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Файл:Сравнение социальных моделей Европы. Социальная и трудовая политика в Европе. Учебно-методическое пособие
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Martin Artiles, Antonio (2001) “Social Pacts in Europe. New
Dynamics” Transfer: European Review of Labour and
Research November 2001 7: 748-752. (See this volume)
Palier, Bruno and Sykes, Robert (2001) “Challenges and Change:
Issues and Perspectives in the Analysis of Globalization and the
European Welfare States” In R. Sykes, B. Palier and P.M. Prior (eds.)
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to Competitiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 21-124
Schmidt, Vivien A. (2008) “Discursive Institutionalism: The
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Serrano Pascual, Amparo (ed.) (2004) Are activation policies
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Swank, Duane (2002) Global Capital, Political Institutions, and
Policy Changes in Development Welfare States. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Pp. 274-297.
Sykes, Rob and Alcok, Pete (1998) Developments in European
Social Policy. Convergence and diversity. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Taylor-Gooby, Peter (2008) The New Welfare State Settlement in
Europe. European Societies, Vol. 10, Num. 1, pp. 3-24.
Streeck, Wolfgang and Thelen, K. (ed.) (2005) Beyond
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York: Oxford University Press.
Van Berkel, R. and Valkenburg, B. (ed.) (2007) Making it
Personal. Individualising activation services in the EU. Bristol: The
Policy Press.
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Part II. TEXTS
Working for Big Brother Ford: limits to the effectiveness of the
European works councils?
Antonio Martin Artiles
(Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 1999 5: 394, DOI: 10.1177/102425899900500309, The
full version of this article can be found at: http://trs.sagepub.com/content/5/3/394.citation)
1. Introduction
The labour dispute at Ford-Almussafes highlights the problems of
inter-union co-operation in the European Works Councils (EWCs). The
Almussafes (Valencia, Spain) and Saarlouis (Germany) Works Councils
were not able to resist the multinational’s pressure. Ford’s Vice
President in Detroit used a video-conference with worker representatives
to threaten closure of the Valencia plant if the workers did not quickly
reach agreement with the company. Moreover, the trade unions and
Works Councils at both plants seem to have competed with each other to
maintain job levels at their own plants rather than co-operated with each
other against the company.
After a long dispute lasting ten months, beginning in January 1998,
unions and the company at the Almussafes plant reached agreement in
November. But the terms of this collective agreement represented a
certain failure for the unions and jobs were lost. One of the main
difficulties faced by the unions during the negotiations was the way the
Spanish trade union electoral system sharpened divisions between them
during the course of the dispute. Holding elections during the
negotiations over the collective agreement weakened the power of the
Works Council.
2. Ford’s initial position
The Ford plant at Almussafes was inaugurated 22 years ago. It
directly employs 8,300 workers and indirectly provides 24,000 jobs in
another 400 companies in the Valencia Region, representing two per
cent of the economically active population. This shows how important
Ford is to the region and explains why public opinion followed this
dispute so closely and why the regional government tried to mediate in
the dispute.
22
The company initially aimed to increase production from 1,560 to
2,100 vehicles per day. Until recently, the plant made 770 units of the
new Focus model and 790 of the Ford Ka. Demand for the Ford Ka
increased and production rose to 1,100. Meanwhile, production of the
Focus dropped to 310. The company wanted to get production of the
Focus back up to previous levels and sought to achieve this by
negotiating greater flexibility of working time, including ten compulsory
Saturdays per worker per year.
3. The trade unions’ initial position
Initially, the unions would accept Saturday work on a voluntary
basis only. They had organised many strikes in the 1970s to keep
Saturday work voluntary. Accordingly, in order to meet the increased
demand, the unions proposed introducing a third shift, recruiting more
workers and revising job classifications. As negotiations dragged on, the
unions represented on the Works Council became increasingly divided.
Before the dispute became public, some progress had been made on the
basis of the company’s offer on pay rises, apprenticeships, holidays and
special bonuses. For the UGT (14 representatives) and Famif (the
administrative staff union, with two representatives), this looked to be
enough to reach preliminary agreement with the company. However, the
CC.OO. (with ten representatives), CGT (six), PUT (three) and the SPV
(two) refused the offer and convened rallies, a demonstration and a 24hour strike.
The dispute became more complex owing to the gulf between the
positions taken by the company and the unions on issues such as
changes to job classifications, the production bonus, job creation, the
third (night) shift, voluntary early retirement and the reduction of the
working week to 35 hours. However, one of the most controversial
issues was the CC.OO., SPV and PUT demand for grade 5 production
workers to be regraded to grade 6. The company refused to accept this
demand as they calculated it would increase the plant’s wage bill by 29
per cent.
4. The significance of public opinion: the shadow of Big
Brother
The company’s response was not long in coming. After nine
months of negotiations and faced with continued difficulties in reaching
23
agreement, the company threatened to sack 1,500 permanent workers by
the year 2003 and to not renew the contracts of more than 430 temporary
workers whose contracts were due to terminate on 23 December 1998.
At the same time, it warned that if an agreement were not reached
quickly, it would transfer production of 310 vehicles of the new Focus
model to the Saarlouis plant in Germany. The Spanish unions countered
by arguing that wages at the German plant were higher and would put
120 dollars on the price of every vehicle produced there and that
Saarlouis would need to recruit more workers. Secondly, they pointed
out that 1,000 workers at Almussafes would retire or could be given
early retirement by the year 2003 and that the Focus production lines
were not working to full capacity.
The UGT favoured coming to a preliminary agreement and
requested mediation by Ford headquarters in the United States. The
CC.OO. divided internally with one group taking a radical position,
close to that of the CGT, and another moderate group taking up a
position close to the UGT. However, things came to a head when, on 22
October, in a video-conference with worker representatives. Ford’s Vice
President in Detroit threatened to close the Almussafes plant and
transfer production to other plants. This shocked public opinion and
prompted commentators to compare Ford to Orwell’s Big Brother. In
addition, the Spanish Industry Minister was far from pleased and
publicly condemned the company’s threat as inappropriate and coercive.
5. The transfer of production to Saarlouis
Meanwhile, at Ford-Saarlouis, the company and the union had
agreed to establish a third shift and to work 15 Saturdays and 16
Sundays between September and December. Ford had also decided to
manufacture a new small vehicle in Saarlouis.
That is how things stood when, on the orders of the company’s
international headquarters, the Ford Spain management gave an
ultimatum to the Almussafes plant unions. Either they sign an agreement
with the company by 25 September or production of the Focus would be
transferred to Cologne. The company insisted on the production of
30,000 more vehicles per year. It had already taken steps to switch
production and had taken ten vehicles to Cologne to study how to
24
assemble them there1. Even so, during the negotiation of the collective
agreement, IG Metall sent a message to the Almussafes works council
stating that no agreement had been reached with Ford and, furthermore,
the Saarlouis plant had reached the limit of its production capacity.
Table 1.
Labour costs. Annual percentages - production line workers
Almussafes
Saarlouis
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
7.8 7.8 6.2 7.9 5.8 6.5
5.8 6.4 1.1 6.4 1.0 4.7
Source: Ford. Spain, quoted in Cinco Diets, 17 September 1998
6. Agreement on flexibility and the effect on jobs
Finally, on 30 and 31 October 1998, after tense and protracted
negotiations lasting 20 hours, the two sides reached a preliminary
agreement which was then ratified by workers at a mass meeting. In the
end, it was surprising how quickly agreement was reached given the
extent and social impact of the dispute. However, the company also
announced that 68,000 Focus vehicles would not be produced at the
Almussafes plant2.
The agreement highlighted important differences in the initial
positions of the two sides on certain issues, but also how much closer
they were on others. Rather than setting out the details of the agreement
here, I will focus on the issues of flexibility and job creation. In relation
to job creation, the agreement represented a compromise whereby
temporary workers currently employed by the company were to be
incorporated into the workforce as the situation returned to normal and
production increased. So the 430 temporary workers will continue
working at the plant, with Ford finally agreeing to renew the contracts it
had already terminated. However, the temporary contracts were not
converted into permanent contracts as the unions would have liked.
Anyway, Ford will recruit 250 new workers in exchange for the
unions’ agreement to convert collective ten-minute breaks into
1
Cinco Dias, 25 September 1998.
2
La Vanguardia, 2 November 1998.
25
individual breaks. This will allow the production of another 330 Focus
vehicles per day. The next step in the direction of creating more jobs
will be the creation of a third shift to run at full capacity.
With regard to working time flexibility, which was one of the main
reasons for the dispute, the two sides agreed on voluntary Saturday
working on the basis of ten Saturdays per worker per year, to cope with
fluctuations in demand. Workers were to be compensated by overtime
pay or through a mixed formula including additional holiday. The
agreement postponed the reduction of the working week to 36.5 hours
until the 2001 collective agreement.
After the dispute ended and the collective agreement was signed,
the union elections were finally held. The results strengthened the
position of the UGT: it obtained one more delegate on the Works
Council. CC.OO. were punished by the electorate and suffered a severe
setback, losing six delegates. The CGT also lost a delegate. In other
words, the unions that took a radical position in the dispute lost ground
in the elections, except the minority unions, who held their positions.
Table 2.
Composition of the Works Council. Number of delegates
1995 1999
UGT 14 15
CC.OO. 13 7
CGT 6 5
SPV 3 3
PUT 3 3
FAMIF 2 2
Total 41 35
7. Conclusions
This agreement, reached after a long process of conflict and
negotiation, illustrates the difficulties of negotiating increases in
production and job creation.
Globalisation and the imbalance of power
This dispute highlighted the enormous advantages that
globalisation gives to multinational companies. It allows them to play
workers and unions in different countries off against each other as each
26
set of workers tries to keep and increase the number of jobs at their own
plant. Big Brother Ford put pressure on the Spanish workers by
threatening first to transfer production of the Focus to Saarlouis in
Germany, and later to close the plant.
Flexibility compared
It is paradoxical that most Focus production has ended up in
Saarlouis where the labour costs are higher3. It seems that labour costs
are not always the determinant factor in deciding plant location issues.
Other forms of flexibility related to work organisation, workforce
participation, vocational skills and multi-skilling could have influenced
the transfer of production. These factors are influential in creating a
more “flexible” labour system, one which is more participatory in terms
of company decision-making and even in the organisation of production.
Wages and work organisation
The dispute highlighted the need to maintain similar pay levels and
employment conditions at the various European plants, a task that the
European Works Council (EWC) should tackle if it wants to avoid
workers being blackmailed by the multinationals. It also highlighted the
need to develop common criteria for work organisation, modernisation
and labour flexibility. It was these issues that the company used to back
up its main arguments and to emphasise the comparative advantages of
different plants.
Employment and flexibility
The final agreement showed how it is possible to create jobs and
increase production (from 1,560 to 1,870 cars per day) through tighter
work organisation and intensive exploitation of fixed capital. The
replacement of ten-minute collective breaks by individual breaks
eliminated the need to stop production. Another 250 jobs were created to
maintain this increased rhythm of production. The establishment of a
third shift will provide even more jobs. However, the radicalisation of
the unions’ position in the dispute lost the chance of converting 430
temporary jobs into permanent ones.
Flexible working time is on the increase in the automobile
industry. It was agreed to work ten Saturdays on a voluntary basis in
exchange for extra pay and an extra holiday.
3
In 1997, the labour costs per worker hour were 47.2 Marks in Germany and 25 Marks in Spain.
José Maria Alvarez, "Las Lecciones de la Ford" (Lessons of Ford), El Periódico, 2 November 1998.
27
Fragmented representation
The dispute also highlighted the difficulties created by fragmented
trade union representation during negotiations. Six unions were
competing in the elections and, although there was a formal attempt to
maintain a certain level of unity of action, their strong internal
differences slowed progress and even blocked negotiations altogether.
The dispute also highlighted the wear and tear inflicted on the unions by
the electoral contest and the way elections can exacerbate divisions. But
that is inevitable.
Public subsidies
Ford management should remember that the Almussafes plant
received thousands of millions of pesetas from public funds, including
before it was built more than 20 years ago. Receipt of such funds should
be accompanied by a moral and social commitment to the region's
society on the part of the company
Abbreviations
СC.OO. - Comisiones Obreras / Workers’ Commissions
UGT - Union General de Trabajadores / General Workers’ Union
CGT - Confederación General de Trabajadores / General Confederation
of Workers
FAMIF - Sindicato de Cuadros, Técnicos y Administrativos de Ford /
Technical and Administrative Staff Union
SPV - Sindicato de Progreso Valenciano / Valencia Progressive Union
(a splinter from the CC.OO.)
PUT - Plataforma Unitària de Trabajadores / Unitary Platform of
Workers (a splinter from the CC.OO.)
28
Workshop: Trade Unions In The 21st Century, organised by the
Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti and the European Trade Union
Institute.
Antonio Martin Artiles
(Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 2001 7: 164, DOI: 10.1177/102425890100700122, The
full version of this article can be found at: http://trs.sagepub.com/content/7/1/164.citation)
Of the two studies presented at this seminar, both of which adopted
a largely econometric approach, the first, entitled What do unions do in
Europe, was conducted by a group of researchers consisting of Alison
Booth (University of Essex). Michael Burda (Humboldt University of
Berlin). Lars Calmfors (Stockholm University). Daniele Checchi
(University of Milan) and Jelle Visser (University of Amsterdam). In his
presentation Lars Calmfors stressed the correlation between two
concepts central to the research, namely trade union representativeness
and the degree of co-ordination of collective bargaining.
The authors of this study take trade union membership figures as
the main indicator by which to measure the trade unions' strength and
representative capacity. Econometric approaches generally take trade
union membership rates, or the degree of coverage of collective
bargaining, as indicators, as these are easier to quantify and use than
other qualitative types of data.
The authors note that trade union membership rates have been
falling over the last twenty years, but this is old news. The main factors
with which the decline is associated identified in the report are also well
known from the specialist literature, and include unemployment, the
casualisation of labour and spread of fixed-term contracts and
outsourcing, growth in employment in the services sector, and the
attitudes displayed by governments and employers. One significant fact,
however, is that after twenty years of declining trade union membership
rates, these are still higher in Europe than in the United States and Japan.
Today the average trade union density in the European Union is 32%,
whereas in North America it is around 15% and in Japan 22%. In other
words, after twenty years of neo-liberal assaults, it is apparent that
membership is not falling as rapidly as in the United States. It did fall
rapidly between 1979 (when it was 44%) and the end of the 1980s but.
as from the 1990s. the drop has been less steep and, by way of a contrary
29
trend, the authors point out that in the Nordic countries trade union
density has remained high (86% in Sweden, for example) and even that
rates have been growing in the period since the 1980s.
In other words, the relative resilience of trade union membership in
Europe would appear to be attributable to the existence of alternative
models of capitalism (the neo-corporatist. Rhineland and Latin models)
in which social institutions and agencies have greater weight and serve
to set limits on the free play of the market, as opposed to the American
model where the market is given free rein and where the conditions are
in place for greater deregulation of the labour market.
These observations lead the authors to suggest the need to
exchange the underlying rationale of neo-liberal discourse, with its
aggressive and anti-trade union stance, in favour of a more liberal-social
form of discourse designed to strengthen and legitimise the role of the
trade unions in the process of European economic integration. In other
words, a link is suggested between the need to strengthen the trade
unions and the need for governance of industrial relations in the
framework of the single currency. This new context of economic
integration can thus be expected to lead to an improvement in
macroeconomia conditions, sustained economic growth, the generation
of new employment and an improvement in its stability and quality, all
of which could have the effect of pushing unionisation rates back up
again. The experience of the Nordic countries serves to illustrate the role
of the trade unions in industrial relations governance and their
contribution to the co-ordination of macroeconomic policy. This role
appears important today when greater economic integration in Europe,
and mergers between large multinational groups, lead to greater
interdependence in trade, corporate competitiveness, labour costs and
wages. In this new European framework the authors stress that the key
will be the level of co-ordination of bargaining (much more than
differences in trade union models, traditions and ideologies).
Accordingly, in an attempt to assess future prospects, they describe a
number of scenarios.
Possibly one of the most interesting aspects of the research
findings and of the seminar was the description of four possible
collective bargaining scenarios developed on the basis of current models
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