateral and multilateral initiatives to stimulate and entrench cooperation with its neighbours. Polish security policy has been buttressed by the treaties of friendship, cooperation and good neighbourly relations signed with the neighbouring stales to the east, south and west of Poland. These treaties regulate the basic questions of bilateral relations, confirm the inviolability of the existing borders, and lay foundations for peaceful cooperation, today. Ireland has no ethnic or territorial conflicts on its borders. Our country has become an advocate of inter–state cooperation at regional and sub–regional levels.

The international environment underlying the security policy of Poland in the 1990s does not give reason to suppose that Poland could be threatened by a large–scale military confrontation. On the contrary, local conflicts and tensions are the likely security threats alongside such «new» security threats as ethno–nationalist upheavals, terrorism, transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, and ecological disasters. The process of changes in the East has raised security concerns for Poland, which has to be prepared for potential ethnic tensions, migratory/refugee movements as well as economic turmoil. However, Poland has embraced the new geostrategic opportunities to ensure security in Central and Eastern Europe.

Dealing with the broadly–defined security threats of the future has highlighted the imperative of international cooperation and internationalization of Polish security policy. In light of the Assumption of Polish Security Policy and the Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, signed on 2 November 1992 accession of Poland to NATO the EU and the WEU has been declared the strategic objective of the Polish state.

Why NATO? Looking retrospectively at the critical role played by NATO in conflict management in Europe in the past decade, rationalization of Poland’s Euro–Atlantic option seems redundant. However, considering NATO’s «open–door policy» and the on–going process of NATO enlargement, I would like to briefly delineate basic determinants of that option, Poland’s membership in NATO (and the future membership in the EU) — in other words, the enlargement of the Euro–Atlantic institutions — expands the sphere of European slability and security. Poland has successfully realized one of the central aims of its foreign and security policy by joining not the Cold War–era Atlantic Alliance, but NATO that has undergone fundamental reform and adaptation to a transformed geo–strategic environment. NATO, which functions today on the basis of dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of collective defence capability, cannot be regarded as a threat NATO is conducive to the entrenchment of democracy and free market economy, the minimization of conflicts, internationalization of security policy, and the fostering of a unique community of values as stipulated in Article I of the Washington Treaty. The political and military instruments of the Alliance have successfully been tested in the Balkan wars. Finally, NATO guarantees the presence on the European continent of the United States — a country that came to Europe’s rescue four times in this century!

Because the attainment of our country’s membership in NATO on 12 March 1999 made the 1992 Security Policy and Defence Strategy obsolete work began on devising a new national security strategy. Let me now briefly review the background to the drafting of the national security strategy. Work on the 1992 security policy was initiated on the directive of the then President of Poland Lech Walensa and executed by an inter–departmental team led by the chief of the National Security Bureau. The members of that team were drawn from the Ministries of National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Office of the Council of Ministers, Central Planning Office, the General Staff, and the National Security Bureau. The draft of that security policy was discussed at the meetings of the State Defence Committee and the parliamentary committee on national defence. The final document was approved by the State Defence Council on 2 November 1992.

In 1999 work on the new national security strategy was conducted by experts from the government ministries. Specialists from the presidential National Security Bureau only gave opinion on the draft. The new Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland was approved by the council of Ministers on 4 June 2000, and the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland was approved by the Ministerial Council on 23 May 2000.

The new Polish national security strategy recognizes that the membership of Poland in NATO has changed our geopolitical and geo–strategic position in the context of a still fluid European security environment. Poland has become part of a successful defence alliance guaranteeing security and creating conditions for stable development that will be additionally strengthened upon Poland’s entry to the EU. The entry of Poland as well as Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO does not raise new lines of division in Europe. One of the fundamental principles of our strategy is that Poland does not seek to enhance its security at the expense of the security of other states (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 1.2.2), but endeavours to maintain an open character of Euro–Atlantic integration, accompanied by an intensification of cooperation with the states outside of the Euro–Atlantic structures (2.6).

We have consistently championed the «open door policy» of NATO. We support next rounds of NATO enlargement We are vitally interested in a constructive development of relations between NATO and our neighbours to the East within the framework of the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council the enhanced Partnership for Peace program, the Permanent Joint NATO—Russia Council, and last but not least, the NATO—Ukraine Commission (3.2.1).

European security space is indivisible. Poland attaches great importance to bilateral and multilateral relations with the stales in Eastern Europe. As a future member of the EU, and concomitantly a party to the Schengen Agreement, we will work hard to ensure that our eastern border will not become a barrier to cooperation, but instead, we will enhance the border infrastructure in order to facilitate trans — border exchange of goods, people, and ideas.

Relations with the Russian Federation are one of the priorities of our foreign and security policy. They must be conducted on the basis of pragmatism, mutual confidence and transparency. We will continue to address Russian anxieties about NATO enlargement by making a convincing case that this process is not a zerosum game.

In fact, NATO enlargement brings the zone of stability closer to Russia. A stable and secure environment on Russia’s borders should impact positively on Russia’s democratization and defence reform.

As far as the latter is concerned, let me say that we are studying carefully the new Russian concept of national security unveiled early this year. particularly regarding the use of tactical nuclear forces.

Russia occupies an integral part in the construction of new European security architecture. President of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, made this clear during his meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in July this year. In the words of our President: «ensuring security on our continent is not possible without the participation of the Russia in the shaping of a new peaceful political military order.»

Poland strives to continue and expand cooperation with Russia in economic, cultural and scientific spheres.

The success of the market reform program in the Russian Federation as well as other states in Eastern Europe is in Poland’s interest as it has serious ramifications on our economic security (2.5). There is room for increased economic cooperation, for instance between the north– eastern voivodships of Poland and the Kaliningrad Oblast.

We emphasize once again that the strengthening of the sovereignty of Ukraine and ensuring its territorial integrity is fundamental to the new European security order.

Poland supports Ukraine’s Euro–Atlanlic aspirations just as Ukraine supported our accession to NATO. We remember this and are thankful for your support. We were the main advocate of Ukraine in its efforts to gain membership in the Council of Europe and we have supported its participation in the Central European Initiative and the Weimar Triangle. We will continue to support Ukraine’s case for entry into the World Trade Organization, which would facilitate the expansion of trade in East–Central Europe.

We would like to add greater dynamism to our economic relations. Ukrainian membership in the WTO is a prerequisite for its joining the Central European Free Trade Agreement. Without a healthy, growing economy a strong international position of Ukraine cannot be certain, therefore, early agreement with Ukraine concerning the provision of Polish expert advice for the reform of Ukrainian economy.

Energy security of Poland and Ukraine is another crucial aspect of our political and economic relations. Dialogue as well as joint projects in this area should continue. We argue strongly that the building of new pipelines for the delivery of gas and oil from Russia to Western Europe must take into account the economic and geostrategic interests of Ukraine.

We need to ensure that the movement of goods, people and ideas across our border continues, while devising means to pool our efforts in the fight against crime. Cooperation between Poland and Ukraine must continue at all levels. The number of institutional fora committed to this end — only to mention the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Ireland and Ukraine at the top level — attest to the intensily of cooperation. Trilateral cooperation, involving Canada and the United States, should be pursued and new avenues for the intensification of such a cooperation should be explored.

We advocate a continuing NATO–Ukraine relationship on the basis of the NATO—Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership signed on 8 July 1997. We are committed to enhancing strategic partnership linking Warsaw and Kiev The Polish—Ukrainian Battalion is a perfect example of the fruits of military cooperation. Since July 2000, Polish and Ukrainian troops have been serving in lhe Kosovo mission. Let me remind you finally that the Polish Embassy) in Kiev currently holds the status of a NATO Contact Point Embassy.

Poland hopes for normalization of relations with Belarus. However, this cannot be attained due to the attitude that the President of Belarus has taken in relation to democratic institutions and the democratic process. The situation of the Belarus economy is also worrisome. We are concerned about the military implications of evolving integration between Belarus and the Russian Federation. Concentration of conventional forces in close proximity to Polish border constitutes a challenge to Polish security (2.3). We hope that thanks to internal efforts and the engagement of the international community, the situation in Belarus will improve and the country will join the community of democracies.

Security in the Baltic Sea region is another priority area Poland supports the integrative arrangements of the Baltic stales (BALTBBAT, BALTNET, BALTRON, BALTEFCOL), and cooperation within the framework of the Membership Action Plan and «PfP+.» We welcome the Partnership Charter signed in January 1998 the United States with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, hoping that it will accelerate the Baltic states progress on the way to the Euro–Atlantic structures. Poland maintains an «enhanced partnership» with Lithuania One important aspect of this is the military cooperation, as exemplified by the establishment of cooperation between the arms industries of both countries, the transfer of Polish equipment to the Lithuanian Army and the creation of a Polish–Lithuanian battalion (LITPOLBAT).

Augmenting bilateral cooperation with our neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe is our active engagement in forms of multilateral cooperation. The national security strategy underlines Poland’s desire to increase regional cooperation (3.4.2). Euro–regions are platforms for inter–state cooperation that we continue to develop. We hope that dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the Visegrad Group will be particularly conducive to Slovakia’s Euro–Atlantic aspirations. We support strongly the membership of Slovakia in NATO.

Political and economic cooperation spanning the Baltic—Black—Caspian Sea area is very important to Poland’s security interests. Poland is an active participant in the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Central European Free Trade Agreement and an observer in the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation We feel that economic relations should be stimulated thanks to the GUAM strategic partnership linking Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Poland is committed to the progress of the Baku—Supsa—Odessa—Brody—Gdansk energy connection.

The new multi–dimensional security challenges in a globalized context of the XXI century demand treating the international system in a holistic approach. National security interests today are interdependent The Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland recognizes this and affirms Poland’s ambition to remain a link between East and West, drawing Russia, Ukraine and other East European states into the Euro–Atlantic community.

Розділ IІ

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ ТА ПРІОРИТЕТИ ПОЛІТИКИ І СТРАТЕГІЇ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ КРАЇН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЇ ЄВРОПИ

Mr. Ratal DOMISIEWICZ, Poland

PARTICULARITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICY OF POLAND

It is a great honour to be able to speak before the gathering of such distinguished guests. As a representative of the National Security Bureau, which oversees the work of the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine, I wish to emphasise the strong commitment of the President of Poland to cultivating the strategic partnership between Poland and Ukraine. This commitment arises from the fundamental tenet of Poland’s raison d’etat that there cannot be an independent and sovereign Poland without an independent and sovereign Ukraine. My gracious hosts need not be reminded that Poland was the first country to recognise the independence of Ukraine. Having become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and a candidate for accession to the European Union, Poland welcomes and supports the Euro–Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine I am convinced that the strategic relationship between our countries will constitute one of the foundations of European security in the future.

The agreement to dissolve the Soviet Union, signed by the leaders of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus on December 1991, accelerated the radical transformation of the international security environment. Freed from the constraints of the Warsaw Pact. Poland regained an opportunity to shape its destiny. Guiding the direction of the Polish state’s international development into the post–Cold War era, the new foreign policy agenda, as outlined in 1991 by the then Polish Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, envisioned Poland’s participation in the creation of a new cooperative pan–European security system centred on a reformed OSCE and incorporating other security organizations, notably the North Atlantic Alliance. The emphasis on a cooperative security framework evidenced Poland’s early and thereafter consistent support for the following basic principles of a national security strategy as well as a new European security order: solidarity, integration, and cooperation. These principles lie at the basis of Polish security policy, the cardinal objective of which is ensuring the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful and democratic development of the Polish state.

Solidarity — borne out of the experience of Poland’s opposition movement to communism — adds an ethical imperative to international relations: the international community cannot shrink from the responsibility for resolving internal conflicts in which violations of human rights occur. Poland too would have to participate in the international community’s safeguarding of security. Thus, there has arisen a consensus that the security policy of the Polish state would not be renationalized. Setting out to become a constitutive component of a new European security system, Poland would have a security policy that is consistent with the security strategy of the international organizations tasked with security management, most importantly the UN, OSCE and NATO.

Integration has become a strategic imperative for overcoming the Yalta–sanctioned division of the European continent, and, in effect, for in building and cooperating Europe. In 1992, our post–Cold War national security policy declared Poland’s membership in the European Union and NATO as the priorities of our foreign and security policy. What is more, we have believed from the start that the expansion of the Euro–Atlantic structures must not limited to the area west of the Bug River. On the contrary, integration — based on the willful participation of the states involved — must encompass all of Europe Let it be clear to all: this process cannot be reversed.

In parallel with the drive for entry into the Euro–Atlantic political and defence structures, Poland has launched bilateral and multilateral initiatives to stimulate and entrench cooperation with its neighbours. Polish security policy has been buttressed by the treaties of friendship, cooperation and good neighbourly relations signed with the neighbouring stales to the east, south and west of Poland. These treaties regulate the basic questions of bilateral relations, confirm the inviolability of the existing borders, and lay foundations for peaceful cooperation, today. Ireland has no ethnic or territorial conflicts on its borders. Our country has become an advocate of inter–state cooperation at regional and sub–regional levels.

The international environment underlying the security policy of Poland in the 1990s does not give reason to suppose that Poland could be threatened by a large–scale military confrontation. On the contrary, local conflicts and tensions are the likely security threats alongside such «new» security threats as ethno–nationalist upheavals, terrorism, transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, and ecological disasters. The process of changes in the East has raised security concerns for Poland, which has to be prepared for potential ethnic tensions, migratory/refugee movements as well as economic turmoil. However, Poland has embraced the new geostrategic opportunities to ensure security in Central and Eastern Europe.

Dealing with the broadly–defined security threats of the future has highlighted the imperative of international cooperation and internationalization of Polish security policy. In light of the Assumption of Polish Security Policy and the Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland, signed on 2 November 1992 accession of Poland to NATO the EU and the WEU has been declared the strategic objective of the Polish state.

Why NATO? Looking retrospectively at the critical role played by NATO in conflict management in Europe in the past decade, rationalization of Poland’s Euro–Atlantic option seems redundant. However, considering NATO’s «open–door policy» and the on–going process of NATO enlargement, I would like to briefly delineate basic determinants of that option, Poland’s membership in NATO (and the future membership in the EU) — in other words, the enlargement of the Euro–Atlantic institutions — expands the sphere of European slability and security. Poland has successfully realized one of the central aims of its foreign and security policy by joining not the Cold War–era Atlantic Alliance, but NATO that has undergone fundamental reform and adaptation to a transformed geo–strategic environment. NATO, which functions today on the basis of dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of collective defence capability, cannot be regarded as a threat NATO is conducive to the entrenchment of democracy and free market economy, the minimization of conflicts, internationalization of security policy, and the fostering of a unique community of values as stipulated in Article I of the Washington Treaty. The political and military instruments of the Alliance have successfully been tested in the Balkan wars. Finally, NATO guarantees the presence on the European continent of the United States — a country that came to Europe’s rescue four times in this century!

Because the attainment of our country’s membership in NATO on 12 March 1999 made the 1992 Security Policy and Defence Strategy obsolete work began on devising a new national security strategy. Let me now briefly review the background to the drafting of the national security strategy. Work on the 1992 security policy was initiated on the directive of the then President of Poland Lech Walensa and executed by an inter–departmental team led by the chief of the National Security Bureau. The members of that team were drawn from the Ministries of National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Office of the Council of Ministers, Central Planning Office, the General Staff, and the National Security Bureau. The draft of that security policy was discussed at the meetings of the State Defence Committee and the parliamentary committee on national defence. The final document was approved by the State Defence Council on 2 November 1992.

In 1999 work on the new national security strategy was conducted by experts from the government ministries. Specialists from the presidential National Security Bureau only gave opinion on the draft. The new Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland was approved by the council of Ministers on 4 June 2000, and the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland was approved by the Ministerial Council on 23 May 2000.

The new Polish national security strategy recognizes that the membership of Poland in NATO has changed our geopolitical and geo–strategic position in the context of a still fluid European security environment. Poland has become part of a successful defence alliance guaranteeing security and creating conditions for stable development that will be additionally strengthened upon Poland’s entry to the EU. The entry of Poland as well as Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO does not raise new lines of division in Europe. One of the fundamental principles of our strategy is that Poland does not seek to enhance its security at the expense of the security of other states (The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 1.2.2), but endeavours to maintain an open character of Euro–Atlantic integration, accompanied by an intensification of cooperation with the states outside of the Euro–Atlantic structures (2.6).

We have consistently championed the «open door policy» of NATO. We support next rounds of NATO enlargement We are vitally interested in a constructive development of relations between NATO and our neighbours to the East within the framework of the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council the enhanced Partnership for Peace program, the Permanent Joint NATO—Russia Council, and last but not least, the NATO—Ukraine Commission (3.2.1).

European security space is indivisible. Poland attaches great importance to bilateral and multilateral relations with the stales in Eastern Europe. As a future member of the EU, and concomitantly a party to the Schengen Agreement, we will work hard to ensure that our eastern border will not become a barrier to cooperation, but instead, we will enhance the border infrastructure in order to facilitate trans — border exchange of goods, people, and ideas.

Relations with the Russian Federation are one of the priorities of our foreign and security policy. They must be conducted on the basis of pragmatism, mutual confidence and transparency. We will continue to address Russian anxieties about NATO enlargement by making a convincing case that this process is not a zerosum game.

In fact, NATO enlargement brings the zone of stability closer to Russia. A stable and secure environment on Russia’s borders should impact positively on Russia’s democratization and defence reform.

As far as the latter is concerned, let me say that we are studying carefully the new Russian concept of national security unveiled early this year. particularly regarding the use of tactical nuclear forces.

Russia occupies an integral part in the construction of new European security architecture. President of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, made this clear during his meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in July this year. In the words of our President: «ensuring security on our continent is not possible without the participation of the Russia in the shaping of a new peaceful political military order.»

Poland strives to continue and expand cooperation with Russia in economic, cultural and scientific spheres.

The success of the market reform program in the Russian Federation as well as other states in Eastern Europe is in Poland’s interest as it has serious ramifications on our economic security (2.5). There is room for increased economic cooperation, for instance between the north– eastern voivodships of Poland and the Kaliningrad Oblast.

We emphasize once again that the strengthening of the sovereignty of Ukraine and ensuring its territorial integrity is fundamental to the new European security order.

Poland supports Ukraine’s Euro–Atlanlic aspirations just as Ukraine supported our accession to NATO. We remember this and are thankful for your support. We were the main advocate of Ukraine in its efforts to gain membership in the Council of Europe and we have supported its participation in the Central European Initiative and the Weimar Triangle. We will continue to support Ukraine’s case for entry into the World Trade Organization, which would facilitate the expansion of trade in East–Central Europe.

We would like to add greater dynamism to our economic relations. Ukrainian membership in the WTO is a prerequisite for its joining the Central European Free Trade Agreement. Without a healthy, growing economy a strong international position of Ukraine cannot be certain, therefore, early agreement with Ukraine concerning the provision of Polish expert advice for the reform of Ukrainian economy.

Energy security of Poland and Ukraine is another crucial aspect of our political and economic relations. Dialogue as well as joint projects in this area should continue. We argue strongly that the building of new pipelines for the delivery of gas and oil from Russia to Western Europe must take into account the economic and geostrategic interests of Ukraine.

We need to ensure that the movement of goods, people and ideas across our border continues, while devising means to pool our efforts in the fight against crime. Cooperation between Poland and Ukraine must continue at all levels. The number of institutional fora committed to this end — only to mention the Consultative Committee of the Presidents of Ireland and Ukraine at the top level — attest to the intensily of cooperation. Trilateral cooperation, involving Canada and the United States, should be pursued and new avenues for the intensification of such a cooperation should be explored.

We advocate a continuing NATO–Ukraine relationship on the basis of the NATO—Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership signed on 8 July 1997. We are committed to enhancing strategic partnership linking Warsaw and Kiev The Polish—Ukrainian Battalion is a perfect example of the fruits of military cooperation. Since July 2000, Polish and Ukrainian troops have been serving in lhe Kosovo mission. Let me remind you finally that the Polish Embassy) in Kiev currently holds the status of a NATO Contact Point Embassy.

Poland hopes for normalization of relations with Belarus. However, this cannot be attained due to the attitude that the President of Belarus has taken in relation to democratic institutions and the democratic process. The situation of the Belarus economy is also worrisome. We are concerned about the military implications of evolving integration between Belarus and the Russian Federation. Concentration of conventional forces in close proximity to Polish border constitutes a challenge to Polish security (2.3). We hope that thanks to internal efforts and the engagement of the international community, the situation in Belarus will improve and the country will join the community of democracies.

Security in the Baltic Sea region is another priority area Poland supports the integrative arrangements of the Baltic stales (BALTBBAT, BALTNET, BALTRON, BALTEFCOL), and cooperation within the framework of the Membership Action Plan and «PfP+.» We welcome the Partnership Charter signed in January 1998 the United States with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, hoping that it will accelerate the Baltic states progress on the way to the Euro–Atlantic structures. Poland maintains an «enhanced partnership» with Lithuania One important aspect of this is the military cooperation, as exemplified by the establishment of cooperation between the arms industries of both countries, the transfer of Polish equipment to the Lithuanian Army and the creation of a Polish–Lithuanian battalion (LITPOLBAT).

Augmenting bilateral cooperation with our neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe is our active engagement in forms of multilateral cooperation. The national security strategy underlines Poland’s desire to increase regional cooperation (3.4.2). Euro–regions are platforms for inter–state cooperation that we continue to develop. We hope that dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the Visegrad Group will be particularly conducive to Slovakia’s Euro–Atlantic aspirations. We support strongly the membership of Slovakia in NATO.

Political and economic cooperation spanning the Baltic—Black—Caspian Sea area is very important to Poland’s security interests. Poland is an active participant in the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Central European Free Trade Agreement and an observer in the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation We feel that economic relations should be stimulated thanks to the GUAM strategic partnership linking Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Poland is committed to the progress of the Baku—Supsa—Odessa—Brody—Gdansk energy connection.

The new multi–dimensional security challenges in a globalized context of the XXI century demand treating the international system in a holistic approach. National security interests today are interdependent The Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland recognizes this and affirms Poland’s ambition to remain a link between East and West, drawing Russia, Ukraine and other East European states into the Euro–Atlantic community.

PARTICULARITIES AND PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND PіOLICY OF ROMANIA

The first draft of the National Security Strategy of Romania was submitted to the Supreme National Defence Council on 6 March 1997. Subsequently, it went through several revisions in order to reflect current developments in doctrine and practice. It was finally approved in its definitive form by the Supreme National Defence Council on 18 June 1999 and presented to ajoint session of the two chambers of Parliament. The basic tenets of the Security Strategy were also incorporated in the National Sustainable Development Strategy of Romania, which was endorsed by the Government in July 1999.

The international context

The terms of reference of any national security strategy necessarily have to cover at least a general outline of the probable evolution of the international environment in which the proposed strategy is expected to operate. Two basic elements have been identified as predominant trends shaping the security picture in today’s world: a) the new reality of power with the attendant restructuring of the international system and b) the multifaceted impact of globalisation.

The former bipolar system, characteristic for almost five decades of the Cold War, is being replaced by what some analysts described as a uni—multi—polar system. The United States has emerged as the single superpower having the capability to project its interests on a global scale, while having to deal with a varying but limited number of regional powers. A gradual, insidious process is under way tending to replace the political–legal and economic–financial system that was built in the aftermath, and according to the outcome, of the Second World War. How this new disposition of the authentic factors of power is going accredit a different set of values and therefore different institutional and legal arrangements is still unclear.

The effects of a large–scale implementation of information technology in conjunction with a breakthrough in communications have already wrought significant changes in various areas of human endeavour. They illustrate the uneven spread, over time and proceeds much faster than the «classical» exchange of goods, services and cultural assets. The manifestation of this phenomenon in the industrialised countries reverberates far into the rest of the world producing new imbalances and gaps, sometimes with destabilising consequences. There are winners and losers in the early stages of the globalisation game. But there are also promises of a more constructive approach to those issues that are perceived as global.

It appears that the time span and the scope of economic cycles hardly lend themselves any longer to rational prediction according to the postulates of conventional econometrics simply because they are the result of incremental structural change over several decades. The implementation of technologies incorporating much more intelligence and much less raw materials and energy in the final product, the impact of new managerial practices and procedures, the greatly enhanced sophistication of services, the acceptance of the concept of sustainable development as the foundation for crucial strategic decisions are just some of the facets of globalisation. Moreover, the transfer of the principles of corporate governance into the political sphere in the shape of the emerging notion of good governance gives a new dimension to the exercise of politics, both nationally and internationally.

Parallel to the clear trends toward closer regional integration and inter–regional cooperation, we witness an increasing tendency toward fragmentation and isolationism. An enhanced concern with human rights has spilled over into the way the international community is tackling domestic conflicts of ethnic, religious or even tribal nature. The projection of power in support of certain universally accepted values across state boundaries is yet to be properly formalised in international law.

Once the conventional threats to international peace and security have somehow receded, we have to face a host of non–traditional challenges: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the illicit traffic in drugs, arms and human beings, organised crime and corruption, illegal migration, terrorism as a means to attain political goals. More actors are now involved in the scene of world politics, states and non–state entities alike, such as multinational corporations, civil society, various interest and pressure groups, even individuals empowered by the global reach of the Internet. The coalitions based on converging views become less formal. Consensus–building and subsequent decision–making become more complicated.

Restrictions and opportunities for the national security strategy

The advent of a new millennium finds Romania in a rather complex position in terms of the basic demands of national security in a dynamic international context. Romania’s strategic decision, promoted by several successive governments, to pursue full integration with the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance has proved its validity, and it enjoys massive support from Parliament, political parties and the general public. It is widely perceived to be compliant with abiding national interest in relation to the foreseeable developments in the regional, European and world scene.

In terms of practical action, the forthcoming period of time can be conventionally divided into two stages: the pre–accession interval (Romania has actually started accession negotiations with the European Union on a number of specific files, and it is well positioned as a credible candidate for the next wave of NATO enlargement) and the postaccession status of full membership in the Euro—Atlantic community. The content and duration of stage one will depend primarily on a) Romania’s own efforts to comply with the requirements and standards of the two integrated organisations, and b) the physical ability and the political will of the latter to accept and absorb new members.

The current position of Romania as a valid candidate but not yet a member requires a multi–directional approach in its bilateral and multilateral relations to enhance its comparative and competitive advantages through a closer correlation of political aims with the targets of the country’s socio–economic development and the demands of national security. No less significant is Romania’s capability to play a meaningful part at a sub–regional level as a factor of stability and consensus–building. In the second stage, once Romania is firmly anchored in the integrated political economic and military structures of the Euro–Atlantic space, its foreign and security policy will be adjusted accordingly with an aim to enhancing its specific contribution to the consensual shaping of common policies.

Security strategy and national interest

The National Security Strategy of Romania defines national interest in the following terms.

•To guarantee and promote the fundamental rights and freedoms and to provide security to the citizens of Romania.

•To consolidate the democratic political system based on the Constitution and the rule of law.

•To ensure the existence of the sovereign, independent, united and indivisible Romanian national state.

•To support natural links with the Romanians living outside national borders and to assist the preservation of their specific identity.

•To participate in security and stability building in Europe.

Foreign and defence policies are integral components of the national security strategy of Romania. In concrete operational terms it is envisaged that the national security policy will evolve along the following main axes:

a) to improve the decision–making process on foreign and defence policies and to achieve an increased coherence of action among all the authorities.

b) to designate or, as the case may be, to re–allocate the necessary material and human resources in a flexible manner in relation to the priority targets of the national security strategy;

c) to prepare and to implement complex programmes in a logical sequence of actions in the political, diplomatic and military spheres in order to promote the specific national aims of Romania in its relations with other states, groups of states or international organisations in conjunction with the clearly identified interests of the partners;

d) to enhance, in keeping with the principle of subsidiarily, the external component of the activities performed by central and local authorities by engaging their direct responsibility in the management of cross–boundary international programmes and projects;

e) to enlarge the sphere of participants in the preparation and examination of options for security policy action by involving contributions from the civil society, social partners (employers and unions), academic community and the media.

The substance of the National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy of Romania is a relatively brief document divided into five sections.

•General principles.

•International security environment.

•Romania’s national interests.

•Risk factors for Romania’s national security.

•Modalities to safeguard the national security of Romania.

The last section comprises distinct chapters on: foreign policy; economic and financial sector; national safety and public order; national defence.

Each of the sections and chapters spells out in concrete detail the policy targets and the envisaged modalities for practical action. At the same time, the document displays a unity of vision and purpose by focusing on the essential guidelines in every area of practical policy–making.

The concluding paragraphs underline the inalienable right of the Romanian nation to security in order to enable it to concentrate on sustainable development and the accomplishment of the personal aspirations of all Romanian citizens. National security is therefore conceived as a necessary prerequisite for safe and decent life rather than as an abstract concept.

The National Security Strategy of Romania has thus provided the broader conceptual framework for further elaboration in sector–specific action plans.

One such departmental policy paper is the Military Strategy of Romania, which was endorsed by the Government on 20 April 2000. It provides a synthetic overview of the on–going processes of reform in the Romanian Armed Forces in the area of military security. The final objective is clearly spelled out in the preamble: «military security through credible defence capability, restructuring and modernisation, intensified operational partnership, gradual integration.» There is nothing in it that may be construed as a threat to the neighbours or a risk factor for regional stability and European security.

Sergiu CELAC, Romania

Sergiu CELAC, Romania

PARTICULARITIES AND PRIORITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND PіOLICY OF ROMANIA

The first draft of the National Security Strategy of Romania was submitted to the Supreme National Defence Council on 6 March 1997. Subsequently, it went through several revisions in order to reflect current developments in doctrine and practice. It was finally approved in its definitive form by the Supreme National Defence Council on 18 June 1999 and presented to ajoint session of the two chambers of Parliament. The basic tenets of the Security Strategy were also incorporated in the National Sustainable Development Strategy of Romania, which was endorsed by the Government in July 1999.

The international context

The terms of reference of any national security strategy necessarily have to cover at least a general outline of the probable evolution of the international environment in which the proposed strategy is expected to operate. Two basic elements have been identified as predominant trends shaping the security picture in today’s world: a) the new reality of power with the attendant restructuring of the international system and b) the multifaceted impact of globalisation.

The former bipolar system, characteristic for almost five decades of the Cold War, is being replaced by what some analysts described as a uni—multi—polar system. The United States has emerged as the single superpower having the capability to project its interests on a global scale, while having to deal with a varying but limited number of regional powers. A gradual, insidious process is under way tending to replace the political–legal and economic–financial system that was built in the aftermath, and according to the outcome, of the Second World War. How this new disposition of the authentic factors of power is going accredit a different set of values and therefore different institutional and legal arrangements is still unclear.

The effects of a large–scale implementation of information technology in conjunction with a breakthrough in communications have already wrought significant changes in various areas of human endeavour. They illustrate the uneven spread, over time and proceeds much faster than the «classical» exchange of goods, services and cultural assets. The manifestation of this phenomenon in the industrialised countries reverberates far into the rest of the world producing new imbalances and gaps, sometimes with destabilising consequences. There are winners and losers in the early stages of the globalisation game. But there are also promises of a more constructive approach to those issues that are perceived as global.

It appears that the time span and the scope of economic cycles hardly lend themselves any longer to rational prediction according to the postulates of conventional econometrics simply because they are the result of incremental structural change over several decades. The implementation of technologies incorporating much more intelligence and much less raw materials and energy in the final product, the impact of new managerial practices and procedures, the greatly enhanced sophistication of services, the acceptance of the concept of sustainable development as the foundation for crucial strategic decisions are just some of the facets of globalisation. Moreover, the transfer of the principles of corporate governance into the political sphere in the shape of the emerging notion of good governance gives a new dimension to the exercise of politics, both nationally and internationally.

Parallel to the clear trends toward closer regional integration and inter–regional cooperation, we witness an increasing tendency toward fragmentation and isolationism. An enhanced concern with human rights has spilled over into the way the international community is tackling domestic conflicts of ethnic, religious or even tribal nature. The projection of power in support of certain universally accepted values across state boundaries is yet to be properly formalised in international law.

Once the conventional threats to international peace and security have somehow receded, we have to face a host of non–traditional challenges: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the illicit traffic in drugs, arms and human beings, organised crime and corruption, illegal migration, terrorism as a means to attain political goals. More actors are now involved in the scene of world politics, states and non–state entities alike, such as multinational corporations, civil society, various interest and pressure groups, even individuals empowered by the global reach of the Internet. The coalitions based on converging views become less formal. Consensus–building and subsequent decision–making become more complicated.

Restrictions and opportunities for the national security strategy

The advent of a new millennium finds Romania in a rather complex position in terms of the basic demands of national security in a dynamic international context. Romania’s strategic decision, promoted by several successive governments, to pursue full integration with the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance has proved its validity, and it enjoys massive support from Parliament, political parties and the general public. It is widely perceived to be compliant with abiding national interest in relation to the foreseeable developments in the regional, European and world scene.

In terms of practical action, the forthcoming period of time can be conventionally divided into two stages: the pre–accession interval (Romania has actually started accession negotiations with the European Union on a number of specific files, and it is well positioned as a credible candidate for the next wave of NATO enlargement) and the postaccession status of full membership in the Euro—Atlantic community. The content and duration of stage one will depend primarily on a) Romania’s own efforts to comply with the requirements and standards of the two integrated organisations, and b) the physical ability and the political will of the latter to accept and absorb new members.

The current position of Romania as a valid candidate but not yet a member requires a multi–directional approach in its bilateral and multilateral relations to enhance its comparative and competitive advantages through a closer correlation of political aims with the targets of the country’s socio–economic development and the demands of national security. No less significant is Romania’s capability to play a meaningful part at a sub–regional level as a factor of stability and consensus–building. In the second stage, once Romania is firmly anchored in the integrated political economic and military structures of the Euro–Atlantic space, its foreign and security policy will be adjusted accordingly with an aim to enhancing its specific contribution to the consensual shaping of common policies.

Security strategy and national interest

The National Security Strategy of Romania defines national interest in the following terms.

•To guarantee and promote the fundamental rights and freedoms and to provide security to the citizens of Romania.

•To consolidate the democratic political system based on the Constitution and the rule of law.

•To ensure the existence of the sovereign, independent, united and indivisible Romanian national state.

•To support natural links with the Romanians living outside national borders and to assist the preservation of their specific identity.

•To participate in security and stability building in Europe.

Foreign and defence policies are integral components of the national security strategy of Romania. In concrete operational terms it is envisaged that the national security policy will evolve along the following main axes:

a) to improve the decision–making process on foreign and defence policies and to achieve an increased coherence of action among all the authorities.

b) to designate or, as the case may be, to re–allocate the necessary material and human resources in a flexible manner in relation to the priority targets of the national security strategy;

c) to prepare and to implement complex programmes in a logical sequence of actions in the political, diplomatic and military spheres in order to promote the specific national aims of Romania in its relations with other states, groups of states or international organisations in conjunction with the clearly identified interests of the partners;

d) to enhance, in keeping with the principle of subsidiarily, the external component of the activities performed by central and local authorities by engaging their direct responsibility in the management of cross–boundary international programmes and projects;

e) to enlarge the sphere of participants in the preparation and examination of options for security policy action by involving contributions from the civil society, social partners (employers and unions), academic community and the media.

The substance of the National Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy of Romania is a relatively brief document divided into five sections.

•General principles.

•International security environment.

•Romania’s national interests.

•Risk factors for Romania’s national security.

•Modalities to safeguard the national security of Romania.

The last section comprises distinct chapters on: foreign policy; economic and financial sector; national safety and public order; national defence.

Each of the sections and chapters spells out in concrete detail the policy targets and the envisaged modalities for practical action. At the same time, the document displays a unity of vision and purpose by focusing on the essential guidelines in every area of practical policy–making.

The concluding paragraphs underline the inalienable right of the Romanian nation to security in order to enable it to concentrate on sustainable development and the accomplishment of the personal aspirations of all Romanian citizens. National security is therefore conceived as a necessary prerequisite for safe and decent life rather than as an abstract concept.

The National Security Strategy of Romania has thus provided the broader conceptual framework for further elaboration in sector–specific action plans.

One such departmental policy paper is the Military Strategy of Romania, which was endorsed by the Government on 20 April 2000. It provides a synthetic overview of the on–going processes of reform in the Romanian Armed Forces in the area of military security. The final objective is clearly spelled out in the preamble: «military security through credible defence capability, restructuring and modernisation, intensified operational partnership, gradual integration.» There is nothing in it that may be construed as a threat to the neighbours or a risk factor for regional stability and European security.

Игнас СТАНКОВИЧЮС, Литва