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Topic 3. MODELS OF THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
1. The growth of scientific knowledge in the model of K. Popper.
2. Methodology of research programs I. Lakatos.
3. The structure of scientific revolutions T. Kuhn.
4. Methodological anarchism P. Feyerabend.
5. Evolutuonary epistemology of St. Tulmin.
1. The growth of scientific knowledge in the model of K. Popper
There is the problem of the growth of scientific knowledge in the center of
the teachings of one of the most influential philosophers of the XX century.
K. Popper (1902–1994). Its solution, as a first
step, involves demarcation, delineating the
border between science and non-science. In
his work «The Logic of Scientific
Discovery» (1934) K. Popper analyzes the
methodological techniques (rules) for the
study of scientific theories and believes that
these techniques and rules represent a logical
structure due to the psychological expectation
to find in the object under study, process, etc.
a certain pattern. K. Popper noticed an
interesting fact paying attention to the
formation of the rules of the scientific
method:
«What are rules of scientific method, and why do we need them? Can
there be a theory of such rules, a methodology?
The way in which one answers these questions will largely depend upon
one’s attitude to science. Those who, like the positivists, see empirical science as
a system of statements which satisfy certain logical criteria, such as
meaningfulness or verifiability, will give one answer. A very different answer
will be given by those who tend to see (as I do) the distinguishing characteristic
of empirical statements in their susceptibility to revision ‒ in the fact that they
can be criticized, and superseded by better ones; and who regard it as their task
to analyse the characteristic ability of science to advance, and the characteristic
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
52
manner in which a choice is made, in crucial cases, between conflicting systems
of theories»1.
K. Popper believed that an attempt should be made to establish the rules
and norms by which a scientist is guided when he is engaged in discoveries:
«I am quite ready to admit that there is a need for a purely logical analysis
of theories, for an analysis which takes no account of how they change and
develop. But this kind of analysis does not elucidate those aspects of the
empirical sciences which I, for one, so highly prize. A system such as classical
mechanics may be ‘scientific’ to any degree you like; but those who uphold it
dogmatically‒believing, perhaps, that it is their business to defend such a
successful system against criticism as long as it is not conclusively disproved ‒
are adopting the very reverse of that critical attitude which in my view is the
proper one for the scientist. In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory
can ever be produced; for it is always possible to say that the experimental
results are not reliable, or that the discrepancies which are asserted to exist
between the experimental results and the theory are only apparent and that they
will disappear with the advance of our understanding. (In the struggle against
Einstein, both these arguments were often used in support of Newtonian
mechanics, and similar arguments abound in the field of the social sciences.) If
you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will
never benefit from experience, and never learn from it how wrong you are»2.
K. Popper noticed:
«If therefore we characterize empirical science merely by the formal or
logical structure of its statements, we shall not be able to exclude from it that
prevalent form of metaphysics which results from elevating an obsolete scientific
theory into an incontrovertible truth.
Such are my reasons for proposing that empirical science should be
characterized by its methods: by our manner of dealing with scientific systems:
by what we do with them and what we do to them. Thus I shall try to establish
the rules, or if you will the norms, by which the scientist is guided when he is
engaged in research or in discovery, in the sense here understood»3.
1
Karl Popper. On the Problem of a Theory of Scientific Method // The Logic of
Scientific Discovery. London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002. P. 27‒28.
2
The same source. P. 27‒28.
3
The same source. P. 27‒28.
1. The growth of scientific knowledge in the model of K. Popper
53
According to K. Popper, these rules can be called the rules of the «game»
called «empirical science». Approximately the same way, we could consider the
study of the rules of a scientific game (scientific work) as «the logic of
research». According to K. Popper the scientific game, is carried out correctly if
the progress of cognition is ensured, if successive theories become more and
more generalized, i.e. their «empirical content» increases. As a result K. Popper
expressed doubt about the validity of inductive logic, which, from the point of
view of the supporters of empiricism, was the only logic capable of justifying the
transition from single factual statements to general provisions of science. He also
rejected the positivist principle of verification as a criterion for the truth of a
theory. K. Popper, instead of the theory of verification, put forward the theory of
falsification based on the fact during the experimental verification any fact will
reject the theory.
Falsification (from Lat. Falsus – false and facio – I do) is a way of
refuting (establishing falsity) of a scientific statement by means of its
empirical verification.
Outstanding characteristics of K. Popper’s concept are the denial that
scientific hypotheses and theories are verifiable. Consequently, the true test of a
hypothesis or theory lies in its falsification, and not verification, which turns out
to be fundamentally unattainable1. Thus, the most effective way to test a
hypothesis is not to carry out many of its «subtle» tests, but to find tests that
would be most difficult for the hypothesis or theory to pass. If the hypothesis
passes this test, then it can be temporarily considered as confirmed. However,
this result can always be falsified.
K. Popper emphasizes that an agreement (convention) promotes the
acceptance of any empirical statement as a basic one and considers
methodological rules as agreements:
«Methodological rules are here regarded as conventions. They might be
described as the rules of the game of empirical science. They differ from the
rules of pure logic rather as do the rules of chess, which few would regard as part
of pure logic: seeing that the rules of pure logic govern transformations of
1
Skirbekk G., Guilier N. History of philosophy: Textbook / Translated from English
V. I. Kuznetsova; ed. S. B. Krymsky. Moscow: Publishing House VLADOS, 2000.
P. 712–713.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
54
linguistic formulae, the result of an inquiry into the rules of chess could perhaps
be entitled ‘The Logic of Chess’, but hardly ‘Logic’ pure and simple. (Similarly,
the result of an inquiry into the rules of the game of science‒that is, of scientific
discovery‒may be entitled ‘The Logic of Scientific Discovery’.)
Two simple examples of methodological rules may be given. They will
suffice to show that it would be hardly suitable to place an inquiry into method
on the same level as a purely logical inquiry.
(1) The game of science is, in principle, without end. He who decides one
day that scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be
regarded as finally verified, retires from the game.
(2) Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its
mettle1, it may not be allowed to drop out without ‘good reason’. A ‘good
reason’ may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is
better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis.
(The concept ‘better testable’ will later be analysed more fully.)
These two examples show what methodological rules look like»2.
According to K. Popper the basis of cognition are advance theories
(hypotheses), i.e. an empirical fact doesn`t confirm the theory, but the existing
theory does, the hypothesis is used as the basis for the appropriate interpretation
of the fact. Experience refutes the theory3.
The growth of scientific knowledge is a process moving from old
problems to the new ones through assumptions and refutations. Thus, this is a
natural selection of hypotheses: our knowledge always consists of the totality of
hypotheses that prove their ability to survive in the struggle for existence;
competition eliminates hypotheses that cannot survive4.
1
Regarding the translation ‘to prove one’s mettle’ for ‘sich bewähren’, see the first
footnote to chapter 10 (Corroboration), below.
2
Karl Popper. On the Problem of a Theory of Scientific Method // The Logic of
Scientific Discovery. London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002. P. 27 ‒ 28.
3
Bessonov B. N. History and philosophy of science: textbook. / B. N. Bessonov.
Moscow: Yurayt Publishing House; 2010. P. 250–251.
4
Shtanko V. I. Philosophy and methodology of science. Textbook for graduate students
and undergraduates of natural sciences and technical universities. Kharkov: KhNURE, 2002.
P. 166.
1. The growth of scientific knowledge in the model of K. Popper
55
According to K. Popper, the growth of scientific knowledge follows the
scheme:
TT
i
P
1
TT
2
EE
P
2
TiT
i
TT
n
P1 – the initial problem;
TTi or TTn – problem theories, possible solutions;
P2 – a new problem (or a set of problems) appearing as a result of
elimination of mistakes in the solution P1.
K. Popper distinguishes three requirements for the growth of knowledge1.
The first requirement is the requirement of simplicity: a new theory should
proceed from a simple one, new, productive and unifying idea of some
connection or relationship that exists between still unrelated things or facts, or
new «theoretical entities». The second requirement is about independently tested
theory i.e. irrespective of the explanation of all the facts have to be explained, it
has to lead to predictions of consequences that have not been observed so far.
Third requirement: the theory must withstand a few new and difficult tests.
Focusing on the problem of objective knowledge, K. Popper considers the
first, the second, and the third worlds as the subject of his methodological
analysis. His idea is the following: «the first world is the world of physical
objects and physical states; the second world is the world of states of
consciousness, mental states, and possibly dispositions for action; the third world
is the world of the objective content of thinking, primarily the content of
scientific ideas, poetic thoughts, and works of art»2. This approach focuses on
bridging the gap between the worlds and considering their interaction. It is
necessary to emphasize the peculiarity of the second world, in which subjective
ideas are embodied and which appears as a kind of buffer between the first
1
Karl R. Popper. Conjectures and refutations // The logic of scientific discovery.
Moscow: Progress. 1983. P. 364–366.
2
Karl R. Popper. Objective knowledge // The logic of scientific discovery. Moscow:
Progress. 1983. P. 439–441.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
56
physical world and the third world, the content of which is scientific knowledge.
K. Popper focuses on the interaction of the worlds. It is supported by means of
the world of knowledge represented by the third world. The third world is
characterized by the tendency to change both the second world (subjective ideas
in the human mind) and the first world (physical). K. Popper emphasizes that
objective philosophical and scientific theories have an impact on the world, but
not carriers of subjective ideas (people) who do not assume what possible
consequences their application will lead to. Objective ideas and theories contain
these possibilities.
The third world is the product of human activity. Why is it autonomous?
The third world is an unintended result of the human activity, but it has an
impact on the further development of civilization and humanity. K. Popper
assumes that material culture and knowledge disappear, but libraries do not. That
is why civilization can return to life. However, the disappearance of libraries will
lead to the death of civilization.
Assignment to the primary source
Check out K. Popper's «The Logic of Scientific Discovery», a study of
methodological techniques for exploring scientific theories:
«In accordance with my proposal made above, epistemology, or the logic
of scientific discovery, should be identified with the theory of scientific method.
The theory of method, in so far as it goes beyond the purely logical analysis of
the relations between scientific statements, is concerned with the choice of
methods‒with decisions about the way in which scientific statements are to be
dealt with. These decisions will of course depend in their turn upon the aim
which we choose from among a number of possible aims. The decision here
proposed for laying down suitable rules for what I call the ‘empirical method’ is
closely connected with my criterion of demarcation: I propose to adopt such
rules as will ensure the testability of scientific statements; which is to say, their
falsifiability»1.
Explain how K. Popper views the growth of scientific knowledge:
«Methodological rules are thus closely connected both with other
methodological rules and with our criterion of demarcation. But the connection
1
Karl Popper. On the Problem of a Theory of Scientific Method // The Logic of
Scientific Discovery. London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002. P. 27‒28.
1. The growth of scientific knowledge in the model of K. Popper
57
is not a strictly deductive or logical one1. It results, rather, from the fact that the
rules are constructed with the aim of ensuring the applicability of our criterion of
demarcation; thus their formulation and acceptance proceeds according to a
practical rule of a higher type. An example of this has been given above
(cf.rule 1): theories which we decide not to submit to any further test would no
longer be falsifiable. It is this systematic connection between the rules which
makes it appropriate to speak of a theory of method. Admittedly the
pronouncements of this theory are, as our examples show, for the most part
conventions of a fairly obvious kind. Profound truths are not to be expected of
methodology2. Nevertheless it may help us in many cases to clarify the logical
situation, and even to solve some far-reaching problems which have hitherto
proved intractable. One of these, for example, is the problem of deciding whether
a probability statement should be accepted or rejected»3.
What theoretical model of the development of science does K. Popper
offer? Compare it with T. Kuhn’s model of scientific growth.
«It has often been doubted whether the various problems of the theory of
knowledge stand in any systematic relation to one another, and also whether they
can be treated systematically. I hope to show in this book that these doubts are
unjustified. The point is of some importance. My only reason for proposing my
criterion of demarcation is that it is fruitful: that a great many points can be
clarified and explained with its help. …
Whether philosophers will regard these methodological investigations as
belonging to philosophy is, I fear, very doubtful, but this does not really matter
much. Yet it may be worth mentioning in this connection that not a few doctrines
which are metaphysical, and thus certainly philosophical, could be interpreted as
typical hypostatizations of methodological rules»4.
1
Cf. K. Menger. Moral, Wille und Weltgestaltung, 1934, P. 58 ff.
2
I am still inclined to uphold something like this, even though such theorems as ‘degree
of corroboration≠probability’, or my ‘theorem on truth-content’ (see the Feigl Festschrift:
Mind, Matter, and Method, edited by P. K. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell, 1966, pp. 343–353)
are perhaps unexpected and not quite on the surface.
3
Karl Popper. On the Problem of a Theory of Scientific Method // The Logic of
Scientific Discovery. London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002. P. 27‒28.
4
The same source. P. 27‒28.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
58
Schema 3.1
ACCORDING TO K. POPPER, THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE FOLLOWS THE SCHEME
Schema 3.2
FOCUSING ON THE PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE,
K. POPPER CONSIDERS THE FIRST, THE SECOND, AND THE THIRD
WORLDS AS THE SUBJECT OF HIS METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
P1 P2 T
1
T
2
T
n
EE
Objective Knowledge
Subject
Material World
Implementation
Civilization
Invention
2. Methodology of research programs I. Lakatos
59
2. Methodology of research programs I. Lakatos
Considering the history of science, the methodologist should consider the
necessity to include the following factors into the theoretical model of scientific
rationality: competition of theories in science, the
choice of theory or methods, the formation of historical
acceptance or rejection of theories in science.
The task of the methodologist is the rational
reasoning of processes that are not connected with real
schemes. Imre Lakatos (1922–1974), an English
mathematician and philosopher of Hungarian origin,
tried to solve this problem.
Actualization of this problem leads to the deployment of
a methodological framework of research programs
based on a set of methodological rules, namely negative
and positive heuristics. I. Lakatos drew attention to the fact that the growth of
scientific knowledge could be described as «the story of the birth, life, and death
of research programs»:
«I have discussed the problem of objective appraisal of scientific growth
in terms of progressive and degenerating problem shifts in series of scientific
theories. The most important such series in the growth of science are
characterized by a certain continuity which connects their members. This
continuity evolves from a genuine research programme adumbrated at the start.
The programme consist of methodological rules: some tell us what paths of
research to avoid (negative heuristic), and others what paths to pursue (positive
heuristic)1.
Even science as a whole can be regarded as a huge research programme
with Popper’s supreme heuristic rule: ‘devise conjectures which have more
empirical content than their predecessors’. Such methodological rules may be
formulated, as Popper pointed rut, as metaphysical principles2. For instance, the
1
One may point out that the negative and positive heuristic gives a rough (implicit)
definition of the ‘conceptual framework’ (and consequently of the language). The recognition
that the history of science is the history of research programmes rather than of theories may
therefore be seen as a partial vindication of the view that the history of science is the history of
conceptual frameworks or of scientific languages.
2
Popper [1934], sections 11 and 70. I use ‘metaphysical’ as a technical term of naive
falsificationism: a contingent proposition is ‘metaphysical’ if it has no ‘potential falsifiers’.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
60
universal anticonventionalist rule against exception-barring may be stated as the
metaphysical principle: ‘Nature does not allow exceptions’. This is why Watkins
called such rules ‘influential metaphysics’1»2.
I. Lakatos proves the necessity to study specific research programs:
«But what I have primarily in mind is not science as a whole, out rather
particular research programmes, such as the one known as ‘Cartesian
metaphysics’. Cartesian metaphysics, that is, the mechanistic theory of the
universe – according to which the universe is a huge clockwork (and system of
vortices) with push as the only cause of motion – functioned as a powerful
heuristic principle. It discouraged work on scientific theories – like (the
‘essentialist’ version of) Newton’s theory of action at a distance – which were
inconsistent with it (negative heuristic). On the other hand, it encouraged work
on auxiliary hypotheses which might have saved it from apparent
counterevidence – like Keplerian ellipses (positive heuristic3)»4.
This position corresponds the critical-rationalistic concept of science.
I. Lakatosis arguing about what the fundamental unit of evaluation of science is.
In the work «Methodology of research programs», he claims that such unit is the
research program.
The research program is the main unit of the development and
evaluation of scientific knowledge. It is a series of successive theories
united by a set of fundamental ideas and methodological principles.
The research program combines:
‒ conventionally accepted, resulting in a non-refutable «hard core»;
‒ positive heuristics, the content of which is based on the arguments and
assumptions aimed at further changing and developing «refutable variants» of
the research program.
1
Watkins [1958]. Watkins cautions that ‘the logical gap between statements and
prescriptions in the metaphysical-methodological field is illustrated by the fact that a person
may reject a [metaphysical] doctrine in its fact-stating form while subscribing to the
prescriptive version of it’ (Ibid., pp. 356‒7).
2
Imre Lakatos. The methodology of scientific research programmes. Philosophical
Papers. Volume I. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. P. 47–52.
3
For this Cartesian research programme, cf. Popper [1960b] and Watkms [1538].
P. 350‒1.
4
Imre Lakatos. The methodology of scientific research programmes. Philosophical
Papers. Volume I. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. P. 47–52.
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