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2. Methodology of research programs I. Lakatos
61
‒ set by the research program, positive heuristics helps the scientist
make a choice from a variety of anomalies;
‒ and, finally, a «protective belt» consisting of auxiliary hypotheses,
and, which is considered as some kind of protection. The main function of the
protective belt is the preservation of the core which can completely transform to
protect it.
In the study, I. Lakatos draws attention to the fact that:
«All scientific research programmes may be characterized by their ‘hard
core’. The negative heuristic of the programme forbids us to direct the modus
tollens at this ‘hard core’. Instead, we must use our ingenuity to articulate or
even invent ‘auxiliary hypotheses’, which form a protective belt around this core,
and we must redirect the modus tollens to these. It is this protective belt of
auxiliary hypotheses which has to bear the brunt of tests and get adjusted and readjured, or even completely replaced, to defend the thus-hardened core. A
research programme is successful if all this leads to a progressive problemshiu;
unsuccessful if it leads to a degenerating problemshift»1.
In this connection, I. Lakatos notes the importance of «negative
heuristics»:
«The idea of ‘negative heuristic’ of a scientific research programme
rationalizes classical conventionalism to a considerable exient. We may
rationally decide not to allow ‘refutations’ to transmit falsity to the hard core as
long as the corroborated empirical content of the protecting belt of auxiliary
hypotheses increases. But our approach differs from Poincare’s justificationist
conventionalism in the sense that, unlike Poincare, we maintain that if and when
the programme ceases to anticipate novel facts, its hard core might have to be
abandoned: that is, our hard core, unlike Poincare’s, may crumble under certain
conditions. In this sense we side with Duhem who thought that such a possibility
must be allowed for; but for Duhem the reason for such crumbling is purely
aesthetic, while for us it is mainly logical and empirical»2.
«Positive heuristics» is important for the research program either.
I. Lakatos points out that it is the positive heuristics of the research program and
not anomalies that determines the problem for the scientist:
1
Imre Lakatos. The methodology of scientific research programmes. Philosophical
Papers. Volume I. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. P. 47–52.
2
The same source. P. 47–52.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
62
«Research programmes, besides their negative heuristic, are also
characterized by their positive heuristic.
Even the most rapidly and consistently progressive research programmes
can digest their ‘counter-evidence’ only piecemeal: anomalies are never
completely exhausted. But it should not be thought that vet unexplained
anomalies – ‘puzzles’ as Kuhn might call them – are taken in random order, and
the protective belt built up n an eclectic fashion, without any preconceived order.
The order is usually decided in the theoretician’s cabinet, independently of the
known anomalies.
Few theoretical scientists engaged in a research programme pay undue
attention to ‘refutations’. They have a long-term research policy which
anticipates these refutations. This research policy, or order of research, is set out
– in more or less detail – in the positive heuristic of the research programme. The
negative heuristic specifies the ‘hard core’ of the programme which is
‘irrefutable’ by the methodological decision of its proponents; the positive
heuristic consists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to
change, develop the ‘refutable variants’ of the research-programme, how to
modify, sophisticate, the ‘refutable’ protective belt»1.
I. Lakatos noticed the profound impact of positive heuristics on scientists
who are forced to confront the wealth of anomalies:
«The positive heuristic of the programme saves the scientist from
becoming confused by the ocean of anomalies. The positive heuristic sets out a
programme which lists a chain of ever more complicated models simulating
reality: the scientist’s attention is riveted on building his models following
instructions which are laid down in the positive part of his programme. He
ignores the actual counterexamples, the available ‘data’2»3.
1
Imre Lakatos. The methodology of scientific research programmes. Philosophical
Papers. Volume I. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. P. 47–52.
2
If a scientist (or mathematician) has a positive heuristic, he refuses to be drawn into
observation. He will ‘lie down on his couch, shut his eyes and forget about the data. (Cf. my
[1963-4], especially pp. 300 ff, where there is a detailed case study of such a programme.)
Occasionally, of course, he will ask Nature a shrewd question: he will then be encouraged by
Nature's YES, but not discouraged by its NO.
3
Imre Lakatos. The methodology of scientific research programmes. Philosophical
Papers. Volume I. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. P. 47–52.
2. Methodology of research programs I. Lakatos
63
A comparative analysis of the methodology of research programs formed
in the history of science and modern methodological concepts made it possible
for I. Lakatos to point out its advantage. Reasoning inductivism, scientific
judgments are mostly those that describe existing facts or judgments that are
irrefutable inductive generalizations of facts. As an example, I. Lakatos refers to
the laws of gravity discovered by Newton through an inductive generalization of
Kepler's phenomena of planetary motion:
«Newton first worked out his programme for a planetary system with a
fixed point-like sun and one single point-like planet. It was in this model that he
derived his inverse square law for Kepler’s ellipse. But this model was forbidden
by Newton’s own third law of dynamics, therefore the model had to be replaced
by one in which both sun and planet revolved round their common centre of
gravity. This change was not motivated by any observation (the data did not
suggest an ‘anomaly’ here) but by a theoretical difficulty in developing the
programme. Then he worked out the programme for more planets as if there
were only heliocentric but no interplanetary forces. Then he worked out the case
where the sun and planets were not mass-points but mass-balls. Again, for this
change ho did not need the observation of an anomaly; infinite density was
forbidden by an (inarticulated) touchstone theory, therefore planets had to be
intended»1.
The example of Newtonis very convincing considering his style of
thinking because he used such ideals as empiricism, utilitarianism:
«This change involved considerable mathematical difficulties, had up
Newton’s work – and delayed the publication of the Principia by more than a
decade. Having solved this ‘puzzle’, he started work on spinning balls and their
wobbles. Then he admitted interplanetary forces and started work on
perturbations. At this point he started to look more anxiously at the facts. Many
of them were beautifully explained (qualitatively) by this model, many were not.
It was then that he started to work on bulging planets, rather than round planets,
etc.»2.
This position but not conventionalism rejects the influence of economic,
social, and cultural factors that, according to inductivists, contribute to the
devaluation of scientific theory. According to I. Lakatos to reconstruct the
1
Imre Lakatos. The methodology of scientific research programmes. Philosophical
Papers. Volume I. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1999. P. 47–52.
2
The same source. P. 47–52.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
64
original knowledge means to act from the position of falsificationism, which
denies both inductivism and conventionalism. A research program «is considered
progressive when its theoretical growth anticipates empirical growth, i.e. when it
can successfully predict new facts; it regresses if its theoretical growth lags
behind its empirical growth1».
Assignment to the primary source
Check out an excerpt written by I. Lakatos «The methodology of scientific
research programs. Philosophical Papers». What theoretical model of the
development of science does I. Lakatos offer? Compare it with K. Popper’s
model of scientific growth.
Schema 3.3
THE RESEARCH PROGRAM
(based on I. Lakatos)
1
Bessonov B. N. History and philosophy of science: textbook. / B. N. Bessonov.
Moscow: Yurayt Publishing House; 2010. P. 283 – 285.
Т
1‒Т2‒Т3‒Т4
‒
Positive heuristics
Negative heuristics
Hard core
3. The structure of scientific revolutions T. Kuhn
65
3. The structure of scientific revolutions T. Kuhn
One of the urgent problems of modern methodology of science is to
consider the development of science not only in terms of cumulative concepts,
but the study of the development of science from
the point of view of non-cumulative theories as
well. In accordance with cumulative concepts,
«knowledge about the real properties,
relationships, processes of nature and society,
once acquired by science, accumulates,
cumulates, forming such a fund, ever-growing
and increasing, hence the growth and
development of knowledge»1. Can cumulative
models submit the process of the dynamics of
science? In accordance with the query and
searching for answers to it under the modern
methodology of science, non-cumulative
concepts of the growth of scientific knowledge
were formed. The most prominent example of a noncumulative approach is the
concept proposed by the American physicist, philosopher and historian of
science Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996).
In the work «The Structure of Scientific Revolutions» (1962),
Thomas S. Kuhn considers science as a long stage of cumulative development, at
certain moments interrupted by scientific revolutions – non-cumulative
outbursts.
The development of scientific knowledge had proceeded in accordance
with «normal science» until the period of the scientific revolution. The term
«normal science» means the research based on past scientific achievements,
which for some time have been recognized by a certain scientific community as
the basis for its practice2. Thomas S. Kuhn believes that scientists within the
framework of «normal science» continue developing theories, the existence of
1
Mikeshina L. A. Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Epistemology. Scientific
knowledge in the dynamics of culture. Research methodology: textbook. allowance /
L. A. Mikeshin. Moscow: Progress-Tradition: MPSI: Flinta, 2005. P. 201.
2
Bessonov B. N. History and philosophy of science: textbook allowance /
B. N. Bessonov. Moscow: Yurayt Publishing House; ID Yurayt, 2010. P. 270–272.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
66
which the paradigm assumes. Considering the three types of problems that make
up the scope of «normal science», Thomas S. Kuhn notices:
«These three classes of problems‒determination of significant fact,
matching of facts with theory, and articulation of theory‒exhaust, I think, the
literature of normal science, both empirical and theoretical. They do not, of
course, quite exhaust the entire literature of science. There are also extraordinary
problems, and it may well be their resolution that makes the scientific enterprise
as a whole so particularly worthwhile. But extraordinary problems are not to be
had for the asking. They emerge only on special occasions prepared by the
advance of normal research. Inevitably, therefore, the overwhelming majority of
the problems undertaken by even the very best scientists usually fall into one of
the three categories outlined above. Work under the paradigm can be conducted
in no other way, and to desert the paradigm is to cease practicing the science it
defines. We shall shortly discover that such desertions do occur. They are the
pivots about which scientific revolutions turn. But before beginning the study of
such revolutions, we require a more panoramic view of the normal-scientific
pursuits that prepare the way»1.
The issue of the authenticity of scientific achievements is solved as
follows. Scientific achievements should be explained by novelty and openness.
Achievements with these two characteristics Thomas S. Kuhn calls paradigms.
Paradigm (comes from Greek. – sample) – theory (model of the
problem statement), adopted as a model for solving research
problems.
Thomas S. Kuhn writes about the paradigm, focusing on the nature of
normal science:
«What then is the nature of the more professional and esoteric research
that a group’s reception of a single paradigm permits? If the paradigm represents
work that has been done once and for all, what further problems does it leave the
united group to resolve? Those questions will seem even more urgent if we now
note one respect in which the terms used so far may be mislead ing. In its
established usage, a paradigm is an accepted model or pattern, and that aspect of
its meaning has enabled me, lack ing a better word, to appropriate ‘paradigm’
here. But it will shortly be clear that the sense of ‘model’ and ‘pattern’ that per
1
Thomas S. Kuhn. The Nature of Normal Science // The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. Volumes I and II. Foundations of the unity of science. Volume II. Number 2.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1970. P. 34.
3. The structure of scientific revolutions T. Kuhn
67
mits the appropriation is not quite the one usual in defining ‘paradigm’. In
grammar, for example, ‘amo, amas, amat’ is a paradigm because it displays the
pattern to be used in conjugat ing a large number of other Latin verbs, e.g., in
producing ‘Laudo, laudas, laudat’. In this standard application, the paradigm
functions by permitting the replication of examples any one of which could in
principle serve to replace it. In a science, on the other hand, a paradigm is rarely
an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the
common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under new
or more stringent conditions»1.
Thomas S. Kuhn shows the uniqueness of the paradigm and also draws
attention to the fact that the paradigm is an object for further development and
concretization in new or more difficult conditions:
«To see how this can be so, we must recognize how very limited in both
scope and precision a paradigm can be at the time of its first appearance.
Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their
competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to
recognize as acute. To be more successful is not, however, to be either
completely successful with a single problem or notably success ful with any
large number. The success of a paradigm‒whether Aristotle’s analysis of motion,
Ptolemy’s computations of planetary position, Lavoisier’s application of the
balance, or Maxwell’s mathematization of the electromagnetic field‒is at the
start largely a promise of success discoverable in selected and still incomplete
examples. Normal science consists in the actualization of that promise, an
actualization achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that the
paradigm displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the match
between those facts and the paradigm’s predictions, and by further articulation of
the paradigm itself»2.
Paying attention to the details of the term «paradigm», T. Kuhn suggests
using the term «disciplinary matrix». The most important components of the
disciplinary matrix include symbolic generalizations, metaphysical paradigms
(metaphysical parts of paradigms), values, and patterns.
1
Thomas S. Kuhn. The Nature of Normal Science // The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. Volumes I and II. Foundations of the unity of science. Volume II. Number 2.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1970. P. 34.
2
The same source. P. 34.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
68
«Symbolic generalizations» refers to expressions that are formal or easily
formalized and are used unanimously by the members of the scientific
community.
Metaphysical paradigms include generally accepted prescriptions that help
determine the solution and explanation of puzzles.
Values, as the third type of elements of the disciplinary matrix, are widely
accepted by the scientific community as a unifying unit. In anomaly resolution, it
is difficult to imagine any other alternative rather than a system of generally
accepted values through which the scientific community achieves success.
Another important element of the disciplinary matrix is the patterns by
which T. Kuhn understands a specific solution of the problem. Considering the
paradigm as a generally accepted model, T. Kuhn proves that the restriction of
the cognitive content of science (namely, the embodiment of scientific
knowledge in theories and rules, the formulation of a problem to ensure ease of
application of rules) is erroneous.
I. Kasavin and V. Porus showed in their research that Thomas S. Kuhn's
«normal science» is in the public service. This tendency has become evident
since the second half of the XX century1. This period is characterized by the
occurrence of the zone of «mutually beneficial exchange between science and
government, when the science is funded as an economically efficient activity that
also satisfies the curiosity of scientists, even if it does not provide society with
positive social and moral incentives and models2». This researcher`s position
allows us to consider science as a political and moral actor, like the legislative,
executive, judicial authorities, the church, the influence of the media and social
networks, and the history of science as a period of gradual development,
interrupted by scientific revolutions.
Scientific revolution is a radical change of the process and content of
scientific knowledge, associated with the transition to new theoretical
and methodological premises, to a new system of fundamental
concepts and methods to a new scientific global picture. Also, this
process is connected with qualitative transformations of the material
1
Ilya T. Kasavin, Vladimir N. Porus. Turning back to Kuhn: is normal science
conservative? // Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 2020, vol.57, no.1. P. 17.
2
The same source. P. 17.
3. The structure of scientific revolutions T. Kuhn
69
means of observation and experimentation, with new ways of
evaluating and interpreting empirical data, with new ideas of
explanation, validity and organization of knowledge.
Scientific revolutions in Thomas S. Kuhn's concept are non-cumulative
episodes of the development of science, during which the old paradigm is
replaced completely or partially by a new paradigm, which is fundamentally
incompatible with the previous one.
T. Kuhn considers the development of science as a historical change of
paradigms occurring in the course of scientific revolutions based on the principle
of historicity in the analysis of the growth of scientific knowledge. At the same
time, the concept of a revolutionary paradigm shift does not take into account
that the period of «normal science» and the period of the scientific revolution are
not isolated from one another.
In addition, the principle of «theoretical loading of a fact, according to
which the conceptual content of a theory related to a certain paradigm focuses
the attention of a scientist, and therefore, in the same cognitive situation,
scientists of different scientific traditions receive substantially different empirical
data»1 plays the most important role in Thomas S. Kuhn's concept. As a result,
we can see such dependence of fact on theory that each theory is endowed with
the ability to create its own facts. Following this method of understanding, the
question arises, how can anomalous content of knowledge appear and
accumulate, which is necessary for a further change of the paradigm.
Assignment to the primary source
Check out an excerpt from Thomas S. Kuhn's «The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions». How does Thomas S. Kuhn explain the revolution in science?
1
Aleksandr M. Dorozhkin, Anna V. Sakharova. Obviousand improbable in Kuhnian
normal science // Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 2020, vol. 57, no. 2. P. 146.
Topic 3. Models of the growth of scientific knowledge
70
Schema 3.4
DISCIPLINARY MATRIX
(based on Thomas S. Kuhn)
DISCIPLINARY MATRIX
Symbolic generalizations
Metaphysical paradigms
(metaphysical parts of
paradigms)
Values
Patterns
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