- •ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
- •INTRODUCTION
- •1. The evolution of money laundering and AML/CFT measures
- •1.1. A brief history of money laundering
- •1.2. The first stage of ML evolution: Al Capone tax evasion charges
- •1.3. The subsequent stages of ML evolution: better hiding techniques
- •1.4. The appearance of “money laundering” expression in the legal context
- •1.5. Further development of the international AML/CFT standards
- •2. An overview of money laundering and AML regime goals
- •2.1. Basic concept of money laundering
- •2.2. Predicate offences: the scope and methods of AML/CFT description
- •2.3. Definition of money laundering in the narrow sense
- •2.4. Definition of money laundering in the broad sense
- •2.5. Anti-money laundering measures of combating organized crime
- •2.6. The process of money laundering and modeling of its phases
- •3. Applying a risk-based approach to a model AML/CFT regime
- •3.1. Key institutions of a national AML/CFT regime
- •3.2. Methodology bases of a risk-based approach and national AML/CFT coordination
- •3.3. Financial institutions: definition for AML/CFT purposes through activities and operations related to managing clients’ assets
- •3.4. Definition of financial institutions for AML/CFT purposes through activities and operations other then managing clients’ assets
- •3.5. AML/CFT definition of designated non-financial businesses and professions
- •3.6. AML/CFT risk-assessment obligations and decisions for countries
- •4. Legal requirements for a national AML/CFT regime
- •4.1. An extension of liability for money laundering to the predicate offence perpetrator: the adverse implications for the economy
- •4.2. Dual criminality for money laundering offences committed internationally
- •4.3. “State of mind” connected with a money laundering offence
- •4.4. Confiscation and provisional measures related to AML/CFT
- •4.5. Non-conviction based confiscation and corporate liability for money laundering
- •5. Explanations of terrorism and the financing of terrorism
- •5.1. Social and economic origins of terrorism
- •5.2. Basic concept of terrorist financing
- •5.3. Legal definition of terrorism and terrorist financing
- •5.4. Characteristics of the terrorist financing offence and legal capacity to prosecute persons that finance terrorism
- •5.5. Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism, terrorist financing and proliferation
- •6. Institutional bases of the international AML/CFT framework
- •6.1. The United Nations bodies of the international AML/CFT framework
- •6.2. The United Nations organizations of the international AML/CFT framework
- •6.3. Main functions of the Financial Action Taskforce
- •6.4. The Financial Action Task Force associate members and observers
- •6.5. The Egmont Group of financial intelligence units and international AML/CFT standard setters in banking, securities and insurance sectors
- •6.6. The Wolfsberg Group of banks and its AML/CFT documents
- •7. Customer due diligence measures undertaken by financial institutions
- •7.1. General requirements for AML/CFT programs of financial institutions and groups of financial institutions
- •7.2. Methodology approach to customer due diligence
- •7.3. Additional features of customer due diligence
- •7.4. Customer due diligence measures for legal persons and their arrangements
- •7.5. Actions of financial institutions in case of inability to comply with customer due diligence requirements
- •7.6. AML/CFT-related record-keeping requirements for financial institutions
- •8. Risk-based approach pursued by financial institutions in customer due diligence
- •8.1. Reliance on customer due diligence information received from third parties
- •8.2. Potentially higher-risk situations for enhanced customer due diligence measures
- •8.3. Lower-risk situations for simplified customer due diligence measures
- •8.4. Enhanced customer due diligence measures
- •8.5. Simplified customer due diligence measures
- •9. Additional AML/CFT measures for specific activities of financial institutions
- •9.1. AML/CFT requirements for cross-border correspondent banking relationships
- •9.2. Definition of wire transfers and activities of involved parties
- •9.3. The scope of applying AML/CFT measures to wire transfers
- •9.4. AML/CFT measures of information gathering related to wire transfers
- •9.6. AML/CFT obligations for persons that provide money or value transfer services
- •10. Additional AML/CFT measures for specific customers, entities and professions
- •10.1. Definition of politically exposed persons and the scope of applying AML/CFT measures
- •10.2. Additional AML/CFT measures for politically exposed persons
- •10.3. AML/CFT requirements for financial institutions with foreign operations
- •10.4. Customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements for designated non-financial businesses and professions
- •10.5. Other AML/CFT requirements for designated non-financial businesses and professions
- •11. Competent authorities of a national AML/CFT system
- •11.1. General requirements for government agencies with an AML/CFT function
- •11.2. Approaches to AML/CFT-related regulation and supervision
- •11.3. Financial intelligence unit and its core functions
- •11.4. AML/CFT responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities
- •11.5. Detecting and countering activities of cash couriers for the AML/CFT purposes
- •12. Additional requirements for a national AML/CFT regime and issues of international cooperation
- •12.1. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and their arrangements
- •12.2. Prevention of using non-profit organizations for the purpose of terrorist financing
- •12.3. General principles of AML/CFT mutual legal assistance
- •12.4. Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation of assets related to money laundering and terrorist financing
- •12.5. Extradition in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing
- •12.6. International exchange of information between government agencies with an AML/CFT function
11.3. Financial intelligence unit and its core functions
The FIU is a national center that serves the following main functions (R. 29)
Applicable to the administrative FIU model
1.Receipt
2.Analysis

(a) Suspicious transactions reports
(b)Other relevant information on ML/FT and associated predicate offences
(c)Additional information from reporting entities requested by the FIU
(d)Financial, administrative and law enforcement information from the widest range of public sources or collected and
maintained by authorities
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However, the software |
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The FIU should add value to the |
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information and should be en- |
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cannot fully replace hu- |
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couraged to use advanced analyt- |
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man judgment |
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ical software |
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Strategic analysis: to identify |
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money laundering and terrorist |
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Operational analysis: to follow |
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financing patterns and trends in |
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the trail of transactions and to link |
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order to determine relevant |
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specific persons identified with |
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threats and to eliminate vulnera- |
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predicate offences, money laun- |
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bilities by establishing policies |
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dering activities, or terrorist fi- |
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and goals for bodies within the |
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nancing |
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AML/CFT regime |
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Information sharing with foreign FIUs |
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3. Dissemination |
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Dissemination upon request: |
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the FIU responds to information |
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requests from competent authori- |
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Spontaneous dissemination: the FIU |
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ties and the decision on conduct- |
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disseminates selected information to |
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ing dissemination remains with |
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competent authorities when there are |
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the FIU |
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grounds to suspect predicate offences, |
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money laundering or terrorist financing |
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89 |
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11.4. AML/CFT responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities
Designated law enforcement and investigative authorities (R. 30)
Should have responsibility for
Within the national
AML/CFT framework
Money laundering and terrorist financing investigations
Traditional criminal investigations into money laundering, terrorist financing and/or predicate offences
Financial investigations – inquiries into the financial affairs of related criminal activity
At least in cases related to major proceedsgenerating offences
A pro-active parallel financial investigation should be developed by these authorities
Tracing the proceeds of crime, terrorist funds or any other assets subject to confiscation
Identifying the extent |
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Developing evidence which can |
of criminality |
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be used in criminal proceedings |
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90 |
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11.5. Detecting and countering activities of cash couriers for the AML/CFT purposes
Legal authority of the law en- |
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If the movement of cash is related |
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forcement to stop and restrain such |
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to ML, TF or predicate offences |
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transportation |
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Measures to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency (or bearer negotiable instruments – BNIs), R. 32
Applicable to both incoming |
The information obtained should |
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and outgoing transportation |
be made available to the FIU |
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Precious metals and precious |
Competent authorities should be |
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able to stop or restrain cash and |
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stones are not included, their |
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BNIs where there is a false decla- |
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movement is otherwise covered |
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ration/disclosure or a suspicion of |
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under customs regulations |
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ML/FT |
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Declaration system with a maximum thresh- |
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Disclosure system |
old of USD/EUR 15,000 |
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(a) Written declaration system for all travelers requires
the completion of a declaration, ticking a “yes”/ “no” box if they carry currency or BNIs above the threshold
(b) Written declaration system for travelers carrying the amounts above the threshold requires only such persons to complete a declaration
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There is no requirement for travelers |
(c) Oral declaration system for all |
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to make an upfront written or oral |
travelers requires them to choose be- |
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declaration, they are only required to |
tween the “red channel” and the |
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give a truthful answer to competent |
“green channel” |
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authorities upon request |
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91 |
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