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But even (and perhaps especially) in nonethnically based states, there remains an important need to harness or create some kind of social glue among citizens and some normative basis for attachment to and respect for political institutions.

Theoretically, the nation-state principle makes sense only if nations are assumed to be cohesive and somewhat unitary; otherwise, there is no apparent reason to look to nations as the normative bases for constructing territorially separate and politically independent states. Fundamentally reconceptualizations of the nature of identity, territoriality, and governance may be needed, but none will succeed that do not account for the factors supporting the development of the nation-state principal and the reasons for its perversions and failures.

Even with the entrenchment of certain norms of customary international law and the emergence of concepts such as crimes against humanity and universal jurisdiction, there remain fundamental and apparently irreconcilable differences in values and perspectives amongst states. The process of developing an international criminal court has both demonstrated the potential for cross-boundary consensus and cooperation and painfully revealed its outer limits. Cultural diversity does not just involve tolerating visibly different languages, customs, and holidays; it requires recognizing and providing space foe completely different and encompassing ways of life that, so far, continue to find their highest political expression in the aspiration for or reality of a sovereign state. Even ostensibly universal values come up against the challenge of nonnegotiable conflicts. It is futile to rely on the force of the better argument when the dialogue cannot proceed beyond what the terms of discussion are or should be.

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Poor cognitive habits are likely to prevail during international crises where high stress tends to: heighten the salience of time and concern for the present and immediate future; reduce the size of the policy-making group or the individuals with which one interacts: minimize communication with potential adversaries; increase use of ad hoc communication channels; encourage random and selective search for information; reduce tolerance for ambiguity and increase the likelihood to stereotype and rationalize; increase cognitive rigidity, reliance on familiar decision rules, and metaphorical thinking; limit the search and assessment of alternatives, often to one approach; increase the likelihood of a polarized choice, favouring positions of over cautiousness or greater risk taking; and disrupt learning and the re-examination of decisions. The stress produced by international crises often contributes to a more closed decision-making process, poor policy-making performance, and maladaptive behaviour/ yet it is important to note that crises and stress do not guarantee defective decision-making; they are likely to constrain or inhibit only so-called open-minded decision-making. This is because, as Holti states, “individuals appear to differ rather widely in the ability to tolerate stress, the threshold at which it begins to impair performance, and strategies for coping with various types of stress.” Furthermore, “just as we cannot assume that “good” processes will ensure high-quality decisions, we cannot assume that erratic processes will always result in low- quality decisions” or end up in fiascoes. Cybernetic and cognitive processes are often very functional and powerful, although not necessary optimal, for making the myriad decisions we face. Ultimately, policy formulation and choice will be affected heavily by individual cognition and personality, which are usually heightened during periods of crisis and high stress.