Добавил:
ivanov666
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз:
Предмет:
Файл:Сравнение социальных моделей Европы. Социальная и трудовая политика в Европе. Учебно-методическое пособие
.pdf
of trade unionism and collective bargaining strategies in the European
context.
Scenario 1: decentralisation of collective bargaining. This first
scenario assumes continuation of the current trend towards
decentralisation of collective bargaining entailing the attempt, in
particular, to adjust wages to specific company situations and their
productivity levels, which might possibly also enable a closer link
between bargaining on employment issues and improvements in
efficiency and productivity within the firm. Under this scenario,
companies would enjoy a more flexible collective bargaining structure
enabling faster adaptation to market fluctuations. But the risk for the
trade unions is that they would be more vulnerable; their representation
would tend to become more limited to the company or group; there
might be a tendency for the coverage of collective bargaining to fall; and
the trade unions would lose influence outside the firm. On the other
hand, their greater proximity to their constituencies could lead to
improved worker participation and to a strengthening of the unions' (or
works councils') legitimacy.
At the same time, however, this scenario would foster the spread of
'human resources policies' and of a form of trade unionism close to the
American model, entailing a distinction between unionised and nonunionised companies, a more individualised link with members and a
conception of the trade union as an organisation that offers services
(shopping discounts, credit cards, etc.) as a means of securing 'customer'
loyalty.
What would collective bargaining along these lines be like? Past
experience shows that this decentralised model can contribute to
ungovernability. This is indeed (he lesson to be learned from the
Donovan Commission Report in the United Kingdom during the 1960s:
intermittent unrest, more strikes and fragmented representation. And in
the event of an inflationary scenario in Europe in the coming years how
would it be possible to agree on wage restraint as a means of controlling
inflation?
Scenario 2: Co-ordination by means of national-level social
pacts. This second scenario derives from the trend towards the
conclusion of national-level social pacts. At EU level the requisite
31
concertation could be achieved via the Macroeconomic Dialogue in
Scenario
1:
Decentralisation of
Greater adaptability of wages
to firms' actual productivity
trade union and
Risks of weakening of trade
Scenario
2.
level
nation by means of social
ion and
Scenario
3.
ion of
lective bargaining at European
pean
tional
Scenario
4.
Combination of
centralisation and some
ing in
tom and
Coordination by European
collaboration with the EcoFin Council and the European Central Bank.
Table 1.
Future scenarios
National-
collective bargaining
•
conditions
• Low cost of
employer coordination.
•
unions
Coordinat
col
Union level
• Unification of the Euro
industrial relations system
• Coordination of transna
bargaining
• Leadership of IG Metall?
coordi
pacts
• Demands for macroeconomic dialogue
• High costs of trade un
employer co-ordination
de
transnational cooperation
• Decentralised bargain
accordance with local cus
practice.
• Adaptation to flexibility
•
Works Councils
This tendency might perhaps be strengthened as a means of
ensuring the required flexibility and competitiveness in the context of
Monetary Union (i.e. in the absence of monetary and exchange rate
policy autonomy): there could be an accelerated need for 'political
exchange' to moderate pay increases and ensure compensation by means
of redistributive fiscal policies. Pacts could thus be associated with the
safeguarding of pension, unemployment insurance and social security
systems (as has happened, for example, in Finland).
Even so, pacts could be difficult to achieve in the event of major
fluctuations in the economic cycle. Fiscal policies would not be
sufficient and would be unable to fulfil their redistributive role.
Scenario 3: Co-ordination of collective bargaining at European
Union level.
32
Integration in the single market is pushing more and more in the
direction of co-ordination of pay bargaining. Labour costs and
competitiveness are increasingly interdependent. This argument is
important in the German trade unions and co-ordination strategies are
already in existence between Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and
Belgium.
Extension of this co-ordination model could presuppose: a) a
unified system of industrial relations in the EU; b) a co-ordination of
certain bargaining topics at EU level: c) transnational co-ordination at
industry level and d) informal co-ordination of bargaining patterns.
However, the cost of this co-ordination would be extremely high. There
are so many obstacles (cultural, linguistic and legal) in the way of this
kind of scenario that it is today barely credible.
Scenario 4: Combination of decentralization and some
transnational co-operation. This option might well be more realistic
given the diverse and divergent nature of trade union cultures and
traditions; it would represent a combination of scenarios 1 and 3. In
other words, it would entail, on the one hand, a decentralised bargaining
model, taking account of local features and, on the other hand, coordinated bargaining involving the European Works Councils and the
European industry federations which would encounter the need to cooperate particularly on pay questions. In this way the trade unions could
win back some of the power they have lost at the level of the nation
state. And co-ordination would be less expensive in this scenario.
All in all, the authors' best guess was that scenario 4 was the most
likely.
The second study, entitled What do unions do to the welfare
states?', is authored by Agar Brugiavini (University of Venice),
Bernhard Ebbinghaus (Max Planck Institute Cologne). Richard Freeman
(National Bureau of Economic Research. USA), Pietro Garibaldi
(Universidad Bocconi). Bertil Holmund (Uppsala University). Martin
Schuludi (Max-Planck Institute. Cologne) and Thierry Verdier (Ecole
Normale Supérieure).
The research findings were presented by Agar Brugiavini who
stressed the strong correlation encountered between trade union
membership figures and the generosity of the welfare state. A
particularly salient observation is that the countries with the highest
33
unionisation rates tend to pay more generous unemployment benefit.
Thus higher trade union density appears to imply higher coverage by the
public welfare state systems. By the same token, countries with lower
trade union membership levels spend a lower percentage of GDP on
pensions, for example.
The authors' proposal is that the trade unions should be encouraged
to take on management of the unemployment insurance system, as is the
case in the Nordic countries and Belgium (Ghent system). This would
mean giving trade unions the responsibility for the administration of
unemployment benefits, leading them to feel, in turn, some
responsibility for pay developments insofar as they would become aware
that rapid pay increases would lead not only to an increase in inflation
and an increase in unemployment but also to losses in the purchasing
power of pensions, management of which would be their responsibility.
Administration of unemployment benefits would entail for the trade
unions a concern for training, reskilling and offering workers incentives
to return to work. All in all it would contribute to mobilisation of the
labour force. And some of the dividends accruing to the trade unions
might be to attract young people into membership, to retain the
unemployed in membership, and thereby raise overall membership
levels: an opportunity, in other words, to recover some of their lost
power.
The main criticisms levelled against the two studies relate to a bias
inherent in their methodology. A first remark refers to the lack of
historical perspective to explain the development of trade unionism and
industrial relations. The ahistorical character of both studies entails a
static approach which neglects the conflict factor as a key element of
social change. A second observation relates to the concepts central to the
studies. First of all, the representativeness of the trade unions cannot be
measured solely using the membership rate as an indicator. In several
countries the criterion of electoral audience is more important than that
of trade union membership. In other countries the size of trade union
strength is enhanced, in terms of representativeness, through labour
legislation, in other words the trade unions are granted a significant role
in the political arena. What is more, it should not be forgotten that trade
unions, as well as being organisations, are social movements. In a word,
use of the quantitative criterion of membership rates enables
34
measurement of 'representation' but not of 'representativeness'. The latter
is a qualitative concept not easily incorporated into econometric models
of analysis.
The third critical observation relates to the concept of
'decentralisation'. This has various meanings insofar as the term is used
in some cases to refer to the decentralisation of bargaining procedures
and in others to the decentralisation of bargaining on specific subjects.
In the specialised literature one finds terms such as 'decentralised coordination' or 'controlled decentralisation' which are employed in order
to take account of the tendency towards a twofold process consisting, on
the one hand, of centralised negotiation of a framework of minimum
standards in terms of contents, at the same time as other matters of
content become decentralised to company level. This applies, for
example, to collective bargaining in Germany, where bargaining takes
place at sectoral level but also incorporates agreement on 'opening
clauses' designed simultaneously to facilitate decentralisation.
The two studies presented by the Debenedetti Foundation are of
considerable interest and provide stimulus for further debate. They may
indeed perhaps mark a turning point in liberal discourse which, since the
1980s, has regarded the trade unions as dinosaurs close to the point of
extinction. This initiative appears, on the contrary, to be an attempt on
the part of the Debenedetti Foundation to revive the dialogue between
liberal thinking and the various social and trade union currents of
thought. Such dialogue is today urgently needed to ensure that the
process of European integration has a social as well as an economic
impact.
Crisis and trade union challenges in Portugal and Spain: between
general strikes and social pacts
Maria da Paz Campos Lima, Antonio Martin Artiles
(Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 2011 17: 387 DOI:
10.1177/1024258911410806, The full version of this article can be found at:
http://trs.sagepub.com/content/17/3/387 )
Summary
This article examines the responses of trade union confederations
to the impact of the international crisis of 2007-2010 in Portugal and in
Spain. Both countries had socialist governments in power and were in
particularly vulnerable positions when the crisis struck. During this
35
period trade union confederations negotiated social pacts and called
general strikes. Drawing from the literature on social pacts, general
strikes and on the identities and strategic actions of trade unions, the
article explores the dynamics of government policies and trade union
responses and their implications for the relationship between social pacts
and general strikes.
Keywords: Social pacts, general strikes, economic crisis, trade
union strategies, socialist parties, trade unions
Introduction
Together with Avdagic et al. (2005, 2011) we define social pacts as
formal agreements of social concertation between the state, unions and
employers that seek to facilitate adjustment in the areas of wage setting,
the labour market and welfare policies. For the purposes of this article
we highlight with Traxler (2010: 50) that: 'as regards actors the
paradigm case of pacts is tripartism (...) because the distinctive and
special contribution of pacts to macro governance, as compared to
collective agreements, is their claim to concert the activities of
organized interests and the state' and that this 'implies demarcating pacts
from peak-level (i.e. centralized) collective bargaining which is a purely
bipartite undertaking by the two sides of industry.'
The role of exogenous economic shocks as a necessary or a
sufficient condition to trigger social pacts has been a concern of the
study of the social pacts concluded over the last two decades in Europe,
both before and under European Monetary Union (EMU). The role of
exogenous economic shocks should be examined in articulation with
other factors, in particular the politico-economic conditions and the
configuration of institutions' and actors' strategies (Avdagic et al., 2005,
2011; Pochet et al., 2010). Avdagic et al. (2005, 2011) concluded that, in
the EU context, economic constraints related to EMU alone were neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the establishment of a social
pact, and demonstrated that a high economic 'problem load' facilitates
pacts only when combined with particular political and/or institutional
conditions. In particular, weak governments and intermediate union
centralization seem to have been key ingredients for successful tripartite
concertation during the 1990s. In terms of economic conditions, high
36
unemployment seemed almost as important for the likelihood of entering
pacts as problems in meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria.
According to Traxler (2010: 73), the bargaining structure figures
among the institutional and power differences which may influence
social pacts, in particular with regard to wage policy. In countries where
coordination of multi-employer bargaining continues to be important,
unions and employers' associations retain their deterrent power to
impose negative externalities on governments, which may result in the
need for cooperation to secure instrumental governance. Yet if the
bargaining units arc strong enough to enforce their interest in wage
moderation across the economy then there is no reason for governments
to conclude pacts.
The focus on actors' strategies has also been considered crucial.
Hamann and Kelly (2007, 2011) have focused on the specificity of the
role played by the governments, compared with the actors on the two
sides of industry, pointing to the determinant role of party political
configurations and electoral dynamics on social pact offers. In line with
a multi-causal and actor-centred approach, Avdagic et al. (2005, 2011)
explained that the dynamics of interaction during social pact
negotiations and perceptions of relative power were crucial factors in
shaping actors' strategies leading to the conclusion of social pacts.
The impact of the international crisis of 2007-2010 on European
policy and on EU countries again directs attention to this debate.
Questions have arisen concerning whether or not governments made
pact offers to deal with the crisis and if employers' organizations and
trade unions have included the possibility of concluding a social pact in
their agendas or have chosen other courses of action. Currently,
exogenous shocks in a number of countries seem to have triggered
general strikes rather than social pacts. However, in a number of
countries, such general strikes were eventually followed by the signing
of social pacts, as has been the case in Portugal and Spain.
The link between social pacts and general strikes has not been
systematically addressed in the literature. The analysis of the period
2007-2010 may provide important insights in this respect. For Kelly and
Hamman (2010a), the specificity of general strikes as compared with
economic strikes is that they are directed against governments and their
(proposed) policies rather than employers. Organized around issues of
37
concern to large segments of the population, the issues that motivate
general strikes are not generally those that are subject to regular
collective bargaining processes and mobilization may extend beyond the
unions' membership.
Hamann and Kelly (2004: 106) pointed to the link between social
pacts and general strikes, asserting that even though unions have rarely
secured all of their demands, they have frequently obtained sufficient
concessions to sign social pacts and sometimes this has been achieved
through the use of general strikes. This is a phenomenon which in the
view of Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2010: 319) can shift the
balance of the 'downward spiral of concession bargaining', into which
social pacts in the last two decades have seemingly forced trade unions.
Moreover, in defining general strikes as involving '... the
mobilization by one or more confederations of the whole of its
membership, as well as non-union members, typically in protest against
a proposed government policy reform, or following a breakdown in bior tripartite negotiations about policy reform', Kelly and Hamann
(2010b: 2) not only focused on the situations when social pacts are
preceded by general strikes (shift in power balance) but also on the
situations when general strikes are preceded by social pacts (including
pact failures). However, a third possibility may be considered, i.e. when
social pacts are concomitant with general strikes, which might challenge
the legitimacy of pacts and their effective implementation, a situation
that might occur when one of the trade union confederations does not
sign a pact and mobilizes workers against it.
Kelly and Hamman (2010b) stress that union exclusion from
government policy-making is strongly associated with a variety of union
protests, including general strikes. They highlight that centre or leftist
governing parties are more likely to engage in social pacts than
conservative parties, presumably because of their traditionally stronger
ties to trade unions, and that general strikes are less likely to occur under
socialist governments. Trade union strategies may also favour social
pacts or general strikes, a choice that challenges their identity as labour
market actors, class actors and societal actors (Hyman, 2001, 2007).
Although strategies tend to be path-dependent, in particularly critical
contexts reorientations can occur (Hyman, 2001, 2007; Visser, 1996),
also because actors' strategic preferences in the interactive games they
38
play are context-related (Avdagic et al., 2005, 2011). In these terms,
instead of the polarized notion of 'boxing or dancing' (Huzzard et al.,
2004) one can observe in critical times a tendency to develop more
mixed strategies of 'boxing and dancing'.
Against this background we explore developments in Portugal and
Spain with reference to the impact of the international crisis of 20072010 with a focus on the choices of governments and trade union
responses. These two countries are particularly interesting in this
context, because in this period they shared the following features:
• a particularly critical situation in relation to the international
crisis and the EU response to the crisis;
• socialist governments were in power over the period;
• governments launched radical austerity plans;
• trade unions held general strikes against governments' austerity
plans; and
• governments launched pact offers and pacts were concluded.
The legacy of social pacts and general strikes prior to the
international crisis - dancing and boxing
It is not our intention to provide detailed analyses of the evolution
of social pacts and general strikes in the two countries. Instead, we
highlight the relevant developments that contribute to a better
understanding of the actors' strategies and actions during the present
crisis, and the similarities and differences between the two countries.
Social pacts emerged earlier in Spain than in Portugal, reflecting
marked differences in the transition to democracy in Portugal and in
Spain: between the Portuguese revolution of 1974 and the Spanish
smoother transition to democracy, where social partnership played a
central role. Industrial relations in the two countries have some
similarities regarding the peak trade union actors at national level. Both
countries present a dual confederal structure on the side of labour, in
Portugal with the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers
(CGTP) and the General Workers' Union (UGT) and in Spain with the
Trade Union Confederation of Workers' Committees (CCOO) and the
General Workers' Union (UGT), whose emergence was linked with the
division along ideological lines. CGTP and CCOO were under the
influence of the Portuguese and Spanish Communist parties
39
respectively, while the Portuguese and Spanish UGT were under the
influence of the socialist parties. But CGTP and CCOO followed
different paths, as did the Portuguese UGT and the Spanish UGT, in
connection with the political and industrial relations changes in each
country. Over the years CGTP and the Portuguese UGT remained more
linked to their initial ideological references than CCOO and UGT in
Spain (Barreto and Naumann, 1998; Campos Lima and Naumann, 1997,
2000, 2011; Pérez, 2010; Royo, 2002).
On the side of employers there is a clear contrast between Portugal
and Spain. In Spain employers' organizations are unified in the national
employers' confederation (CEOE) which, together with the Spanish
Confederation of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (CEPYME), has
the status of national representatives of employers. In Portugal the
organizational picture is more fragmented, in so far as four
confederations represent the employers: the Confederation of Portuguese
Industry (CIP); the Portuguese Trade and Services Confederation
(CCP); the Portuguese Confederation of Agriculture (CAP); and the
Portuguese Confederation of Tourism (CTP).
Between 1979 and 1985, 58.8 percent of salaried workers in
Portugal were union members (Royo. 2002) while in Spain, in 1980,
only 8.3 percent of salaried workers were union members (Waddington,
2005). In the 1990s, there was a clear decline in union density in
Portugal, while Spain was one of the few countries where union density
increased. In 1999 trade union density was some 22.4 percent in
Portugal and some 16 percent in Spain. Density has remained more or
less stable over the last decade (OECD, 2011). While in Spain the
evolution of CCOO and UGT membership resulted in a balanced
position of the two confederations, in Portugal that evolution led to the
clear predominance of CGTP in relation to UGT (Campos Lima and
Naumann, 2011; Carley, 2004; Waddington, 2005). Despite the low
trade union density rates in both countries trade unions have over the
years showed considerable capacity for mobilizing both union members
and non members. Furthermore, via the overall efficiency of the erga
omnes system, collective agreements are extended to cover all workers,
which represents a 'gain in representativity'. In Spain, this has been
underpinned by the trade union electoral system (representation in works
40
Соседние файлы в предмете [НЕСОРТИРОВАННОЕ]