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transition is smooth and continuous, there are well-established mathematical methods for describing it. In nature, however, the evolution of forms is rarely smooth; it usually involves abrupt changes and perplexing divergencies. Such discontinuous and divergent phenomena have long resisted mathematical analysis, and in most cases quantitative description is still unattainable. In the past few years, however, a method for the construction of qualitative, topological models have been developed. 147. This paper presents the argument that is quite impossible to say, at the moment, if the structure of though influences the structure of language. One might reasonably ask why such an argument needs to be presented. There would thus seem to be no room for argument. There is, however, a sense in which the influence of thought is not obvious. In fact, in this further though, the question remains entirely open and no one can yet say what connection, if any, there is between though and language. But that is the argument of the paper. To explain the argument, it is necessary first to describe how language appears to be acquired. The account will necessarily be brief; a more complete description can be found elsewhere (McMorgan 1994). 148. I will start by citing what I consider a commonsensical explanation as stated by Barstow (1994:154): "We might take as necessary ingredients of an act of explanation (1) some phenomenon, (2) some puzzlement about the phenomenon, (3) some hypothesis about the phenomenon, (4) some grounds for feeling that the hypothesis is correct". With regard to the first of these, I see no reason for us to restrict ourselves in advance regarding the type of phenomenon to be explained. 149. Generalizations are not made in a theoretical void. They are put forward against a background of a more or less well-developed theory, and with a view to adding a new hypothesis to this theory, is necessary. I some true generalizations follow from the corpus of hypotheses constituting some accepted theory, then that theory is not thereby in need of augmentation by a new hypothesis. Conversely, if the contradictory of some true generalization follows from some set of hypotheses, then at least one of those hypotheses must be wrong and should be abandoned. Between these two extremes, we have the case of a true generalization which neither absolutely confirms nor absolutely disconfirms an existing set of hypotheses. 150. As far as the structure of a logical system is concerned, the distinction between assumption and axiom may not seem essential. This is the case of first order logic and intuitionistic logic. For these logical systems, it does not matter, when applying an inference rule, whether or not the formulas involved are assumptions. This is not the case for all logical systems. For some of them, this distinction can be very important. This is the case of linear logic and some relevance logic. 151. Third, and perhaps most important, science is

invariably open-minded and non-dogmatic. It holds even its best theories tentatively and sees them as always subject to change, and does not claim that they describe the nature of things for all possible conditions and for all times. It is exceptionally flexible and never devout. 152. Science uses logic, both Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian, to check its hypotheses, and usually ends up with theories that are not self-contradictory and are not falsified by other views of people and the world. It rules out magic, cavalier jumping to conclusions, and many illogical "non sequiturs.” 153. First, his original premises, retained even by his critics, are shown to be false. Next, the question is redefined and reformulated on the basis of a much fuller survey of the secondary literature, with new source material added. This reveals new connections at once more precise and more extensive. Finally, some general conclusions are drawn, and -- what has by now come to seem of no less importance -- the causes, effects, and cures of a historiographical chaos, by no means unique to this particular question -- are indicated. 154. The proposed model does not appear to be based on the research at all but rather on the authors' own intuitions. The only apparent virtue of the ideal model is that it is different from the four studies. However, different does not necessarily means better, particularly when one considers the expense to implement the ideal model. 155. In my opinion, even the way we subdivide science shows Western science as dualistic and elementalistic in structure. Physics, the study of "physical happenings”, stands opposed to psychology, the study of "mental happenings". The revolutionary theories of twentieth-century physics do include some metadiscussion of how an observer/experimenter arrives at her/his picture of "physical happenings", and in the mathematics of the theories, some heavily metaphorical representations of such topics. But to date, the community of scientists has neither accepted any non-dualistic and non-elementaistic theory, nor even agreed that such a theory exists. 156. This is a scientific model which applies to sciences like physics which observe phenomena with a limited number of variables, and a consistent behaviour of them -- but also then the application of the model will not completely be without problems, inasmuch as it requires a certain amount of simplification of reality. The model is most suitable for theoretical constructions like mathematics, but it cannot apply to research fields with a higher number of variables , with inconsistent behaviour as are found in the humanities. 157. If we mean by "theory", along with the definition of the "Encyclopedia Britannica", "a systematic ideational structure of broad scope, conceived by the imagination of man, that encompasses a family of empirical (experimental) laws regarding regularities existing in objects and events, both observed and posited — a structure suggested by these laws and devised to explain them

in a scientifically rational manner", then this construction cannot be considered a theory under any meaningful current sense. The "Encyclopedia Britannica" goes then further as follows:"...

whereas empirical laws each express a unifying relationship among a small selection of observables, scientific theories have much greater scope, explaining a variety of such laws and predicting others as yet undiscovered. 158. We can compare competing theoretical systems in regard to such characteristics as these: a) the clarity and precision with which the theories are formulated; b) the systematic, i.e. explanatory and predictive, power of the systems in regard to observable phenomena; c) the formal simplicity of the theoretical systems with which a certain systematic power is attained; d) the extent to which the theories have been confirmed by experimental evidence. 159. To conclude this discussion of dogma in the theory, let us note that its adherents seem trapped in the dilemma of the chicken and the egg (Popper 1963:47). They insist constantly on the truism that accumulating data without prior ideas or theories is a senseless activity, hence the necessity to elaborate theories first. This type of criticism has been applied to the taxonomy of many forms; but if it had been applied to biology or physics, Hooke would have been forbidden to look into his microscope, or nuclear physicists to use particle accelerators. Fortunately, such questions are raised only rarely by working scientists. A scientist who accepts the theories of electromagnetism and of bubble nucleation will nevertheless search literally millions of images in order to find particles for which he has no theory. 160. Here one could embark on an excursus into philosophy of science. Are descriptive theories in fact explanatory ? When Watson and Crick proposed a structure for DNA, were they providing a description or an explanation ? Instead, I would like to call a truce. I believe that certain descriptions are explanatory, but I will accept that some explanations are not descriptive. A number of questions now naturally arise. What sort of things count as explanatory for Bridges ? Are here explanations valid ? And, at least for those of us who remain tied to description, are these explanations useful to the descriptive enterprise ? 161. It is true that the differences in analysis cannot be divorced from differences among the theories in terms of which the analyses are couched; for example, if a theory does not provide the apparatus needed for identifying the two processes, then either this option is wrong or the theory is wrong. This is precisely why the debate is important. Equally, it could, in principle, turn out that the only way to choose among the alternative analyses is by invoking theoryinternal principles; this conclusion will be forced on us if we cannot find any relevant facts. However, I think there are enough facts to make the choice on empirical grounds, which will allow us to draw appropriate theoretical conclusions afterwards.

162. Bach's statement regarding scientific explanation raises a further issue which requires discussion -- namely his third point, that an explanation requires "some hypothesis about the phenomenon". Discussion of this matter in the philosophy of science has tended to revolve around the thesis concerning explanation which was first advanced by Heugel, commonly called the deductive-nonlogical, or sometimes the "covering law" model. Briefly stated, the explanandum or "the thing to be explained”, if it can be deduced from a base, can be derived from the explanans which contains at least one law. The explanans or deductive basis will also, in explaining individual events, include one or more particular statements, often called initial conditions. 163. I mentioned above the requirement that the statement of laws in a theory should be minimized. A scientific law can be regarded as a hypothesis that is generally accepted as true; and since anyone who postulates a hypothesis does so in the belief that it may be true, i.e. that it may turn out to be a law (although of course the truth of a hypothesis can never be known for certain), we are also required to keep the postulation of hypotheses to a minimum. Hypotheses are formulated in such a way that generalizations follow from them, but it is possible in principle to formulate any number of saturate hypotheses from which the same generalizations follow. This is undesirable. There is no need for an "overkill" of generalizations by hypotheses. If a generalization follows from one hypothesis (or, more usually, from a set of hypotheses), then we do not need another to account for it. 164. What is interesting is that the authors did not subject their ideal model to any of the analyses used to critique the four models discussed in the research section. As the model proposed is not in any way related to or a product of the research preceding it, it is difficult to believe the authors' claim that it came about as a result of the research. Given the fact that the research failed to find any correlation between model and attitude, it is difficult to understand why the authors would go to the trouble of proposing a new model at all. The proposed model does not appear to be based on the research at all but rather on the authors' own intuitions -- the very approach to curriculum development they criticize in their introduction. 165. The past decade can be characterized as a time of excited searching for the right conceptual tools and methods to investigate the relations between these two spheres. The appearance of the above-mentioned books reflects a period of assessment, consolidation, and institutionalization of these concepts and practices. Each of the books attempts to describe the regularities that can be found in the ways that the two domains interact, and tries to state the principles that must underlie the regularities. The authors, and the approaches which they represent, differ in their views of explanation, their means of getting at the regularities, and their characterization of data. We

find it useful to locate these works in relation to three broad schools or approaches, which we sketch as prototypes with, we admit, highly reducive names: the Philosophers, the Data Gatherers, and the close Readers. The Data Gatherers are united in opposing the Philosophers' indifference to "real" data; but, otherwise, they split rather sharply into three groups according to their preferences on how to get useful data. The Close Readers are willing to sacrifice the obvious generality claimed by the Data Gatherers in order to conduct an intensive microanalysis, either to focus on a particular phenomenon or to carry out a many-leveled analysis. 166. "The Collected Writings" contains a wide range of publications by Korzybski: formal academic papers (fifteen), "comments" or forewords to work by others (twelve), complete letters and excerpts, transcripts, mimeographs, book reviews, memoranda, editorials and even an obituary and one patent application. The remaining twenty-five percent of the book consists of material not authored by Korzybski: nine complete articles for which he wrote review articles for or made comments on, programs for congresses of 1935, 1941 and 1949, a context-setting overview of the formative influences on Korzybski by A.W. Read, a biographical sketch by C. Schuchardt (Read) , scientific opinions and other comments on the first and second editions of "Science and Sanity", and an enlightening selection of items relevant to the founding and subsequent development of the Institute and the International Society. 167. Yet on the face of it, it is not necessary to believe that knowledge of nature must turn out to be organizable in a philosophically satisfactory way. From a suitable distance, we cannot soundly claim that the historic development of science has proved nature to be understandable in a unique way. What had happened is that the ground of the unknown has continually been shifted, the allegory has continually changed. David Hume expressed this in 1773: "While Newton seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he showed at the same time the imperfections of this mechanical philosophy, and thereby restored her ultimate secrets to that obscurity in which they ever did and ever will remain". In the empirical sciences, we are far from being able to prove that we have been approaching an increasing understanding of the type that characterized the development of, say, some branches of mathematics.

Our interests and tools change, but not in a linear, inevitable way. For example, the historic development from organismic science to a mechanistic and then to the mathematical style could have taken place in the opposite direction. And the ontological status of scientific knowledge itself has been turned completely upside down since the beginning of the twentieth century. The experimental detail is now not simply the token of a real world; on the contrary,

to some scientists and philosophers it is all that we can be more or less sure about at the moment. Karl Popper summarized this view in these words: “I think that we shall have to get accustomed to the idea that we must not look upon science as a "body of knowledge", but rather as a system of hypotheses; that is to say, as a system of guesses and anticipations which in principle cannot be justified, but with which we work as long as they stand up to tests, and of which we are never justified in saying that we know that they are "true" or "more or less certain" or even "probable".

Our justification for these hypotheses is that they have a hold on our imagination and that they help us to deal with our experience. On this basis, all the scientist needs to say, if anyone should ask what he or she is doing, is: hypotheses fingo. This — a new methodological thema reinforced by the scientific advances of the first two decades of our century — was precisely what Lodge, Larmor, Poincare and so many others could not accept. Poincare, who was perhaps technically the best-prepared scientist in the world to understand Einstein's relativity theory of 1905, did not deign to refer to it once in his large published output up to his death in 1912. This silence was not mere negligence; Poincare, despite his silence, had understood a consequence of the new physics only too well. The Data Gatherers in order to conduct an intensive micro-analysis to focus on a particular phenomenon.

Покажчик способів перекладу англійських слів різних частин мови

(цифрою позначено сторінку)

Іменник 93, 94, 97, 116, 164, 188, 229, 243, 249 Прикметник 45, 181, 183, 184, 187, 207, 250

Дієслово особові форми 23, 28, 30, 33, 37, 259, 264, 267, 271

неособові форми інфінітив 49, 53, 60, 63, 90, 99, 114, 127, 136, 138, 191, 224, 229

герундій 45, 88, 119, 151, 198, 226

дієприкметник I 41, 157, 201

дієприкметник II 43, 119, 147, 162, 166, 203, 207

модальні дієслова 34, 49, 53, 60, 63, 78 Займенник 78, 87, 98, 109, 111, 113, 208, 252, 254, 257

Прислівник 125, 134 Числівник 221, 254

Сполучник і сполучне слово 72, 105, 122, 149, 170, 173, 210, 220, 235, 257

Прийменник 35, 91, 102, 118, 137, 196 Детермінант речення 125, 130 Неозначений артикль 177 Означений артикль 86, 179

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