1. Termination by Mutual Consent.

В§ 110. Agency may be terminated at any time

by mutual consent. — The agency may be terminated

by mutual consent of the principal and agent at any

time. Notwithstanding any limitation or condition

originally imposed, the same power that made the ar-

rangement in the first instance can subsequently waive

the condition or remove the limitation. So far as any

authority depends upon the act of the parties (as dis-

tinguished from authority created by law) the law has

no purpose to subserve which will require the continu-

ance of the relation, when both parties desire and agree

that it shall be terminated.

§§111-113.] TERMINATION OF THE AGENCY. (IH

2. Revocation by Principal.

§ 111. Power of principal to revoke.— Usually at

any time. — In the ordinary case, agency is (rented to

subserve some purpose which the principal has in mind.

It is the principal's will that is to be executed, his

interest that is to be promoted. The agent usually has

no other interest than to carry the principal's purpose

into effect and earn the promised compensation. If,

therefore, the principal's circumstances are altered, if

his purpose change, if his inter- 1 will be better served

by discontinuing the enterprise than by prosecuting it,

he certainly ought to have it in his power to withdraw

the authority; and the agent can ordinarily have no

interest in the matter which will justify him in insist-

ing upon going on, if his claim to such damages as he

may legally have sustained by the termination of the

authority be recognized. It is, therefore, the general

rule that the principal may revoke the agent's author-

ity at any time before 1 its execution and for any reason

deemed sufiicient to himself.

See Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317, 43 Am. Dec. 670; State

v. Walker, 88 Mo. 279; Owen v. Frink, 24 Cal. 171, 178; Lord v.

Thomas, 64 N. Y. 107.

В§112. Of course, if the authority has been

executed, or the agent has entered into a legally bind-

ing contract, the authority, though otherwise revocable,

cannot be revoked so as to affect these acts already

done. If the authority has been executed in pari only,

and the residue be severable, the authority as to such

residue may be revoked as in other cases.

§ 1 13. Not when coupled with an interest. —

"While revocability is thus the rule in the ordinary c.

there may be cases wherein there is something more

than a mere authority — cases wherein the agent is also

64 Termination of the agency. [в§в§113-114

something more than a mere agent — cases wherein he

has, in the property or thing concerning which the au-

thority exists, some proprietary interest of his own

which the continuance of the authority is necessary to

protect — cases wherein, in the language of the law,

the authority is "coupled with an interest." In such

cases the rule of revocability does not apply so far as

to permit the principal to cut off the authority neces-

sary ior the protection of the agent's interest.

See Smyth v. Craig, 3 Watts & Serg. (Pa.) 14; De Forest v.

Bates, 1 Edw. (N. Y.) Ch. 394; Raymond v. Squire, 11 Johns. (N.

Y.) 47; Jackson v. Burtis, 14 id. 391.

В§ 114. Precisely what shall be deemed to be

an authority "coupled with an interest" is not easy to

define, but it is everywhere agreed that it must be an

interest or estate in the subject matter of the agency,

and not merely an interest in the results which are to

flow from the execution of the authority.

An interest in the subject matter, concerning which

the authority was given, in order to render it available

as a security for some claim or demand, would be an

interest which would prevent revocation; but an inter-

est merely in the form of a right to commissions or

profits out of the proceeds of the execution of the

authority would not be sufficient.

In the former case there is something existing in

which the agent has a present interest before the au-

thority is executed; in the latter case the thing in which

he has an interest, namely, the proceeds of the execu-'

tion of the authority, obviously cannot come into exist-

ence until after the authority is executed. The former

interest is sufficient to prevent revocation ; the latter is

not.

See Alworth v. Seymour, 42 Minn. 526, Cas. Ag. 314; Mansfield

v. Mansfield, 6 Conn. 559, 16 Am. Dec. 76; Chambers y. Seay, 12,

Ala. 373, Cas. Ag. 252.

C

§§115-116.] i ELIMINATION OF THE AGENi 65

В§ 115. The mere fact that the authority wВЈU

called "irrevocable" or "exclusive" will not prevent its

revocation.

See Chambers v. Seay, 73 Ala. 373, Cas. Ag. 252; Blackstone y.

Buttermore, 53 Penn. 266, Cas. Ag. 255.

And even the fact that the principal may have ex-

pressly agreed that the agency shall continue for a cer-

tain period will not prevent his revoking the authority

before that time, if not coupled with an interest; but

he will be liable to the agent for the damages which

the agent sustains on account of the revocation con-

trary to the agreement.

See Standard Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 84 Ga. 714, 8 L. R. A. 410, Cas.

Ag. 273; Missouri v. Walker, 125 U. S. 339, Cas. Ag. 277; Wilcox &

G. Sew. Mach. Co. v. Ewing, 141 U. S. 627, Cas. Ag. 283; Durkee v.

Gunn, 41 Kan. 496, 13 Am. St. Rep. 300, Cas. Ag. 312.

Distinction is sometimes made in these cases between

the power to revoke and the right to revoke; the prin-

cipal always having the power to revoke but not hav!

the rig lit to do so in those cases wherein he has agreed

not to exercise his power during a certain period. If,