Is made respecting its termination, it is presumed to

be at will, and either party may terminate it without

liability at any time by giving reasonable notice.

See Sheahan v. Steamship Co., 87 Fed. Rep. 167, 57 U. S. App.

254, 30 C. C. A. 593; Rees V. Pellow, 97 Fed. Rep. 167, 38 c. C. A. 94.

But contracts for a definite time may in some cases

be presumed from the circumstances, even though no

express understanding to that effect was had.

See Rhodes v. Forwood, L. R. 1 App. Cas. 256, Cas. Ag. 259;

Turner v. Goldsmith [1891], 1 Q. B. Div. 544, Cas. Ag. 266; Lewis

V. Insurance Co., 61 Mo. 534, Cas. Ag. 269; Glover V. Henderson, 120

Mo. 367, 25 S. W. Rep. 175, 41 Am. St. Rep. 695; Warren Chemical

Co. v. Holbrook, 118 N. Y. 586, 23 N. E. Rep. 908, 16 Am. St.

Rep. 788.

§121. Discharge of agent justified when.— And

even though employed for a definite time, the agent

may lawfully be discharged, if he proves incompetent

for the task assumed, or if he is guilty of wilful dis-

obedience to lawful orders or of such disorderly or

68 TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. [§§ 121-124.

immoral conduct as amounts to a breach of his implied

undertaking to conduct himself with fidelity and pro-

priety.

See Dieringer v. Meyer, 42 Wis. 311, 24 Am. Rep. 415, Cas. Ag.

289; Bass Furnace Co. v. Glasscock, 82 Ala. 452, 60 Am. Rep. 748,

Cas. Ag. 291.

§ 122. Renunciation by agent justified when.—

The agent may also lawfully terminate the relation if

he is required to do dishonest or unlawful acts.

II. TERMINATION BY OPERATION OF LAW.

§ 123. In general. — The authority may also be ter-

minated in many cases by mere operation of law upon

the happening of some event which makes the further

continuance of the agency incompatible, impracticable

or impossible. The most important of these events

are:

§ 124. Death of principal. — The death of the prin-

cipal operates to instantly terminate au authority, not

coupled with an interest. "The interest which can

protect a power after the death of the person by whom

it was created must be an interest in the thing itself.

The power must be ingrafted upon some estate or in-

terest in the thing to which it relates." A mere interest

in commissions or profits to result from the execution

of the power is not enough.

See Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 174, Cas. Ag. 322; Knapp v.

Alvord, 10 Paige, 205, 40 Am. Dec. 241, Cas. Ag. 328; Farmers' Loan

& Trust Co. v. Wilson, 139 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. Rep. 784, 36 Am. St.

Rep. 696; Pacific Bank v. Hannah, 90 Fed. Rep. 72, 59 U. S. App.

457, 32 C. C. A. 322; Gardner v. First Nat. Bank, 10 Mont. 149, 10

L. R. A. 45.

By the weight of authority the rule applies even

though the fact of the death may not be known to the

agent or to the third person with whom he deals;

$8 124-128.] TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. 69

though the harshness of this rule has caused it in some

cases to be changed by statute, and some courts deny

it so far as it would operate to defeat interests acquired

in ignorance of the death.

See Weber v. Bridgman, 113 N. Y. 600, Cas. Ag. 331. Contra. See

Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 282, 39 Am. Dec. 76;

Ish v. Crane, 8 Ohio St. 520, 13 id. 574; Dick v. Page, 17 Mo. 2:^4;

Deweese v. Muff, 57 Neb. 17, 73 Am. St. Rep. 488.

§125. Death of agent. — The same result must also

ensue from (he death of the agent, except in those casts

in which the agent had an authority coupled with an

interest.

S 12G. Insanity of principal or agent. — The in-

finity of the principal or the agent must also ordi-

narily operate to terminate an authority not coupled

with an interest; saving, usually, the rights of third

persons who, in ignorance of the insanity, have parted

with things of value to which they can not be restored.

See Matthiessen, etc., Co. v. McMahon, 38 N. J. L. 536, Cas. Ag.