Крючков Фундаменталс оф Нуцлеар Материалс Пхысицал Протецтион 2011

Daily administrative control of nuclear material

Custodians and the facility’s top officials control NM as the persons responsible for the integrity of NM. Administrative controls include systematic checks of NM performed by custodians or the persons authorized so by the facility administration for the NM inventory to be verified or anomalies and infringements in NM handling, accounting and control rules at workplaces to be timely detected. This form of control checks the NM inventory and disposition at authorized locations, the NM integrity (tamper indicating devices), alarms and so on.

10.2. Intrastate and international control of NM

Rostekhnadzor of Russia

Russia has state controls implemented in the form of supervision by a special organization, Rostekhnadzor of the Russian Federation. The functions of this cover all aspects of national nuclear safety and security, and are governed by the atomic energy law. This law authorizes Rostekhnadzor to:

∙develop federal standards and regulations;

∙license NM uses by organizations;

∙enforce NM accounting and control regulations within organizations;

∙enforce NM physical protection regulations within organizations;

∙supervise nuclear, radiation, technical and fire safety.

Emphasis in this is placed on supervision of NM accounting and control within organizations. Rostekhnadzor inspectors carry out audits of all documents on the NM in each of the MBAs that exist at the enterprise, perform verifying measurements of their own and make a statement with respect to the status of NM accounting at the given enterprise. Subject to Rostekhnadzor supervision are all enterprises and organizations in Russia that possess nuclear material (except those operated by the Russian Defense Ministry).

International control of nuclear material

International controls are implemented for the nuclear proliferation resistance purposes. International NM control is based on the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty the parties to which are practically all countries of the world. This nuclear material control is described in Part I (Chapter 3).

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CHAPTER 1

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE OBJECTIVE OF PHYSICAL

PROTECTION

Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, as defined by the Russian atomic energy law [1], is a nuclear activity directed at ensuring security of nuclear installations (NI) through protection of these against a particular type of threats (theft of nuclear material, acts of sabotage at nuclear facilities and so on).

Physical protection is involved in all phases and stages of the nuclear facility (NF) lifecycle and in handling of nuclear material (NM), including transportation thereof.

Russian regulatory documents [1, 2] establish requirements to ensuring the physical protection of NIs, which, among other factors, take into account international obligations of the Russian Federation in uses of atomic energy. Regulations of the Russian Federation prohibit nuclear activities without physical protection being ensured.

Noteworthy is the hierarchical structure of physical protection measures taken at the state, industry and nuclear installation levels.

These measures are implemented by respective physical protection systems.

The state system of physical protection comprises government authorities and agencies, as well as federal executive power bodies carrying out state administration with respect to uses of atomic energy and government regulation with respect to security of installations making use of atomic energy, other federal executive power bodies and organizations involved in ensuring physical protection.

This level also includes oversight with respect to the fulfillment of physical protection requirements as declared in respective regulatory documents.

A specific objective of the state system of physical protection is to reduce the likelihood of NM being trespassed on by preventively detecting the actions prepared for and limiting the capabilities of potential attackers to make so that the adversary would not have respective materiel, e.g. armored vehicles, missile launchers, helicopters and so on, as well as information on the physical protection measures taken at particular NIs.

An agency system of physical protection combines and coordinates the efforts taken by installations within the authority of the respective agency to ensure physical protection thereof, as well as guidance, funding and control of their activities.

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The agency level involves guidance with respect to the specified type of activities at all installations within the respective agency’s control given the specific nature of the industry concerned, procedural assistance and logistic support to the establishment (perfection) of the physical protection system (PPS) at installations, and internal control of physical protection at NIs. To this end, management structures are formed within the respective executive power bodies to be in charge of these functions.

A system of physical protection at a nuclear installation level

(installation-level PPS) implements the above complex of provisions immediately at the installation concerned. It is exactly the installation-level PPS that forms an essential, key link in the entire spectrum of physical protection activities. The responsibility area thereof is the installation’s site, as well as all buildings, structures and, clearly, nuclear material proper and critical components of nuclear facilities this includes. It is exactly here that particular tasks in protection of nuclear material against theft and nuclear facilities against acts of sabotage are addressed.

A separately addressed task is protection of nuclear material in the process of transportation (movements between installations).

The activities at all levels are essential and contribute to the overall task of ensuring physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.

The state and agency systems of physical protection address general political, organizational and financial problems. Most research, engineering and practical problems arise in ensuring physical protection immediately at the level of installations. It is exactly these problems and ways to resolve these that we shall discuss below.

There is an important point to the PPS construction as a complex human-machine system, which involves competitive interests of the parties concerned (the attacker and the protection system). The human link in the PPS, made up of persons making and persons implementing decisions (emergency response teams and so on), as well as the need for addressing the task in an uncertain environment (no prior awareness of the adversary’s intents) limit the applicability of analytical research techniques. Mathematical modeling (simulation), as shown below, offers the most attractive solution.

A very important question is how this complex system can be built so that it would be efficient. To find the answer, one cannot avoid using a systems approach to enable, by defining the overall objective of the PPS as protection of the installation, the requirements to its separate subsystems to be formulated.

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It is also important to analyze the PPS establishment (perfection) process as such, which requires a systems approach as well to coordinate the work performed at separate stages and steps.

The recent trend in the evolution of modern NI physical protection systems has been towards an increasingly comprehensive use of technology therein. The technological innovations in the PPS field include, not being limited to, new types of intruder detection sensors and systems, including for novel applications (water area, low-flying targets, detection of introduced items), as well as systems automating some of the functions implemented earlier by the physical protection personnel. Use of hardware improves the performance of the NI physical protection systems by reducing the human factor effects thereon and promotes so safety and security culture at NIs.

The questions answered to in the subsequent chapters are what the PPS is, what this is composed of, and what roles its separate subsystems and components (hardware, response force, structural elements and others) are assigned to. Further we shall dwell on how this system can be built, what its lifecycle stages and phases are, and what procedures and techniques can be used to support the establishment (perfection) and operation of the PPS.

References

1.Закон Российской Федерации об использовании атомной энергии. Принят 21 октября 1995 г.

2.Правила физической защиты ядерных материалов, ядерных установок и пунктов хранения ядерных материалов. Утверждены Постановлением Правительства РФ от 7 марта 1997 г. № 264.

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CHAPTER 2

REGULATORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PHYSICAL

PROTECTION

Physical protection is a complex and critical task, which requires a regulatory and legal framework to be formed for this to guide activities in the field.

NM physical protection activities are governed by respective Russian laws and regulatory documents. Requirements and recommendations in a number of international documents should be also taken into account. We shall start from these.

There is an IAEA-developed document [1] which forms a conceptual physical protection basis for different countries possessing nuclear material and nuclear facilities. This views physical protection in each particular country as a national problem to be addressed given the country’s specific features (geopolitical environment, peculiarities of nuclear installations, crime rate in the given country and so on).

The second international document is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1989). Also taking physical protection as a national-level issue, this document places emphasis on international NM transport.

The atomic energy law is the underlying Russian law [2]. Some of the chapters and sections therein do deal with physical protection issues, still, as is clear, in the most general terms.

More detailed regulation of physical protection is provided in another federal document [3]. This defines the functions of executive power bodies and sets forth major requirements for physical protection of nuclear sites, as well as for nuclear material and facilities during transport.

Law, clearly, simply outlines different aspects of physical protection activities and provides only general guidance on how this to be ensured. Therefore, a vital task is to generate industry (interindustry) regulations to take into account the specific features of nuclear installations and the need for carrying out interbranch activities.

The above instruments govern necessary procedures and impose requirements upon the PPS, its components and types of activities. A number of documents at this level describe the techniques of carrying out some activities (e.g. site vulnerability analysis, PPS performance assessment, PPS testing and others). One example to consider is Rosatom’s system of the PPS industry documents as discussed in [4, 5].

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An essential part of the PPS regulatory framework is site-level regulations (bylaws, instructions and so on). These contain more detailed requirements to PP with regard for the specific features of this very NI. Such documents are developed and employed directly at the level of installations.

References

1.INFCIRC/225/rev. 4 «Методические рекомендации по физической защите ядерного материала».

2.Закон Российской Федерации об использовании атомной энергии. Принят 21 октября 1995 г.

3.Правила физической защиты ядерных материалов, ядерных установок и пунктов хранения ядерных материалов. Утверждены Постановлением Правительства РФ от 7 марта 1997 г. № 264.

4.Системы физической защиты ЯМ и У. Инструкция по организации проектирования. Минатом РФ. РД 95 10544–99.

5.Системы физической защиты ЯОО. Общие требования. Минатом РФ, 2001.

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CHAPTER 3

STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS OF THE PHYSICAL

PROTECTION SYSTEM (PPS)

Nuclear material and nuclear facilities are contained in respective buildings and rooms within the protected area confined by a perimeter. Figure 3.1 shows a standard layout of a physically protected site.

Fig. 3.1. Standard layout of a physically protected site

A note should be made that only some of the buildings that accommodate NM and critical NF components require physical protection, while the presence of others affects physical protection tasks only indirectly (limited visibility, onsite movement routes and so on). This will be given

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more detailed consideration in Chapter 5 where principles of the PPS zonal arrangement will be discussed.

Onsite forces and features are responsible for the physical protection at the level of nuclear installations. These are chiefly a response force as well as engineered physical protection features (EPPF).

Collectively, physical protection forces and features form a physical protection system (PPS), which represents an interlinked set of organizational, administrative and legal provisions, physical protection personnel and engineered features intended to ensure the physical protection of a particular nuclear site.

The PPS is a complex man-machine system an analysis whereof requires such techniques as systems engineering and operations research [1].

An analysis of such systems requires these to be first decomposed (subdivided) into subsystems. This makes it easier to get an insight into the hierarchical structure of the system as the whole and its individual components.

We shall decompose a PPS into respective subsystems. When doing this, one should keep in mind that a lower-level system is a subsystem of a higher-level system. Thus, in turn, the PPS is a subsystem of the whole NI safety and security system, which also includes other systems (nuclear safety, fire safety, NM accounting and control, etc.).

The PPS structure is shown in Fig. 3.2.

PhysicalСистема физическойprotectionзащитыsystem

Fig. 3.2. Structure of a physical protection system

As can be seen in Fig. 3.2, the PPS has three key components, the functions whereof will be discussed hereinafter.

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The prime objective of engineered physical protection features is to acquire information on unauthorized activities to be further used to produce respective control responses.

Physical barriers have the purpose of making it more difficult for attackers to carry out the actions planned.

Administrative provisions establish the onsite PP procedures (rules). The guard force response to suppress the above attacker actions is a sort of an “actuator” for the PPS and makes it possible to reach the final objective of the NI protection.

A note should be made that the PPS subsystems at all levels should be balanced and contribute to the overall goal of the NI protection against unauthorized activities of potential attackers.

Separate subsystems and their respective functions are described hereinafter.

References

1. Подиновский В.В. Оптимизация систем по последовательно применяемым критериям. М.: Радио и связь, 1985.

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