Добавил:
ivanov666
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз:
Предмет:
Файл:Сравнение социальных моделей Европы. Социальная и трудовая политика в Европе. Учебно-методическое пособие
.pdf
free-riding. These include the productive structure with its very
high presence of small firms, the system of erga omnes clauses for
collective agreements, and the prevalence among workers of a
culture of little active participation. Consequently, (see Checchi
and Lucifora 2002), the existing institutional regulations lead trade
unions to compete basically for representative status rather than for
membership. However, the trade union audience (measured
through the vote, or through the acceptance of trade unions and
their proposals) tends to be fairly or very high. The institutionally
recognised faculties of the trade unions and their pragmatism make
a decisive contribution to this situation.
c. The principle of audience and institutional representative status
that trade unions are acknowledged to have means that they do not
need the active participation of their members. This does not mean
that membership is not important, as it provides human and
financial resources, but it does not acquire the dimensions that Offe
and Wiesenthal (1992) attribute to it.
Trade unions are organisations with highly complex structures.
They have a confederal leadership (a confederal secretariat or
executive); the various federations, with their respective structures and
governing bodies; the trade union delegates or the organisations of the
trade union in firms; and finally the members of the trade union elected
as the unitary representatives of the workers in firms.
Each element within a single organisation has a high degree of
autonomy in its respective sphere. Nevertheless, each one depends upon
the others in order to be recognised. For instance, the confederal
leadership requires the explicit or implicit support of the federations,
regional organisations and representatives in firms; likewise, the latter
owe their very existence to the support given by the organisation as a
whole. This complex relationship entails that the parts making up a trade
union maintain quite autonomous stances within their sphere of activity,
even while under the unavoidable obligation of belonging to the
organisation, which limits leakages from, or ruptures within, it: in other
words, in spite of their autonomy, the parts of the organisation must
71
avoid taking positions involving confrontation16. All of this implies a
need for a strong consensus, albeit one having wide margins of
'dissimulated' discretion that will avoid open confrontation.
Tolerance and the acceptance of cooperation become important
values in the face of the diversity of interests represented by trade
unions17. This helps to avoid the dilemma posed by Offe and Wiesenthal
(1992) with regard to the difficulties trade unions have in governing a
plurality of interests. This tolerance and acceptance of consensus is
reinforced by pragmatism18. Thus, the internal governability of
organisations is maintained, even when they lack the centralised control
mechanisms and the systems of sanctions typical of bureaucratic
organisations.
The governability of employers' organisations
Throughout Spain the representative status of the CEOE is
guaranteed by the law. Regional and sectoral associations are therefore
affiliated to the CEOE so that it will represent them, thus helping to
legitimise the organisation's function as a social interlocutor and a
guarantor of social harmony. From the time of its creation the CEOE's
priorities have been the political consolidation of Spain and the
strengthening of the market economy (Costas and Nonell 1996). On the
basis of these strategic objectives it participated in and promoted the
signing of centralised bargaining agreements that were applied by the
other elements in the fabric of associations, and by firms. Consequently,
the governability of the CEOE is directly related to the reduction of
costs (see below).
16
On the basis of case studies, Escobar (1993) and Pimentel (1993) conclude that workers'
committees and the trade unions in firms tend to act with a high degree of independence in respect
of the strategies of the trade union organisations. Nevertheless each one seeks to avoid open conflict
with the other, which moderates differences.
17
According to the interviews we held with UGT and CCOO. it is important to acknowledge the
efforts toward internal coordination carried out by trade unions through the creation of opinion,
internal meetings, sessions and training. Direct intervention, involving sanctions, is limited only to
extreme eases of open conflict, namely, of breach of the basic rules of behaviour within the
organisation.
18
Among the numerous examples in this regard is the building construction sector where the
elimination of seniority payments has been accepted: in some firms the trade union negotiators have
agreed to a double wage scale; in other firms there is an avoidance of outright refusals with regard
to overtime and shorter working hours.
72
The reasons that lead a firm to join the CEOE and cede its
representativeness to the association are:
The reduction of transaction costs and of the costs involved in the
negotiation of working conditions. Spanish employers show a
certain resistance, especially because of the small size of
businesses, to undertake collective bargaining at the level of the
firm. Therefore they tend to delegate the responsibility for
bargaining to a representative of the firm, as most collective
bargaining takes place at an intermediate, i.e. provincial,
negotiating level. In turn, provincial collective agreements
constitute a source of income for the law firms that represent the
employers' organisations. This provincial structure is a legacy from
the past and leans strongly in the direction of tradition and local
customs.
Regional and sectoral organisations offer, in the main, consulting
and training services to their firms. In the case of Spain, the
services that they offer differ widely from association to
association. An additional service is the management of the funds
devoted to occupational training, something which has been beset
by problems and a lack of transparency.
The governability of the CEOE in Spain can therefore be
considered on two levels: the national level and the regional and sectoral
level.
At the national level firms and their regional associations yield
responsibility to the CEOE through centralised collective bargaining or
national agreements when economic results are not favourable and price
tensions are reflected in worse business results. The difficulty that public
policy encounters in controlling the evolution of prices with traditional
instruments and the loss of credibility of the forecasts for the evolution
of the retail price index introduce a high cost in intermediate collective
bargaining, and this makes it preferable for the CEOE to negotiate
centralised agreements in order to guarantee a stable bargaining
scenario.
At the regional level, the relationship between the CEOE and the
intermediate representative organisations is not without conflict. For
instance, at the time of the 1994 labour reforms, national sectoral
collective agreements began to change significantly as a result of the
73
application of the reforms and the appearance of collective bargaining
with a certain innovatory capacity. The CEOE, which was not involved
in the process, recommended in 1995 that wage restraint should be
negotiated in exchange for the non-introduction of substantial changes in
collective agreements. In 1996 it stated openly that it was against the
experience undertaken in certain businesses of introducing flexibility
mechanisms through double wage scales or pacts concerning
compensation (Aguar et al. 1999); it also blocked the signing of
agreements at the level of the autonomous communities19. In 1997 it
renewed its involvement by signing a new centralised agreement for the
reform of the conditions governing work contracts and for collective
bargaining.
Finally, there is weak governability at the lowest regional levels,
the associational fabric is weak in certain sectors, and there are conflicts
between levels of representation. There are sectors in which organised
employer interests do not exist, and there are also sectors appearing above all in services related to new activities - in which employer
associational activity is being transformed.
With regard to the first case, the lack of employer representation
became evident in the 1997 centralised agreement, in which the so-
called Acuerdo de Vacíos (Agreement on Voids) was made,
referring to the fact that after the disappearance of the Labour
Ordinances, there was no type of industrial relations agreement in
certain sectors. The cause of this institutional void is to be found in
the lack of employer representatives for the negotiation of the new
agreements.
In the second case, in emerging sectors the large firms that make
their entry with market power are interested in taking on the
representation of employers at the national level, thus taking
responsibility away from the regional levels in order to control
labour costs. This is the case of the agreement governing
temporary employment agencies, in which, despite the existence of
collective bargaining agreements at the autonomous community
19
In Catalonia, the social partners had a collective bargaining agreement at the autonomous
community level ready to sign; it introduced in its turn mechanisms for resolving disputes out of
court. At the last moment, the Catalan employers withdrew (Aguar el al. 1999).
74
level, the large firms have formed a national employers' association
and have taken negotiations to a national level.
In short, the dynamics of the various representative organisations
can be explained by the role that each of them plays in the representation
of employer interests in collective bargaining. Sectoral bargaining thus
co-exists at the provincial level (metal) and the national level (textiles
and building construction). This complex system of collective
bargaining is taken for granted in the strategies of employers'
associations, and it is understood that there should be no decisive
initiatives to alter it, but simply solutions to the difficulties of
coordination and articulation that may appear.
The composition of bargaining commissions
In respect of the representative status of the social partners in
Spain, 74.7% of the signatories to collective agreements before 2002
belonged to the CCOO or the UGT. This figure rose to 77.3% in 2003
(Table 2). In the same period, other small trade unions decreased their
presence slightly. The signatories that were groups of workers not
belonging to any trade union declined sharply.
Table 2
Share of collective agreements in relation to signatories
1998 2003 Variation
CCOO 38.1 39.2 + 1.1
UGT 36.6 38.1 + 1.5
Other trade unions 15.3 15.1 -0.2
Groups of workers 10.5 7.4 - 3.1
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Consejo Económico y Social (1999 and 2004).
The legitimacy of trade unions is also evinced in the results of
trade union elections. The latest available figures (for 1990) are shown
in Table 3.
75
Table 3
Participation in elections of trade union representatives in firms,
Spain, 1990
Total wage-earners (*) [1] 9 372 500
Wage-earners in firms with elections [2] 5 373 613
Voters [3] 3 974 406
[2] out of [1](*) 57.3%
[3] out of [2] 74.0%
(*) The figure for wage-earners refers to the total number of wage-earners according
to the Encuesta de Población Activa (Survey of the Active Population); nevertheless,
it must be borne in mind that only workers in firms with six or more employees can
participate in the electoral processes.
Source: Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security (1992), cited by CES
(2004). The figures are not more up-to-date because since the responsibilities in this
regard were transferred to the autonomous communities, no further aggregate figures
have been published at the national level.
Finally, the participation of workers in the electoral processes for
trade union representatives is quite high (74%; Table 3), which
demonstrates a degree of commitment to or trust in, such processes and
the candidates. Furthermore, 77.3% of the representatives elected by the
workers were from candidatures presented by CCOO and UGT, a
percentage which has been rising since the advent of democracy
(Miguélez 2000). However, as collective agreements are governed by
the Workers' Statute, which states that to have general validity they must
be signed by more than 50% of the representatives of each party, UGT
and CCOO are rarely able to control bargaining without each other,
although in some cases they can seek the support of a third trade union
with sufficient strength (this is only possible in very specific sectors or
in the autonomous communities of Euskadi, Navarra and Galicia). It is
therefore not surprising that for approximately ten years CCOO and the
UGT have reached agreements on the criteria for approaching collective
bargaining.
The third dimension: control capacity and the results of
bargaining
The capacity for controlling collective bargaining leads us to the
debate between centralisation and decentralisation, and to the structure
76
and efficiency of the collective bargaining system. We will explore these
two questions and we will then examine the results of collective
bargaining as empirical evidence of its degree of governability.
Governability and the sphere of collective bargaining
From the interviews carried out for this paper, several employer
and trade union strategies can be identified. Large firms are interested in
the centralisation of collective bargaining as a procedure for the
harmonisation of costs and the reduction of transaction costs (e.g. the
agreement in the building construction sector and the temporary
employment agency agreement). On the other hand, small firms seem to
have a preference for regional (provincial) collective agreements, in
order to maintain a negotiating structure closer to the local level. In
short, the interests, practices and bargaining positions of firms reveal
complexities and contradictions that cannot be reduced to a simple
choice between decentralising or centralising collective bargaining.
Trade unions are interested in the centralisation and coordination
of collective bargaining for obvious reasons of worker solidarity, but
also because sectoral collective agreements are more dynamic and
productive of renewal than agreements made at a lower level. The
agreements of firms are perhaps less dynamic. Nevertheless, trade
unions cannot neglect the local sphere, as they must remain close to
those they represent and must maintain identity and legitimacy.
The results of our work lead us to reflect on proposals for the
reform of collective bargaining. The application to Spain of the theories
on the benefits of the 'inverted U' (see above) has focused reform
proposals on the need to modify the structure of collective bargaining by
fostering decentralisation, and to improve its articulation by promoting
national agreements aimed at favouring decentralised negotiations. This,
in turn, would allow a reduction in the inflationary tendency of
provincial sector agreements, as the Banco de España argues, and as the
Partido Popular also maintained when it was in government.
Izquierdo et al. (2003) state that 53.75% of workers are affected by
a provincial agreement. The authors defend the necessity of reforming
the levels of intermediate negotiation as their inefficiency is reflected in
the results.
77
Even so, it is not sustainable to attribute exclusively to this level of
Number of
provincial negotiation the conditions of economic inefficiency alluded to
in the theories based on the thesis of the 'hump' or 'inverted U". The
structure of collective bargaining in Spain is a reality that remains fairly
constant in time (Table 4).
Table 4.
Structure and levels of collective bargaining
Level
Workers
Agreements
1994 2003 1994 2003
Firm 2 309 3 263 688 491 908 363
Sectoral-provincial 772 896 3 006 613 4 532 352
Sectoral-local 17 12 6 741 11 011
Sectoral-inter-provincial 25 56 481 208 823 138
Sectoral-autonomous community
Sectoral-intcr-autonomous
-
- -
22
-
823 188
- -
community
Sectoral-national 43 65 991 117 1 806 845
Total 3 192 4 364 5 184 294 8 147 177
Sources: The available figures, for 1994 and 2003. were published in CES (1995):
Memoria sobre la situation socioeconomica y laboral. Madrid, p. 224; likewise. CES
(2004): Memòria sobre la situation socioeconomica y laboral. Madrid, p. 369.
At the provincial levels of bargaining the agreed wage increases
are higher than those at the national level, although there is less wage
dispersion. One instance of distortion lies in the differences in wages
between the various provincial agreements in the same productive
activity. For example, it can be seen that the metalworkers' agreement
negotiated at the provincial level in Catalonia is led by the province of
Barcelona, and that the other three Catalan provinces follow similar
lines, but on the subject of wage-fixing and nominal wages there are
considerable differences. These differences can be explained by the
regional competition of the firms in the sector. In this case, the vehicle
distributors or workshops included in this branch of production exercise
their market power by forcing a differentiation of wages at the
provincial level, though it must be borne in mind that the large
automobile firms have agreements of their own.
78
Table 5.
(with an
Inflation and wage increases as part of agreements, 1985-2000
Years Wage increase
escape clause)
(1)
Forecast
inflation
(guides
collective
Annual
inflation (2)
Increase in
purchasing
power (1-2)
bargaining)
1985 7.9 7.0 8.8 -0.9
1986 8.2 8.0 8.8 -0.6
1987 6.5 5.0 5.2 1.3
1988 6.4 3.0 4.8 1.5
1989 7.8 3.0 6.8 1.0
1990 8.3 5.7 6.7 1.6
1991 8.0 5.0 5.9 2.1
1992 7.3 5.0 5.9 1.4
1993 5.5 4.5 4.6 0.9
1994 3.6 3.5 4.7 -1.1
1995 3.9 3.5 4.7 -0.8
1996 3.8 3.5 3.6 -0.2
1997 2.9 2.2 2.0 0.9
1998 2.6 2.1 1.8 0.8
1999 2.7 1.8 2.3 0.4
2000 3.7 2.0 3.4 0.3
2001 3.6 2.8 3.6 0.0
2002 3.8 2.0 3.5 0.3
2003 3.7 2.0 3.0 0.7
2004 3.6 2.7 3.2 0.4
Sources: Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security. Statistics for
collective agreements; Spanish lnstituto Nacional de Estadística. Cited in the
Memoria sobre la situation socioeconomica y laboral, Consejo Economico y Social.
Madrid 2002, p. 406 and 2004, p. 328.
By way of contrast, in the sectors of production in which national
sectoral agreements are reached (textiles, chemicals, graphic arts,
department stores), an employer strategy can be detected. An instance of
this is the agreement in the textile sector, which has a nation-wide
market but is highly concentrated in Catalonia. Catalan firms are
79
interested in negotiating at this national level in order to set minimums
on the overall wage costs of all competing firms.
The results of collective bargaining
Annual wage increases are governed by the guidelines accepted by
employer and trade union leaderships when there are centralised
agreements, and by intermediate organisations in other collective
bargaining sessions. These annual wage increase guidelines are agreed
by the social partners (especially employers) because habitually they are
guidelines as to minumums and reduce transaction costs. The result is
wage restraint, as shown in Table 5 (above), which provides evidence of
the governability of collective bargaining.
This table shows the recent existence of a high degree of control in
the behaviour of pay in relation to the forecast inflation rate, as has been
recognised by researchers such as Fina et al. (2001: 164): 'The reasons
for the downward trend of [pay] drifts correspond to the influence of
collective bargaining and the increasingly close connection between
agreed pay and earned pay.' Another researcher (Royo 2002) claims
that Spanish collective bargaining is a model in which pay rises adapt to
the levels set by the social partners. It is thus obvious that, as Perez
Infante (2003) concludes, collective bargaining does not generate
inflation.
Conclusions
The institutions that favour governability of collective bargaining
in Spain are directly related to 1) the generalised extension clauses that
allow for a major coverage of collective bargaining and favour the
coordination of decisions; 2) the legal representative status of the social
partners as a substitution for organisational centralisation; and 3) the fact
that bargaining power is sustained by collective bargaining regulations.
Clearly, the Spanish model of governability has its limitations, its
tensions and even its crisis in some periods.
Given that the governability of collective bargaining is based on
the existing institutional framework, on the strategies of social agents
and on their interaction with the policy of macroeconomic stabilisation,
our analysis is along the lines of the hypothesis advanced by Kittel and
Traxler (2001), who stress that the key to explaining the interactions
80
Соседние файлы в предмете [НЕСОРТИРОВАННОЕ]