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UGT decided to call together a general strike for 24 November 2010. On
this occasion the general strike was against a socialist government, the
first socialist government to experience a general strike called also by
UGT.
In December, a month after the approval of the 2011 budget in the
parliament (with the support of PSD), the PS government presented a
third package of austerity to combat the deficit in 2012 (in the
framework of the Initiative on Competitiveness and Employment) to be
presented at the European Council. On this occasion, the centre-right
PSD did not support the government as it did in relation to the two
previous austerity plans, moving from a reserved stance to a strategy of
further opposition. The socialist government needed the support of the
social partners and proposed negotiations for a social pact on
employment and competitiveness. Among the issues to be discussed
were the reduction of severance pay in cases of dismissal and the
creation of a fund for severance pay, which faced the clear opposition of
CGTP and a cautious approach from UGT.
In the first two months of 2011, the effects of the budget cuts
started to have an impact on people's lives and a number of strikes in the
public and in the private sector emerged as a consequence. In this
turbulent context, international and European pressure increased,
demanding more austerity. The PS government answered this double
pressure (internal and external) with a dual approach, combining social
concertation and unilateral decision taking. On 9 March, two days
before the special Brussels summit of the leaders of euro area, the
government succeeded in obtaining a written commitment from the
social partners (with the exception of CGTP) on their willingness to
negotiate a pact on employment and competitiveness. After the Brussels
meeting, on 12 March, the Prime Minister José Socrates announced a
new austerity plan, the fourth in one year, including measures such as
freezing and cutting pensions and increasing taxes, and cuts to health
and welfare budgets. The new austerity plan was meant to reassure
investors and European Union members that Portugal could meet its
debt obligations without the need for outside help.
Both trade union confederations reacted against the austerity plan,
and against the fact that they were not consulted in advance. Alongside
such a reaction, two major demonstrations took place, both of which had
51
been called prior to these developments: one on the initiative of young
people (with the help of YouTube) against precariousness, low wages
and unemployment on 12 March, which assembled 300 000 persons; and
the other called by CGTP against the austerity plan on 19 March, which
mobilized thousands of persons. Moreover, opposition parties from the
left to the right demanded the discussion of the new austerity plan in
parliament, formally announcing their opposition to the plan. The prime
minister warned that if the measures failed to win support there was a
risk that the country would be forced into a bailout, and threatened to
resign if parliament did not approve them. The parliament was due to
take decisions on the matter on 23 March, and opposition was
predictably fierce. On 22 March the tripartite social pact on employment
and competitiveness was signed, once again without the CGTP. On 23
March the parliament rejected the austerity plan, after which Prime
Minister José Socrates presented his resignation to President Anibal
Cavaco Silva. Early elections were set for the beginning of June 2011.
On 6 April, the day when the interest rate Portugal pays on its 10year bond rose to over 8.5 percent, the Portuguese caretaker
administration led by Prime Minister José Socrates announced that it
would request financial assistance, and following this Portugal became
the third European country (after Greece and Ireland) to ask the
European Union and the International Monetary Fund for a loan under
the terms of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF).
In Spain the socialist government, CEOE-CEPYME, CCOO and
UGT spent late 2009 and the summer of 2010 negotiating a social pact
with a view to facing up to the economic crisis and pressure from the
European Council and international financial institutions. Though the
government tried to maintain a balance between the positions of
employers and trade unions, the concerted effort ended in failure due to
the opposition of unions to the orientation of some of the proposed
measures. The pension reform proposal to increase the retirement age to
67 was one of the main reasons why the unions refused the deal at the
time.
Despite the government's failure to conclude a social pact, peak
level organizations of employers and unions were able to conclude in
early 2010 a three-year Inter-confederal 'Settlement on Employment and
Collective Bargaining' (AENC, 2010-2012) which included the
52
conversion of temporary jobs into permanent ones, restrictions on
temporary employment, compliance with the principle of equal
treatment and non-discrimination, further development of vocational
training, the promotion of 'handover' contracts to rejuvenate staff,
limitations in the use of subcontracting and temporary employment, the
fostering of internal flexibility, the development of information,
consultation and participation rights of workers and moderation in wage
growth (2010: up to 1 percent; 2011: between I and 2 percent; and 2012:
between 1.5 and 2.5 percent).
In May 2010 the government launched an austerity plan to reduce
the deficit including the freezing of some pensions, cuts in public
employees' salaries and reductions in some family programmes. As a
consequence, conflict was reopened with the unions. The failure of the
tripartite action on labour market reform led to a Royal Decree Law
(RDL, 16 June 2010, on Urgent Measures for Reforming the Labour
Market), which was unilaterally promoted by the socialist government.
The 'brother' trade union of the socialist government was surprised and
felt let down by such a radical change of course9: in just a few months a
social-democratic course had turned in a more neoliberal direction.
Although the RDL's labour reform proclaimed the goals of
promoting permanent employment, with a temporary reduction in
working hours to maintain employment levels and to increase the
opportunities for the unemployed with a special focus on young people,
a great many of the measures indicate a shift in a neoliberal direction.
The proposed capitalization plan for unemployment insurance implies a
way to individualize responsibility for employability, toeing the line of
'active employment policies'. The greater coordination of active and
passive employment policies favours tightening up eligibility conditions
for unemployment benefits. The RDL gives more decision-making
power to companies in such fields as internal flexibility or the
modification of working conditions, and even facilitates a widening of
the wage gap. It opens the possibility of uncoupling company
agreements from sector agreements which can affect a range of topics,
including working hours and their distribution, shifts and remuneration
systems. Trade unions consider that ways are being introduced of
dismantling centralized collective bargaining in favour of company-level
9
Interview with the UGT General Secretary, Càndido Méndez, El País. 25 August 2010.
53
negotiations (CCOO, 2010; UGT, 2010). Furthermore, the reform
facilitates individual and collective redundancies on the grounds of
economic, technical, organizational and productive reasons, thus
allowing companies to make workers redundant even though they are
not in dire economic straits. Put in a nutshell, guarantees for 'fair'
dismissal were suspended, along with workers' representatives' rights to
information and letters justifying dismissal. The cost of dismissing
workers was further reduced by various measures towards reducing
severance pay, including that severance pay for new contracts amounts
to 20 days for each year of service. Finally, the RDL legalizes profitoriented private employment agencies and grants Temporary Work
Agencies a wider field of action. To sum up, the reforms seem to be
giving companies the opportunity to promote individualized industrial
relations, decentralize collective bargaining and undermine the
protective character of labour legislation, namely in the case of
dismissals. All this led to CCOO and UGT calling a general strike on 29
September 2010.
Four months later, following the increase of international pressure,
on January 2011, a tripartite social pact was signed between the
government CCOO-UGT and CEOE-CPYME. This social pact 'Acuerdo
Social e Económico para el crecimiento, el empleo y la garantia de las
pensiones' comprises three distinctive types of agreements: i) a tripartite
pact comprising the reform of the public pensions system, the
development of employment policies and industrial policies as well as
technological innovation and energy policies; ii) a bipartite pact between
the government and the trade unions to reform the public sector; and iii)
a bipartite agreement between the employers and the trade unions to
reform collective bargaining. The move from general strike to social
pacts in Spain seems, like in Portugal, to be related to increasing
international and European pressure, with the main difference being the
scale. It currently seems out of question that the IMF will intervene in
Spain, so the pressure is going in the direction of meeting internally at
all costs the requirements of financial stabilization. Furthermore, the
very high level of unemployment puts increased pressure on unions.
Conclusions
Among the euro area countries, Portugal and Spain have been
among the most subjected to the global financial crisis, combined with
54
the straightjacket of the EMU regime. Austerity plans resulting from
external pressures triggered general strikes and massive protests, which
were followed, later, by social pacts. This process provides evidence that
exogenous shocks are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
the emergence of a single course of action (either strikes or social pacts).
The highly critical situation worked as a catalyst, challenging trade
unions to act (almost) simultaneously as a counter power and as
regulatory actors, seeking to mobilize power resources to limit (or stop),
for a short while, anti-labour policies and austerity plans, and enhance
their capacity to participate in longer-term negotiations. This shifting
pattern of boxing and dancing shows not only the difficulties for
governments in finding popular solutions to the economic crisis, but also
the ambiguities encountered by trade unions in representing labour
interests on the one hand and acting as 'responsible' social partners on
the other. Strikes and other conflicts are, on the one hand, necessary
means to demonstrate the dissatisfaction among trade union members
who are supposed to pay for the capitalist crisis. Such demonstrations
are also part of the political game, in which they, on the other hand, can
enhance trade unions' power resources in acting as co-partners in
governance by negotiating social pacts.
This two-way game (boxing and dancing) has to be understood in
the context of different and conflicting national purposes and externally
vis-a-vis the EU/IMF and financial markets. General strikes and mass
demonstrations were called against the austerity plans of governments,
but were also an expression of a generalized opposition to external
constraints and impositions. The challenge was to fight for the
withdrawal of such plans (or amend them), without creating additional
difficulties to (for) the socialist parties in power. This challenge was
particularly acute for the trade union confederations historically linked
to socialist parties. In Spain there had been earlier experiences of
general strikes against the PSOE held by UGT, but in Portugal the UGT
participation in a general strike against the socialist government set a
precedent. This has to be understood in the context of efforts to respond
to internal and external pressure simultaneously.
Initial austerity plans decided unilaterally by the governments did
not calm financial markets or European institutions. In particular, in
Portugal, each austerity plan was followed by increasing external
55
pressure. By making pact offers the governments hoped to improve their
popularity and give a signal of their capacity to implement those plans,
in order to avoid further external pressures. Trade unions were caught in
a dilemma in so far as the proposed pacts included new anti-labour
measures, not compensated by significant pro-labour measures. Why
should labour sign such pacts? The motives of the unions were complex:
to support the socialist governments and prevent a political crisis,
fearing the return of right-wing parties; and to reduce the international
pressure, and even more negative social consequences, against a
background of rising unemployment; and/or because they believed that
otherwise the IMF/EU would require even more drastic measures.
The social pact signed in Spain in January 2011 prevented a
political crisis in the short term but whether it will prevent new
collective mobilizations cannot be predicted, as workers' conditions
continue to be undermined and trade unions have to play their role as
representatives of workers' interests. Through a variety of approaches
the PSOE government tried to combine previous experiences of
concertation in Spain - tripartite, bipartite and inter-confederal - to be
effective in calming the markets. In Portugal the social pact of March
2011 was signed in the context of ongoing mass demonstrations, some
of which were called by the CGTP which did not sign the pact.
Moreover, the pact was signed in the midst of the storm provoked by the
government announcement of a new austerity plan, the fourth in one
year, the main measures of which were not discussed with the social
partners. The parliament rejected the austerity plan and the prime
minister resigned. The pact thus neither prevented a political crisis nor
did it prevent the resignation of the prime minister.
In our view, the experiences of Portugal and Spain, as case studies,
call for more comparative studies of the ambiguous relationship between
general strikes and social pacts in circumstances of emergency. For us, a
first lesson emerges from these processes. Trade unions are still capable
of mobilizing workers when needed, but national trade union action
must be coordinated with regional and European action to develop
alternative policy options. The few socialist governments left in Europe
as well as those of the countries brutally targeted by austerity and
neoliberal plans have to coordinate their efforts and develop joint action
56
in alliance with trade unions for a social Europe. As for trade unions and
for socialist parties the question remains: to be or not to be?
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency
in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
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The governability of collective bargaining. The case of Spain
Rosa Nonell, Ramon Alós-Moner, Antonio Martin Artiles and Joaquin
Molins
(Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 2006 12: 349. DOI:
10.1177/102425890601200306 The full version of this article can be found at:
http://trs.sagepub.com/content/12/3/349)
Summary
The aim of this article is to analyse the concept of governability of
collective bargaining proposed by Traxler, Blaschke and Kittel (2001)
and to demonstrate its explanatory capacity and limitations in the
Spanish case. Governability is an important subject that should be taken
into account in the reform of industrial relations systems and in the
debate with regard to centralisation and decentralisation of collective
bargaining in Europe. The authors' main hypothesis is drawn up in line
with the institutionalist approach. Their argument, based on the results
of collective bargaining, is that the Spanish system of collective
bargaining, in spite of the organisational weakness of the unions and of
the employers' associations, is governable thanks to the role of the state,
the institutions, the legal ordering, as well as tradition and custom.
Keywords: Governability, collective bargaining, power, domain,
capacity of control, representation, representativeness, coverage, wages,
wage dispersion
Introduction
This article, which should be considered as a research note, also
reports on an initial research project carried out in 2005. During that
year we carried out 13 interviews as an initial exploration of the
governability of collective bargaining in Spain. The research consisted
of interviews and discussion groups with representatives of the
employers' associations and with the trade union representatives of
CCOO and the UGT10, as well as analysis of documents of the main
Spanish employers' associations and trade unions.
Centralised collective bargaining models that have strong
organisational structures favouring governability (Austria and the
*10
CCOO (Comisiones Obreras): UGT (Union Genera! de Trabajadores).
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