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It seems that the same presumptions are applicable in

this respect to corporations as to natural persons."

See Moyer v. East Shore Terminal Co. (1894) 41 S. Car. 300, 19

S. E. Rep. 651, 44 Am. St. Rep. 709.

So partnerships may, unless restricted, perform by

agent the acts which are within the scope of the part-

nership business.

See St. Andrews Bay Land Co. v. Mitchell, 4 Fla. 192, 54 Am. Dec.

340, Cas. Ag. 26; Lucas V. Bank of Darien, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 280, Cas.

Ag. 27; Clark v. Slate Valley R. Co. (1890), 136 Pa. 408, 20 Atl. Rep.

562, 10 L. R. A. 238.

The rule applies to limited partnerships as well as

to ordinary partnerships.

See Park Bros. & Co. v. Kelly Axe Mfg. Co. (1892), 49 Fed. Rep.

618, 6 U. S. App. 26, 1 C. C. A. 395.

§39. Natural or legal incapacity. — Incapacity to

be a principal may be either natural or legal. It is

<J

/

§§ 39-41.7 WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. 25

natural where it inheres in the very nature, character

or situation of the person, as in the case of insane per-

sons, very young infants, and the like. It is legal where

It results from the operation of some arbitrary rule of

law, as in the case of married women at the common

law, or of the infant who has nearly but not quite

reached the age which may be fixed for his majority.

§40. Insane persons as principals. — Insane per-

sons and other persons who, from unsoundness of mind,

arc incompetent to make contracts, are incompetent to

act by agent.

See Plaster v. RIgney (1899), 97 Fed. Rep. 12, 38 C. C. A. 25.

But if the incapacity was not known to the other

party, who has acted in good faith and taken no ad-

Vantage of it, an executed contract will not be set aside

If the other party can not be restored to his original

condition.

See Drew v. Nunn (1879), 4 Q. B. Div. 661.

§ 41. Infants as principals. — The rule has been laid

down, especially in the older cases, that an infant can

not appoint an agent, and that any such appointment

Is void. The better rule is that the arjpointment is

simply voidable, like the infant's ordinary contracts,

and that as to those matters, l ike the purchase of neces-

saries, and the like, concerning which the infant could

act in person, he may act by agent.

See Coursclle v. We3'erhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 72 N. W. Rep. 697;

Patterson v. Lippincott, 47 N. J. L. 457, 54 Am. Rep. 178, Cas. on

Ag. 507; Askey v. Williams (18S9), 74 Tex. 291. 11 S. W. Rep. 1101,

5 L. R. A. 176; Beliveau v. Amoskeag Co. (1895), 68 N. H. 225, 40

Atl. Rep. 734, 44 L. R. A. 167; Trueblood v. Trueblood, S Ind. 195,

65 Am. Dec. 756, Cases on Agency 29; Armltage v. Widoe, "J M'

124. The last two cases show the older rule; the first one, the mod-

ern rule.

Even under the older rule, an infant might, under many clrcum-

2G WHO MAY BE PRINCIPAL OR AGENT. [§§41-42.

stances, employ a servant (Chappie v. Cooper, 13 M. & W. 252) though

he could not appoint an agent. Service may often be a necessary

for which the infant may bind himself, but the appointment of

an agent has in view the creation of contractual obligations, and the

contractual capacity of the infant is limited.

§ 42. Married women as principals. — Unmarried

men, at common law, might act by agent, but mar-

ried women were incompetent to act in their own be-

half, and could not therefore act by agent. In most

Suites this incapacity has been largely removed by

statutes which usually provide that a married woman

may acquire and hold property as her separate estate

and may make contracts respecting it, as though she

were unmarried ; and a married woman may now act by

agent in respect to those matters concerning which the

statutes have made her competent to act in person. It

was said in a recent case, concerning one of these stat-

utes, "these provisions have brushed away many of the

disabilities of the wife under the common law; have

recognized her individual existence, and conferred upon

her distinct rights and powers respecting contracts, the

carrying on of business, the owning, controlling and

disposing of property, equal to those held and enjoyed

by her husband. She is clothed with, power to manage

her own affairs, and certainly has power to appoint

an agent or attorney to do that which she is capable

of doing in person."

See Munger v. Baldridge (1889), 41 Kans. 23ti, 21 Pac. Rep. 159,

13 Am. St. Rep. 273.

As will be seen in a later section (В§ 48) where a

married woman may act by agent, she may appoint her

husband as such agent.

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