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4. Methodological anarchism of P. Feyerabend
81
circumstances and the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process,
for making it ‘rational’»1.
On the example of the development of Copernicus' theory, starting from
Galileo up to the XX century, the process of the formation of a theory is shown,
the prerequisite for the creation of which, paradoxically, is an antiepistemological game.
«The development of the Copernican point of view from Galileo to the
20th century is a perfect example of the situation I want to describe. We start
with a strong belief that runs counter to contemporary reason and contemporary
experience. The belief spreads and finds support in other belief s which are
equally unreasonable, if not more so (law of inertia; the telescope). Research
now gets deflected in new directions, new kinds of instruments are built,
‘evidence’ is related to theories in new ways until there arises an ideology that is
rich enough to provide independent arguments for any particular part of it and
mobile enough to find such arguments whenever they seem to be required. We
can say today that Galileo was on the right track, for his persistent pursuit of
what once seemed to be a silly cosmology has by now created the material
needed to defend it against all those who will accept a view only if it is told in a
certain way and who will trust it only if it contains certain magical phrases,
called ‘observational reports’. And this is not an exception – it is the normal
case: theories become clear and ‘reasonable’ only after incoherent parts of them
have been used for a long time. Such unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodical
foreplay thus turns out to be an unavoidable precondition of clarity and of
empirical success»2.
P. Feyerabend draws attention to the necessity to change the ways of
expression, since scientific progress inexorably entails the transformation of
speech forms.
«Now, when we attempt to describe and to understand developments of
this kind in a general way, we are, of course, obliged to appeal to the existing
forms of speech which do not take them into account and which must be
distorted, misused, beaten into new patterns in order to fit unforeseen situations
1
Paul Feyerabend. Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge.
London, New Left Books, 1975. P. 9–19.
2
The same source. P. 9–19.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
82
(without a constant misuse of language there cannot be any discovery, any
progress). ‘Moreover, since the traditional categories are the gospel of everyday
thinking (including ordinary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice, [such
an attempt at understanding] in effect presents rules and forms of false thinking
and action – false, that is, from the standpoint of (scientific) common sense.’1
This is how dialectical thinking arises as a form of thought that ‘dissolves into
nothing the detailed determinations of the understanding’,2 formal logic
included»3.
Thus, the process of forming a theory is shown by P. Feyerabend as a
complex, multicomponent process that presupposes the achievement of progress,
relying on anarchism. В своей работе, не претендуя на исключительность
трактовок, философ довольно часто использует такие слова, как прогресс,
продвижение, улучшение и пр.:
«Thus for an empiricist, ‘progress’ will mean transition to a theory that
provides direct empirical tests for most of its basic assumptions. Some people
believe the quantum theory to be a theory of this kind. For others, ‘progress’ may
mean unification and harmony, perhaps even at the expense of empirical
adequacy. This is how Einstein viewed the general theory of relativity. And my
thesis is that anarchism helps to achieve progress in any one of the senses one
cares to choose. Even a law-and-order science will succeed only if anarchistic
moves are occasionally allowed to take place)4».
P. Feyerabend’s attitude based on anarchism, allows us to conclude that
there is only one principle ‒ «everything is possible».
«It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of
rationality, rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To
those who look at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent
on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for
intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’, it will
become clear that there is only one principle that can be defended under all
1
Herben Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, London, 1941, p. 130.
2
Hegel, Wisserucha ji der Logik, Vol. 1, Hamburg, 1965, p. 6.
3
Paul Feyerabend. Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge.
London, New Left Books, 1975. P. 9–19.
4
The same source. P. 9–19.
4. Methodological anarchism of P. Feyerabend
83
circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle:
anything goes»1.
The possibility of a universal method of cognition is denied, since any
development of knowledge presupposes a rejection of the old methods.
According to P. Feyerabend following the method is incompatible with creative
thinking.
Thus, the main feature of P. Feyerabend’s methodology is unconditional
subjectivism, unconditional relativism. Everything determines the personal and
collective preferences of scientists. And also unlimited proliferation
(multiplication) of competing theories is permissible. Only the convention
(agreement) of scientists will help to avoid conflict under this approach.
Proceeding from the principle «everything is permissible», P. Feyerabend asserts
the commensurability of science, religion, myth, magic. Moreover,
P. Feyerabend expresses his disappointment with science, substantiates doubts
about the rationality of science and its dominance over other forms of social
consciousness. Thus, «Feyerabend laid the rational foundations of modern
irrationalism»2.
Assignment to the primary source
Check out an excerpt from P. Feyerabend «Against Method. Outline of an
Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge». What is meant by the «philosophical
devaluation of the scientific method»? What is your attitude to the idea of
«anarchist methodology» by P. Feyerabend?
1
Paul Feyerabend. Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge.
London, New Left Books, 1975. P. 9–19.
2
Nikiforov A. L. Translator's Preface // Paul Feyerabend. Against Method. Outline of an
Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge / Paul Feyerabend; translated from English by
A. L. Nikiforov. Moscow: AST: AST MOSCOW: KHRANITEL, 2007. P. 5–13.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
84
Schema 3.7
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANARCHISM
(based on P. Feyerabend)
P. Feyerabend insists that methodological
violations are a kind of impetus for the
further development of science.
From P. Feyerabend’s point of view the
absence of methodological regulations is the
main idea of epistemological anarchism.
Anarchism in P. Feyerabend’s concept is a
consequence of the principle of
proliferation and the principle of
incommensurability.
Revealing the principle
of proliferation, «it is
necessary to invent and
develop theories and
concepts that are
incompatible with
existing and recognized
theories».
In turn, the principle of
incommensurability is
aimed at protecting any
even fantastic concepts
from criticism from
other concepts.
As a result, «the combination of the principle of proliferation with the
principle of incommensurability forms the methodological basis of
anarchism: everyone can (even have to) invent his own concept; it
cannot be compared with other concepts, for there is no basis for such a
comparison; therefore, everything is permissible and justified».
This implies not only the idea of methodological pluralism, but also
epistemological anarchism – «anything goes» («everything is
possible», «everything is okay»).
5. Evolutionary Epistemology of St. Tulmin
85
5. Evolutionary Epistemology of St. Tulmin
American philosopher Stephen Edelston Toulmin (1922‒1997) offered the
theory of the evolutionary development of science. To justify his point of view,
St. Toulmin suggested the trilogy on which he
based his work «Human Understanding» (1972).
The initial premise of this work is the evolutionary
biological theory of Ch. Darwin, which «was used
as a heuristic analog for modeling the evolution of
"conceptual populations". Mostly it concerned the
conceptual formations of science»1. St. Toulmin
noted that in order to understand research
activities, it is necessary to answer the question:
«What are the skills or traditions, the activities,
procedures, or instruments of Man’s intellectual
life and imagination – in a word the concepts –
through which that human understanding is achieved and expressed?
The final, philosophical goal of the inquiries that follow is, accordingly, to give
an adequate account of the intellectual authority of our concepts, in terms of
which we can understand the criteria by which they are to be appraised. <…>
First, our philosophical account must be relevant to the actual practice of rational
criticism. We cannot be satisfied to lay down canons of intellectual appraisal as a
matter of abstract epistemological theory, without asking what bearing they have
on the practical tasks actually facing the critical intellect. Secondly, it must be
given in terms which are operative in the light of all our present knowledge. We
must take care not to beg empirical questions for which well-founded answers
are already available in the epistemic sectors of other disciplines – whether they
have to do with the historical evolution of concepts in different communal
activities, or with their acquisition and employment in the lives and experience
of individuals. So far as possible, indeed, our account should be worked out in
the light of those empirical insights and answers, and stated using terms that
dovetail with those of all the associated fields. And, if we enter those other
1
Porus V. N. The price of «flexibe rationality» (on the philosophy of St. Toulmin) //
Philosophy of Science. Issue 5: Philosophy of Science in Search of New Paths. M.: IP RAS,
1999. P. 236.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
86
fields, it will simply be because our own philosophical problems concern the
mutual bearing and relevance of those subjects – and these mutual relations are
the sole property of no one discipline»1.
It is through rationality, which is a conglomerate of ideas, methods and
ways of reasoning understanding of phenomena is achieved in the scientific
community. As we can see St. Toulmin understands epistemology as a theory
that is a kind of criterion that can organize a comparative analysis of various
traditions of scientific reasoning. V. N. Porus shows that such a «"comparative
epistemology" would have very little in common with the "logical analysis of the
language of science", which for neo-positivists was the synonym of the
philosophy of science. The fact is that epistemology, as St. Toulmin proved,
should not examine the ways of constructing and transforming artificial formal
structures in which "living", that is, historically developing and successive
scientific theories are dissected, but the "rationality" that manifests itself in the
processes of this development and allows us to see the action of human
intelligence»2.
The need to proceed from the difference of thinking and understanding can
lead to the following formulation of the question for the methodologist. That is
to ensure the unity of tasks, both directed outward (practical tasks) and directed
inward (theoretical tasks). There fore the questions about scientists appear. That
is whet her they stop thinking, whether philosophers lose their sense of reality.
St. Toulmin draws attention to the fact that if the unity of understanding was
achieved in the past, today it is necessary to create a new «epistemic selfportrait», «and to re-explain the abilities, processes and activities through which
a person gains understanding of nature, and nature in turn becomes accessible to
the human mind»3. This approach allows us to focus on the explanation of the
problems, concepts and simple ideas of thinking that are characteristic of both
1
Stephen Toulmin. Human Understanding. Volume I. General Introduction and Part I.
Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1972. P 11.
2
Porus V. N. The price of «flexibe rationality» (on the philosophy of St. Toulmin) //
Philosophy of Science. Issue 5: Philosophy of Science in Search of New Paths. M.: IP RAS,
1999. P. 230.
3
Tulmin St. Human understanding / Per. from English Z.V. Kaganova, General edition
and introductory article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences prof. P.E. Syvokonya. M.:
Progress, 1984. P. 45.
5. Evolutionary Epistemology of St. Tulmin
87
the twentieth century and the seventeenth century, namely, the epistemic
portraits of R. Descartes and J. Locke. Such explanation should be convincing
due to the following circumstances. On the one hand, research will take place in
the area where an empirical approach can outline the directions for further
advancement of science and philosophy. On the other hand, as St. Toulmin says,
a complete separation of the scientific and philosophical aspects of human
understanding is impossible to achieve. There fore, such explanation (epistemic
self-portrait) must be convincing not only within the limits of formal philosophy,
but also in all other disciplines that deal with perception and thinking, cognition
and ideas.
And here we are approaching important points of the evolutionary concept
of St. Toulmin: first, the way of transformation of human skills and abilities,
which is necessary for understanding; second, the relationship of changing the
ways of activity with the evolution of understanding. According to this concept,
there is the difference in the interpretation of the development of knowledge.
Accor St. Toulmin noted that methodology of the history of natural science could
not coincide with the methodology of natural science. From this point of view,
the past turns out to be close and it leads to a theoretical system, because of a
consistent appeal to humanitarian knowledge. In fact, humanitarization of
research is being implemented, and the historian of science faces the problem of
the limitations of explanatory procedures and the need to refer to the procedures
of understanding.
The analysis of the growth of scientific knowledge from the point of view
of changing paradigms indicates important methodological changes that have
occurred in the scientific knowledge and consciousness of scientists. The crisis
of ideology, which reflects the inviolability of the universal principles of human
knowledge, found its expression in St. Toulmin’s works. There was the idea that
the existence of universal principles of human understanding (in other words, the
historical invariance of rationality) is a prerequisite for rational judgment. In
turn, it was implied that without rational judgment, it is not possible to reveal
layers of meaning, to compare historical periods and cultural epochs. Analyzing
the development of science St. Toulmin drew attention to the fact that when the
idea of inert matter was accepted, doubts arose in the comprehensive
materialistic explanation of rational activity.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
88
«If a theory of human understanding is to follow the rest of twentiethcentury science and history, then, it must be based not on unchanging principles
and guarantees, but on the developing interactions between Man, his concepts,
and the world in which he lives. Human variability is restricted only within the
slowly changing limits of our genetic constitution and cultural experience. The
problem of human understanding in the twentieth century is no longer an
Aristotelian one, in which Man’s epistemic task is to recognise the fixed
Essences of Nature; nor is it an Hegelian one, in which Human Mind alone
develops historically against a static background of Nature. Rather, it is a
problem that requires us to come to terms with the developing relationship
between Human Ideas and a Natural World, neither of which is invariant. Instead
of Fixed Mind gaining command over Fixed Nature by applying Fixed
Principles, we should expect to find variable epistemic relationships between a
variable Man and a variable Nature»1.
Thus, considering the peculiarities of the development of science,
St. Toulmin refers to the evolution but not revolution as the driving force. First,
he points out that the basis of human understanding is «life forms».
«Being ‘enculturated’ by our upbringings as we are, we think and act in
terms of intellectual and moral presuppositions characteristic of our own culture;
these presuppositions determine not only what kinds of conduct we consider
right and wrong, but also what kinds of phenomena we regard as puzzling or
self-explanatory, what sound or established picture of the world we use to
interpret our experience, what types of scientific argument and evidence we find
cogent or plausible, and so on; and, since men’s intellectual standards have
varied between different historical and cultural milieus in just the same way as
their ethical and aesthetic preferences, we are faced with the inescapable
question, what intellectual authority can be claimed – in principle – for one set of
standards rather than another. <…> How we think or what we can understand
depends entirely on the general presuppositions with which we are brought up;
1
Stephen Toulmin. Human Understanding. Volume I. General Introduction and Part I.
Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1972. P 20–21.
5. Evolutionary Epistemology of St. Tulmin
89
the search for a rationality transcending one particular milieu is the pursuit of a
will-o’-the-wisp»1.
In addition, these «life forms» must be stable, i.e. present in both the initial
and final stages of the development of science. First, according to such
approach, the emphasis is on their standardized content, which will realize
communication. Secondly, the moment of «historical understanding» should be
taken into account. The methodologist connects the correct understanding of
scientific problems with the ability of the scientist to foresee what scientific
research in the future will lead to a new «conceptual understanding». It is not
difficult to find analogy between the growth of scientific knowledge and the
emergence of new species in the biological evolutionary theory of Ch. Darwin. It
can be said that for the construction of forms of historical understanding, it is
important for each individual to understand the problem, which will eventually
acquire the outlines of a collective understanding. We have an alternative to the
existing concepts formed in the history and methodology of scientific
knowledge: the capacity for individual creativity can transform collective
understanding, but only if there are favorable social factors. The work of
St. Toulmin «Human understanding» has received a wide response because it is
obvious that with each step in the development of scientific knowledge, a new
opportunity for deeper reflection on the ways of developing scientific knowledge
is created.
Assignment to the primary source
Check out an excerpt from St. Toulmin «Human understanding». What is
meant by the «epistemic self-portrait»? What is your attitude to the idea of
«comparative epistemology» St. Toulmin?
1
Stephen Toulmin. Human Understanding. Volume I. General Introduction and Part I.
Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1972. P 66–67.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
90
Schema 3.8
EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY
(based on St. Toulmin)
The initial premise of this work is the evolutionary biological
theory of Ch. Darwin.
As we can see St. Toulmin understands epistemology as a theory
that is a kind of criterion that can organize a comparative analysis
of various traditions of scientific reasoning.
And here we are approaching
important points of the
evolutionary concept of
St. Toulmin:
‒ first, the way of
transformation of human
skills and abilities, which is
necessary for
understanding;
‒ second, the relationship
of changing the ways of
activity with the evolution
of understanding.
Thus, considering the
peculiarities of the
development of science,
St. Toulmin refers to the
evolution but not revolution
as the driving force. First, he
points out that the basis of
human understanding is «life
forms».
In addition, these «life
forms» must be stable, i.e.
present in both the initial
and final stages of the
development of science.
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