I. Authority cannot be delegated for the perform-

ance of an act which from its nature or the terms of

the law requiring it, can only be performed by the

principal in person. The rule in this class of cases is

sometimes stated in this way : that authority cannot be

delegated for the performance of a purely personal

duty.

II. Authority cannot be delegated to do an act

which is illegal, immoral or opposed to public policy.

§20. The first exception. — It is a general rule

that a personal duty, trust or confidence imposed upon

one person cannot be delegated by him to another. So,

"if a public duty or trust is imposed on anyone, these,

not being things which one does in his own right, can-

not be delegated, but must be performed personally."

§§ 29 -31.] FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. 17

It is this principle which creates the limitation, here-

after to be considered, upon the power of an agi q1 to

delegate Ins agency. But the same rule may operate in

some cases upon the principal, and it prevents him

from delegating to an agent those things which by stat

ute, custom or the inherent nature of the act are re-

quired to be done by him in person.

See United States v. Bartlett, Dav. 9, 24 Fed. Cas. 1021; Combes'

Case, 9 Co. 76, b.

§30. Illustrations. — Thus, for example, an

elector who is entitled to vote at a public election must

do so in person, and can not vote by agent. And where

a statute required an affidavit to be made concerning

matters peculiarly within the knowledge of a certain

person, it was held that he must make the affidavit him-

self, and that one made by an agent would not suffice.

See Mechem on Public Officers, В§ 187; United States v. Bartlett

supra.

So it has been held that power to make, under a

statute, an assignment for the benefit of creditors can

not be delegated to an agent, the court saying: "Where

an act authorized by statute must, from its nature or

the necessary construction of the statutory authority,

be done in person — for example, the statute authoriz-

ing a party to make his will — the power to do the act

cannot be delegated. Such cases fall within the excep-

tion to the general rule that a person may authorize

another to dispose of his property for him in any man-

ner he himself may do."

See Minneapolis Trust Co. v. School District, (1897) 6S Minn.

414, 71 N. W. Rep. 679. Compare In re Whitley Partners (1886)

32 Ch. Div. 337; Hyde v. Johnson, 2 Bing. N. C. 776, 29 Eng. Com.

L. 488.

§31. The second exception. — Under the second

head the rule is, that the law will not sanction the

IS FOR WHAT PURPOSES CREATED. t§§ 31-33.

creation or enforce the performance of an agency which

has for its purpose or which naturally and directly

tends to promote, the commission of an act which is

cither illegal or immoral in itself, or which is opposed

to public policy.

It may be thought at first view that this is not an

exception to the rule at all— that the principal himself

could not do any of the acts which are so condemned.

This, of course, might be true of certain of them, but

there are still many cases wherein one might, with im-

punity, act in person, but could not appoint an agent

to act for him. Thus, for example, one may very fre-

quently resort to personal persuasion to procure legis-

lation, or obtain a contract or a pardon by personal