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I. The party alleging that ratification has taken

place must establish it by a preponderance of the evi-

dence.

See Reese v. Medlock, 27 Tex. 120, 84 Am. Dec. 611.

No new consideration is necessary. The original con-

sideration suffices.

See Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. Rep. 498, 12

L. R. A. 140.

5. What Amounts to a Ratification.

§ 84. General rule.— Ratification may be either ex-

press or implied. There are cases in which it must be

express or formal. It is a general rule that the act of

ratification must be of the same nature as that which

would be required to confer authority to do the ratified

act in the first instance. Thus if authjonty^ujoto: seal

85 84-87.] OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. 51

would have been required, ratification by an instrument

under seal is access ary ; if written authority vvas requi-

site, r atification by writing is necc s sary.

See Hawkins v. McGroarty, 110 Mo. 516, Cas. Ag. L67; Ko:

Dearlove, 114 111. 23, 32 N. E. Rep. 542, 30 Am. St. Rop. H6; Worrall

V. Munn, 5 n. Y. 229, 55 Am. Dec. 330; Zottman V. Sau Francisco. 20

Cal. 96, 81 Am. Dec. 96.

В§ 85. Ratification by instrument under seal.

— The tendency, however, is strong to abolish the rule

which requires ratification under seal.

See Mclntyre v. Park, 11 Gray (Mass.) 102, 71 Am. Dec. 690, Cas.

Ag. 170.

And here, as in other eases, if the instrument to be

ratified was unnecessarily under seal, the ratification

may be made without seal.

See Adams v. Power, 52 Miss. 828; Worrall v. Munn, supra; Zott

man v. San Francisco, supra.

В§ 80. Ratification by authority subsequently con-

ferred.— Ratification may be effected by subsequently

conferring authority to do the act to be ratified.

See Rice v. McLarren, 42 Me. 157, Cas. Ag. 190.

§ 87. Ratification by conduct. — Inasmuch as au-

thority for the doing of most acts may be conferred by

parol, the ratification of most acts may be eff< cted by

parol. This is the rule wherever some technical

requirement like that of writing or sealing does not

intervene. In the great majority of cases, ratification

is inferred from conduct, and this is often done where

the party had no express intention to ratify or even in-

tended not to ratify. The principle of estoppel applies

here and where a party by his words or conduct has led

another to believe that tlu k act was done by his author-

ity. he will not afterward be permitted to deny it to the

52 OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION. [§§ 87-89.

, ; ejudice of the other who has in good faith relied

'ii it.

See ante §§ G7, 68; Dixon v. Bristol Sav. Bank, 102 Ga. 461, 31 S.

E. Rep. 96, 66 Am. St. Rep. 193; Brown v. Wilson, 45 S. Car. 519, 23

S. E. Rep. 630, 55 Am. St. Rep. 779; Ward v. W'illiams, 26 111. 447,

79 Am. Dec. 385, and note: Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Cowell, 28 Pa.

St. 329, 70 Am. Dec. 128; Gillett v. Whiting, 141 N. Y. 71, 35 N. E.

Rep. 939, 38 Am. St. Rep. 762.

§ 88. By accepting benefits.— One of the most

common methods of ratifying an act. is by accepting the

benefits of it; and it is the general rule that a person

who, with knowledge of the facts, accepts the benefits

of the act must accept also its responsibilities.

See Hyatt v. Clark, 118 N. Y. 563, Cas. Ag. 177; .Tones v. Atkin-

son, 68 Ala. 167, Cas. Ag. 192; Thacher v. Pray, 113 Mass. 291, 18

Am. Rep. 480, Cas. Ag. 204; Mayer v. Dean, 115 N. Y. 556, 22 N. E.

Rep. 261, 5 L. R. A. 540; Mining Co. v. Bank, 95 Fed. Rep. 23, 36

C. C. A. 633; Thomas v. City Nat Bank, 40 Neb. 501, 58 N. W. Rep.

943, 24 L. R. A. 263; Reed v. Morton, 24 Neb. 760, 40 N. W. Rep.

282, 1 L. R. A. 736; Savings Bank v. Butchers' Bank, 107 Mo. 133,

17 S. W. Rep. 644, 28 Am. St. Rep. 405; Gunther v. Ullrich, 82 Wis.

222, 52 N. W. Rep. 88, 33 Am. St. Rep. 32; Sherman Center Town Co.

v. Morris, 43 Kan. 282, 19 Am. St. Rep. 134; Hitchcock v. Griffin Co.,

99 Mich. 447, 58 N. W. Rep. 373, 41 Am. St. Rep. 624.

§ 89. By bringing suit. — Another common

method is by bringing suit based upon, and for the en-

forcement of the act, This, when done with a knowl-

edge of the facts, shows an intention to take the bene-

fits of the act, and the burdens must be taken with the

benefits.

This rule, however, would not apply to suits brought

for the purpose of avoiding or repudiating the unau-

thorized act, or to suits brought to prevent loss by it.

See Shoninger v. Peabody, 57 Conn. 42, Cas. Ag. 172; Roberts v.

Rumley, 58 Iowa, 301, Cas. Ag. 143; Park Bros. & Co. v. Kelly Axe

Mfg. Co., 49 Fed. Rep. 618, 6 U. S. App. 26, 1 C. C. A. 395; Pickle v.

Muse, 88 Tenn. 380, 12 S. W. Rep. 919, 17 Am. St. Rep. 900; Wheeler

& Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Aughey, 144 Pa. St. 398, 22 Atl. Rep. 667, 27

Am. St. Rep. 638.

§§90-92.]

OF AUTHORITY BY RATIFICATION.

§90. By acquiescence. — When a person learns

that anot her has assumed, without authority, to do

some act for him as his agent, he has the option to

repudiate or ratify the act, but he must do one thing

or the other, lie has a reasonable time within who h

to decide, but if,., with knowledge of the facts, he fails

to repudiate the act within a reasonable time, he will

Ik' deemed to have affirmed it.

See Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150, Cas. Ag. 1S6; Hazard v.

Spears, 4 Keyes, 469, Cas. Ag. 182; Hamlin v. Sears, 82 N. Y. 327,

Cas. Ag. 136; Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen (Mass.) 447, Cas.

Ag. 110; Scott v. Railway Co., 86 N. Y. 200, Cas. Ag. 148; Central

R. & B. Co. v. Cheatham, 85 Ala. 292, 4 So. Rep. 828, 7 Am. St. Rep.

48; Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Cowell, 28 Pa. St. 329, 70 Am. Dec.

128; Augusta, etc., R. Co. v. Kittel, 52 Fed. Rep. 63, 2 C. C. A. 615;

Central Trust Co. v. Ashville Land Co., 72 Fed. Rep. 361, 18 C. C. A.

590; Union Switch Co. v. Johnson Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 940, 10 C. C. A.;

Raymond v. Palmer, 41 La. Ann. 425, 6 So. Rep. 692, 17 Am.

St. Rep. 398; Quinn v. Dresbach, 75 Cal. 159, 7 Am. St. Rep. 138.

This rule, according to the weight of au-

В§ 91. -

thority, applies whether the person who did the unau-

thorized act was an agent for other purposes or a mere

stranger who had volunteered to act as agent; though

ratification is less readily presumed where the person

was such a stranger.

See Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150, Cas. Ag. 186; Ladd v. Hilde-

brant, 27 Wis. 135, 9 Am. Rep. 445; Terry v. Provident Fund Society,

13 Ind. App. 1, 41 N. E. Rep. 18, 55 Am. St. Rep. 217.

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