9.2 Static Strategies |
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9.2.1Definition of Static Resource Allocation Strategies
In this section, four fundamental strategies are defined and described in detail.
9.2.1.1Static Strategy “Persist” (STRAT-P)
The strategy STRAT-P may be interpreted as the one selected by wireless LANs that are not following any game approach. A player representing such a wireless LAN selects actions as they are defined by its requirement, without taking into account the resource allocations of an opponent player. A player that follows STRAT-P is referred to as myopic, as it is not aware of any activity of other players in its environment. The Figure 9.1 illustrates this strategy as machine with a single state, using the notation of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
9.2.1.2Static Strategy “Best Response” (STRAT-B)
The strategy STRAT-B implements the rational behavior, which attempts to maximize the payoff by estimating the opponent player’s behavior. If all players select this strategy, players will adjust into a Nash equilibrium. How fast this adjustment process converges into the equilibrium depends on the success of the prediction, as explained in Section 7.4, p. 152.
9.2.1.3Static Strategy “Coop” (STRAT-C)
The strategy STRAT-C implements the cooperative behavior without taking into account any effect of this behavior on the resulting outcome. Note that there are many games where cooperation is not the desirable behavior because it leads to very small observed payoffs for the cooperating players.
all resulting payoffs
n=1 |
PERSIST: BEH-P |
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Figure 9.1: Strategy STRAT-P as machine in the notation of Osborne and Rubin- |
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stein (1994). There is one state labeled as PERSIST, |
which is the initial state at |
stage n =1 . In this state, the player plays the behavior |
BEH-P as defined in Sec- |
tion 8.3.2.1, p. 184. The strategy is static, thus, upon any outcome of a SSG, the player will play BEH-P in the complete MSG.