- •Will 2019 be another difficult year for EM?
- •When will EM equities begin a decent rally; what support is required?
- •Is there a case for local-currency debt over hard-currency debt?
- •Positives to rely on; developments to be warned of
- •Key messages
- •Signposts and triggers for change
- •Pictures that tell the story
- •Overview of EM asset calls
- •EM growth challenges return
- •Late cycle is not kind to EM, but no blow-ups this time
- •Equities: Cheapening as expected, amid tighter liquidity
- •Box 1: What do asset, product and labour markets tell us about the stage of the economic cycle?
- •Box 1: What do asset, product and labour markets tell us about the stage of the economic cycle? (continued)
- •Chinese equities better placed than many in EM
- •Currencies: Better total returns
- •Box 2: How far are we from capitulation in EM equities?
- •Box 3: How can investors overcome EM's weakest link – currencies?
- •Top trades for 2019
- •1. Long China A-shares vs EM ex China, Long USDCNY
- •2. Long MSCI EM Value vs MSCI EM Growth
- •3. Long 10y Indian government bonds vs MSCI India
- •5. Long G3 currencies vs KRW
- •6. Long CZK vs ZAR
- •7. Long 10y Russia OFZ, long RUBCAD
- •8. Long NTN-F 2025, Long BRLCOP
- •9. Receive 2Y Mexico TIIE rates
- •China (too) makes difficult choices now
- •Box 4: Can a more globally accepted CNY help fund a potential deficit in China?
- •Box 5: How sensitive are global assets to a weaker CNY?
- •Box 5: How sensitive are global assets to a weaker CNY? (Continued)
- •Equities: Probing what is cheap and why
- •The 'where and how' of EM being cheap – taking a lens to EM multiples
- •The consensus and reality on earnings
- •Our bottom-up numbers agree with the top-down
- •Understanding the size, sector and country reads
- •Box 6: Can Indian equities find their groove?
- •Can the consumption story recover?
- •Temporary liquidity squeeze or credit shock?
- •Box 6: Can Indian equities find their groove? (continued)
- •Have valuations adjusted enough for a re-examination?
- •Growth or Value?
- •Leading indicators suggest Growth heavyweights, consumer and tech, will remain under pressure for now
- •Box 7: Semiconductors: Where next for the fading 'Memory Supernova'?
- •A different size and nature of stimulus from China
- •Currencies: A shift in pressure points
- •That unravelled fast
- •Box 8: What reforms can we expect from Brazil?
- •Box 9: What is the collateral damage from China's inclusion in global indices?
- •A narrowing growth gap against DM still, but for different reasons
- •Can external balances, carry and valuation help EMFX withstand the relative growth challenges?
- •Box 10: Why is EM growth not benefitting from stronger US growth?
- •We find few currencies to be cheap enough to withstand further pressure.
- •The CNY will remain a source of volatility
- •Main risks to our views
- •Local rates: Buffered by term premia & real rates
- •Another challenging year ahead, but past worst
- •Has value been re-built?
- •Which markets are rich, and which are cheap?
- •Which local rates are sensitive to FX and credit?
- •Box 11: Which EM debt market is most vulnerable to slower portfolio flows?
- •Box 12: What will ECB and BoJ normalisation mean for EM assets?
- •Box 12: What will ECB and BoJ normalisation mean for EM assets? (continued)
- •Monetary policy expectations: what’s mispriced?
- •Curve shapes – where’s the alpha?
- •Box 13: Where is term premium in EM local currency debt?
- •Putting everything together
- •Credit: Help from more realistic risk premia
- •No large step adjustment due in EM credit
- •A modest widening amid weak growth is the base case
- •CNY volatility will mean greater pressure on EM corporates
- •Box 15: Will onshore defaults continue in China?
- •Political calendar
- •Performance of 2018 top trades
- •UBS FX & macroeconomic forecasts
- •Valuation Method and Risk Statement
vk.com/id446425943
Box 10: Why is EM growth not benefitting from stronger US growth?
Why has EM suffered so much from a higher cost of capital driven by a tighter Fed but not been able to benefit from the strong US growth? This is because the nature of US capex has been changing. It has been much more focussed on intellectual property and shale gas & oil (Figure 130). These sectors, which constitute 58% of capex growth in the last 12 months (Figure 131), do not help EM. In order for EM manufacturers to benefit more amidst a loss of growth momentum in the commodity producers, US capex must broaden out more. US transport and equipment spending was stronger this year, compared to 2015, but not considerably so.
Our broader point, which has underpinned our views about FX being the weakest link and mediocre income statements in EM, is that we are getting less trade growth per unit of global growth. Defined in this way, globalisation has been slowing for more than a decade now, independent of the imposition of tariffs, which could well make things worse. Even for an economy like the US, where import growth has been considerably stronger than Europe in absolute terms, import growth has slowed relative to growth in domestic demand (See Figure 132 and Figure 133). Again, this is because a lot of the type of spending in the US is in services (intellectual property) or in the energy sector, neither of which make big demands for imports.
A higher share of services in consumption and investment is not just a US phenomenon. The same is happening in China, and its import intensity of output will therefore also fall. This is reflected in the valuation gap between service sector equities in EM (healthcare, internet companies, consumer discretionary) relative to goods sector equities (industrials, materials, or hardware). The former still look expensive, but are getting cheaper. For us, they constitute the long-term EM investment.
Figure 130: Breakdown of US capex (USD bn) |
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Figure 131: US capex growth |
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3500 |
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Structures |
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Information processing eqpt |
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3000 |
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Industrial eqpt |
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Transportation eqpt |
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IP Products |
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Residential |
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2500 |
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2000 |
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1500 |
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1000 |
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500 |
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0 |
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Dec-07 |
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Dec-09 |
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Dec-11 |
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Dec-13 |
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Dec-15 |
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Dec-17 |
15 |
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10 |
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5 |
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0 |
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-5 |
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US non-residential investment |
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growth ex shale oil/gas and IP |
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-10 |
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growth |
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-15 |
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-20 |
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03 |
04 |
05 |
06 |
07 |
08 |
09 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
14 |
15 |
16 |
17 |
18 |
Source: Haver, UBS |
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Source: Haver, UBS |
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Figure 132: US real imports ex oil to GDP (pre-crisis)
20% |
Non-oil |
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imports (%, |
15% |
y/y) |
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10% |
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5% |
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y = 3.2398x - 0.0319 |
0% |
R² = 0.5755 |
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-5% |
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Domestic demand (%, y/y) |
-10% |
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-1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%
Source: Haver, UBS
Figure 133: US real imports ex oil to GDP (post-crisis)
20% Non-oil imports (%,
y/y)
15%
y = 0.9891x + 0.0257 R² = 0.0698
10%
5%
0%
-5%
Domestic demand (%, y/y)
-10%
0% |
1% |
2% |
3% |
4% |
Source: Haver, UBS Note: Data is since 2011
Bhanu Baweja
Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018 |
64 |
vk.com/id446425943
In real (inflation adjusted) terms, the bond yield spread against G2 rates has increased, and sits at a comfortable level, precisely because EM inflation remains well contained and bond carry increased after local debt curves steepened in 2018 (Figure 134). However, an increase in real rates in Europe and higher domestic inflation, as pass-through from this year’s currency depreciation takes a toll on prices, could require a more forceful response from EM central banks.
Figure 134: In real terms EM (Ex Turkey) rates spread to G2 remains high
3.8 |
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EM spread to G2 (ex Turkey) |
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Latest: 96%ile |
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3.3 |
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EM (ex turkey, GBI-weighted) |
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2.8 |
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G2 real yields |
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Latest: 91%ile |
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2.3 |
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1.8 |
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1.3 |
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0.8 |
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Latest: 83%ile |
0.3 |
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(0.2) |
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(0.7) |
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Jan-11 |
Jan-12 |
Jan-13 |
Jan-14 |
Jan-15 |
Jan-16 |
Jan-17 |
Jan-18 |
Source: Haver, Bloomberg, UBS estimates. Note: Real rate based on 36-month exponential headline Inflation.
…but in real terms the spread to G2 rates is back at the early 2018 level
We find few currencies to be cheap enough to withstand further pressure.
Our Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) valuation metric (Figure 135) shows a reasonable spread between undervalued and overvalued currencies. This suggests that at least some currencies have a degree of valuation cushion. However, we advise against resting too heavily on this assumption. Several of the most undervalued currencies have large current account surpluses because the currencies are deliberately kept cheap, e.g. SGD, TWD and KRW; yet all three of these currencies showed notable sensitivity to CNY weakness in the middle of 2018, indicating that cheapness did not provide much cover. Even though ARS depreciation in 2018 is set to halve the current account deficit in 2019, expectations of high inflation (around 40% in 2019) imply that in nominal terms the exchange rate will continue depreciating during the year just to impede unwanted real exchange rate appreciation.
Our biggest concern is that most EM currencies are fairly valued or rich. Therefore, in times of heightened stress, we believe valuation will provide limited, if any, protection. In addition, as DM central banks continue tightening monetary conditions, the recently observed levels of capital inflows into EM economies might overstate the sustainable current account balance. An increase in DM real rates would decrease the sustainable level of capital inflows, worsening the FEER metric towards less undervaluation.
Our FEER shows a majority of EM currencies as undervalued…
…but tighter DM financial conditions could imply lower capital inflows skewing FEER metrics to less undervaluation
Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018 |
65 |
vk.com/id446425943
Figure 135: FEER metrics show relative over/undervaluation across EMFX
20%
15 UNDERVALUED
10
5
0
-5
-10
OVERVALUED
-15
ILS |
RUB |
ARS |
Source: Haver, PIIE,
SGD |
TWD |
KRW |
BRL |
PEN |
CZK |
HUF |
PLN |
THB |
MXN |
MYR |
CLP |
RON |
CNY |
INR |
TRY |
PHP |
IDR |
COP |
ZAR |
UBS estimates
The CNY will remain a source of volatility
Slower growth, policy easing and a deteriorating current account all point in the direction of more weakness in the CNY. We expect a further ~6% depreciation against the USD to 7.30. If 25% tariffs are imposed on ‘all’ Chinese exports to the US, the CNY will weaken more.
Assessing the sensitivity of USD/EMFX to USD/CNY while controlling for risk (using the MSCI World index) and oil prices, and using a smaller sample by including only periods in which USD/CNY trended higher for more than a 12-week period, we find that commodity exporters and deficit countries are the most exposed (Figure 136). Malaysia and Indonesia are the most exposed in Asia.
We expect the renminbi TWI to depreciate in 2019 as Chinese growth slows
Commodity exporters and deficit countries are the most exposed to CNY weakening
Figure 136: Impact of 1% depreciation in USD/CNY on |
Figure 137: EMFX sensitivity to Chinese IP |
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1.2 |
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2.0 |
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Turkey Chile |
AfricaSouth |
Russia Colombia Indonesia Argentina Korea |
Singapore Australia India Taiwan Malaysia Thailand Canada Mexico UK Brazil Japan Norway |
HongKong Poland Eurozone Sweden US |
AUD |
CAD |
CLP |
CNY |
COP |
IDR |
KRW |
MXN |
MYR |
NZD |
PHP |
THB |
TRY |
TWD |
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Source: Bloomberg, UBS estimates |
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Source: Bloomberg, Haver, UBS estimates Note: betas from regressions using q/q |
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% momentum since the beginning of 2010. The chart includes only betas that |
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were found to be significant with a reasonable R-square. |
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The sensitivity of EMFX to CNY is similar to the sensitivities we find to Chinese activity (Which assets will benefit from Chinese infrastructure investment?). Specifically, we examined the sensitivity of EMFX to Chinese infrastructure investment, overall FAI and IP, while controlling for risk sentiment and the global cycle using MSCI World, 2-yr US yields and the DM manufacturing PMI. Again we find the commodity currencies and small open economy currencies to be the most sensitive to Chinese activity, as Figure 137 shows.
Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018 |
66 |
vk.com/id446425943
Main risks to our views
The biggest risk to our view is that even the small rise in US rates that we expect through 2019 continues to widen the cracks in EMFX, and the asset class is 1) weaker than we expect; and 2) high yielders do not outperform growth-sensitive currencies as a result. It will be a bigger challenge for EM if US rates rise more and/or for longer than we forecast.
ECB policy normalisation could be a double-edged sword for EM. Our baseline view is that as the ECB normalises, the EUR will erode its current undervaluation and, as it does, it will support EMFX vs the USD. In short, USD/EMFX has a high beta to EUR/USD, therefore if the EUR appreciates so will USD/EMFX, although likely with a lag. However, if the ECB does not hike confidently – for instance if growth disappoints or inflation is slow to pick up – the performance of EMFX would be at risk. In contrast, if the Eurozone recovery is stronger than expected, the ECB could normalises policy confidently, perhaps more quickly than we expect. This would put more upward pressure on Bund yields, driving lower EMFX if it causes European investors to curtail their appetite for EM assets.
A more positive risk for EMFX is a reduction in US-China trade tensions. Media headlines, at least, suggest that there is scope for a rapprochement around the Trump-Xi meeting scheduled to take place on the side-lines of the G20 meeting later this month. History tells us that it is foolish to try and predict what will happen next in the US-China trade spat, but some easing of pressures would be a positive for EMFX, as the recent price action around the trade headlines indicates.
Another positive risk is the possibility of more China stimulus, which is more likely if data remains broadly weak. However, more policy support to take away the tail risks to growth at least, would help EM assets, and indications of a pickup in growth, more so.
Our FX scorecard (Figure 138), which employs valuation, flows, carry and macro variables to rank EM currencies, screen high-carry and strong external balance currencies, RUB, MXN and BRL, as the most attractive among EMFX. Interestingly, ARS, which screens as undervalued and has high nominal carry, is weighed down in the scorecard by a weak macro backdrop. CNY, PHP and HUF screen as the least attractive currencies in the scorecard.
Higher US rates could still hit vulnerable EM currencies
Too timid or strong growth in Europe also poses a risk to EMFX
A decrease in US-China trade tensions would decrease EM expected growth deceleration
Forceful stimulus in China would boost EM asset prices
Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018 |
67 |
vk.com/id446425943
Figure 138: FX Scorecard
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Carry |
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Macro |
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Trade |
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PI liabilities, % |
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exchange rate, |
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rolling |
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from 5y avg |
years) |
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Weights |
20% |
5% |
10% |
5% |
5% |
5% |
25% |
10% |
10% |
5% |
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Russia |
16% |
22% |
1.5 |
1.0 |
-0.4% |
-0.5 |
4.6% |
-0.1% |
0.3 |
5.8 |
6.8 |
More |
Mexico |
1% |
14% |
-0.7 |
1.7 |
2.2% |
0.0 |
6.1% |
0.1% |
1.8 |
9.6 |
8.0 |
Attractive |
Brazil |
7% |
19% |
0.9 |
0.6 |
0.2% |
0.0 |
3.0% |
0.0% |
0.7 |
11.2 |
8.7 |
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Taiwan |
14% |
62% |
0.4 |
-0.2 |
-2.3% |
2.5 |
-3.2% |
0.1% |
0.9 |
7.4 |
9.4 |
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Singapore |
14% |
60% |
-0.3 |
-0.7 |
1.0% |
-0.2 |
-1.1% |
0.1% |
-0.4 |
3.1 |
10.6 |
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Poland |
3% |
20% |
-1.0 |
-1.0 |
-0.1% |
0.6 |
-1.1% |
0.2% |
0.5 |
8.2 |
10.7 |
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Turkey |
-5% |
1% |
0.0 |
0.3 |
0.7% |
-0.7 |
20.8% |
0.1% |
-0.9 |
13.4 |
10.7 |
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Malaysia |
1% |
13% |
0.3 |
1.6 |
-1.6% |
1.3 |
0.6% |
0.0% |
-1.0 |
9.2 |
11.4 |
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India |
-4% |
68% |
-0.4 |
-1.2 |
0.0% |
-0.8 |
3.6% |
0.0% |
0.9 |
10.1 |
11.6 |
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Argentina |
14% |
41% |
-2.1 |
-2.5 |
5.6% |
-0.8 |
48.2% |
0.0% |
-1.4 |
12.3 |
11.7 |
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S Africa |
-14% |
15% |
1.2 |
1.0 |
5.9% |
0.2 |
4.5% |
0.0% |
0.9 |
11.6 |
11.8 |
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Chile |
0% |
23% |
0.7 |
0.2 |
2.6% |
0.1 |
-0.1% |
0.0% |
-0.6 |
8.2 |
12.4 |
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Colombia |
-8% |
11% |
0.5 |
1.1 |
1.3% |
1.3 |
1.6% |
-0.1% |
0.4 |
10.6 |
12.4 |
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Thailand |
3% |
98% |
0.0 |
-0.9 |
-0.1% |
-0.9 |
-1.0% |
0.0% |
0.0 |
7.3 |
12.5 |
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Israel |
18% |
93% |
-2.7 |
-2.7 |
0.0% |
1.7 |
-3.1% |
0.0% |
1.6 |
6.6 |
12.6 |
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Czech R |
4% |
64% |
-2.6 |
-1.6 |
-2.6% |
0.3 |
-1.7% |
0.1% |
-0.3 |
6.0 |
12.8 |
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Korea |
8% |
75% |
-0.4 |
-1.3 |
0.8% |
1.6 |
-1.6% |
0.0% |
-0.2 |
8.2 |
12.8 |
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Hungary |
3% |
13% |
-1.1 |
-2.1 |
-1.3% |
0.1 |
-2.5% |
0.0% |
-0.1 |
8.8 |
13.0 |
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Indonesia |
-7% |
4% |
-1.3 |
-1.6 |
0.6% |
-0.6 |
5.9% |
0.0% |
-1.1 |
8.9 |
13.1 |
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Romania |
-1% |
33% |
-1.6 |
-1.6 |
1.4% |
1.1 |
0.6% |
0.1% |
-0.2 |
8.9 |
13.4 |
|
Philippines |
-5% |
65% |
-1.9 |
-1.7 |
0.2% |
1.5 |
3.1% |
0.0% |
0.2 |
9.5 |
13.5 |
Less |
China |
-4% |
75% |
-1.3 |
-1.6 |
1.5% |
0.1 |
0.7% |
0.2% |
-0.9 |
11.5 |
13.7 |
Attractive |
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Source: Haver, Bloomberg and UBS estimates
Global Macro Strategy 19 November 2018 |
68 |