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Given the division of labour in our project, we agreed that each of the four of us would choose two, three or perhaps four highly significant or important debates from our previous studies of our four thematic areas and review them in separate chapters. These chapters are now being written, so we here preview their main contents on the basis of our existing, agreed upon, outlines. Even so, because professorships and academic Departments focused on International Relations seem historically to have been largely, if not exclusively, 20 Century phenomena, our list of globally significant debates may be seen as evidence of multiple International Relations discipline-defining efforts. More precisely our criteria for debate selection were as follows. These should be genuine debates, with people developing positions by including relevant supporting evidence. There should be at least 2 sides of identifiable participants, often more, and a judge that can judge claims, relevance, truthfulness, utility, etc, and something like an outcome, at least in the judges’ view.

Part 3

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The centrality of the state in realist theorizing is due therefore to its elevation, especially during the XXth century, to such a dominant role in international and domestic affairs, and realists tend to forget that the state – and especially its latest manifestation as a heavily bureaucratic, socially differentiated and territorially anchored entity – is a relatively novel construct, indeed a product of modernity. It is a culturally and historically specific concept, embedded in an ideology that claims to be “timeless”, eternal. The principal symbolic event in the rise of the state was the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, although the development of actually existing statehood was a process only fully realized in the years following the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht. The universalising ambitions of Respublica Christiana had by then finally evolved into a society of mutually exclusive, nominally sovereign territorial states. It was only during the XIXth century that the state finally assumed a form that we would recognize today.

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In recent years realism has fallen under a state of intense siege, assailed on all sides by batteries of theoretical, empirical and moral objections, although it still retains its privileged position as “our dominant theory”. Much of this intellectual pounding is well deserved, for contemporary realism, so narrow and reductive, is not and can never be a fully adequate approach to understanding (and trying to cope with) the extraordinary complexity of global politics: it is better viewed as a negative and cautionary discourse, a necessary yet highly partial interpretation of the world. We ignore its perpetual scepticism at our peril. The problem, though, lies not so much in the emblematic tropes of realism, but in the ideological belief that realism is the only way in which to view (and consequently act in) the world, a totalising explanatory construct; it is this hegemonic tendency which represents its main failing – both theoretically and ethically. Realism forecloses the possibility of transformation, of escape from history; as such it annihilates the future through denying any possibility of transcending the past.

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Realism has never been, and under the spurious guise of scientism is still not, just an instrumental explanatory approach; it is an ideological project, which prescribes a way to live in light of its pessimistic interpretation of human political relations. At a time when respected realist scholar Condoleezza Rice has followed in the footsteps of classical realist avatar Henry Kissinger through the revolving door linking American academia with public service, and in an age when it has played such a significant role in framing the academic and policy discourse of the world’s sole superpower- until George Bush’s much-vaunted “new realism” was usurped by a radically different discourse in the wake of 11 September 2001 – the ideological contours of realism are essential to grasp. At the dawn of a new millennium and under increasing fire, realists, ever adaptable, will no doubt try to rework their ideas and maybe even their ideals in order to cope with the fluidity of the international system.

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We can see that it is sovereignty, defined in terms of autonomy and consequently on an inside/outside, citizen / foreigner, us/them series of dichotomies, which must be central to realist ideology, for it is the only concept that makes sense in the mutually constitutive conceptual constellation which also includes power and anarchy; only a self-consciously hermetically-sealed entity can engage in the nervous stand-off characteristic of the security dilemma. In Kantian terms, contemporary realism requires as its condition of possibility the autonomous conception of sovereignty and not, as is so commonly presumed, statehood itself. This means that it is possible to envisage actors other than states engaging in realist behaviour – such as balancing – because as long as power is present and as long as anarchy rules, then sovereign bodies would be subject to realist structural prerogatives; this is what allows Waltz to talk about the ‘realist’ behaviour of street gangs. Indeed we could envisage the same happening with multiple other forms of political actor, and indeed with any collective body that maintains a viable sovereign inside/outside distinction.

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The realist school does not reject the importance of ideals or values. It does, however, insist on a careful, even unsentimental, weighing of the balance of material forces, together with an understanding of the history, culture and economics of the societies comprising the international system - above all, our own.

The idealist school of thought is impatient with self-imposed restraints. It does not necessarily reject the geopolitical aspect of realism. But it translates it into a call for crusades on behalf of regime change.

Though advanced as a new doctrine, the regime-change prescription follows well-established precedent. It was the impetus behind the religious wars of the 17th century, the wars of the French Revolution in the 18th and early 19th centuries, the Holy Alliance, the Trotskyite version of Communism, and the contemporary Muslim jihad.

Realists judge policy by the ability to persevere in the pursuit of an objective in stages, each of which is imperfect by absolute standards but would not be attempted in the absence of absolute values.

The acolytes of idealism sweep away such restraints; focusing on the ultimate objective, they reject the contingent discussion of feasibility with its inevitable geopolitical component.

Realists seek equilibrium; idealists strive for conversion. This is why crusaders have usually caused more upheavals and suffering than statesmen.

American exceptionalism, viewing itself as a shining city on the hill, has always insisted on representing universal values beyond the traditional dictates of national interest.

In a world of jihad, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, President Bush in his second inaugural address put forward a challenge at once going beyond the interests of any one country and that different societies could embrace without prejudice to their own interests.

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A clear-eyed commitment to the freedom agenda should keep the following principles in mind:

The process of democratisation does not depend on a single decision and will not be completed in a single stroke. Elections, however desirable, are only the beginning of a long enterprise.

Americans need to understand that successes do not end their engagement but most probably deepen it. For as we involve ourselves, we bear the responsibility even for results we did not anticipate.

Elections are not an inevitable guarantee of a democratic outcome. Radicals like the Hezbollah and Hamas seem to have learned the mechanics of democracy in order to undermine it and establish total control.

In countries where a vacuum must be filled and U.S. forces are present, the American capacity to affect events is considerable. Even then, however, it is not possible to apply automatically models created over centuries in the homogeneous societies of Europe and America to ethnically diverse and religiously divided societies in the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

In multiethnic societies, majority rule implies permanent subjugation of the minority unless part of a strong federal structure and a system of checks and balances. To achieve this by negotiation between parties that consider dominance by the other groups a threat to their very survival is an extraordinarily elusive undertaking. It will, however, determine the degree to which democratic goals in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan can be achieved.

Lebanon illustrates another aspect of these considerations. The upheaval that expelled Syrian forces is a testimony to the growth of popular consciousness but also to the changed strategic environment.

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The test will be whether the United States and the international community are able to bring about an agreed political framework and whether they can mobilize an international presence to guarantee that the conflicting passions do not once again erupt into violence.

It is the fusion of strategy and values, the merging of the practical and the ideal - and not an overemphasis on one at the expense of the other - that holds the key to Lebanon's future.

In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the vacuum is potential, not actual. A wise policy will navigate between efforts to overcome stagnation and pressures that will dissolve the existing political framework into a contest of radical factions or the victory of one of them. Policies erring in either direction could turn these countries into the Achilles heel of the entire Middle East policy.

Finally there is the challenge of how to deal with societies such as China and Russia, which so far have relied on the Western political tradition only to a small degree, if at all, in their transition to the globalised world.

So far they have used their own histories or national senses of identity as guides. To what extent and by what means can America influence this process? And in what direction?

The implementation of the freedom agenda needs to relate the values of the democratic tradition to the historic possibilities of other societies.

We must avoid the danger that a policy focused on our domestic perceptions may generate reactions in other societies rallying around patriotism and leading to a coalition of the resentful against attempts at perceived American hegemony.

A strategy to implement the vision of the freedom agenda needs consensus-building, both domestically and internationally. That will be the test as to whether we are seizing the opportunity for systemic change or participating in an episode.

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From the standpoint of American interests, the current geopolitical state of affairs in the world’s principal energy-rich zone leaves much to be desired. Several of the key exporting states—notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—are weak and politically debilitated. Iraq faces a prolonged period of stabilization, reconstruction and rehabilitation. Another major energy producer, Iran, has a regime hostile to the United States and opposes U.S. efforts on behalf of a Middle Eastern peace. It may be seeking wmd and is suspected of terrorist links. The United States has sought to isolate Iran internationally, but with limited success.

Just to the north, in the southern Caucasus and Central Asia, the newly independent energy-exporting states are still in the early stages of political consolidation. Their systems are fragile, their political processes arbitrary and their statehood vulnerable. They are also semi-isolated from the world energy markets, with American legislation blocking the use of Iranian territory for pipelines leading to the Persian Gulf and with Russia aggressively seeking to monopolize international access to Turkmen and Kazakh energy resources. Only with the completion, several years from now, of the U.S.-sponsored Baku-Çeyhan pipeline will Azerbaijan and its trans-Caspian neighbours gain an independent link to the global economy. Until then, the area will be vulnerable to Russian or Iranian mischief.

For the time being, the powerful and exclusive U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region and the effective U.S. monopoly of significant long-range warfare capabilities give America a very considerable margin for unilateral policymaking. If it should become necessary to cut the potential nexus between the proliferation of wmd and conspiratorial terrorism, the United States has the means to act on its own, as it proved in bringing down the recent Iraqi regime.

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It is difficult to envisage how the United States alone could force Iran into a basic reorientation. Outright military intimidation might work initially, given the gaping disparity of power between the two states, but it would be a gross error to underestimate the nationalist and religious fervour that such an approach would likely ignite among the 70 million Iranians. Iran is a nation with an impressive imperial history and with a sense of its own national worth. While the religious zeal that brought the theocratic dictatorship to power seems to be gradually fading, an outright collision with America would almost certainly re-ignite popular passions, fusing fanaticism with chauvinism.

While Russia has not stood in the way of any decisive U.S. military efforts to alter the strategic realities of the region, the current geopolitical earthquake in the Persian Gulf could jeopardize America’s efforts to consolidate the independence of the Caspian Basin states. American preoccupation with the mess in Iraq, not to mention the cleavage between America and Europe as well as the increased American-Iranian tensions, has already tempted Moscow to resume its earlier pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan to abandon their aspirations for inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic community, and to step up its efforts to undermine any enduring U.S. political and military presence in Central Asia. That would make it more difficult for the United States to engage the Central Asian states in a larger regional effort to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A resurgence of Muslim extremism of the Taliban variety could then even acquire a regional scope.

These risks could be lessened by closer U.S.-EU strategic collaboration with regard to Iraq and Iran. That may not be easy to achieve, given divergent American and European perspectives, but the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of any compromise.