Чтение литературы по специальности на английском языке. Теория и практика информационной обработки текста. Учебное пособие для студентов факультета эк

uneven though the playing field, the postwar system has enabled many poor economies to succeed, although the number is too few.

Justifiably, much attention has been focused on the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and their role in the new economic landscape. Goldman Sachs’ 2003 paper on the BRICs highlighted the rise of these four economies and their future importance as their populations and income were projected to increase substantially in the long term (Wilson & Purushothaman 2003). Projections showed that the BRICs would be among the six largest economies in the world by 2050. Focusing on trends in demographics and output, this analysis crystallised the notion that there was a group of up-and- coming economies toward which global attention was shifting. Over time, the term has moved beyond its original meaning to include more than just economic implications – it is an acknowledgement that the BRICs will play a more important role on the world political stage as well.

While the BRICs are a distillation of this idea, and its major protagonists, they are not completely representative of this global shift – the field of potential global players is undoubtedly larger. This paper examines a group of 10 countries that will play an important role in global economics and politics, focusing on the current state of their engagement in the international system and their representation in the global financial architecture. A critical look at the roles and responsibilities of new actors is particularly important in the current environment as the global financial and economic crises present emerging powers with an unprecedented opportunity to increase their level of engagement in both economic and political spheres, and to contribute to systemically important initiatives.

Efforts to identify rising powers and the implications of their growth is not new. In fact, the World Bank’s 1997 Global Economic Prospects Report identified the rise of the ‘Big 5’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China and Indonesia) and projected to 2020 their influence on world patterns of resource allocation, production, trade, relative prices and returns to factors of production. There have been numerous other attempts since to put forward new combinations of countries considered as the next global players, and these studies have all proposed innovative ways of analysing country combinations.

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However, these studies have been largely focused either on attempts to address the issue of credible representation in global institutions (i.e. governance), or on identifying emerging market opportunities for multinational corporations and investors (see Wilson & Stupnytska 2007; World Bank 2008b; Rueda-Sabater, Ramchandran & Kraft 2009). None of these approaches is definitive, however, as each is driven by the specific objective of the exercise. Our approach is similarly subjective.

This paper is structured as follows. The first part identifies the 10 New Economic Powers (NEPs) and details their rise in terms of population, GDP and share of world trade. The next section evaluates these 10 countries on a wider set of measures based on their engagement in the world economy and policy. Following that is an examination of whether the current representation of the NEPs in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) accurately reflects this engagement, and a critical look at the outcomes of the efforts of the April 2009 G-20 Summit in London to address issues of participation and representation. Finally, we outline the economic and political challenges facing the global community, and areas where the NEPs can potentially increase their level of engagement and play a systemically important role.

The New Economic Powers (NEPs)

Over the past 25 years the world’s economic landscape has shifted. While the G7 has, and will, remain a relevant, if not dominant, group, its relative decline in share of world population and output will continue as its ranks are joined by rising developing economies. In 1980, the G7 represented 68% of world GDP at market prices; today that share is 61%. By 2030, the G7 share of global GDP is predicted to fall to 43%. With regard to population, the G7’s 11.2% share in 2008 will to fall to 9.6% in 2030.

This paper focuses on 10 emerging economies, the NEPs (Poland, a country that would have made the list, was not included because of its membership in the European Union), which today control 13% of global output but are projected to represent 34% by 2030 – three-quarters that of the G7. Because of this projected growth and their resulting economic clout, these 10 countries will be

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Table 1: NEPs’ GDP, population 2008

Source: World Bank, GDP using constant 2000 market prices

poised to assume substantial leadership roles on issues affecting the global community. In fact, because of their future importance, the full participation of these countries in international initiatives will be necessary for international organisations to retain their legitimacy. Using this group of countries as a base, this paper examines the current state of the NEPs’ engagement and identifies opportunities for them to engage further.

Our initial process in choosing the NEPs from the universe of emerging economies focused on two essential factors: demographic weight and economic weight. Since demographics matter in global decision making, only countries with populations greater than 25

Figure 1: Projected shares of GDP 2008

Renalning

OECO; 11%

Other energing 10%

Source: World Bank

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Figure 2: Projected of GDP 2030

Renalning

OECO; 9%

Other energing 15%

G7

43%

Figure 3: Projected GDP 2030

US

China

Japan

India

Germany

UK

France

Brazil

Korea

Italy

Canada

Mexico

Russia

Turkey

Indonesia

Saudi Arabia

South Africa

Constant year 2000 US$bn

Source: World Bank

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Figure 4: Projected population 2030

million were considered. Second, since economic clout is often a prerequisite for political clout, GDP was the second major criterion for selection.

Задание 22

22.1.Прочитайте статью.

22.2.Изложите основные положения статьи в форме краткого конспекта, исключив всю избыточную информацию.

The Invisible Director on Corporate Boards

Clayton P. Alderfer1

Over the years, the board of directors of a large manufacturing company had unconsciously developed a unique way of ending its meetings. Several members, who shared a helicopter ride from corporate headquarters to a nearby city, simply excused themselves and left the boardroom when it was time for their aircraft to depart. Those remaining attempted to finish the agenda, but because of

1 Alderfer is professor of organizational behavior at the Yale School of Organization and Management. He has written numerous articles and books on group dynamics and organizations.

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their displeasure about their colleagues’ departure, their efforts were often halfhearted. When the chairman noted the flagging attempts, he would adjourn the meeting – often feeling that discussion of the most important issues had been limited. Even after the ringleader of the “metropolitan contingent” resigned from the board, this pattern persisted.

To a newcomer on the board, such behavior would seem obviously counterproductive. He or she would wonder why the chairman or other directors didn’t complain. But my guess is such wonderings wouldn’t last very long, for the director would soon become part of the group and would start acting according to group instead of individual norms.

Whether they like it or not, all board members are part of a group with its own dynamics and patterns that affect how it acts. I’ve done research on how boards of directors behave (see the insert for a description of the study), and I’ve observed that for the most part directors aren’t aware of the group dynamics that affect the board’s behavior. Most directors, therefore, are blind to the need to correct it in some cases or to exploit it in others.

Whether a board can find the elusive line between being a rubber stamp and undermining corporate leadership depends on how it acts as a group, the board-chief executive relationship, and the effects of subgroups of directors on the board-management relationship. These three sets of forces determine the corporate board’s group dynamics: they sit like an invisible director affecting what the board does.

In this article, I want to look at these dynamics and specify actions that both directors and managers can take to improve these relationships. My purpose is to show that directors who are truly effective see themselves as members of groups and subgroups, not merely as individuals. Before going on to explore the different effects group dynamics have on boards, let’s look first at what I mean when I talk about the board as a group.

A special kind of group

Corporate boards easily meet definitional criteria for being a group of people who depend psychologically on one another. Because they are legally required to represent shareholders’ interests

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and have to depend on management for the information they need to do so, directors are dependent on each other. Directors may also be sued as a group – a fact that board members may forget when they think of themselves only as individuals.

At the same time, however, people on boards are strong individuals who run their own companies or lead public institutions. They generally see themselves, therefore, only secondarily as group members. They are often unaware – perhaps particularly in the board context – of how much their membership in groups influences their behavior and how others behave toward them.

For instance, in the example with which I began the article, the chairman and virtually all the directors, including members of the metropolitan contingent, said they didn’t like the way board meetings ended. Yet they didn’t speak openly about how they felt. This beautifully illustrates how unconscious group processes operate. Instead of talking about the issue, the directors chose, as individuals, to live with the problem. In other words, no one person thought that he or she alone could change the behavior. As long as the directors saw themselves only as individuals and not as a group, they felt powerless to act. And most important, they couldn’t act because, at the same time, they felt subordinate to the group Of course, individual directors do influence board-management relationships, but no director – regardless how strong – can escape group forces. In addition, any individual, whether director or CEO, can become more effective if he or she is able to work with, rather than deny or ignore, group forces.

This change in perspective can affect a director’s behavior. Most directors, for example, see their most important relationship as that between themselves and the CEO. How directors relate to each other appears far less important. In the most extreme form of this view, directors speak in board meetings only if they have cleared their remarks in advance with the CEO.

Directors know that the effectiveness of this way of operating depends on their confidence in the CEO, and they admit that diminished confidence may result in a problem. But instead of altering the board’s operating procedures, they think the solution is to change the CEO. Some directors hold the view that boards

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have only one question to ask: ‘Should we change the CEO?’ If the answer is no, it’s business as usual.

Now let’s look more closely at how group dynamics and the difference in perspective affect boards’ effectiveness. All groups have protocols. Although awareness of protocols doesn’t eradicate them, it does make it possible to change them. A group that is unaware of what it’s doing is, in a sense, out of control.

The new member

One CEO of a large corporation told me that when he joined a board he waited nearly a year before speaking for the first time, and then he spoke only on a subject he knew well. This CEO was acting in accordance with a behavioral norm that directors widely share: new board members should not speak extensively until they become thoroughly knowledgeable about the corporation and its board. This tradition also implies that the board should not take up valuable time to “educate” new directors about issues that others take for granted and that the new directors would be embarrassed by seeming uninformed.

If, however, we look at the board as a group that wants to be effective rather than just as an assemblage of individuals, then a new member is particularly qualified to ask “naïve” questions. These questions are valuable precisely because the person has not yet absorbed the unconscious assumptions that board members with longer service share.

When the board acts as a group, the education of a new board member becomes a joint process between the director and the whole board – not just between the new director and the chairperson. The new director has to learn the key questions facing the corporation and how the board operates. On the other side, the board can get a fresh perspective on its own assumptions by listening carefully to what the new director says.

Boards vary considerably in how much they help new directors learn about the corporation and the board. Many directors told me that the rate at which new directors become fully functioning in their roles depends on the kinds of introductory experiences the CEO, top managers, and other directors provide. Board members who

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understand that group forces can intentionally and unintentionally silence new members for a long time can act to counter these forces and accelerate new directors’ learning. New board members can also speed up the process by talking with other directors outside of meetings to learn how they perceive the board’s workings.

Shades of meaning

At board meetings, the one thing everyone does all the time is evaluate everything. A director’s chief responsibility is to evaluate management and its recommendations. But management also evaluates directors and directors evaluate each other-although rarely publicly.

The result of all this unremitting evaluation is that stakes are very high and failure is painfully public. In this atmosphere, directors and managers understandably phrase their questions and comments carefully. Managers have told me they appreciate certain directors who can ask surgical questions that demonstrate the director’s knowledge of the matter and illuminate crucial issues, but that don’t embarrass the manager.

One nonproductive result of the unceasing scrutiny is that some directors speak euphemistically. For example, a senior director told me, ‘Frank (the chief executive) has a problem with Tom (the chief financial officer), and I’ve told him so’. Translation: ‘I’ve told the CEO he should fire his CFO’. I only learned what the director meant when the chief executive translated it for me.

On the other hand, directors often address managers (but rarely each other) in a confrontational, challenging, and teasing style. They tend to behave this way when they believe a manager is poorly prepared or when they sense they aren’t hearing the full story. Managers experience this sort of cross-examination severely. Regardless of whether or how soon the CEO speaks up during this kind of episode, it’s likely to leave an emotional residue that will continue to influence the board-management relationship for some time. In some cases, managers’ careers have been blemished and directors have been asked to resign. In most board meetings I’ve observed, directors use both indirect and confrontational styles of questioning (not at the same time, of course).

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If we look at boards as collections of individuals, these styles make sense. Evaluation reveals a person’s standing. As long as directors can ask surgical questions of a manager who fully understands them and can answer them satisfactorily, few problems arise. But if the questions become euphemistic and the manager misunderstands, then the stage is set for either avoidance of the issue or escalating antagonism. Following the individual model, the director is likely to blame the manager, and the manager is likely to fault the director. And both parties will be correct – but only partially. Whether it knows it or not, the board as a group is also responsible.

CEOs, their boards and their directors

The analysis presented here derives from research and consultation carried out over the last five years. The process began with interviews of individual directors. Whenever possible, I matched outside directors with chief executives of corporations on whose boards they served. In approximately half of the corporations, I spoke first with the outside directors and asked those people to help me contact the Chief executive. For the other half, I spoke first with the chief executive and asked him to identify an outside director who might be willing to interview with me. I chose this research strategy because I assumed that the picture of a particular board might differ depending on whether I spoke first with the CEO or with an outside director. At the conclusion of this set of interviews, I had spoken with ten CEO-director pairs and eight individual directors. Twentyseven of these people were white men; one was a white woman.

To someone with an interest in multiple perspectives about groups and organizations, this seemed like a limited sample. I set out explicitly, therefore, to speak to white female and racial minority directors. As a result of these efforts, I was able to speak with seven white female and six minority directors. Except for one, all of the racial minority people were black men.

The final portion of the sample includes three complete boards with whom I worked on a long-term basis. These relationships grew directly out of the research; learning of my work, directors or CEOs asked if I would be interested in working with their boards. These boards also included a number of white female and minority

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