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Файл:Сравнение социальных моделей Европы. Социальная и трудовая политика в Европе. Учебно-методическое пособие
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council elections across the country), which gives stronger trade unions
a greater say at the negotiation table.
In line with corporatist literature, social pacts were unlikely to
appear in Portugal and Spain due to the lack of institutional and
organizational conditions (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979). However,
despite the dual and competing confederal structure on the side of
labour, the low levels of trade union membership, and the strong
fragmentation of trade union and employers' associations, in the last
decades social pacts became a strategy of policy-making (Avdagic et al.,
2011; Campos Lima and Naumann, 2011; Molina and Rhodes, 2011;
Nonell et al., 2006; Pochet et al., 2010). Through their engagement in
social pacts trade unions and employers' associations gained a growing
institutional role that transcended their affiliation and mobilization
capacities. This represented a 'gain in authority' which enabled the
'governability of industrial relations' (Baylos, 1991). Consequently, the
'gain in institutional representativeness' has been a necessary
compensating condition for implementing the social pacts (Köhler and
Martin Artiles, 2009). However, the great majority of social pacts have
not been officially termed social pacts but rather tripartite agreements or
simply agreements, although politicians, trade unionists and employers
have commonly used the term social pacts to designate them.
In Portugal, this growing institutional role was promoted by the
creation, in 1984, of the Standing Committee for Social Concertation
(CPCS). This tripartite committee, in which the government, the trade
union confederations (CGTP4 and UGT) and the employers'
confederations (CIP, CCP CAP and later CTP) have been represented
for 27 years, has had from the very beginning competencies for social
concertation in several areas that go beyond incomes policy, such as
employment policy, labour legislation and welfare provision, and has
constituted a permanent forum facilitating social pacts. Such an
institution did not emerge in Spain, where the rounds between the social
partners have been more likely to be the result of reactions to specific
critical phases or of initiatives to anticipate them. This institutional
difference may have favoured the occurrence of more tripartite pacts in
Portugal than in Spain. In Portugal 17 tripartite pacts were signed
between 1986 and 2008 (Campos Lima and Naumann, 2011), while in
4
CGTP refused to take part in CPCS until 1987.
41
Spain nine tripartite pacts were signed between 1979 and 2008 (Molina
and Rhodes, 2011). In addition, in Spain bipartite pacts signed only
between the government and the trade unions (without the employers)
were also observed, a phenomenon that did not happen in Portugal
where pact offers are made to all 'social partners' in the context of the
CPCS5.
The increase in peak-level (i.e. centralized) collective bargaining
(Traxler, 2010) in Spain has probably been an alternative to tripartite
social pacts over the last decade, at least regarding incomes policy. In
Spain between 1979 and 2008 inter-confederal negotiations led to 17
bipartite settlements (Molina and Rhodes, 2011). The increase in interconfederal coordination of collective bargaining over the years has led
some researchers to suggest that the Spain is moving towards 'a
coordinated economy' (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In particular, the Interconfederal Settlements on Collective Bargaining - ANCs - (2002-2008),
concluded under EMU, enabled a form of bipartite vertical coordination
of collective bargaining6. The legally binding nature of ANCs helped to
boost the role of centralization (Pérez, 2010). Inter-confederal
coordination of collective bargaining has not been a feature of industrial
relations in Portugal and therefore centralized tripartite incomes policy
has been the option followed.
The trade union confederations in Portugal and Spain have also
pursued quite different strategies. In Portugal, between 1986 and 2008,
UGT signed all the tripartite social pacts, while CGTP signed only six.
Furthermore, the CGTP signed neither the pacts on incomes policy, nor
the three most encompassing social pacts concluded in Portugal: the
1990 Economic and Social Agreement, launched by the PSD
government; the 1996 Strategic Concertation Agreement launched by
the PS; and the 2008 Tripartite Agreement launched by the PS. In
contrast, the Spanish trade union confederations have shown a more
forthcoming approach. The Spanish UGT signed the great majority of
social pacts, with the exception of the 1998 bipartite Agreement on the
Stabilization of Temporary and Part-Time Employment and the 2001
5
Paradoxically these emanated during the right-wing government of PP, headed by Aznar, in 1996,
1997, 1998 and 1999 respectively. They have focused on pensions, part-time work and temporary
work.
6
Inter-confederal agreements were already reached in 1979, 1980 and in 1983 on incomes policy
and collective bargaining.
42
tripartite Agreement on Pensions and Social Protection, both launched
during the government of the centre-right PP headed by Aznar. The
trade union confederation CCOO also signed the great majority of the
social pacts with the exception of the broad tripartite pact, the Economic
and Social Agreement (AES) 1984-86 launched during the PSOE
government headed by Gonzalez (see Molina and Rhodes, 2011).
However, the fact that the majority of social pacts in Portugal have not
had the support of the CGTP, and that in Spain the majority of social
pacts have had the support of both confederations is not only the result
of trade union strategies, but also of government (and employer)
strategies. A particular feature of the Portuguese case is that unanimity
among the actors has not been considered either a necessary or a
sufficient condition for producing a pact (Campos Lima and Naumann.
2011).
Although signing social pacts has become a common practice in
both countries, the evolution of industrial relations was marked by
certain ruptures of open conflict, including general strikes. Spain and, to
a lesser degree, Portugal figure among the southern European countries
which experienced more general economic strikes between 1980 and
2008 (Kelly and Hamman, 2010b). In both countries - and especially in
Spain - the trade unions evidently shifted between different strategies,
partly over the years, but also in parallel, for example signing social
pacts over a specific issue and striking over another issue. Between 1980
and 2008 in Spain five general strikes were launched, four of which
were against the policy of the socialist PSOE governments and one
against that of the right-wing PP government. The 1985 strike against
PSOE policy was called only by CCOO, but all the following ones,
starting with the 1988 general strike, were called by CCOO and UGT.
This contrasts sharply with the developments in Portugal where, until
2008, UGT took part in only one general strike in 1988 together with
CGTP against a centre-right government; whereas the other strikes
against right-wing and socialist governments were launched only by
CGTP, the larger confederation. Thus, the Spanish trade union
confederations have to a large extent been combining boxing and
dancing, while in Portugal the UGT's dominant preference for dancing
contrasts with the CGTP's preference for boxing (Huzzard et al., 2004).
The year 1988, however, seems to have been a turning point both in
43
Portugal and in Spain. For the first time, general strikes were held by
Portugal
Ge
Trade unions
volved in general
Government
1988
CGTP and UGT
against the reform
PSD with
Failure of social pact
AES Broad tripartite
government,
both trade union confederations (see Table 1).
Social pacts and general strikes under the international crisis
Developments prior to the austerity plans
Although the international financial crisis deepened from 2007, the
impact in Portugal and Spain in terms of slower GDP growth first
became clear in the middle of 2008. In Portugal, the slowdown followed
a long period from 1999 to 2008, when the GDP increase was less than 1
percent on average in real terms, well below the average euro area
increase. In Spain, by contrast, this slowdown followed a period, from
1998 to 2007, where GDP growth on average was almost 5 percent
(more than double the euro area average) and employment soared
correspondingly. Hence, while the unemployment rate in 2006 (8.5
percent) had fallen towards the euro area average (8.3 percent), in 2008
there was a huge increase to 11.3 percent and the increase escalated to
18 percent in 20097.
In Portugal, unemployment rose much less dramatically, from 7.8
percent in 2006 to 9.6 percent in 2009, slightly above the euro area
average of 9.4 percent (see Table 2). In Portugal the global crisis
deepened the already critical economic situation, whereas in Spain it
triggered a major shift from a banking and real estate driven bubble to a
deep crisis with very critical levels of unemployment (Pérez, 2010). In
both countries the combination of falling GDP and rising unemployment
led to sharp increases in public budget deficits in 2009 reaching 9.4
percent in Portugal and 11.2 percent in Spain.
Table I.
General strikes and social pacts in Portugal and Spain, 1980-2011
a
(1984-2011)
nera
l
in
Tripartite social pacts
composition
strikes
strikes and motive
Centre-right
1988
of the labour law
7
The unemployment rate thus surged to the high levels observed during the mid-1990s, before the beginning of the decline in real Spanish interest
rates and the subsequent real estate boom associated with the country's entry into the euro.
absolute
majority
44
1990
social pact (
employers and UGT)
Portugal
Ge
nera
Trade unions
volved in general
Government
CGTP against the
2007
CGTP against the
revision of the
PS, Socrates
Two tripartite social pacts
on social security and one on
vocational training
overnment, employers and
Tripartite Social pact on i
crease
of statutory minimum wage
ers and
2008
employment policy and the
vision of the labour code
ployers and
2010
CGTP
and UGT
Against austerity
PS, Socrates
Tripartite Social pact on
employment and
ness (government,
Trade unions
volved in
eral strikes and
Government
ing
1985
CCOO against the
tite
social pact (government,
1988
CCOO and UGT
For the withdrawal
of the youth
Table I
(continued)
(1984-2011)
l
strikes
2002
in
strikes and motive
labour code
labour code
composition
Centre-right
coalition
PSD/PP
with
absolute
majority
Tripartite social pacts
2006
(g
UGT)
n
(government, employ
CGTP and UGT)
Tripartite broad pact -
package
Spain (1980-2010)b
in
gen
motive
Pension Act
(minority)
composition
PSOE,
Gonzalez
PSOE,
re
(government, em
UGT)
2011
competitive
employers and UGT)
Pacts (preceding and follow
general strikes)
1984-88 AES Broad tripar
employers and UGT)
Gonzalez
Absolute
45
employment plan
and against the
economic policy
b
Trade unions
volved in
eral strikes and
Government
ing
1992
CCOO and UGT
For the
drawal of the
cree which cut
1992 Tripartite social pact
ing
ployers,
1994
CCOO and UGT
Against cuts in
ments and
bour market
OO and UGT
Against measures
of unemployment
protection and
With absolute
–
Agreement on Pensions and
Social Protection
(government, employers and
Table I
(continued)
Spain (1980-2010)
majority
in
gen
motive
with
de
unemployment
benefits
social
achieve
the la
reform
CC
composition
PSOE.
Gonzalez
Absolute
majority
PSOE,
Gonzalez
PP, Aznar
Pacts (preceding and follow
general strikes)
Agreement on lifelong learn
(government, em
CCOO and UGT)
2001 Tripartite Social Pact
2002
majority
Basic
CCOO
Employment Law
CCOO and UGT
2010
Against austerity
package
a
The social pacts mapped are only those immediately preceding the general
strikes or following them interval of two years in the period from 1980 to 2011. They
were selected based on Campos Lima and Naumann (2011); Molina and Rhodes
(2011) and updated to include developments in 2010/2011.
b
We exclude from this table the 1991 general strike (4 hours) against the Gulf
War and the 2003 general strike (2 hours) against the Iraq War.
PSOE, Zapatero
Minority
2011 Global tripartite pact
(government, employers,
CCOO and UGT)
In both countries the crisis hit when socialist governments were in
power. In Portugal, in 2005, a spectacular turn to the left gave the PS an
46
absolute majority of the votes for the first time in history, after the rule
of a centre-right coalition PSD-CDS (2002-2005). In Spain, a turn to the
left in 2004 gave the majority to PSOE, after the long rule of the PP
(1996-2004). While in Portugal the majority government led by Prime
Minister Socrates had a powerful parliamentary majority, in Spain the
minority government led by Prime Minister Zapatero was reliant in
parliament on support from two small left-wing parties - the Republican
Left of Catalonia and the United Left.
Table 2.
Real GDP growth rate and unemployment rate, euro area (16),
Portugal and Spain, 2006-2009
Euro area (16) Portugal Spain
GDP Growth
2006 3.0 1.4 4.0
2007 2.8 2.4 3.6
2008 0.4 0.0 0.9
2009 4.1 2.5 3.7
Unemployment
rate
2006 8.3 7.8 8.5
2007 7.5 8.1 8.3
2008 7.5 7.7 11.3
2009 9.4 9.6 18.0
Source: Eurostat (2006-2009).
In Portugal, the PS policies during 2006-2007 were shaped against
the background of worsening economic conditions. In this period, the PS
government succeeded in concluding four tripartite social pacts: one
signed by CGTP and UGT on the increase of the statutory minimum
wage (for the period 2007-2011 at an annual rate of about 5.3 percent);
and three signed only by UGT, two regarding changes in the systems of
social protection and pensions, and one on vocational training.
On 25 June 2008, the government reached a social pact with all the
employers' confederations and the UGT, which set up the basis for the
revision of the labour code. The social pact was preceded by a general
strike on May 2007 and a demonstration involving some 200 000
47
workers at the beginning of June 2008 organized by CGTP, and
followed by massive protests against the government's policy in the
public sector. At the end of its first mandate in 2009, the PS government
launched a series of exceptional temporary measures intended to deal
with the rise of unemployment and limit its negative social impact,
which were welcomed by the trade union confederations: extending the
period of unemployment social allowance; reducing the number of
working days a claimant must have to be eligible for unemployment
benefit; improving social protection of families and children during
periods of unemployment; and protecting jobs through support for small
and micro companies. But the government's popularity was decreasing
in connection with the crisis and the unpopular reforms (in the public
and private sector). Thus, in the 2009 elections the PS led by Socrates
only just managed to secure a second mandate, and lost the overall
majority it had gained in 2005.
In Spain, the PSOE government at the beginning of its mandate in
2004 signed a protocol for social dialogue with the trade unions and
employers where the major issues for discussion were active labour
market policy, training, minimum wages, employee involvement and the
reform of collective bargaining. The subsequent social pacts signed
during the first mandate involved a variety of issues: labour market
reform to limit the incidence of temporary employment signed in 2006;
regulations designed to provide social assistance to those unable to care
for themselves; new provisions for retirement after 65 as well as
disability and widowers' pensions; and a new procedure for extending
collective agreements to areas of employment without coverage (Molina
and Rhodes, 2011).
The tripartite social pact (Agreement for the Enhancement of
Growth and Employment, AMCE) signed in 2006 addressed as a
priority again the conversion of temporary jobs into permanent ones.
This pact emerged in the middle of the romance between the new
socialist government and trade unions and against the pompous
backdrop of the Declaration on Social Dialogue one year earlier. The
content of the AMCE8 resembled that of the AIEE (1997) in that it
provided subsidies (in the form of discount on an employer's social
security contributions) for the conversion of temporary contracts into
8
Royal Decree/Law 5/2006 and Law 43/2006 on enhancing the growth of employment.
48
permanent ones. The AMCE included the improvement of
unemployment benefits, the promotion of equal opportunities and the
attempt to regulate the conditions of the self-employed.
In 2008, when the socialist government was re-elected, the first
symptoms of the crisis and economic recession were clear. A tripartite
agreement was signed in July on a 'Declaration of principles for the
promotion of the economy, employment, competitiveness and social
progress'. However, new labour market proposals were not well received
by the unions. In addition, in 2009 the trade unions and employers failed
to renew their Inter-confederal Agreement (ANC) on Collective
Bargaining due to differences on how to deal with the economic crisis
and the criteria for wage bargaining.
These developments in the two countries can be seen as a prelude
to the general strikes and social pacts against the background of the
austerity plans that followed.
General strikes and social pacts against the background of
austerity plans
In 2009, when the scale of the crisis became apparent, the reelected socialist governments first in Spain (2008) and then in Portugal
(2009) were in a much weaker position than in their first mandate to
respond to the new challenges and face the international pressures that
escalated as budget deficits and debts rose rapidly. Aggressively
targeted by the international rating agencies, they were also viewed as
promoters of instability in the euro area, and, along with Ireland and
Greece, Portugal and Spain have been the countries of the euro area
most subject to the turmoil emanating from the global financial crisis
while simultaneously being constrained by the uniform monetary policy
and strict fiscal requirements of European Monetary Union (EMU). The
combination of deep recession, public deficits and debts, and the
straightjacket of the EMU regime have unleashed strong pressure on
labour.
In both countries, the socialist governments launched austerity
plans to deal with the impact of the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis,
to which the trade union confederations responded uniformly with
general strikes. In Spain, UGT and CCOO called a general strike on 29
September 2010, the fourth they had held together against the policy of
49
socialist governments; in Portugal, two months later, the CGTP and
UGT called a general strike on 24 November 2010, the second they had
held together in 20 years, but the first they held together to protest
against the policy of a government of the Socialist Party.
At the outset of 2011 new reforms were proposed in both
countries, which led to the conclusion of social pacts. In Spain a
tripartite social pact (Acuerdo Global) was signed in January 2011
between the government, CCOO-UGT and CEOE-CEPYME and in
Portugal, in March 2011, a tripartite social pact on employment and
competitiveness was signed between the government, the UGT and the
employers' confederations CAP, CCP, CIP and CTP. Besides the aim of
regaining their popularity, which had been undermined by contested
measures and the massive general strikes, the governments felt
compelled to compensate for their weaknesses in parliament and signal
calm and unity when confronted by pressure from financial markets and
euro area austerity.
In Portugal the first austerity plan, announced on 13 April 2010,
was the result of an agreement between the prime minister and the
leader of the centre-right PSD. In addition to this plan the government
decided to change the basis for the calculation of unemployment
benefits, limiting the amount, imposed stricter obligations to accept
available job offers and withdrew the temporary measures of social
protection and employment support, expecting to save about €15 lm in
public expenditure and to support financial recovery.
The second package of austerity was announced in September
2010 in connection with the proposal for the state budget for 2011 and
aimed at reducing the budget deficit significantly. The package
included: a 5 percent reduction on all expenditure on public sector
wages, including a wage cut of between 3.5 percent and 10 percent for
wages above €1 500 a month; the freezing of all promotions; reduction
in spending on pensions, allowances and other social benefits, including
family allowances; raising value-added tax (VAT) from 21 percent to 23
percent; freezing public investment; and privatizations in the transport
sector. CGTP and UGT opposed the proposed measures, considering
them a brutal attack on workers, and stressing their negative impact on
employment. UGT union leaders accused the ministers of reneging on
commitments on pensions and incomes policy. As a result, CGTP and
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