alimov_v_v_artemeva_yu_v_obshestvennopoliticheskii_perevod_p / общественно политический перевод

В. ПУТИН: Мы строим нашу позицию, исходя из экономических со­ ображений. Мы продаем большое количество оружия в Китай. Чем меньше будет конкурентов на китайском рынке, тем лучше. (Шум в зале.) Что дура­ ка-то валять, я говорю, как есть. Но в целом мы уверены, что договоримся с нашими европейскими партнерами, более того, сможем совместно работать на китайском рынке. У нас даже есть идеи, которые могут привести к со­ трудничеству между Россией и европейскими странами в сфере высоких технологий. Это интересное направление сотрудничества.

Что касается политической составляющей, то не мне решать, отме­ нять эмбарго или не отменять. Это'решение должен принять или не при­ нять Евросоюз.

Теперь по поводу закона. Советский Союз и Россия всегда выступали за территориальную целостность Китайской Народной Республики. Мы не меняем своей позиции и сейчас и считаем, что КНР имеет право на вос­ становление своей территориальной целостности, и понимаем стремление китайского руководства решить эту задачу. При этом мы, конечно, исхо­ дим из того, что эта задача может и будет решена мирными средствами.

VLADIMIR PUTIN: Our position is based on economic considerations. We sell a lot of arms to China. The less competitors on the Chinese market, the better, (laugh in the room). There's no point acting the fool, I'm just saying it like it is. Overall, we are sure we will be able to reach agreements with our European part­ ners, and, what's more, work together on the Chinese market. We even have ideas that could lead to cooperation between Russia and European countries on hightech projects. These are interesting possibilities for cooperation.

As for the political aspect, it is not up to me to decide whether or not to lift the embargo. This is a decision for the European Union to make.

Regarding the law, the Soviet Union, and Russia today, always supported China's territorial integrity. We have not changed our view and we think that China has the right to restore its territorial integrity. But at the same time, we act on the basis that this can and should be done through peaceful means.

Ж. ШИРАК: Я думаю, что в вопросе эмбарго речь идет о каком-то временном запрете до тех пор, пока не прояснится общая ситуация. Пози­ ция России несколько отличается от позиции Европейского союза.

Благодарю вас.

JACQUES CHIRAC: I think that regarding the embargo there is a tempo­ rary ban until the general situation becomes clearer. Russia's position differs somewhat from that of the European Union.

Thank you.

X. Подготовьте сообщение по Ираку на английском языке и выступите в роли переводчика.

INTRODUCTORY EXERCISES

I.Рекомендуется для зрительно-устного перевода:

NATO Handbook

CORE FUNCTIONS

1. NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the princi­ ples of the United Nations Charter. The Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. This central Alliance objective has taken on renewed significance since the end of the Cold War because, for the first time in the postwar history of Europe, the prospect of its achievement has become a reality.

The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of a common commitment to mutual cooperation among sovereign states based on the indi­ visibility of the security of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance ensures that no member country is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. In short, the Alliance is an association of free states united in their determination to preserve their security through mu­ tual guarantees and stable relations with other countries.

II.Переведите устно на слух:

admission into NATO; to achieve the solution; to serve the interests of both parties; to take smth for granted; close cooperation; the extent of influence; to be completely irrelevant; to get veto power; the right to veto a decision; to adopt the model of smth; a sence of equal dignity; to gain influence; to be left iso­ lated; to safeguard the freedom and security; common values of democracy.

III. Рекомендуется для зрительно-письменного и зрительно-устного пе­ ревода:

Russia Into NATO? It Can Be Done

OPINION

The Moscow Times Thursday, October 4,2001

By Ira Straus

In Germany last week, President Vladimir Putin raised the question of Russian membership in NATO with greater concreteness than ever before. What he called for was not immediate admission into NATO, but for NATO to

begin immediate discussions with Russia to work out the terms and condi­ tions for Russian membership in the alliance.

This is the only professional way to do it: to discuss and get agreement on both sides on a plan that, in order to get mutual consent, must necessarily satisfy the basic interests on both sides. Putin said that this has already been delayed far too long. In light of the terrorism crisis, it would be hard to disagree with him on this point.

Yet it is quite possible that there will be no serious response from NATO.

Between a voice and veto there is a better modus operandi: a vote.

Many people in NATO, as in Russia, believe that it is impossible to achieve a solution that serves the interest of both sides. In fact, very few people in NATO have any idea of how it could be done: most of them take it for granted that Russian membership would simply be bad for NATO. Putin's meeting with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in Brussels on Wednes­ day has, however, yielded pledges of closer cooperation from both sides.

It is necessary, then, to have a conception in mind of how Russian mem­ bership in NATO could be made to work to the benefit of both sides. Each side must enter the discussion having some such conception in mind, no doubt biased a bit to its own benefit but still serving the interest of both; other­ wise a constructive negotiation would be impossible.

What would such a conception look like?

Let me start with a radical proposition: There is only one concern that really matters on each side, and that is the extent of Russia's influence in NATO. All the other concerns — standardization of weapons, the human rights record on Chechnya, NATO's intervention in Kosovo, civilian control of the military, all the supposed standards for NATO membership — are secondary. Many of them are completely irrelevant. Who needs to insist on standardization of weapons prior to achieving membership? The original NATO members have been working on standardizing their weapons for 50 years and still have a long way to go on it. This hasn't stopped them from sticking together in NATO. As to civilian control, it is a good thing, but Turkey's%military has been one of the forces keeping the civilians in line with the modern world.

What NATO really fears is that Russia will get veto power and use it to make it impossible for NATO to reach any of the decisions it wants to reach and needs to reach. What Russia fears, or has objected to in the past arrangements, is that, under the formula of a "voice not a veto," it has not had enough influence to make a difference, and that NATO will never give it any real influence.

The question boils down to: "How can Russia have real influence in NATO, commensurate with its natural importance, without holding a veto that it could wield arbitrarily to make a nonsense of NATO?" Or, "How can we

find a middle term between the two extremes of 'a powerless consultative voice' and 'an absolute power of veto?"'

The answer is not difficult to find. Every democracy knows of a middle term between a "voice" and a "veto," one that is a much better modus oper­ andi than either of them. It is a vote.

There are many other possible middle terms. There can be "consensus minus one." There can be voting with a 90 percent majority threshold for decisions, or 75, or 67, or 50 percent. Votes can be taken among countries or among individual citi­ zens. Each country's vote can be weighted, whether by population, by economic size, by geographical size, by military strength, or by any other factor. And there can be a variety of methods of making decisions, some used ordinarily while others are held in reserve as emergency options. In every legislature, numerous minor matters are passed unanimously i.e. without anyone objecting, while the party leaders decide which issues need to be put to the test of a serious debate and a vote.

The lack of middle terms is not the problem. The problem is the lack of serious consideration of them, on the part either of Russia or of NATO.

One reason for the lack of consideration is that most people believe that every country in NATO has the right to veto every decision. In reality, under the North Atlantic Treaty there is no legal right to veto decisions in NATO; instead, the North Atlantic Council sets its own procedures. The Council has in fact usu­ ally preferred to operate by consensus, in the sense of getting all members to agree not to dissent publicly or disrupt the public front of unanimity, and NATO rhetoric has emphasized this in a manner that gives an impression that there is genuine unanimity and that every country would have veto power if it disagreed. However, agreement to waive objections is far from genuine unanimity, and there have been occasions, particularly in the early 1980s, when even the public front of unanimity was breached and decisions were made while allowing the dissenters to publish their disagreement in footnotes to the common document.

Since the Council controls its own procedures, let us offer a model of a procedure that it could adopt that would satisfy both the needs of Russia for genuine influence, and the need of NATO to be safe from the threat of irrespon­ sible vetoes. The model is weighted voting combined with consensus.

Consensus would remain the normal operating procedure, but an option of two-thirds weighted voting, would be held in reserve for use in case some country or countries were being too frequently obstructive. The most fair way to weight the vote would be by population; it is the most stable and democratic measure, and gives everyone a sense of equal dignity.

Russia could impel the alliance to pay attention to its interests.

Consensus would continue to be used as the normal operating procedure, so there would not be sharp break from past NATO practices and methods of

operation; but the option of voting would enhance the workings of consensus, by putting obstreperous countries — like France. Greece or Turkey — on notice that they cannot gain anything by behaving too obstructively.

In this model, Russia could join NATO and gain a weight in decision making nearly 60 percent as large as America's and twice as large as any other European country's. Every Russian would have the same voting power as every European and American. However, neither Russia nor America would have enough weight to give it veto power.

This example suffices to show that a way can be found to satisfy concerns on both sides and end up with a result that makes it workable to have Russia in NATO. And by being workable, it would benefit both sides tremendously. Rus­ sia would get into the main institution of European security instead of being left isolated outside. Russia would gain influence on decision making and have enough weight to be able to organize coalitions around itself and impel the alliance to pay serious attention to Russian interests. NATO would get its expansion without alienating Russia. And above all, Russia and the West would be allies not adversaries, adding tremendously to the ability of each side to realize its security interests.

I repeat, this is not the only model. There are many workable models. The point is that all of them by the mere fact of being workable, make Russia's membership in NATO a matter that serves tremendously the interests of both sides. And this makes it possible, if not obligatory, to start serious discussions about them between Russia and NATO

Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator. Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO, and Fulbright professor of international relations at Mos­ cow Slate University and Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He contributed this com­ ment to The Moscow Times.

James A. Baker III

In 1993 I proposed that NATO draw up a clear road map for expanding the alliance eastward to include not only the states of Central and Eastern Europe but also a democratic Russia. "Otherwise, the most successful alliance in history is

destined to follow the threat that created it into the dustbin of history."1 The alli­ ance did, of course, expand eastward and survive. Today, following the admission of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, nine other countries either have asked for membership consideration or have signaled an interest. By engaging in air missions and peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, NATO has enlarged its military mission to include out-of-area operations in a region whose troubles did not directly threaten the members' security, but did threaten European stability. Now, with the invocation of the North Atlantic Treaty's mutual defense obliga­ tions under Article 5 in response to the September terrorist attacks on the United States, the alliance is serving a more irnportant role in Western security than at any other time since the end of the Cold War.

Russia, however, still waits outside the door. The idea that Russia could even be eligible for membership has been met with opposition and indifference, mainly because Russia has never been ripe for membership — because it has embraced democracy and free markets only rhetorically, without creating the institutions or exercising the political will necessary to commit itself fully. Accordingly, unwill­ ing to consider marriage, the West has offered cohabitation arrangements — first the Partnership for Peace, then the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council — that have served useful functions without offering a satisfactory long-term solution. Then in 1997, over strong Russian objections, NATO admitted three former allies of the Soviet Union, without making it clear that Russia, too, would be eligible for membership if it embraced democracy and free markets. Meanwhile, Russia's his­ toric distrust of NATO and of the United States, which had dampened at the be­ ginning of the 1990s, flared back alive when NATO, a defensive alliance, took up arms in an offensive action against Russia's Slavic kinsmen and political allies in the 1999 Kosovo conflict. When the fighting ended, 96 percent of Russians either agreed or totally agreed with the proposition that "NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia is a crime against humanity," and 77 percent either agreed or totally agreed that "[tjhere is nothing stopping NATO from getting involved in Russia as it did in Yugoslavia."2 Those propositions are wrong, of course, but the poll results demon­ strated the depth of Russian public antipathy toward the intervention. As the old millennium ended and the new one began, the never-strong possibility of Russian membership in NATO appeared to be dead.

Times have changed. Both Russia and the United States have new presi­ dents. Russian president Vladimir Putin revived the NATO issue in a news con­ ference in July, shortly before he met with President George W. Bush. "Putin challenged the Western alliance to either enroll Russia or disband, calling NATO a Cold War relic that will only continue to sow the seeds of suspicion in Europe as long as it excludes its onetime archenemy."3 Bush also reportedly had "asked advisers ... about the wisdom of such an approach." The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States are almost certain to accelerate discus­ sion of the issue.

How Can Russia Join NATO?

The affirmative case for Russian eligibility for NATO membership is fairly straightforward and easy to make. The alliance has at least two implicit and at least five explicit criteria for admission. The first implicit requirement is that the candidate be a member of the Atlantic community — that is to say, the West. The second is that the candidate share important security concerns with the other members. Russia surely qualifies on both counts. Since the end of the Cold War, it has repeatedly declared its identification and wish to align with the West, a region that, for NATO's purposes, already extends eastward to Greece and Turkey. As for common security concerns, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington rattled nerves in Moscow as much as they did in Paris, Berlin, and other European capitals. Furthermore we may assume this aggression will not be the last such challenge to Western security. Of course, the question of what constitutes "the West" cannot be answered satis­ factorily by reference to maps.

1James A. Baker HI is a senior partner of the international law firm Baker Botts L. L. P. He served as the nation's sixty-seventh secretary of the treasury and sixty-first secre­ tary of state.

2Copyright © 2001 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Mas­ sachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly • 25:1 pp. 95-103.

3THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY • WINTER 2002 .

VI. Переведите письменно на слух:

разделять точку зрения; иметь в виду; получать общее одобрение; защи­ щать права человека; вступление в НАТО; служить интересам двух сто­ рон; вступить в дискуссию; принять решение; удовлетворять потребности; чувство равного достоинства; методы действия; расхождения во мнениях; раскол в Совете Безопасности ООН; играть значительную роль в мире; выполнять обязательства; окончание вооруженного конфликта; четвертого апреля 1999 года; единое мнение по вопросам содействия.

VII. Рекомендуется для зрительно-устного перевода:

50-летие НАТО, Брюссель

1.Североатлантический союз был создан в 1949 году, через несколько лет после окончания Второй мировой войны для обеспечения безо­ пасности стран, входящих в эту организацию

2.Основная цель Североатлантического союза — обеспечивать коллек­ тивную безопасность стран-участниц в соответствии со статьей 5 Вашингтонского договора.

3.В сегодняшней трансформированной Европе Союз обеспечивает бо­ лее широкий диапазон сотрудничества в интересах политической стабильности, экономического развития и долгосрочной безопасно­ сти стран-участниц и партнеров организации.

4.Политическая и идеологическая конфронтация между Востоком и Западом, которая доминировала сорок лет, стала известна как Холод­ ная война.

5.В течение этого периода отношения между Востоком и Западом бы­ ли натянутыми (to be strained).

6.Периоды снижения напряженности сменялись периодами кризиса, и на обеих сторонах заметно было присутствие огромных военных сил как единственного способа поддержания равновесия.

7.Падение Берлинской стены в 1989 году символизировало конец этой эры.

8.У России и у стран НАТО много общих интересов в области безо­ пасности.

9.Основополагающий акт между Россией и НАТО, подписанный в мае 1997 года в Париже, усиливает это партнерство в области безопасно­ сти учреждением Постоянного объединенного комитета, который представляет форум для консультаций, сотрудничества, совместного принятия решений и совместных действий НАТО и России в согла­ сованных районах (agreed areas).

10.Этот Совет разработал амбициозную рабочую программу, предна­ значенную для развития сотрудничества во многих сферах, в кото­ рых НАТО и Россия имеют общие интересы.

11.Они включают предотвращение и решение региональных конфликтов, поддержание мира (peacekeeping), способствование разоружению и контролю над вооружением, прекращение распространения оружия массового поражения, улучшение ядерной безопасности, решение проблем окружающей среды, планирование действий в чрезвычай­ ных ситуациях и сотрудничество в научных областях.

VIII. Рекомендуется для зрительно-письменного перевода:

Джордж Робертсон:

Яне исключаю возможности вступления России в НАТО

—На волне иракских событий высказывались мнения о неспособно­ сти ООН в нынешнем виде брать под контроль острые кризисные ситуа­ ции: мол, на это более способно «по праву сильного» НАТО. Разделяете ли вы такую точку зрения?

— Не думаю, что я бы пришел к такому выводу. Ведь, в конце кон­ цов, те же расхождения во мнениях, что вызвали раскол в Совете Безопас­ ности ООН, раскололи и Североатлантический совет, и Совет Россия— НАТО. Наконец, НАТО и ООН — совершенно разные организации с со­ вершенно разными мандатами и возможностями. Я думаю, что обе они еще много лет будут играть в мире значительную роль.

В дискуссии по вопросу Ирака часто упускают из виду значительную общность позиций, существовавшую в международном сообществе. В ООН все бьши согласны с тем, что режим Саддама Хусейна представлял угрозу международному миру и безопасности, как это продемонстрировала резолю­ ция СБ ООН, единогласно принятая в ноябре прошлого года. Расхождения возникли по вопросу о средствах и сроках противодействиях этой угрозе. Эти расхождения получили отражение и в ходе дискуссии в НАТО, но они не по­ мешали нам выполнить свои обязательства по отношению к государству-со­ юзнику, граничащему с Ираком. Расхождения существовали и между членами Совета Россия—НАТО, но мы не стали повторять то, что произошло во время кризиса в Косово, когда одно из государств-членов приостановило все со­ трудничество из-за одного вопроса. Теперь, после окончания вооруженного конфликта, мы снова достигли единогласия в СБ ООН по вопросу о необхо­ димости содействия усилиям по стабилизации и восстановлению в Ираке.

IX. Совместите словосочетания в левой и правой колонках:

X.Рекомендуется для последовательного перевода на слух:

The Atlantic Alliance and Russia

Russia and NATO countries have many common security interests. Coop­ eration between them has been steadily growing. The most significant example of this is Russian participation in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in May 1997 in Paris, strength­ ens this security partnership by establishing a Permanent Joint Council which provides a forum for consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action between NATO and Russia in agreed areas. This Council has developed an ambitious Work Programme designed to enable cooperation to be increased in many fields where NATO and Russia have shared interests. This includes preventing and settling regional conflicts, peacekeeping, promoting disarma­ ment and arms control, stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, improving nuclear safety, solving environmental problems, planning how to deal with civil emergencies and cooperating in scientific fields. Neither NATO nor Russia has allowed subjects on which they do not agree to prevent them from making remarkable progress in many of these areas or from progressively building up their cooperation.

Cooperation between NATO and Russia is continuing to develop. What seemed impossible yesterday is normal today and tomorrow will be commonplace.

Opponents of the process are being daily confronted by the reality that successful cooperation is in the interests of everyone. In Bosnia, forces from NATO and Russia as well as many other countries work side by side to create conditions which favour peace and stability, not strife and conflict.

XI. Рекомендуется для (сравнительного) последовательного перевода:

COMMENTARY

Текст может быть использован для зрительно-устного перевода с подго­ товкой:

Миниатюрные ядерные войны

Результаты пересмотра ядерной политики, обнародованные в США, представляют собой серьезную угрозу сложившемуся мораторию на прове­ дение ядерных испытаний. Вполне возможно, эта угроза является даже бо­ лее серьезной, чем проведенные Индией и Пакистаном в 1998 году ядерные испытания. Под угрозой оказался не только подписанный в 1996 году Договор о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний, но и зафиксированный этим договором принцип недопустимости проведения ядерных взрывов.

Сторонники разработки новых ядерных устройств утверждают: ис­ пытания могут понадобиться для создания боезарядов, способных унич­ тожать цели, с которыми обычные заряды, даже весьма точные и мощные, справиться не могут.

Американским военным и разработчикам практически удалось убе­ дить политиков и общество (как у себя в Америке, так и за рубежом), что новые боезаряды будут именно миниатюрными, избирательными и прак­ тически безвредными для мирного населения.

Сторонники разработки «миниатюрных» зарядов избегают приво­ дить оценки мощности, необходимой для уничтожения бункеров. Но если необходимость ее увеличения возникнет уже после возобновления ядер­ ных испытаний, предъявлять им счет за несоответствие реальности обе­ щаниям будет поздно.

В текстах по разоружению встречаются названия договоров, состоя­ щие из нескольких слов. Обычно первое написание договора дается пол­ ностью и сопровождается сокращением этого названия в скобках. В даль­ нейшем вместо сложного названия в тексте используется его сокращение: the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). The ABM treaty can still be ef­ fectively compromised... *

INTRODUCTORY EXERCISES

I.Переведите письменно на слух:

the production of fissile materials; International Atomic Energy Agency; reduc­ tion in strategic arms; to put pressure on; to put into force the treaty outlawing nuclear tests; to retain monopoly; to give up nuclear arms; Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; to possess nuclear weapons; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;

current state of tension; to cut arsenals; to ban missile test flights; to express grave concerns; nuclear deterrent forces; to develop nuclear weapons; a pretext for advancing a nuclear weapons program; to accuse Teh(e)ran [tiVram]; pre­ liminary steps; wise diplomacy; to dissolve tension in the region.

II.Рекомендуется для зрительно-устного перевода с подготовкой:

The framework of arms-control treaties and agreements that ended the EastWest Cold War arms race in the late '80s and early '90s came under increasing strain in 1995. Strong lobbies agitating for increased defense spending are becom­ ing more vocal and influential on both sides of the Atlantic. If these special inter­ ests prevail, the U.S.-Russian arms-limitation framework could disintegrate as early as 1997, and the century could witness a new unlimited nuclear arms race.

Today, the main threat clearly comes from Washington. Russia is too weak economically to start another arms race, although the managers of many idle mili­ tary factories as well as millions of jobless defense industry workers and engineers in Siberia and the Urals are undoubtedly interested in new large defense orders.

Recently published Cold War documents reveal that it was the United States which time and again accelerated the strategic arms race by introducing new weapons, in the hope that Russia could not match them. The U.S. Republi­ cans may also believe that breaking the ABM treaty will bring only diplomatic protests from Moscow. This may be a grave miscalculation — during the '80s, Russian communist leaders, terrified by Ronald Reagan's Star Wars propa­ ganda, developed the capability of mass-producing cheap, new ballistic mis­ siles, a capability that still exists today.

III. Рекомендуется для зрительно-письменного и зрительно-устного пе­ ревода:

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

For more than three decades, there have been five nuclear powers — without a war between them. But as nations gather in New York to start to re­ view the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty the nuclear future is more uncertain and potentially more dangerous than when the treaty, known as the NPT, was indefinitely extended in 1995.

Since then India and Pakistan have become declared, and defiant, nuclear powers, joining Israel as a trio of states "illegally" possessing nuclear weap­ ons. The United States Senate has rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would outlaw all nuclear explosive tests, thus greatly compli­ cating the task of building a nuclear bomb without detection.

North Korea's intentions as a potential, if not actual, clandestine nuclear power remain worrisome. Iraq's nuclear activities are no longer under interna­ tional inspection.

There are several nuclear choices for the international community: the status quo, proliferation or abolition. A restoration of the 1995 status quo would require a rollback of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan and only them. But trying to denuclearize South Asia amid the current state of ten­ sions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and other issues is as unrealis­ tic as demanding immediate abolition of all nuclear weapons everywhere.

The 1998 tests by the two countries confirmed the folly of believing that five legal nuclear powers — the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France — could indefinitely retain their monopoly over one class of weapons. The treaty restricts nuclear arms to those countries on the understanding that they would negotiate in good faith on giving them up.

If the NPT status quo of 1995 cannot be restored and the risks of arms control reverses and proliferation are real, there are two alternatives: having even more nuclear powers or a move to a world free of nuclear weapons.

It is hard to convince some countries of the futility of weapons of mass destruction when all holders insist on keeping them. The preaching and the use of sanctions against India and Pakistan, need to be buttressed by example. The case for independent British and French nuclear deterrent forces is not compel­ ling. Their phased disarmament would put pressure on all holders of nuclear weapons, including China, to cut their arsenals. The United States also needs to move faster in negotiating further reductions in their strategic arms.

There are other steps that would add impetus to global nuclear disar­ mament. They include further constraints on the deployment of nuclear weapons outside the territory of the country that owns them, putting into force the treaty outlawing nuclear tests, banning missile test flights and the pro­ duction of fissile materials for nuclear arms, taking such arms off alert status and physically separating nuclear forces, warheads and missiles.

Getting the nuclear powers to take even these less difficult steps will be hard. Getting them to commit to total nuclear disarmament will be even harder. The chasm over which the international community must leap is the belief that world security can rest on weapons of total insecurity.

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IV. Переведите вопросы к тексту и ответьте на них:

1.Сколько было ядерных держав и сколько лет они жили без войны до пересмотра Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия?

2.What treaty has the United States Senate rejected?

3.Какие еще страны были объявлены ядерными державами?

4.What are the intentions of North Korea in this respect and what are the Irak's nuclear activities now?

5.Какие разновидности ядерного выбора имеются у международного сообщества?