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———. 1982. “The Simulation Heuristic.” In Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, ed. D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tver c, aistsky. New York: Cambridge University Press, 201–208.

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Also by Daniel Kahneman

International Differences in Well-B f, aisan

(written with Ed Diener and John F. Helliwell)

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

(edited with Thomas Gilovich and Dale Griffin)

Choices, Values, and Frames (edited with Amos Tversky)

Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology

(edited with Edward Diener and Norbert Schwartz)

Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases

(edited with Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky)

Attention and Effort

Acknowledgments

I am fortunate to have many friends and no shame about asking for help. Every one of my friends has been approached, some of them many times, with requests for information or editorial suggestions. I apologize for not listing them all. A few individuals played a major role in making the book happen. My thanks go first to Jason Zweig, who urged me into the project and patiently tried to work with me until it became clear to both of us that I am impossible to work with. Throughout, he has been generous with his editorial advice and enviable erudition, and sentences that he suggested dot the book. Roger Lewin turned transcripts of a set of lectures into chapter draft s. Mary Himmelstein provided valuable assistance throughout. John Brockman began as an agent and became a trusted friend. Ran Hassin provided advice and encouragement when it was most needed. In the final stages of a long journey I had the indispensable help of Eric Chinski, my editor at Farrar, Straus and Giroux. He knew the book better than I did and the work became an enjoyable collaboration—I had not imagined that an editor could do as much as Eric did. My daughter, Lenore Shoham, rallied round to help me through the hectic final months, providing wisdom, a sharp critical eye, and many of the sentences in the “Speaking of” sections. My wife, Anne Treisman, went through a lot and did a lot—I would have given up long ago without her steady support, wisdom, and endless patience.

Notes

Introduction

prone to collect too fewobservations: We had read a book that criticized psychologists for using small samples, but did not explain their choices: Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences

(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1969).

question about words: I have slightly altered the original wording, which referred to letters in the first and third position of words.

negative view of the mind: A prominent German psychologist has been our most persistent critic. Gerd Gigerenzer, “How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear,” European Review of Social Psychology 2 (1991): 83–115. Gerd Gigerenzer, “Personal Reflections on Theory and Psychology,” Theory & Psychology 20 (2010): 733–43. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions,” Psychological Review103 (1996): 582–91.

offered plausible alternatives: Some examples from many are Valerie F. Reyna and Farrell J. Lloyd, “Physician Decision-Making and Cardiac Risk: Effects of Knowledge, Risk Perception, Risk Tolerance and FuzzyProcessing,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 12 (2006): 179–95. Nicholas Epley and Thomas Gilovich, “The Anchoring-and- Adjustment Heuristic,” Psychological Science 17 (2006): 311–18. Norbert Schwarz et al., “Ease of Retrieval of Information: Another Look at the Availability Heuristic,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 61 (1991): 195–202. Elke U. Weber et al., “Asymmetric Discounting in Intertemporal Choice,” Psychological Science 18 (2007): 516–23. George F. Loewenstein et al., “Risk as Feelings,” Psychological Bulletin 127 (2001): 267–86.

Nobel Prize that I received: The prize awarded in economics is named Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. It was first given in 1969. Some physical scientists were not pleased with the addition of a Nobel Prize in social science, and the distinctive label of the economics prize was a compromise.

prolonged practice: Herbert Simon and his students at Carnegie Mellon in the 1980s set the foundations for our understanding of expertise. For an excellent popular introduction to the subject, see Joshua Foer,

Moonwalking with Einstein: The Art and Science of Remembering (New York: Penguin Press, 2011). He presents work that is reviewed in more technical detail in K. Anders Ericsson et al., eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.)

kitchen was on fire: Gary A. Klein, Sources of Power (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

studied chess masters: Herbert Simon was one of the great scholars of the twentieth century, whose discoveries and inventions ranged from political science (where he began his career) to economics (in which he won a Nobel Prize) to computer science (in which he was a pioneer) and to psychology.

“The situation…recognition”: Herbert A. Simon, “What Is an Explanation of Behavior?” Psychological Science 3 (1992): 150–61.

affect heuristic: The concept of the affect heuristic was developed by Paul Slovic, a classmate of Amos’s at Michigan and a lifelong friend.

without noticing the substitution:.

1: The Characters of the Story

offered many labels: For reviews of the field, see Jonathan St. B. T. Evans and Keith Frankish, eds., In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond

(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition,” Annual Review of Psychology 59 (2008): 25 {59 eight="0%"5–78. Among the pioneers are Seymour Epstein, Jonathan Evans, Steven Sloman, Keith Stanovich, and Richard West. I borrow the terms System 1 and System 2 from early writings of Stanovich and West that greatly influenced my thinking: Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West, “Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2000): 645–65.

subjective experience of agency: This sense of free will is sometimes illusory, as shown in Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, 2003).

attention is totally focused elsewhere: Nilli Lavie, “Attention, Distraction and Cognitive Control Under Load,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 19 (2010): 143–48.

conflict between the two systems: In the classic Stroop task, you are shown a display of patches of different colors, or of words printed in various colors. Your task is to call out the names of the colors, ignoring the

words. The task is extremely difficult when the colored words are themselves names of color (e.g., GREEN printed in red, followed by Y ELLOW printed in green, etc.).

psychopathic charm: Professor Hare wrote me to say, “Your teacher was right,” March 16, 2011. Robert D. Hare, Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (New York: Guilford Press, 1999). Paul Babiak and Robert D. Hare, Snakes in Suits: When Psychopaths Go to Work (New York: Harper, 2007).

little people: Agents within the mind are called homunculi and are (quite properly) objects of professional derision.

space in your working memory: Alan D. Baddeley, “Working Memory: Looking Back and Looking Forward,” Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 4 (2003): 829–38. Alan D. Baddeley, Your Memory: A User’s Guide (New York: Firefly Books, 2004).

2: Attention and Effort

Attention and Effort: Much of the material of this chapter draws on my Attention and Effort (1973). It is available for free download on my website (www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/docs/attention_and_effort/Attention_hi_quality.pdf). The main theme of that book is the idea of a limited ability to pay attention

and exert mental effort. Attention and effort were considered general resources that could be used to support many mental tasks. The idea of general capacity is controversial, but it has been extended by other psychologists and neuroscientists, who found support for it in brain research. See Marcel A. Just and Patricia A. Carpenter, “A Capacity Theory of Comprehension: Individual Differences in Working Memory,” Psychological Review 99 (1992): 122–49; Marcel A. Just et al., “Neuroindices of Cognitive Workload: Neuroimaging, Pupillometric and Event-Related Potential Studies of Brain Work,” Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science 4 (2003): 56–88. There is also growing experimental evidence for general-purpose resources of attention, as in Evie Vergauwe et al., “Do Mental Processes Share a Domain-General Resource?” Psychological Science 21 (2010): 384–90. There is imaging evidence that the mere anticipation of a high-effort task mobilizes activity in many areas of the brain, relative to a low-effort task of the same kind. Carsten N. Boehler et al., “Task-Load-Dependent Activation of Dopaminergic Midbrain Areas in the Absence of Reward,” Journal of Neuroscience 31 (2011): 4955–61.

pupil of the eye: Eckhard H. Hess, “Attitude and Pupil Size,” Scientific

American 212 (1965): 46–54.

on the subject’s mind: The word subject reminds some people of subjugation and slavery, and the American Psychological Association enjoins us to use the more democratic participant. Unfortunately, the politically correct label is a mouthful, which occupies memory space and slows thinking. I will do my best to use participant whenever possible but will switch to subject when necessary.

heart rate increases: Daniel Kahneman et al., “Pupillary, Heart Rate, and Skin Resistance Changes During a Mental Task,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 79 (1969): 164–67.

rapidly flashing letters: Daniel Kahneman, Jackson Beatty, and Irwin Pollack, “Perceptual Deficit During a Mental Task,” Science 15 (1967): 218–19. We used a halfway mirror so that the observers saw the letters directly in front of them while facing the camera. In a control condition, the participants looked at the letter through a narrow aperture, to prevent any effect of the changing pupil size on their visual acuity. Their detection results showed the inverted-V pattern observed with other subjects.

Much like the electricity meter: Attempting to perform several tasks at once may run into difficulties of several kinds. For example, it is physically impossible to say two different things at exactly the same time, and it may be easier to combine an auditory and a visual task than to combine two visual or two auditory tasks. Prominent psychological theories have attempted to attribute all mutual interference between tasks to competition for separate mechanisms. See Alan D. Baddeley, Working Memory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). With practice, people’s ability to multitask in specific ways may improve. However, the wide variety of very different tasks that interfere with each other supports the existence of a general resource of attention or effort that is necessary in many tasks.

Studies of the brain: Michael E. Smith, Linda K. McEvoy, and Alan Gevins, “Neurophysiological Indices of Strategy Development and Skill Acquisition,” Cognitive Brain Research 7 (1999): 389–404. Alan Gevins et al., “High-Resolution EEG Mapping of Cortical Activation Related to Working Memory: Effects of Task Difficulty, Type of Processing and Practice,” Cerebral Cortex 7 (1997): 374–85.

less effort to solve the same problems: For example, Sylvia K. Ahern and Jackson Beatty showed that individuals who scored higher on the SAT showed smaller pupillary dilations than low scorers in responding to the same task. “Physiological Signs of Information Processing Vary with Intelligence,” Science 205 (1979): 1289–92.

“law of least effort”: Wouter Kool et {ute979): 1289al., “Decision Making and the Avoidance of Cognitive Demand,” Journal of Experimental

Psychology—General 139 (2010): 665–82. Joseph T. McGuire and Matthew M. Botvinick, “The Impact of Anticipated Demand on Attention and Behavioral Choice,” in Effortless Attention, ed. Brian Bruya (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, 2010), 103–20.

balance of benefits and costs: Neuroscientists have identified a region of the brain that assesses the overall value of an action when it is completed. The effort that was invested counts as a cost in this neural computation. Joseph T. McGuire and Matthew M. Botvinick, “Prefrontal Cortex, Cognitive Control, and the Registration of Decision Costs,” PNAS 107 (2010): 7922–26.

read distracting words: Bruno Laeng et al., “Pupillary Stroop Effects,”

Cognitive Processing 12 (2011): 13–21.

associate with intelligence: Michael I. Posner and Mary K. Rothbart, “Research on Attention Networks as a Model for the Integration of Psychological Science,” Annual Review of Psychology 58 (2007): 1–23. John Duncan et al., “A Neural Basis for General Intelligence,” Science 289 (2000): 457–60.

under time pressure: Stephen Monsell, “Task Switching,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2003): 134–40.

working memory: Baddeley, Working Memory.

tests of general intelligence: Andrew A. Conway, Michael J. Kane, and Randall W. Engle, “Working Memory Capacity and Its Relation to General Intelligence,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2003): 547–52.

Israeli Air Force pilots: Daniel Kahneman, Rachel Ben-Ishai, and Michael Lotan, “Relation of a Test of Attention to Road Accidents,” Journal of Applied Psychology 58 (1973): 113–15. Daniel Gopher, “A Selective Attention Test as a Predictor of Success in Flight Training,” Human Factors 24 (1982): 173–83.

3: The Lazy Controller

“optimal experience”: Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: Harper, 1990).

sweet tooth: Baba Shiv and Alexander Fedorikhin, “Heart and Mind in Conflict: The Interplay of Affect and Cognition in Consumer Decision Making,” Journal of Consumer Research 26 (1999): 278–92. Malte Friese, Wilhelm Hofmann, and Michaela Wänke, “When Impulses Take Over: Moderated Predictive Validity of Implicit and Explicit Attitude Measures in Predicting Food Choice and Consumption Behaviour,” British Journal of Social Psychology 47 (2008): 397–419.

cognitively busy: Daniel T. Gilbert, “How Mental Systems Believe,” American Psychologist 46 (1991): 107–19. C. Neil Macrae and Galen V. Bodenhausen, “Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically about Others,”

Annual Reviewof Psychology 51 (2000): 93–120.

po {"><21; : Sian L. Beilock and Thomas H. Carr, “When High-Powered People Fail: Working Memory and Choking Under Pressure in Math,”

Psychological Science 16 (2005): 101–105.

exertion of self-control: Martin S. Hagger et al., “Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 136 (2010): 495–525.

resist the effects of ego depletion: Mark Muraven and Elisaveta Slessareva, “Mechanisms of Self-Control Failure: Motivation and Limited Resources,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29 (2003): 894– 906. Mark Muraven, Dianne M. Tice, and Roy F. Baumeister, “Self-Control as a Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (1998): 774–89.

more than a mere metaphor: Matthew T. Gailliot et al., “Self-Control Relies on Glucose as a Limited Energy Source: Willpower Is More Than a Metaphor,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 92 (2007): 325–36. Matthew T. Gailliot and Roy F. Baumeister, “The Physiology of Willpower: Linking Blood Glucose to Self-Control,” Personality and Social Psychology Review11 (2007): 303–27.

ego depletion: Gailliot, “Self-Control Relies on Glucose as a Limited Energy Source.”

depletion effects in judgment: Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav, and Liora Avnaim-Pesso, “Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions,” PNAS 108 (2011): 6889–92.

intuitive—incorrect—answer: Shane Frederick, “Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (2005): 25–42. syllogism as valid: This systematic error is known as the belief bias. Evans, “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition.”

call them more rational: Keith E. Stanovich, Rationality and the Reflective Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

cruel dilemma: Walter Mischel and Ebbe B. Ebbesen, “Attention in Delay of Gratification,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 16 (1970): 329–37.

“There were no toys…distress”: Inge-Marie Eigsti et al., “Predicting Cognitive Control from Preschool to Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood,” Psychological Science 17 (2006): 478–84.