Добавил:
Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз: Предмет: Файл:
UBS EM Outlook 2019_watermark.pdf
Скачиваний:
3
Добавлен:
06.09.2019
Размер:
1.56 Mб
Скачать

vk.com/id446425943

Box 10: Why is EM growth not benefitting from stronger US growth?

Why has EM suffered so much from a higher cost of capital driven by a tighter Fed but not been able to benefit from the strong US growth? This is because the nature of US capex has been changing. It has been much more focussed on intellectual property and shale gas & oil (Figure 130). These sectors, which constitute 58% of capex growth in the last 12 months (Figure 131), do not help EM. In order for EM manufacturers to benefit more amidst a loss of growth momentum in the commodity producers, US capex must broaden out more. US transport and equipment spending was stronger this year, compared to 2015, but not considerably so.

Our broader point, which has underpinned our views about FX being the weakest link and mediocre income statements in EM, is that we are getting less trade growth per unit of global growth. Defined in this way, globalisation has been slowing for more than a decade now, independent of the imposition of tariffs, which could well make things worse. Even for an economy like the US, where import growth has been considerably stronger than Europe in absolute terms, import growth has slowed relative to growth in domestic demand (See Figure 132 and Figure 133). Again, this is because a lot of the type of spending in the US is in services (intellectual property) or in the energy sector, neither of which make big demands for imports.

A higher share of services in consumption and investment is not just a US phenomenon. The same is happening in China, and its import intensity of output will therefore also fall. This is reflected in the valuation gap between service sector equities in EM (healthcare, internet companies, consumer discretionary) relative to goods sector equities (industrials, materials, or hardware). The former still look expensive, but are getting cheaper. For us, they constitute the long-term EM investment.

Figure 130: Breakdown of US capex (USD bn)

 

Figure 131: US capex growth

 

 

 

 

3500

 

 

 

 

 

 

Structures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Information processing eqpt

3000

 

 

 

 

 

 

Industrial eqpt

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Transportation eqpt

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IP Products

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Residential

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

500

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dec-07

 

 

 

 

Dec-09

 

Dec-11

 

 

 

 

 

Dec-13

 

 

 

 

 

Dec-15

 

 

 

 

 

Dec-17

15

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US non-residential investment

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

growth ex shale oil/gas and IP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-10

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US non-residential investment

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

growth

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-15

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-20

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Source: Haver, UBS

 

Source: Haver, UBS

 

 

 

Figure 132: US real imports ex oil to GDP (pre-crisis)

20%

Non-oil

 

 

imports (%,

15%

y/y)

 

10%

 

5%

 

 

y = 3.2398x - 0.0319

0%

R² = 0.5755

 

-5%

 

 

Domestic demand (%, y/y)

-10%

 

-1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%

Source: Haver, UBS

Figure 133: US real imports ex oil to GDP (post-crisis)

20% Non-oil imports (%,

y/y)

15%

y = 0.9891x + 0.0257 R² = 0.0698

10%

5%

0%

-5%

Domestic demand (%, y/y)

-10%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

Source: Haver, UBS Note: Data is since 2011

Bhanu Baweja

Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018

64

vk.com/id446425943

In real (inflation adjusted) terms, the bond yield spread against G2 rates has increased, and sits at a comfortable level, precisely because EM inflation remains well contained and bond carry increased after local debt curves steepened in 2018 (Figure 134). However, an increase in real rates in Europe and higher domestic inflation, as pass-through from this year’s currency depreciation takes a toll on prices, could require a more forceful response from EM central banks.

Figure 134: In real terms EM (Ex Turkey) rates spread to G2 remains high

3.8

 

EM spread to G2 (ex Turkey)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Latest: 96%ile

3.3

 

EM (ex turkey, GBI-weighted)

 

 

 

 

 

2.8

 

G2 real yields

 

 

Latest: 91%ile

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

Latest: 83%ile

0.3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(0.2)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(0.7)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Jan-11

Jan-12

Jan-13

Jan-14

Jan-15

Jan-16

Jan-17

Jan-18

Source: Haver, Bloomberg, UBS estimates. Note: Real rate based on 36-month exponential headline Inflation.

…but in real terms the spread to G2 rates is back at the early 2018 level

We find few currencies to be cheap enough to withstand further pressure.

Our Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) valuation metric (Figure 135) shows a reasonable spread between undervalued and overvalued currencies. This suggests that at least some currencies have a degree of valuation cushion. However, we advise against resting too heavily on this assumption. Several of the most undervalued currencies have large current account surpluses because the currencies are deliberately kept cheap, e.g. SGD, TWD and KRW; yet all three of these currencies showed notable sensitivity to CNY weakness in the middle of 2018, indicating that cheapness did not provide much cover. Even though ARS depreciation in 2018 is set to halve the current account deficit in 2019, expectations of high inflation (around 40% in 2019) imply that in nominal terms the exchange rate will continue depreciating during the year just to impede unwanted real exchange rate appreciation.

Our biggest concern is that most EM currencies are fairly valued or rich. Therefore, in times of heightened stress, we believe valuation will provide limited, if any, protection. In addition, as DM central banks continue tightening monetary conditions, the recently observed levels of capital inflows into EM economies might overstate the sustainable current account balance. An increase in DM real rates would decrease the sustainable level of capital inflows, worsening the FEER metric towards less undervaluation.

Our FEER shows a majority of EM currencies as undervalued…

…but tighter DM financial conditions could imply lower capital inflows skewing FEER metrics to less undervaluation

Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018

65

vk.com/id446425943

Figure 135: FEER metrics show relative over/undervaluation across EMFX

20%

15 UNDERVALUED

10

5

0

-5

-10

OVERVALUED

-15

ILS

RUB

ARS

Source: Haver, PIIE,

SGD

TWD

KRW

BRL

PEN

CZK

HUF

PLN

THB

MXN

MYR

CLP

RON

CNY

INR

TRY

PHP

IDR

COP

ZAR

UBS estimates

The CNY will remain a source of volatility

Slower growth, policy easing and a deteriorating current account all point in the direction of more weakness in the CNY. We expect a further ~6% depreciation against the USD to 7.30. If 25% tariffs are imposed on ‘all’ Chinese exports to the US, the CNY will weaken more.

Assessing the sensitivity of USD/EMFX to USD/CNY while controlling for risk (using the MSCI World index) and oil prices, and using a smaller sample by including only periods in which USD/CNY trended higher for more than a 12-week period, we find that commodity exporters and deficit countries are the most exposed (Figure 136). Malaysia and Indonesia are the most exposed in Asia.

We expect the renminbi TWI to depreciate in 2019 as Chinese growth slows

Commodity exporters and deficit countries are the most exposed to CNY weakening

Figure 136: Impact of 1% depreciation in USD/CNY on

Figure 137: EMFX sensitivity to Chinese IP

EMFX

 

-1.0

 

 

 

Period of renminbi depreciation

1.8

Beta

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Infrastructure

 

FAI

Industrial production

 

 

(%)

 

Strong

 

1.6

 

 

 

 

 

 

-0.5

 

 

Full sample

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0.0

 

 

 

 

 

1.2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0.5

 

 

 

 

 

1.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.0

 

 

 

 

 

0.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1.5

 

 

 

Weak

 

0.6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0.2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Turkey Chile

AfricaSouth

Russia Colombia Indonesia Argentina Korea

Singapore Australia India Taiwan Malaysia Thailand Canada Mexico UK Brazil Japan Norway

HongKong Poland Eurozone Sweden US

AUD

CAD

CLP

CNY

COP

IDR

KRW

MXN

MYR

NZD

PHP

THB

TRY

TWD

ZAR

0.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Bloomberg, UBS estimates

 

 

Source: Bloomberg, Haver, UBS estimates Note: betas from regressions using q/q

 

 

 

 

 

 

% momentum since the beginning of 2010. The chart includes only betas that

 

 

 

 

 

 

were found to be significant with a reasonable R-square.

 

 

 

 

 

The sensitivity of EMFX to CNY is similar to the sensitivities we find to Chinese activity (Which assets will benefit from Chinese infrastructure investment?). Specifically, we examined the sensitivity of EMFX to Chinese infrastructure investment, overall FAI and IP, while controlling for risk sentiment and the global cycle using MSCI World, 2-yr US yields and the DM manufacturing PMI. Again we find the commodity currencies and small open economy currencies to be the most sensitive to Chinese activity, as Figure 137 shows.

Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018

66

vk.com/id446425943

Main risks to our views

The biggest risk to our view is that even the small rise in US rates that we expect through 2019 continues to widen the cracks in EMFX, and the asset class is 1) weaker than we expect; and 2) high yielders do not outperform growth-sensitive currencies as a result. It will be a bigger challenge for EM if US rates rise more and/or for longer than we forecast.

ECB policy normalisation could be a double-edged sword for EM. Our baseline view is that as the ECB normalises, the EUR will erode its current undervaluation and, as it does, it will support EMFX vs the USD. In short, USD/EMFX has a high beta to EUR/USD, therefore if the EUR appreciates so will USD/EMFX, although likely with a lag. However, if the ECB does not hike confidently – for instance if growth disappoints or inflation is slow to pick up – the performance of EMFX would be at risk. In contrast, if the Eurozone recovery is stronger than expected, the ECB could normalises policy confidently, perhaps more quickly than we expect. This would put more upward pressure on Bund yields, driving lower EMFX if it causes European investors to curtail their appetite for EM assets.

A more positive risk for EMFX is a reduction in US-China trade tensions. Media headlines, at least, suggest that there is scope for a rapprochement around the Trump-Xi meeting scheduled to take place on the side-lines of the G20 meeting later this month. History tells us that it is foolish to try and predict what will happen next in the US-China trade spat, but some easing of pressures would be a positive for EMFX, as the recent price action around the trade headlines indicates.

Another positive risk is the possibility of more China stimulus, which is more likely if data remains broadly weak. However, more policy support to take away the tail risks to growth at least, would help EM assets, and indications of a pickup in growth, more so.

Our FX scorecard (Figure 138), which employs valuation, flows, carry and macro variables to rank EM currencies, screen high-carry and strong external balance currencies, RUB, MXN and BRL, as the most attractive among EMFX. Interestingly, ARS, which screens as undervalued and has high nominal carry, is weighed down in the scorecard by a weak macro backdrop. CNY, PHP and HUF screen as the least attractive currencies in the scorecard.

Higher US rates could still hit vulnerable EM currencies

Too timid or strong growth in Europe also poses a risk to EMFX

A decrease in US-China trade tensions would decrease EM expected growth deceleration

Forceful stimulus in China would boost EM asset prices

Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018

67

vk.com/id446425943

Figure 138: FX Scorecard

 

Valuation

 

Flows

 

Carry

 

Macro

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aggregate

 

 

UBS FEER

Real effective

Trade

Non-oil/gas

PI liabilities, %

 

 

Change in G3

Industrial

UBS Macro

 

 

 

 

score

 

 

exchange rate,

Trade

FDI/GDP

12m FX carry vs.

and Chinese

Production Z-

 

 

estimates, %

balance/GDP

GDP, 12m

Balance Sheet

 

 

 

percentile of 15y

balance/GDP

Z-score (5y)

USD

import shares

score (last three

 

 

 

undervaluation

Z-score (5y)

rolling

Risk Index

 

 

 

 

range

 

Z-score (5y)

 

 

 

from 5y avg

years)

 

 

 

Weights

20%

5%

10%

5%

5%

5%

25%

10%

10%

5%

 

 

Russia

16%

22%

1.5

1.0

-0.4%

-0.5

4.6%

-0.1%

0.3

5.8

6.8

More

Mexico

1%

14%

-0.7

1.7

2.2%

0.0

6.1%

0.1%

1.8

9.6

8.0

Attractive

Brazil

7%

19%

0.9

0.6

0.2%

0.0

3.0%

0.0%

0.7

11.2

8.7

 

Taiwan

14%

62%

0.4

-0.2

-2.3%

2.5

-3.2%

0.1%

0.9

7.4

9.4

 

Singapore

14%

60%

-0.3

-0.7

1.0%

-0.2

-1.1%

0.1%

-0.4

3.1

10.6

 

Poland

3%

20%

-1.0

-1.0

-0.1%

0.6

-1.1%

0.2%

0.5

8.2

10.7

 

Turkey

-5%

1%

0.0

0.3

0.7%

-0.7

20.8%

0.1%

-0.9

13.4

10.7

 

Malaysia

1%

13%

0.3

1.6

-1.6%

1.3

0.6%

0.0%

-1.0

9.2

11.4

 

India

-4%

68%

-0.4

-1.2

0.0%

-0.8

3.6%

0.0%

0.9

10.1

11.6

 

Argentina

14%

41%

-2.1

-2.5

5.6%

-0.8

48.2%

0.0%

-1.4

12.3

11.7

 

S Africa

-14%

15%

1.2

1.0

5.9%

0.2

4.5%

0.0%

0.9

11.6

11.8

 

Chile

0%

23%

0.7

0.2

2.6%

0.1

-0.1%

0.0%

-0.6

8.2

12.4

 

Colombia

-8%

11%

0.5

1.1

1.3%

1.3

1.6%

-0.1%

0.4

10.6

12.4

 

Thailand

3%

98%

0.0

-0.9

-0.1%

-0.9

-1.0%

0.0%

0.0

7.3

12.5

 

Israel

18%

93%

-2.7

-2.7

0.0%

1.7

-3.1%

0.0%

1.6

6.6

12.6

 

Czech R

4%

64%

-2.6

-1.6

-2.6%

0.3

-1.7%

0.1%

-0.3

6.0

12.8

 

Korea

8%

75%

-0.4

-1.3

0.8%

1.6

-1.6%

0.0%

-0.2

8.2

12.8

 

Hungary

3%

13%

-1.1

-2.1

-1.3%

0.1

-2.5%

0.0%

-0.1

8.8

13.0

 

Indonesia

-7%

4%

-1.3

-1.6

0.6%

-0.6

5.9%

0.0%

-1.1

8.9

13.1

 

Romania

-1%

33%

-1.6

-1.6

1.4%

1.1

0.6%

0.1%

-0.2

8.9

13.4

 

Philippines

-5%

65%

-1.9

-1.7

0.2%

1.5

3.1%

0.0%

0.2

9.5

13.5

Less

China

-4%

75%

-1.3

-1.6

1.5%

0.1

0.7%

0.2%

-0.9

11.5

13.7

Attractive

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Haver, Bloomberg and UBS estimates

Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018

68