- •ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
- •INTRODUCTION
- •1. The evolution of money laundering and AML/CFT measures
- •1.1. A brief history of money laundering
- •1.2. The first stage of ML evolution: Al Capone tax evasion charges
- •1.3. The subsequent stages of ML evolution: better hiding techniques
- •1.4. The appearance of “money laundering” expression in the legal context
- •1.5. Further development of the international AML/CFT standards
- •2. An overview of money laundering and AML regime goals
- •2.1. Basic concept of money laundering
- •2.2. Predicate offences: the scope and methods of AML/CFT description
- •2.3. Definition of money laundering in the narrow sense
- •2.4. Definition of money laundering in the broad sense
- •2.5. Anti-money laundering measures of combating organized crime
- •2.6. The process of money laundering and modeling of its phases
- •3. Applying a risk-based approach to a model AML/CFT regime
- •3.1. Key institutions of a national AML/CFT regime
- •3.2. Methodology bases of a risk-based approach and national AML/CFT coordination
- •3.3. Financial institutions: definition for AML/CFT purposes through activities and operations related to managing clients’ assets
- •3.4. Definition of financial institutions for AML/CFT purposes through activities and operations other then managing clients’ assets
- •3.5. AML/CFT definition of designated non-financial businesses and professions
- •3.6. AML/CFT risk-assessment obligations and decisions for countries
- •4. Legal requirements for a national AML/CFT regime
- •4.1. An extension of liability for money laundering to the predicate offence perpetrator: the adverse implications for the economy
- •4.2. Dual criminality for money laundering offences committed internationally
- •4.3. “State of mind” connected with a money laundering offence
- •4.4. Confiscation and provisional measures related to AML/CFT
- •4.5. Non-conviction based confiscation and corporate liability for money laundering
- •5. Explanations of terrorism and the financing of terrorism
- •5.1. Social and economic origins of terrorism
- •5.2. Basic concept of terrorist financing
- •5.3. Legal definition of terrorism and terrorist financing
- •5.4. Characteristics of the terrorist financing offence and legal capacity to prosecute persons that finance terrorism
- •5.5. Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism, terrorist financing and proliferation
- •6. Institutional bases of the international AML/CFT framework
- •6.1. The United Nations bodies of the international AML/CFT framework
- •6.2. The United Nations organizations of the international AML/CFT framework
- •6.3. Main functions of the Financial Action Taskforce
- •6.4. The Financial Action Task Force associate members and observers
- •6.5. The Egmont Group of financial intelligence units and international AML/CFT standard setters in banking, securities and insurance sectors
- •6.6. The Wolfsberg Group of banks and its AML/CFT documents
- •7. Customer due diligence measures undertaken by financial institutions
- •7.1. General requirements for AML/CFT programs of financial institutions and groups of financial institutions
- •7.2. Methodology approach to customer due diligence
- •7.3. Additional features of customer due diligence
- •7.4. Customer due diligence measures for legal persons and their arrangements
- •7.5. Actions of financial institutions in case of inability to comply with customer due diligence requirements
- •7.6. AML/CFT-related record-keeping requirements for financial institutions
- •8. Risk-based approach pursued by financial institutions in customer due diligence
- •8.1. Reliance on customer due diligence information received from third parties
- •8.2. Potentially higher-risk situations for enhanced customer due diligence measures
- •8.3. Lower-risk situations for simplified customer due diligence measures
- •8.4. Enhanced customer due diligence measures
- •8.5. Simplified customer due diligence measures
- •9. Additional AML/CFT measures for specific activities of financial institutions
- •9.1. AML/CFT requirements for cross-border correspondent banking relationships
- •9.2. Definition of wire transfers and activities of involved parties
- •9.3. The scope of applying AML/CFT measures to wire transfers
- •9.4. AML/CFT measures of information gathering related to wire transfers
- •9.6. AML/CFT obligations for persons that provide money or value transfer services
- •10. Additional AML/CFT measures for specific customers, entities and professions
- •10.1. Definition of politically exposed persons and the scope of applying AML/CFT measures
- •10.2. Additional AML/CFT measures for politically exposed persons
- •10.3. AML/CFT requirements for financial institutions with foreign operations
- •10.4. Customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements for designated non-financial businesses and professions
- •10.5. Other AML/CFT requirements for designated non-financial businesses and professions
- •11. Competent authorities of a national AML/CFT system
- •11.1. General requirements for government agencies with an AML/CFT function
- •11.2. Approaches to AML/CFT-related regulation and supervision
- •11.3. Financial intelligence unit and its core functions
- •11.4. AML/CFT responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities
- •11.5. Detecting and countering activities of cash couriers for the AML/CFT purposes
- •12. Additional requirements for a national AML/CFT regime and issues of international cooperation
- •12.1. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and their arrangements
- •12.2. Prevention of using non-profit organizations for the purpose of terrorist financing
- •12.3. General principles of AML/CFT mutual legal assistance
- •12.4. Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation of assets related to money laundering and terrorist financing
- •12.5. Extradition in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing
- •12.6. International exchange of information between government agencies with an AML/CFT function
6.3. Main functions of the Financial Action Taskforce
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The FATF secretariat is |
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The presidency is |
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The Group of Eight (G8) |
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housed at The Organiza- |
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a one-year posi- |
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was originated in1975. |
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tion for Economic Co- |
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tion held by a |
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Currently it is a forum for |
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operation and Develop- |
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senior official |
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the governments of the |
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ment (OECD) headquar- |
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from a FATF ju- |
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world’s largest economies: |
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ters in Paris |
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risdiction |
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Canada, France, Germany, |
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Italy, Japan, Russia, the |
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U.K. and the U.S. |
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The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) |
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Operating under a finite lifespan; the current |
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The FATF was estab- |
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mandate will expire in December 2020 |
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lished by the 1989 G7 |
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summit held in Paris |
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Main activities |
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Standard setting |
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Officials from member coun- |
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tries discuss AML/CFT issues |
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Ensuring effective compliance with |
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the standards (mutual evaluations) |
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Research of money laun- |
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dering and terrorist financ- |
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Identifying current money laundering and |
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ing methods and trends, re- |
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terrorist financing threats |
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lease of typologies reports |
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Identification of high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions
The FATF members (regional organizations are underlined)
1. |
Argentina |
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13. |
Greece |
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25. |
Norway |
2. |
Australia |
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14. |
Gulf Co-operation Council |
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26. |
Portugal |
3. |
Austria |
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15. |
Hong Kong, China |
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27. |
Republic of Korea |
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Belgium |
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16. |
Iceland |
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28. |
Russian Federa- |
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Brazil |
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17. |
India |
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tion |
6. |
Canada |
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18. |
Ireland |
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29. |
Singapore |
7. |
China |
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19. |
Italy |
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30. |
South Africa |
8. |
Denmark |
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20. |
Japan |
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31. |
Spain |
9. |
European |
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21. |
Kingdom of the Nether- |
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32. |
Sweden |
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Commission |
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lands |
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33. |
Switzerland |
10. |
Finland |
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22. |
Luxembourg |
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34. |
Turkey |
11. |
France |
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23. |
Mexico |
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35. |
United Kingdom |
12. |
Germany |
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24. |
New Zealand |
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36. |
United States |
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51 |
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6.4. The Financial Action Task Force associate members and observers
FATF-style regional bodies |
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The following FATF |
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(FSRBs) are engaged in activities |
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observers have, among |
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similar to ones of FATF; it pro- |
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FATF |
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other functions, a spe- |
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vides for better inclusion of re- |
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cific AML/CFT mis- |
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gional distinctive features |
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sion or function |
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1.Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-
Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL)
2.Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)
3.Eurasian Group (EAG)
4.Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF)
5.Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD)
6.Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)
7.Groupe d’Action Contre le Blanchiment d’Argent en Afrique Centrale (GABAC)
8.Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)
1.United Nations: UNODC, UNCTC, The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions
Committee (1267 Committee), World Bank, IMF
2.Egmont Group of FIUs, Anti-Money Laundering Liaison Committee of the Franc Zone (CLAB)
3.Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)
4.Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Group of International Finance Centre Supervisors (GIFCS)
5.Interpol, World Customs Organization (WCO), Europol, Eurojust
6.European Central Bank (ECB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
7.Organization of American States: Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE) and Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD); Commonwealth Secretariat
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6.5. The Egmont Group of financial intelligence units and international AML/CFT standard setters in banking, securities and insurance sectors
The Egmont Group of FIUs |
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Established in 1995, now is com- |
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prised of over 130 member FIUs |
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• runs Egmont Secure Web (ESW) that |
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Allows member FIUs to |
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facilitates communications among FIUs |
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cooperate in the areas |
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• offers training and personnel exchanges |
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of information ex- |
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• promotes establishment of FIUs in de- |
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change, sharing exper- |
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veloping countries |
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tise and training |
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The Basel Committee on |
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Established in 1974 to improve the qual- |
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Banking Supervision (BCBS) |
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ity of banking supervision worldwide |
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It has released the following documents:
•Statement on prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of money laundering, 1988
•Core principles for effective banking supervision (when first released in
1997 Principle 15 dealt with money laundering, including “know your customer” rules; it became Principle 18 in the 2006 edition and Principle 29 in the latest draft edition)
•Customer due diligence for banks, 2001
•Due diligence and transparency regarding cover payment messages related to cross-border wire transfers, 2009
The International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
The International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)
Established in 1983; with regard to
AML/CFT it has passed several
guidelines for securities traders, including the guidance for collective
investment schemes, 2005
Established in 1994; it has issued guidance papers on money laundering prevention in the insurance sector and a relevant typology report
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6.6. The Wolfsberg Group of banks and its AML/CFT documents
The Wolfsberg Group
Over twenty standards and statements have been released, including the following:
Anti-money laundering principles for pri- vate banking (published in 2000, revised in 2002 and 2012)
Anti-money laundering principles for cor- respondent banking (2002)
Guidance on a risk-based approach for managing money laundering risks (2006)
Anti-money laundering guidance for mu- tual funds and other pooled investment vehicles (2006)
Anti-corruption guidance (2011, the pre- decessor paper was released in 2007)
Trade finance principles (2011)
Series “frequently asked questions” on politically exposed persons, beneficial ownership, intermediaries, correspondent banking, etc.
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It is an association of eleven global private banks that came together in 2000 to develop AML/CFT industry standards
Consist of twelve principles that cover issues of client ac- ceptance, updating client files, identifying unusual activity, ongoing monitoring, reporting, staff training, etc.
Consists of fourteen principles; some of them are devoted to different levels of enhancement in due diligence and application of the risk-based approach to this procedure.
It identifies some of the measures financial institutions may consider in order to prevent corruption in their own operations and to protect themselves against the misuse of their operations in relation to corruption.