Political Theories for Students

For example, by promoting direct lines of communication between citizens and all levels of government, Canada has managed to evolve a sense of community and nation in order to hold divergent populations together over time; Canadians have exploited the common experience of bordering the United States as one particular means of creating an identity as a people. Another aspect of Canadian federalism has contributed to the system’s success by allowing for the cultural survival of multiple traditions. The constitution allows for a decentralized mixture of judicial systems; common–law and civil–law mechanisms exist side–by–side in a complimentary, competitive relationship. This legal duality in part has enabled the survival of French–Canadian customs.

As in the United States, Canada enjoys a noncentralized party system. Unlike the U.S. two–party system, which allows for a number of different interests to cooperate loosely for common purposes in order to elect presidents, the Canadian parliamentary system requires that a given party must be much more cohesive and unified in order to win and maintain power. This means that leaders must transcend provincial, factional differences and find areas of consensus to push forward through policy. This push for truly national issues, then, enhances the stability of the federal structure and assists in the creation of unity across the provinces.

Unsuccessful Manifestations

Other systems have not been as successful as Canada or the United States in maintaining a federal structure. Many of the destructive problems faced by these governments appeared when one region or section of the nation gained too much power over the others and, in effect, could enforce its citizens will against the citizens of other states. The experience of nine- teenth–century Prussia illustrates this point well; in that case, Prussia became so dominant that no other states could gain the chance to offer national leadership or even contribute an alternative voice to public policy. The king and his decisions reflected the values and views of Prussia. Similarly, the Soviet Union faced the same concerns during the twentieth century. Despite the question of communism, the overwhelming power of Russia dominated the nation. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic represented three–fourths of the country’s territory and three–fifths of the country’s population. No other group—linguistic, ethnic, or geographic, not to mention political—could possibly compete with it for dominance in policy, and the federal system had little chance of survival.

The Canadian illustration of success and the Prussian and Soviet examples of failure are not the

only windows into federalism in practice, however. The theory continues to evolve and develop across the globe from Brazil to Switzerland, from Nigeria to Malaysia.

Balance

Federalism not only has different manifestations in different places, but it also has different manifestations in the same place over time. The United States is a prime example of a nation that has experienced dual federalism, cooperative federalism, creative federalism, and several new federalisms in its history. The relationship between the states and the national government involves a healthy amount of gray area. Take, for example, the issue of medical marijuana in the United States.

According to the federal Controlled Substances Act, marijuana is an illegal substance regardless of the conditions under which it is used; in other words, marijuana use for medical reasons and for personal pleasure are equally against the law. Between 1978 and 1996, however, legislatures in thirty–four states passed laws recognizing marijuana’s medicinal value. California, Arizona, Alaska, Oregon, Nevada, and Washington went a step further. Their state legislatures adopted initiatives that exempted patients who used marijuana under a physician’s care from facing criminal penalties relating to the possession and cultivation of marijuana for medicinal use. A tug–of–war developed between the states and the national government. The national government would not legalize the drug, but states said they would not prosecute certain offenders. The states pressured the national government to change its policy and vice–versa. There was no resolution.

Other controversial subjects offer similar examples. Some states recognize gay marriages while others do not, yet the U.S. Constitution seems to require a national standardization so that all states give “full faith and credit” to practices in other states; in short, a legally recognized marriage in Vermont, according to the Constitution, must also be so in Kansas. What is the role of the state? The nation? The changing relationship among government levels in the federalist system makes answers challenging.

Nations other than the United States also have explored the balance of federalism in their own systems. The Swiss Confederation, for example, united twenty–six cantons, the equivalent of states, and about three thousand communes together into a nation. The Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation was adopted in 1848 and revised in 1874 and 1999 with amendments in the interim. It established the federal

government’s responsibilities as those dealing with external and internal security, transportation and communication affairs, forestry, water, money, and social insurance programs. Each canton, however, had its own constitution, justice system, and infrastructure. Although the national law trumped canton law, much variation remained among laws in different cantons. Managing this balance, and also administering the army of this neutral country, remains a dynamic experiment in federalism.

Supreme Court rulings in the United States More than a century after Calhoun explained his vision of states’ rights federalism, the U.S. Supreme Court offered an opinion 180 degrees in the opposite direction, effectively overturning the Tenth Amendment. In the 1985 Garcia vs. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, in which the top court reversed a district court ruling and favored a federal agency’s ruling that a state mass transit authority was not immune from federal minimum wage and overtime requirements, Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the court opinion that no constitutional barriers limited federal regulation of state matters; if the national government were constrained, he said, it was by the political process, not by the letter of the law:

“...As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the continued role of the States is to say little about the nature of that role. Only recently, this Court recognized that the purpose of the constitutional immunity recognized in National League of Cities is not to preserve ‘a sacred province of state autonomy.’” EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S., at 236. With rare exceptions, like the guarantee, in Article IV, 3, of state territorial integrity, the Constitution does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace. James Wilson reminded the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787: “It is true, indeed, sir, although it presupposes the existence of state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose them to be the sole power to be respected.” Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2nd ed. 1876). According to Elliot:

The power of the Federal Government is a “power to be respected” as well, and the fact that the States remain sovereign as to all powers not vested in Congress or denied them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between state and federal power lies. In short, we have no license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under the Commerce Clause....

MAJOR WRITINGS:

The Federalist Papers

James Madison describes the U.S. system as part national and federal; this complements the theory of dual federalism that balances national and state authority without giving either the upper hand. Madison’s explanation comes from his work with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay in support of the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, The Federalist Papers, from 1787–1788. In Federalist #39, Madison writes:

First.—In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be introduced....

If we try the constitution by its last relation to that authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly national nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by States, not by citizens, it departs from the national and advances towards the federal character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the federal and partakes of the national character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, even when tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.

In short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.

The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States’ interests is apparent even today in the course of federal legislation....

We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of which has been the substitution of popular election of Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the States in the federal political process. Nonetheless, against this background, we are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the “States as States” is one of process rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a “sacred province of state autonomy.” EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S., at 236.

U.S. federalism is not stagnant, however. Only 10 years after the Garcia decision, the U.S. Supreme Court set a limit on the reach of the Commerce Clause for the first time in 60 years, carving out a constitutional space for states’ rights. Chief Justice William Rhenquist delivered the 1995 opinion on United States vs. Alfonso Lopez, Jr.:

We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See U. S. Const., Art. I, 8. As James Madison wrote, “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292–293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This constitutionally mandated division of authority “was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Ibid....

These are not precise formulations, and in the nature of things they cannot be. But we think they point the way to a correct decision of this case. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate

commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.

To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action. See supra, at 8. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, at 195, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local, cf. Jones and Laughlin Steel, supra, at 30. This we are unwilling to do.

Author David L. Shapiro points to Garcia in asserting that even on a national level, state considerations will be recognized.

When the Supreme Court held in Garcia that state employees were, after all, subject to federal minimum wage requirements, Congress was quick to respond with at least some relief—including permission to the states to afford compensatory time off instead of paying costly overtime rates that would otherwise be required by federal law. And the complaints voiced by many states that they are being forced to pay too large a share of the cost of many programs are clearly being heard in the halls of Congress.

The European Union

One of the most interesting federalist experiments is the European Union, an organization of western European nations that oversees the states’ economic and political integration and provides a framework for unified action in security and foreign policy matters. The European Union (EU) is the grandchild of the European Economic Community (EEC), which formed in 1957 in order to organize and integrate the economies of the western European nations. In 1967 the EEC merged with the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community to form the European Communities (EC). The financial success of the trade policies adopted by the EEC and then the EC persuaded member nations to consider further integration. In 1991, the Treaty on European Union created the EU out of the EC. Member states include Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden.

The Commission of the European Communities, led by twenty commissioners with at least one representing each nation in the Union, initiates and implements the Union’s legislation. The European Parlia-

ment (EP) acts as the EU’s legislative branch, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) serves as the EU’s judicial branch. The EU, then, serves as the highest level of government in this form of federalism, and the nations’ governments serve as the second level; in other words, the EU, were it compared to the U.S. system, would mirror the national government and the nations’ governments would parallel the states’ governments.

The EU’s judicial branch has been innovative in its federalism. As Nathan Griffith pointed out in his article “Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Political Safeguards, The Federal Majority, and Judicial Nullification” in the fall 2001 Humane Studies Review, the relationship between the ECJ and the national courts has opened the door for what John C. Calhoun would have loved: nullification. Whereas Calhoun imagined legislative nullification—a state’s legislature might declare the law the nation’s legislature made was un- constitutional—in the case of the EU, a national court such as Germany’s Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVG) might exercise judicial nullification. The BVG’s own judgments have opened the door.

Also, according to the BVG’s past judgments, as Griffith pointed out, Germany is bound by the EU’s laws because Germany binds itself. The opportunity for secession, the same withdrawal the Southern U.S. states attempted in the nineteenth century, remains open for EU members. Interestingly enough, the BVG recognized the older EC as a supranational government; it recognizes the EU as a federation of states. The growth of the nations’ power, then, contrasts with the opposite experience in the United States. The possibilities for judicial nullification and secession on the part of the member states further suggests that the balance of power would not soon shift away from the member nations to the EU itself.

Asked about the expected state of European Unity in the future, Oxford University historian Timothy Garton Ash said,

I think we will not have a clearly defined federal United States of Europe. We will muddle through as we are at the moment with a European law covering a single market, competition policy—broadly speaking economic Europe—and a strange mixture of intergovernmental and supranatural authority in other areas. It will be extremely mess. No schoolchild will be able to understand it in ten pages, but I think it will still be done.

Urgency, however, hastens many an agenda. The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 may force EU officials to more quickly address common criminal justice concerns.

BIOGRAPHY:

Johannes Althusius

Johannes Althusius is remembered as the father of federalism and a champion of popular sovereignty. The German political theorist studied philosophy and law in Switzerland before becoming a professor at the University of Herborn in Nassau. He wrote several works on law including an analysis of Roman legal thought, but his chief work was the 1603 Politica: Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples, which explored forms of human association. He determined there were five primary building blocks to human interaction: the family, the voluntary corporation, the local community, the province, and the state.

Althusius noted that each level existed independently. He described different arrangements of associations, and in the process articulated the first real theory of federalism. He believed federalism, with people sovereign through their associations, would best achieve national stability and unity. Associations, he continued, would only add to the happiness and quality of life of each member. The people, not the institutions, were his first concern.

Althusius rose to public office in Emden, East Friesland, later known as Germany, and died there in 1638. For some years his work disappeared from the minds of the academy, but his work was rediscovered and reprinted in the early twentieth century. His articulation of the theories of federalism and popular sovereignty remain milestones.

And, some of today’s more modern political systems bear the fingerprints of Althusius. “The revival of interest in Althusius in our time has accompanied the revival of possibilities in confederation,” professor Daniel J. Elazar writes.

The European Union is the leading example of postmodern confederation; there are now three or four others as well. Although Althusius himself does not develop a theory of confederation per se, his particular kind of federal thinking in which he sees his universal association as constituted by comprehensive organic communities has clearly had something to contribute to an emerging postmodern theory of confederation.

The attacks on America, wrote F. T. McCarthy in The Economist magazine, “have utterly changed the atmosphere.” He added:

National sensitivities about protecting old ways of doing things suddenly seem self–indulgent. Spurred on by this new mood, integrationists eager to set up a European police force and a European prosecutor and keen to agree on shared definitions of Euro–crimes suddenly sound more plausible.

Shortly after the attacks, Antonio Vitorino, the EU’s new justice commissioner and former deputy prime minister of Portugal, received the blessing of the EU governments to make provisions for a single European arrest warrant. The 15 member governments must ratify the changes.

“It does not burn my lips,” Vitorino says of the word federalism, though he quickly asserts his interest lies in criminal justice, not theory. While terrorism poses an immediate concern, Vitorino is said to be targeting cyber–crime, environmental infractions and financial–services fraud.

The experiences of the United States, the Swiss Confederation, and the European Union show how the dynamism and adaptability of federalism make its precious balance unstable; it also, however, ensures its longevity in some form.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICAL RESPONSE

Like many political theories, federalism is prettier in the abstract. Ideal forms do not encounter sectional divide, war, or depression. Federalism is delicate, history messy.

The theory of federalism has much to recommend it. Federalist theorists asked a number of important questions that some other theories do not take into account. How can unity be created out of many different groups? How can disparate people work together peacefully? How can a distant state know the needs of a local community? How can local communities provide large–scale services such as defense? How can individual rights be assured? How can citizens be protected from those who rule? How can the opportunity to abuse power be limited?

The theory’s Achilles’ heel lies in keeping the system once it is devised. Madison realized that striking the perfect balance between the state and national governments was only half the trick; the other half came in maintaining it. If a constitution divides sovereignty between nation and states, who ensures that neither side oversteps its boundary? Who watches over

the federal balance? Neither side could be trusted to do so, because either might take the opportunity to claim more power. Both sides require watching, but if both are suspect, who plays judge? The so–called “who watches the watchers?” dilemma lies at the heart of the federalist model.

Aspects of federalism, practically speaking, make sense. The division of sovereignty allows different levels of government to specialize, which creates efficiency. The national government can exploit economies of scale to provide services such as defense without being sidetracked by regional issues a distant government would not understand, and vice–versa.

Two practical problems affect federalism. If balance is delicate, how can a people be sure they haven’t tipped the scale too far one way or another? Even if the balance is workable, how can it be righted once the scales have tipped? Consider the Articles of Confederation. After their colonial experience with Great Britain, the former colonists understandably did not want to face the same problems with their new government. They tipped the balance of federalism toward the states’ authority. At the time, each of the provisions of the compact seemed reasonable.

Imposed Limitations

The Articles provided for a loose confederation united by one house of Congress. Since the British authorities had been too distant, then this government, by focusing power in the states, would remain close to home, able to interact with the people and see their needs. Only one house was needed because, frankly, there was not going to be much for it to do. One state received one vote in Congress because the Articles was a compact between states, not individuals, and no state wanted to be represented less than the others just because fewer people happened to live there.

Congress could request funds from states, but states maintained the power of the purse. After being taxed without representation, and for reasons unrelated to the colonies, the people believed granting the taxation power to a national government would lead to a repeat of the same grievances. Virginians did not want New Yorkers spending their money. By keeping taxation a state matter, Congress would have to prove the worth of its need beyond a shadow of a doubt before any state agreed to give funds, and in the meantime those who kept the coffers were the ones who had the locals’ best interest at heart.

“The taming of the continent’s vast distances by modern technology makes it difficult today to appreciate how the primeval wilderness appeared to the colonists,” constitutional author Raoul Berger wrote.

“When William Houston was sent from Georgia to the Constitutional Congress in 1785, he thought of himself as leaving his ‘country’ to go to ‘a strange land amongst Strangers’.”

“There are several responses available to a defender of a strong federal system—a system based on the states as presently constituted as at least an appropriate starting point for a diffusion of governmental authority that increases democratic participation and that recognizes individual and small group preferences,” wrote David L. Shapiro of federalism today.

First, California is, of course, the most populous and thus a highly atypical state. At the other end of the scale, such states as Wyoming and New Hampshire are sufficiently small that electors are likely to know their representative personally—at least their representative in the larger chamber of the state legislature—and are likely to have met and discussed issues with that representative on a number of occasions.

Under the Articles of Confederation, amendments required unanimous agreement of representatives from all states. Again, this is understandable; the colonists had rebelled against a system in which they did not feel represented. In the new system, everyone’s voice would be heard, and nothing would be done that would impact one group adversely. The Articles provided for no single leader; the Committee of States was the de–facto executive. In a society wary of monarchs, this solved the problem. Term limits, too, lessened fears that representatives would become an aristocracy. The decisions made in creating the Articles of Confederation followed from the experiences and concerns of the people.

Overall Failure

The federalist model, however, did not work. Many circumstances conspired against it, not the least of which was the terrible public and personal debt the War of Independence brought. The government began bankrupt; it never had a chance. Some historians and political scientists claim the Articles would have failed anyway, however, because the system tipped the balance too far in the direction of the states. Instead of unifying the states in post–victory camaraderie, the Articles allowed sectional conflict and petty jealousy swell while key problems affecting all the states remained unresolved. By the time it was obvious that change was imperative, leaders had given up on the government. The former colonists tried to strike the proper federalist balance, but it proved too delicate to find on the first try, and so difficult to repair that the entire compact was abandoned. The Articles of Confederation illustrate the practical difficulty of a system that requires a careful balance in order to succeed.

United States history offers other illustrations of the failure of federalist experiments. The Civil War came about when the balance of sectional interests at the national level destabilized and tore apart the nation. The “devolution revolution” of the 1980s proved that, even when the national government sought to limit its own power and return authority to the states, the old balance, once lost, could not be regained. The schizophrenia of the Garcia and Lopez decisions reflects an underlying uncertainty about what federalism really means when applied to the real world.

TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY

•How did the “interposition” of the 1950s resemble ”nullification” of the 1830s?

•In what ways did the Great Society differ from the New Deal?

•How is the European Union like the states under the Articles of Confederation?

•Look at the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, especially the section on the army. What federalism label best describes the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sources

Althusius, Johannes. Politica. Frederick S. Carney. Trans. and Ed. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995.

Anti–Federalist Papers. Available at http://www.constitution. org/afp/afp.htm.

Berger, Raoul. Federalism: The Founders’ Design. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987.

Calhoun, John C. Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun. Ross M. Lence, ed. Indianapolis, Liberty Fund: 1992.

Cayton, Andrew, Elisabeth Israels Perry, and Allan M. Winkler. America: Pathways to the Present. Needham, Massachusetts: Prentice Hall, 1995.

Diamond, Martin. “What the Framers Meant by Federalism.” From A Nation of States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1974). In O’Toole, Lawrence J. Jr., ed. American Intergovernmental Relations. Washington: CQ Press, 1993.

Elazar, Daniel J. “Althusius’ Grand Design for a Federal Commonwealth.” In Althusius, Johannes. Politica. Frederick S. Carney. Trans. and Ed. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995.

Griffith, Nathan. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Political Safeguards, The Federal Majority, and Judicial Nullification,” Humane Studies Review. 14:1 (Fall 2001). Available at http://www.humanestudiesreview.org.

Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. Clinton Rossiter, ed. New York: Mentor, 1961.

Hamilton, Christopher and Donald T. Wells. Federalism, Power, and Political Economy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990.

Johansen, Bruce E. Forgotten Founders: How the American Indian Helped Shape Democracy. Cambridge: The Harvard Common Press, 1982.

Kazin, Michael. The Populist Persuasion: An American History. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

McCarthy, F.T. “Europe: Antonio Vitorino.” The Economist,

September 29, 2001.

Miller, David, ed. The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Cambridge, Blackwell, 1991.

Nagorski, Andrew. “Towards a Europe of 27: Timothy Garton Ash on Enlarging the EU.” Newsweek, January 1, 2001.

Newmyer, R. Kent. John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001.

Shapiro, David L. Federalism: A Dialogue. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1995.

Storing, Herbert, ed. The Anti–Federalist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

Sturgis, Amy H. “’Liberty in Perfection’: Freedom in Native American Thought,” The Freeman (September 1999): 42–45.

Walker, David B. The Rebirth of Federalism: Slouching Toward Washington. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1995.

Further Readings

Althusius, Johannes. Politica. Frederick S. Carney. Trans. and Ed. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995.

Buchanan, James M. “Federalism and Individual Sovereignty,” The Cato Journal. 15:2–3 (Fall/Winter 1996). Available at http://www.constitution.org/afp/afp.htm. This work illustrates the ties between the idea of personal freedom and the political theory of federalism.

Drake, Frederick D. and Lynn R. Nelson, eds. States’ Rights and American Federalism: A Documentary History. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999. This book looks at the history of federalism in the United States and the contested nature of the relationship between the state and national governments.

Durland, William R. William Penn, James Madison, and the Historical Crisis in American Federalism. Lewiston, New York: E. Mellen Press, 2000. This work explores the Madisonian model of federalism and the theory’s crucial early years.

Ostrom, Vincent. The Meaning of America Federalism: Constituting A Self–Governing Society. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991. This book weighs the U.S. experience with federalism as an illustration of the theory in action.

Racheter, Donald P. and Richard E. Wagner, eds. Federalist Government in Principle and Practice. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. This book contrasts the ideal of federalism with the way it has evolved in actual institutions.

SEE ALSO

Liberalism

OVERVIEW

Few political systems have shown the adaptiveness and longevity of feudalism. This system, based on personal relationships, local administration, and defined hierarchies, touched several continents for more than 1,500 years. In some places it filled the void left by other political organizations; in others, it represented the next stage in the evolution of government. In both cases, feudalism grew out of practice and precedents. Theory followed experience. In all cases, a parallel code of values and aesthetics—chivalry in the West, bushido in the East—complemented and reinforced the system. Feudalism relied on personal and/or family honor as well as self–interest to work. Its informal and varied methods required a balance between superiors and dependents, rights and responsibilities. Though not in practice today, feudalism and the legends it inspired continue to fascinate many people.

HISTORY

Modern individuals often equate feudalism with the image of King Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table. Medieval Arthurian legends sprang from the feudal tradition and its code of chivalry, and as fruits of the system, do reflect on the values of feudalism itself. But the contemporary, Hollywood–inspired image of a strong king uniting a close–knit Camelot is not an accurate picture of feudalism. In fact, feudal-

Feudalism

WHO CONTROLS GOVERNMENT? Nobility

HOW IS GOVERNMENT PUT INTO POWER? Birth; feudal

contract

WHAT ROLES DO THE PEOPLE HAVE? Work for nobles’

benefit

WHO CONTROLS PRODUCTION OF GOODS? Nobility

WHO CONTROLS DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS? Nobility

MAJOR FIGURES William the Conqueror; Eleanor of

Aquitaine

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE Medieval England

CHRONOLOGY

410: Rome falls to Visigoth invasion.

507: The Frankish Merovingian Dynasty is established. The precaria develops during this time.

751: The Frankish Carolingian Dynasty is established. The benefit develops during this time.

1086: William I institutes the Oath of Salisbury, forcing vassals to swear fealty to the King.

1095–1291: Europeans forced join the Crusades to place Jerusalem under Christian control.

1138: Geoffrey of Monmouth completes History of the Kings of Britain.

1215: King John signs the Magna Carta.

1603: Ieyasu Tokugawa becomes shogun in Japan.

1945: The end of emperor worship erases the last vestige of Japanese feudalism.

ism grew because empires fell and kings were not strong. Local, decentralized, informal decision–mak- ing among individuals in the absence of powerful authorities led to the evolution of feudalism.

A Chaotic Time

The feudal system emerged out of a time of chaos in Europe. The rise of Augustus as the first Roman emperor had marked the beginning of the Roman Empire in 27 B.C. For 500 years, the empire provided stability and peace across a vast territory spanning three continents. Carefully constructed public works such as roads, bridges, and aqueducts united the lands physically, while personal allegiance and sometimes worship of the emperor united the people psychologically. Roman law became a universal standard, applicable even to commerce with non–Romans, and professional law schools ensured its uniformity and longevity. The death of Roman Emperor Theodosius I in 395 A.D. and the fall of Rome to the Visigoths in 410, however, spelled the beginning of the end for what had once been a unified West; the great Roman Empire and the peace it provided was no more. By 771, Charlemagne became ruler of a less vast but nonetheless impressive empire that stretched through France, Germany, and Italy, with the blessing and sup-

port of the Pope, but bitter civil wars after his death plunged Europe into disorder once again. Though the Church, based in Rome and led by the Pope, tried to fill the void left by the empire and provide central authority, protection, and law to the different peoples, it often faced internal strife and external obstacles. Invasions from the north, south, and east posed further threats to stability. This period is sometimes known as the Dark Ages, or, more properly, the Early Middle Ages.

Developing Order

As a response to the void of centralized authority, local areas began to develop or renew customs to help people live together in some kind of order. These customs included rules about duties and obligations: who owed what to whom, and when they owed it. Many of these customs were not new. For example, the Germanic peoples had developed a system known as the comitatus, or war band, by the time of the Roman Empire. In this group, the war chief owed his followers food for sustenance and spoils from the battles the group fought together. In return, the leader’s companions owed him their loyalty and fighting prowess without question. The comitatus system had never really disappeared, but it grew in practice in the Early Middle Ages as authority dissolved elsewhere. These customs had several key features: they were localized, not centralized; they were based on personal relationships; and they outlined hierarchies of people, from superiors to subordinates. These features represented the first forms of feudalism in practice.

Another example of an arrangement of this kind was practiced during the Merovingian era. The Merovingian dynasty began with Clovis I, a tribal chieftain who by 507 had built a Frankish, or French, empire stretching to Germany. Clovis united the Gallic clergy and institutionalized Christianity in his dynasty and lands. Though Clovis was a powerful ruler for his time, the authority he and his successors wielded was extremely limited. Most decisions about property and justice were decided locally by informal means. One such means, the proto–feudal legal custom of the precaria, developed under Merovingian rule. The precaria was an agreement under which one individual would give another the right to live and work on a piece of land for a limited amount of time, after which the land reverted back to the original owner. Clergy and lay people used the precaria for a variety of reasons, from escaping tax liabilities to rebuilding a home economy after a crop failure. This kind of temporary commendation, or vassalage, was a contract, and as such came with its own set of duties and obligations.

By 751 Charlemagne’s father, Pepin the Short, had replaced the Merovingians and founded the Carolingian dynasty of kings with the Pope’s blessing. The Carolingians also relied on decentralized means of maintaining order and therefore fostered the evolution of the feudal system. During the Carolingian period, the precaria developed into the benefit. Just as men had duties and obligations to their lords—pro- viding protection, arms, etc.—the lords also had duties and obligations to their men. Those in superior conditions had to provide for the sustenance and maintenance of their pledged dependents, or vassals. Some lords took in their dependent men as members of their households; others granted them land to work so they could support themselves. These positions or lands or offerings became known as benefits, the tangible evidence of the lord’s faithfulness and his recognition of his man’s loyalty. Under the Carolingians, a variation on this theme also evolved. A king might give the lord who supported him land from royal holdings, but the king might also ask other vassals—for instance, the Church—to grant his man some of their property. This became known as the precaria verbo regis, or grant at the king’s command. A vassal who received this precaria would owe service not to the most recent landholder, such as the Church, but to the king who arranged for the benefit. The complexity and characteristics of local duties and responsibilities—feudal- ism itself—took shape in the last years of the Carolingian era.

If local customs of duties and obligations anticipated the content of what would become feudalism, then certain events before the chaos of the Early Middle Ages anticipated the ceremony of what would become feudalism. One example is that of Tassilo’s commendation. Pepin the Short was uncle to Tassilo, a young boy and Duke of Bavaria. Though the Bavarian people did not wish to be under Carolingian rule, and Tassilo’s father had led an unsuccessful revolt against Pepin earlier, Pepin defended Tassilo’s duchy of Bavaria from usurpers and protected the young nobleman. In return, he demanded that Tassilo formally commend himself to Pepin in a public and permanent manner. In 757, Tassilo took his nobles to the general assembly meeting in Compiègne, and swore his loyalty to Pepin and Pepin’s successors. The ceremony was a complex one. Tassilo took Pepin’s hands in his and promised lifelong devotion. He touched religious relics—reportedly the bodies of Saints Denis, Germanus, and Martin, among others—as he promised his dedication to Pepin. Even the members of the Bavarian aristocracy who came with Tassilo had to swear loyalty oaths to Pepin and his sons. In this way, Tassilo showed he was subordinate and faithful to Pepin,

MAJOR WRITINGS:

History of the Kings of Britain

Geoffrey of Monmouth provided the feudal system with a set of heroes. A native of either Wales or Brittany, Geoffrey had a scholarly bent and became a bishop of St. Asaph in 1152. His major work was a chronicle of history called Historia regum Britanniae, or History of the Kings of Britain, which he completed in 1138. In this work he claimed to be translating a much older document brought by the Archdeacon of Oxford from Brittany, and he presented his book as an accurate portrayal of times past. In reality, however, scholars believe there was no older document and much of Geoffrey’s History came straight from his imagination.

This does not make his achievement any less important, however, for the popular History was read widely at the time (and still is today). Geoffrey provided readers with a list of larger–than–life figures, great kings and their great warriors, who related to each other in feudalistic ways. The heroic vassals performed their duties for their lords, and the lords in turn provided for their dependents. They embodied the chivalric virtues of courage, faithfulness, and loyalty. Geoffrey’s History included an account of King Arthur and his followers, described as if they were members of the Germanic comitatus, a war band bound together by mutual oaths and obligations. Another work attributed to Geoffrey, Vita Merlini, also influenced later tales of Arthur and Merlin.

Geoffrey influenced a generation of chroniclers in the Middle Ages such as Wace (1100?–1174) and Layamon (unknown, late twelfth, early thirteenth century) to preserve history and their perceptions of it. More importantly, however, he gave his audience a popular and enduring cast of characters who reflected the best of feudalism and its chivalric code. By blurring the line between fiction and non–fiction, he also started the mystery over the nature and truth of the historical King Arthur, the fact on which the legends were based. As one of the fathers of Arthurian literature, Geoffrey’s influence lives on today.