Ing in the execution of his undertaking and within the

scope of his authority.

The older cases hold the principal not liable for the

agent's wilful and malicious acts, but the modern rule

Is that he is liable for these also if the agent committed

them while he was acting in the execution of his agency

and within the scope of his authority.

It is entirely immaterial that the principal did not

direct or know of the act complained of, or even that

he disapproved or forbade it, if it were done while the

agent, as has been stated, was acting in the execution

of his agency and within the scope of his authority.

See Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, Cas. Ag. 8; Wilson v.

Owens, 16 Ir. L. Rep. 225, Cas. Ag. 9; Bank v. Railroad Co., 106 N.

Y. 195, 60 Am. Rep. 440, Cas. Ag. 576; Friedlander v. Railway Co.,

130 U. S. 416, Cas. Ag. 579; Southern Express Co. v. Brown, 67 Miss.

260, 19 Am. St. Rep. 306; Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 25 N.

E. Rep. 14. 23 Am. St. Rep. 809; Cosgrove v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255,

10 Am. Rep. 361; Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104, 11 Am. Rep.

405; Phelon v. Stiles, 43 Conn. 426; Fifth Ave. Bank v. Forty-second

Street, etc., Ry. Co.. 137 N. Y. 231, 33 N. E. Rep. 378, 33 Am. St.

Rep. 712; Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N. Y. 652, 43 N. E.

Rep. 68. 51 Am. St. Rep. 727; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Higdon,

94 Ala. 286, 10 So. Rep. 282, 33 Am. St. Rep. 119; Eichengreen v.

Railroad Co., 96 Tenn. 229, 34 S. W. Rep. 219, 54 Am. St. Rep. 833.

В§ 254. The act will be deemed to have been done

while the agent was 11ms acting in the execution of

his agency and within the scope of his authority, if it

were done while the agent was engaged in doing that

which he was authorized to do — if the default com-

plained of were a part of, or incident to, or

interwoven With, the act authorized. Certainly

136 DUTIES OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON. [§§ 234-255.

if the thing complained of were designed to

facilitate or promote the act authorized, of which

it thus formed a part — if it were intended how-

ever mistakenly, to further the principal's business,

promote his welfare or protect his interests in matters

concerning which the agent was then acting and au-

thorized to act — it would be within the rule. But so

much as this cannot be required; for it is clear, by the

modern authorities at least, that though the agent at

the moment may not have had the principal's interests

in mind, though he may have been roused to resent-

ment, puffed up by brief authority, or quickened by

mere wantonness, still if he did the act complained of

while he was engaged, in the course of his employment,

in the performance of an act authorized to be per-

formed, the principal will be responsible. Especially is

this true, though it is not the criterion, where the in-

strument or means of injury is some implement, tool,

machine or other agency with which he has been in-

trusted by the principal for the execution of his

authoritv.

See Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Starnes, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 52, 24 Am.

Rep. 296; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Dickson, 63 111. 151, 14 Am. Rep.