хрестоматия 1

щим положениям, это далекое от действительности обобщение, которым мы гордимся и на которое полагаемся, есть примитивное свойство нервной деятельности. Я вам уже говорил, как мы образовываем различные связи, ассоциации между раздражителями из внешнего мира и пищевой реакцией животного. И вот, если мы образуем такую связь на звук органной трубы, вначале будут действовать и другие звуки, и они будут вызывать пищевую реакцию. Получается обобщение. Это основной факт. И должно пройти известное время, вы должны применить специальные меры, для того чтобы действующим остался лишь один определенный звук. Вы поступаете таким образом, что при пробе других звуков животное не подкармливаете, и благодаря этому создаете дифференцировку. Любопытно, что в этом отношении животные резко отличаются между собой. Одна собака эту общую генерализацию удерживает очень долго и с трудом сменяет на деловую и целесообразную специализацию. У других же собак это совершается быстро. Или другая комбинация опытов. Если вы возьмете и прибавите к этому звуку еще какоенибудь действие на собаку, например станете чесать ей кожу, и если вы во время такого одновременного действия и звука и чесания давать еды не будете, что из этого выйдет? Собаки здесь опять разделятся на две категории. У одной собаки произойдет следующее. Так как вы во время одного звука ее кормите, а во время действия и звука и чесания не кормите, то у нее очень скоро образуется различение. На один звук она будет давать пищевую реакцию, а когда вы к звуку прибавите чесание, она будет оставаться в покое. А знаете, что получится у других собак? У них не только не образуется такого делового различения, а, наоборот, образуется пищевая реакция и на это прибавочное раздражение, т. е. на одно чесание, которое ни само по себе, ни в комбинации со звуком никогда не сопровождается едой. Видите, какая путаница, неделовитость, неприспособленность. Такова цена этой обобщенности. Ясно, что она не есть достоинство, не есть сила.

Следующее свойство ума - это стремление научной мысли к простоте. Простота и ясность - это идеал познания. Вы

ТЕОРИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ

знаете, что в технике самое простое решение задачи - это и самое ценное. Сложное достижение ничего не стоит. Точно так же мы очень хорошо знаем, что основной признак гениального ума - это простота. Как же мы, русские, относимся к этому свойству? В каком почете у нас этот прием, покажут следующие факты.

Я на своих лекциях стою на том, чтобы меня все понимали. Я не могу читать, если знаю, что моя мысль входит не так, как я ее понимаю сам. Поэтому у меня первое условие с моими слушателями, чтобы они меня прерывали хотя бы на полуслове, если им что-нибудь непонятно. Иначе для меня нет никакого интереса читать. Я даю право прерывать меня на каждом слове, но я этого не могу добиться. Я, конечно, учитываю различные условия, которые могут делать мое предложение неприемлемым. Боятся, чтобы не считали выскочкой, и т. д. Я даю полную гарантию, что это никакого значения на экзаменах не будет иметь, и свое слово исполняю. Почему же не пользуются этим правом? Понимают? Нет. И тем не менее молчат, равнодушно относясь к своему непониманию. Нет стремления понять предмет вполне, взять его в свои руки.

У меня есть примеры попуще этого. Чрез мою лабораторию прошло много людей разных возрастов, разных компетенций, разных национальностей. И вот факт, который неизменно повторялся, что отношение этих гостей ко всему, что они видят, резко различно. Русский человек, не знаю почему, не стремится понять то, что он видит. Он не задает вопросов с тем, чтобы овладеть предметом, чего никогда не допустит иностранец. Иностранец никогда не удержится от вопроса. Бывали у меня одновременно и русские, и иностранцы. И в то время, как русский поддакивает, на самом деле не понимая, иностранец непременно допытывается до корня дела. И это проходит насквозь красной нитью через все. Можно представить в этом отношении много и других фактов.

Мне как-то пришлось исторически исследовать моего предшественника на кафедре физиологии профессора Велланского. Он был, собственно, не физиолог, а контрабандный философ. Я

2005 © Плотников Михаил Вячеславович

ли. Или из черты детальности ума мы вместо специальности берем общие положения. Мы постоянно берем невыгодную линию, и у нас нет силы идти по главной линии. Понятно, что в результате получается масса несоответствия с окружающей действительностью. Ум есть познание, приспособление к действительности. Если я действительности не вижу, то как же я могу ей соответствовать? Здесь всегда неизбежен разлад. Приведу несколько примеров.

Возьмите веру в нашу революцию. Разве здесь было соответствие, разве это было ясное видение действительности со стороны тех, кто создавал революцию во время войны? Разве не ясно было, что война сама по себе - страшное и большое дело? Дай Бог провести одно его. Разве были какие-либо шансы, что мы сможем сделать два огромных дела сразу - и войну, и революцию? Разве не сочинил сам русский народ пословицы о двух зайцах?.. Но это прописная истина, ими мы не живем.

Возьмите нашу Думу. Как только она собиралась, она поднимала в обществе негодование против правительства. Что у нас на троне сидел вырожденец, что правительство было плохое - это мы все знали. Но вы произносите зажигательные фразы, вы поднимаете бурю негодования, вы волнуете общество. Вы хотите этого? И вот вы оказались перед двумя вещами - и пред войной, и пред революцией, которых вы одновременно сделать не могли, и вы погибли сами. Разве это - видение действительности?

Возьмите другой случай. Социалистические группы знали, что делают, когда брались за реформу армии. Они всегда разбивались о вооруженную силу, и они считали своим долгом эту силу уничтожить. Может, эта идея разрушить армию была и не наша, но в ней в отношении социалистов была хоть видимая целесообразность. Но как же могли пойти на это наши военные? Как это они пошли в разные комиссии, которые вырабатывали права солдата? Разве здесь было соответствие с действительностью? Кто же не понимает, что военное дело - страшное дело, что оно может совершаться только при исключительных условиях. Вас берут на такое дело, где ваша жизнь каждую минуту висит на волоске. Лишь

ТЕОРИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ

разными условиями, твердой дисциплиной можно достигнуть того, что человек держит себя в известном настроении и делает свое дело. Раз вы займете его думами о правах, о свободе, то какое же может получиться войско? И тем не менее, наши военные люди участвовали в развращении войска, разрушали дисциплину.

Много можно приводить примеров. Приведу еще один. Вот Брестская история, когда господин Троцкий проделал свой фортель, когда он заявил и о прекращении войны, и о демобилизации армии. Разве это не было актом огромной слепоты? Что же вы могли ждать от соперника, ведущего страшную, напряженную борьбу со всем светом? Как он мог иначе реагировать на то, что мы сделали себя бессильными? Было вполне очевидно, что мы окажемся совершенно в руках нашего врага. И однако, я слышал от блестящего представителя нашей первой политической партии, что это и остроумно, и целесообразно. Настолько мы обладаем правильным видением действительности.

Нарисованная мною характеристика русского ума мрачна, и я сознаю это, горько сознаю. Вы скажете, что я сгустил краски, что я пессимистически настроен. Я не буду этого оспаривать. Картина мрачна, но и то, что переживает Россия, тоже крайне мрачно. А я сказал с самого начала, что мы не можем сказать, что все произошло без нашего участия.

Вы спросите, для чего я читал эту лекцию, какой в ней толк. Что, я наслаждаюсь несчастьем русского народа? Нет, здесь есть жизненный расчет. Вопервых, это есть долг нашего достоинства - сознать то, что есть. А другое вот что. Ну, хорошо, мы, быть может, лишимся политической независимости, мы подойдем под пяту одного, другого, третьего. Но мы жить все-таки будем! Следовательно, для будущего нам полезно иметь о себе представление. Нам важно отчетливо сознавать, что мы такое. Вы понимаете, что если я родился с сердечным пороком и этого не знаю, то я начну вести себя как здоровый человек и это вскоре даст себя знать. Я окончу свою жизнь очень рано и трагически. Если же я буду испытан врачом, который

2005 © Плотников Михаил Вячеславович

ТЕМА 1: ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОНЯТИЯ

О русском уме

скажет, что вот у вас порок сердца, но если вы к этому будете приспособляться, то вы сможете прожить и до 50 лет. Значит, всегда полезно знать, кто я такой. Затем еще есть и отрадная точка зрения. Ведь ум животных и человека это есть специальный орган развития. На нем всего больше сказываются жизненные влияния, и им совершеннее всего развивается как организм отдельного человека, так и наций. Следовательно, хотя бы у нас и были дефекты, они могут быть изменены. Это научный факт. А тогда и над нашим народом моя характеристика не будет абсолютным приговором. У нас

43

могут быть и надежды, некоторые шансы.

Я говорю, что это основывается уже на научных фактах. Вы можете иметь нервную систему с очень слабым развитием важного тормозного процесса, того, который устанавливает порядок, меру. И вы будете наблюдать все последствия такого слабого развития. Но после определенной практики, тренировки на наших глазах идет усовершенствование нервной системы, и очень большое. Значит, невзирая на то, что произошло, всетаки надежды мы терять не должны.

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Автор: Источник:

ТЕМА 2: ТЕОРИЯ ПОЗНАНИЯ И ЛОГИКА СОЦИАЛЬНЫХ НАУК

Institutionalised knowledge

Meisenberger Sarah, Seiwald Johann

Paper for the EURAM Conference 2002 “Epistemology and Methodology: Rhetoric, Logic and Hermeneutics in Knowledge Creation”

1 Introduction

Knowledge is becoming a more and more important resource for organisations (Blackler, 1995, Probst/Büchel, 1997, von Krogh/Roos/Kleine, 1998, Gherardi, 1996). Knowledge can be represented in several ways and the content of knowledge depends highly on the theoretical approach and its context. Organisations develop their organisational knowledge base which provides the basis for learning, action and decisions. This organisational knowledge is not generated in a purely selfreferential process. Organisations are embedded in environmental contexts which are the frameworks within organisational knowledge is developed. Environmental institutions are, on the one hand, deposits of knowledge for organisations and on the other hand, restrictions for organisations to which organisations have to adapt up to a certain degree.

The relationship between institutions and knowledge is highly complex and will be analysed in this paper. The denomination "knowledge 'in' and 'of' institutions" gives the impression that this complex relationship is being reduced to a simple logic. But it would be quite too simple to regard institutions as pure representational forms of knowledge what "knowledge 'in' institutions" implies. "Knowledge 'of' institutions" could stand for an equation of institution and knowledge. The paper tries to explain the relationship between knowledge and institutions whereby

these simplifications of this relationship should just be a first contribution to the discussion.

The paper consists of five main parts. As the theoretical background on which the definition of knowledge in general and knowledge in management studies is based has great impact on the results produced, chapter 2 explains the assumptions concerning knowledge and institutions within the framework of new institutionalism and institutional economics. The characteristics of institutionalised knowledge will be discussed in chapter 3, followed by the presentation of the importance and functions of institutionalised knowledge for organisations (chapter 4). The paper ends with some conclusions (chapter 5).

2 Theoretical Assumptions on Institutions and Knowledge

Assumptions which underlie different concepts of knowledge have a major impact on the research results produced. Therefore, a discussion of the notions of a certain theoretical background – especially of ontological and epistemological assumptions – is a prerequisite for an analysis of knowledge.

Burrell/Morgan (1979) in their book "Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis" discuss different assumptions relating to a subjective or an objective research paradigm. As far as the assumptions of ontological nature are concerned, which are treating the very essence of the

phenomenon under investigation, two types can be distinguished: whereby realists see the reality investigated to be external to the individual and imposing itself on individual consciousness from outside, nominalists see reality as a product of individual consciousness.

Institutions, as part of reality, therefore can be conceptualized on the one hand, in a more realistic stance as the "external environment" to an organisation, a fact that exists independently of an individual's appreciation, a reality of its own, in the way they are conceptualized within the theory of new institutional economics (Ebers/Gotsch, 1998, Williamson, 1995). Institutions are considered as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 1990). One of the main objectives of the analysis of institutions is to explain the structure, the behavioural assumptions and the efficiency of institutions, and the institutional change (Ebers/Gotsch, 1999). In general, the institutional environment ("the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution", North, 1981) and the institutional arrangements ("an arrangement between economic units that governs the way in which these units can cooperate and/or compete", North, 1981) can be distinguished. The institutional environment therefore is ontologically separated from the arrangements that represent the relations between different organisations. The environment and the arrangements have an ontological state.

On the other hand, within the framework of the institutional theory1 old institutional theory1 sees in institutionalisation the "process of instilling with value" (Scott, 1987). Institutions are not seen as mere technical instruments, but as "means of instilling value, supplying intrinsic worth to a structure or process that, before institutionalisation, had only instrumental utility" (Scott, 1987). New institutionalism conceptualises organisations as organisms

1 The denomination "old institutional theory" refers to the approaches of Selznick and his scholars. The distinction between old and new institutional theory dates back to the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1991).

embedded in the field (sector, society) and emphasises legitimacy in contrast to old institutional theory that sees the organization embedded in the local community and centred vested interest (DiMaggio/Powell, 1991). With reference to Berger/Luckmann (1999) such as many contributions to new institutionalism refer to their work "The social construction of reality" these concepts move towards a more nominalistic point of view2.

Closely related to the question about the state of reality is the question how we might begin to understand the world and communicate this knowledge to others. This epistemological dimension can be divided into a positivistic and an antipositivistic stance at the extreme ends of the objectivistsubjectivist continuum. Positivists assume that humans are able to capture reality, to "mirror" what is outside there, to develop a true or false picture of the world. Representatives of an antipositivistic understanding of epistemology question the assumption of an objective reality and reject the understanding of science that can generate objective knowledge of any kind (Burrell/Morgan, 1979).

In alignment to Pepper's World Hypotheses, Tsoukas (1994) describes four different types of knowledge in management studies. Whereby formism and mechanism theories ground in a positivist epistemology, as they base on an analytical fundament, contextualism and organism theories can be assigned to a more anti-positivist research program which bases on a synthetic basis.

New institutional economics is dealing with the following two basic questions. The first emphasis is put on the analysis of which institutions have to bear the lowest costs and leading to the highest efficiency when treating co-ordination problems. And the second question asks how the coordination problems, the costs, and the ef-

2 Berger/Luckmann (1967) provide a conceptual basis for new institutionalism, especially the early works of Meyer/Rowan (1977) and Zucker (1977) drew directly to Berger/Luckmann. Many works of new institutionalism refer directly to Berger/Luckmann or adopt some thoughts and conceptual elements but it has to be remarked that some concepts of Berger/Luckmann were not adopted, such as the process of internalization (see Powell/DiMaggio, 1991, Scott, 1994, Meyer, 1996, Barley/Tolbert, 1997).

ficiency of an economic exchange influence the institutional change.

Briefly, four components are analysed in this theoretical model including "institution", "exchange", "costs", and "efficiency" and all of these four components can be treated as exogenous or endogenous variables dependent on the chosen assumptions and perspectives (Ebers/Gotsch, 1999). The relationship between actors and phenomena are mainly viewed in instrumental terms.

Institutions are a creation of human beings. They evolve and are altered by individuals. Hence, the concept on institutional economics must begin with the individual. Human behaviour is quite more complex than reducing it to a simple utility function. But for valuable analysis it is quite useful to reduce the complexity of human behaviour and state some behavioural assumptions. The concept of institutional economics is related to the assumptions of rational-choice models. Although individual actors face many repetitious situations and can act rationally in such situations, they also are confronted with many unique and non-repetitive choices where the information is incomplete and where outcomes are uncertain. Accordingly, people decipher the environment by processing information in order to understand the environment and solve the problems they confront (North, 1990).

On the contrary, new institutionalism moves towards a more nominalistic ontological conceptualisation and therefore, knowledge has to be treated in a different manner than within the framework of new institutional economics. As institutions according to new institutionalism have no ontological state per se, institutions are seen as deeply rooted and embedded in the context from where they arise (see Scott, 1983a, Scott, 1983b). Therefore, institutions and their influence are only understandable within the broad context that points to the connection to contextualism which is "synthetic: it takes a pattern, a gestalt, as the object of study, rather than a set of discrete facts (Tsoukas, 1994)". "Organizations are affected by the structure of relations of the inter-organisational systems in which they are embedded, and these systems are in turn affected by the societal systems in which they are located,

and these systems are in turn affected by the system in which they are located (Scott, 1983a)."

Therefore, institutions can only be understood when the institutional context is taken into consideration and this fact is not only emphasised in the theory of new institutionalism but also the new institutional economics put attention to the contextual set-up of organisations which influences directly the creation of knowledge. In order to maximise an organisation's objectives information, skills, and knowledge among other things are needed. And the kinds of information and knowledge required by the entrepreneur are in good part a consequence of a particular institutional context. And that context will not only shape the internal organisation but also the direction of the acquisition of knowledge and skills. Therefore, the institutional context has to be examined to see what kind of demand exists for different kinds of knowledge (North, 1990).

As a general and all including theory of knowledge cannot be presented within this paper or never at all, the definition of knowledge of Berger/Luckmann (1998) should serve as a starting-point for the discussion and the emphasis should be put on the dialectical relationship between context and arising knowledge. Berger/Luckmann (1998) who widely influenced sociology and especially sociology of knowledge see knowledge as “the consciousness that phenomena are real and have determinable properties” (Berger/Luckmann, 1998). Institutionalisation is the process of interaction between people with the result (institution) of meaning systems which are regarded as objectified and externally (Berger/Luckmann, 1999, Zucker, 1987). Institutionalised knowledge, therefore, is the taken for granted knowledge, regarded as objectified and external.

But how the concept of knowledge is treated within the concept of new institutional economics and the question who knows what within the institutional frameworks are hardly discussed and integrative answers are not found or given. Knowledge can be distinguished into communicable knowledge, as the name implies is knowledge that can be transmitted from one person to another, and tacit knowl-

edge (a term coined by Polanyi, 1967), which is acquired in part by practice and can be only partially communicated (North, 1990). Individuals internalise knowledge through the process of institutionalisation and learning by doing as taken for granted aspects of social reality. And institutions (informal or formal) function as representatives of institutionalised knowledge which is not questioned but practiced or applied. Institutions, consequently, are regarded as they consist of institutionalised knowledge. And within this paper institutions without institutionalised knowledge are neglected. On the contrary, knowledge can be manifested without institutions and can exist loosely coupled from any institutionalised form of knowledge, so the concept of knowledge is considered as the broader phenomenon than the concept of institutions.

A conception of knowledge in these senses emphasises a nominalistic point of view. As the concept of Berger/Luckmann provides an integral conceptual basis this explanation should be taken as the basis of the argumentation in this paper. This broad definition of knowledge should enable a general discussion of institutionalised knowledge and should not restrict in advance.

3 Characteristics of institutionalised knowledge

When characteristics of institutionalised knowledge should be discussed it has to be considered that this includes a classification and categorisation which is inherent in a simplified consideration of reality in general and of knowledge in special. One has to be aware that simplification is used to illustrate complexity and certain complex structures and relations in order to understand different aspects and properties of institutionalised knowledge which differ strongly in their appearance.

The subtitle of the paper "Properties of knowledge ‘in’ and ‘of’ institutions" gives the impression of treating the relationship as inside-outside discussion or as representational mode but there exists a reciprocal relationship between the institutional logic and knowledge: "Institutions are then influenced by the knowledge they themselves have induced. To understand the emergence reproduction, and change of

institutions, the reciprocal relation between instit utions and the knowledge manifesting them needs to be considered (Stein, 1997)."

3.1 Embedded in the environmental context

Institutions are reservoirs of knowledge and provide a knowledge basis for organisations, individuals, and for the society on the whole. They are subsystems of society (Walgenbach, 1998) and therefore, "macrolevel abstractions" and "independent of any particular entity" (DiMaggio/Powell, 1991). A crucial distinction in this study is made between institutions and organisations. Like institutions, organisations provide a structure to human interaction. But organisations are purposive entities designed by their creators to maximise wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities afforded by the institutional structure of the society. Knowledge is deeply rooted in the context in which institutions are embedded. The way knowledge develops shapes the perceptions of the world around and in turn those perceptions shape the search for knowledge (North, 1990). And consequently, organisations are affected by the structure of the inter-organisational systems in which they are embedded and in turn affected by the world system in which

they are located (Scott, 1983a).

The process of institutionalisation is not a purely organisational but a widely interorganisational activity and as a consequence institutional knowledge is highly social and acquired in social activities.

The next point will deal with this aspect of institutionalised knowledge.

3.2 Social type of knowledge

When reality is considered as generally socially constructed (as nominalists do) such an assumption induces major ontological impacts on the research results. Proceeding from this theoretical background the social component of institutionalised knowledge is considered as an implicit assumption resulting from its embeddedness in the environmental context. Institutional arrangements provide constitutive rules as they define "the nature of actors and their capacity for action" (Scott, 1994). Through institutional rules actors are integrated into the world and their role

within the society is developed. Additionally, rights, interests and capacities of actors are constructed by these institutional rules (Scott, 1994). Institutions are relatively reinforced social expectation structures and as a consequence not only constrain individual and collective action but enable these actions primarily (Hassen/Krücken, 1996).

Within the framework of new institutional economics knowledge is also regarded as a social construction in the sense that the way knowledge develops influences the perceptions people have about the world around them and consequently, the way in which they rationalise, explain and justify that world (North, 1990). And as individuals confront many actions and are faced with problems, the embedded set of institutions enable s them not to have to think too much about problems or to make choices between too many alternatives. Institutions offer a stable equilibrium and knowledge of routines in which the matter of choices appears to be regular, repetitive, and clearly evident, so that 90 percent of actions in a day do not require much reflection (North, 1990).

3.3 Pre-produced objectified knowledge

Objectified knowledge is considered as knowledge which is “objective” to the community that shares it. In an organisation, for example patents, written rules and procedures, and organisational charts that are known by the whole organisation are all part of the explicit and collective body of knowledge (Spender, 1996). In the process of institutionalisation this collective and objectified knowledge is infused with value (Scott, 1987). Institutionalised knowledge can be interpreted as "a treasure of ready made pre-constituted types and characteristics" (Schütz, 1962) that is socially derived. In an organisational context, institutions such as formalised organisational programs "are prefabricated formulae available for use by any given organisation” (Meyer/Rowan, 1977) and therefore, represent validated and correct patterns of behaviour (Walgenbach, 1998) which are legitimated through the process of institutionalisation, give normative character, and ascribe cognitive validity to the knowledge (Berger/Luckmann, 1999).

ТЕОРИЯ ОРГАНИЗАЦИИ

From the point of view of new institutional economics institutions include any form of constraints hat human beings devise to shape human interaction. They can either be formal or informal, evolve over time or be created and can include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities (North, 1990).

3.4 Stable, but provisional

Institutional knowledge tends to be very stable (Greenwood/Hinings, 1996) as institutions are regarded as relatively stable patterns of behaviour and meaning. "To the institutional school, however, the prevailing nature of change is one of constant reproduction and reinforcement of existing modes of thought and organization (Greenwood/Hinings, 1996, 1027)." Isomorphic and self-reproducing effects support the stabilisation of the institutionalised knowledge base; as a consequence, change in institutionalised knowledge is difficult and involves deinstitutionalisation. Such an institutional framework hence shape the acquisition of knowledge and skills and that direction will be the decisive factor for the long-run development of that society (North, 1990).

3.5 Is efficiency inherent in institutionalised knowledge?

Even though institutions provide a certain set of stability features it has to be maintained that it does not guarantee in any way that the institutions relied upon are efficient, although stability may be a condition for complex human interaction, it has certainly not to be a sufficient condition for efficiency (North, 1990). But contingency theorists (Donaldson, Child) and new institutional economists (Williamson, see Ebers/Götsch, 1998) put a great emphasis on the aspect of efficiency as organisational structures are regarded as an instrument that enables efficient coordination within an organisation.

New institutionalists doubt the efficiency claim of institutions and organisational structures (Walgenbach, 1998). As those are regarded as taken for granted aspects of human life, the normative and cognitive aspects are highlighted. Institutional beliefs are myths (Meyer/Rowan, 1977) in the sense that they depend on the fact

2005 © Плотников Михаил Вячеславович

that they are widely shared or are promulgated by individuals or groups who had been granted the right to determine such matters (Scott, 1983b). Institutions serve as "templates for organizing" that are legitimised and are not questioned any more. As institutions persist, even if they are suboptimal (DiMaggio/Powell, 1991), the question may arise why institutionalised knowledge is seen as valid even if it proves as not efficient anymore.

3.6 Evaluated

The concept of efficiency arises from the underlying logic of rationality which is inherent in the assumptions of new institutional economics. But this logic has been widely doubted (March/Olsen, 1994, Meyer/Rowan, 1977, Tolbert/Zucker, 1996). As a consequence, new institutionalism argues from the point of view of "logic of appropriateness". Institutional rules are not followed as they are uniquely efficient, but as they are forms of appropriate behaviour and taken for granted. But why do institutions and institutionalised knowledge appear as appropriate?

Institutions are deposits for knowledge which resulted from the experiences of people and are part of the "social heritage ". Only a small part of individual knowledge is generated through the process of individual experience. Most parts are socially derived. Institutionalised knowledge was tested and evaluated and the taken for granted aspects of institutions reinforce the assumption that this knowledge is proved as right. Organisational structures are “pre-tested” what encourages the adoption of those structures (Tolbert/Zucker, 1996) and consequently, institutions can serve as "knowledge at hand" (Schutz, 1962, 307)3.

4 Influence of institutionalised knowledge on organisations and the logic behind institutionalised knowledge

Institutions have a major impact on organisations in a way that they provide a structure to everyday life and offer guid-

3 It is not neglected that institutions and institutionalized knowledge depend highly on the relations and power structures between the involved actors but in this paper such questions are not discussed.

ance to human interaction. They include any form of constraints and can be either formal or informal. Institutional knowledge, therefore, influences the collective knowledge base and the process of organising. This chapter triggers some specific characteristics which institutional knowledge evolves in the process of in

4.1 Uncertainty avoidance and creation of stability

Organisations try to exploit their existing resources and create new opportunities by the means of an efficient and effective organisational arrangement in order to survive in the environment and to serve the purposes of people (Penrose, 1959). The existence of organisations is constantly in question, and their survival is viewed as problematic (Pfeffer, Salancik, 1978). But the major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction and therefore, institutions establish the opportunities in a society. Organisations are created to take advantage of those opportunities, and, as the organisations evolve, they alter the institutions (North, 1990).

Uncertainties arise as a consequence of both the complexity of the problems to be solved and the way problems are solved by the individual (North, 1990). As institutional knowledge is highly normative and prescriptive as a consequence of being widely and deeply accepted by the members of a collective (Barley/Tolbert, 1997), the efficiency immanent to these rules is pushed to the background.

Institutions develop to "rational myths" (Meyer/Rowan, 1977). Through institutional adoption environmental as well as organisational stability can be achieved. Whereby in the preinstitutionalisation stage efficiency is the central motive for imitation and the development of new forms of organis ing, in later stages the efficiency turns to a myth and adoption is a normative issue (Tolbert/Zucker, 1996).

The integration of knowledge in routines creates internal stability of the organisation. Objectified knowledge legitimates actions in a given situation and ensures reliable quality of outputs over time (Stein, 1997). And this knowledge of how things are done or should be done stabilise the