482 P A R T V |
International Finance and Monetary Policy |
funds available. By this time, the crises had gotten much worseÑand much larger sums of funds were needed to cope with the crisis, often stretching the resources of the IMF. One reason central banks can lend so much more quickly than the IMF is that they have set up procedures in advance to provide loans, with the terms and conditions for this lending agreed upon beforehand. The need for quick provision of liquidity, to keep the loan amount manageable, argues for similar credit facilities at the international lender of last resort, so that funds can be provided quickly, as long as the borrower meets conditions such as properly supervising its banks or keeping budget deficits low. A step in this direction was made in 1999 when the IMF set up a new lending facility, the Contingent Credit Line, so that it can provide liquidity faster during a crisis.
The debate on whether the world will be better off with the IMF operating as an international lender of last resort is currently a hot one. Much attention is being focused on making the IMF more effective in performing this role, and redesign of the IMF is at the center of proposals for a new international financial architecture to help reduce international financial instability.
International Considerations and Monetary Policy
Direct Effects of the Foreign
Exchange Market on the Money Supply
Our analysis in this chapter so far has suggested several ways in which monetary policy can be affected by international matters. Awareness of these effects can have significant implications for the way monetary policy is conducted.
When central banks intervene in the foreign exchange market, they acquire or sell off international reserves, and their monetary base is affected. When a central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market, it gives up some control of its money supply. For example, in the early 1970s, the German central bank faced a dilemma. In attempting to keep the German mark from appreciating too much against the U.S. dollar, the Germans acquired huge quantities of international reserves, leading to a rate of money growth that the German central bank considered inflationary.
The Bundesbank could have tried to halt the growth of the money supply by stopping its intervention in the foreign exchange market and reasserting control over its own money supply. Such a strategy has a major drawback when the central bank is under pressure not to allow its currency to appreciate: The lower price of imports and higher price of exports as a result of an appreciation in its currency will hurt domestic producers and increase unemployment.
Because the U.S. dollar has been a reserve currency, the U.S. monetary base and money supply have been less affected by developments in the foreign exchange market. As long as foreign central banks, rather than the Fed, intervene to keep the value of the dollar from changing, American holdings of international reserves are unaffected. The ability to conduct monetary policy is typically easier when a countryÕs currency is a reserve currency.9
9However, the central bank of a reserve currency country must worry about a shift away from the use of its currency for international reserves.
C H A P T E R 2 0 The International Financial System 485
special drawing rights (SDRs), p. 474 |
trade balance, p. 467 |
World Bank, p. 470 |
sterilized foreign exchange |
unsterilized foreign exchange inter- |
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intervention, p. 465 |
vention, p. 464 |
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Questions and Problems |
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QUIZ |
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Questions marked with an asterisk are answered at the end |
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gold and one franc is convertible into |
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ounce of |
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of the book in an appendix, ÒAnswers to Selected Questions |
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40 |
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gold? |
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and Problems.Ó |
7. |
If a countryÕs par exchange rate was undervalued |
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1. |
If the Federal Reserve buys dollars in the foreign |
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during the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate |
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exchange market but conducts an offsetting open mar- |
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regime, what kind of intervention would that coun- |
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ket operation to sterilize the intervention, what will be |
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tryÕs central bank be forced to undertake, and what |
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the impact on international reserves, the money sup- |
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effect would it have on its international reserves and |
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ply, and the exchange rate? |
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the money supply? |
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*2. |
If the Federal Reserve buys dollars in the foreign |
*8. |
How can a large balance-of-payments surplus con- |
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exchange market but does not sterilize the interven- |
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tribute to the countryÕs inflation rate? |
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tion, what will be the impact on international reserves, |
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ÒIf a country wants to keep its exchange rate from |
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the money supply, and the exchange rate? |
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changing, it must give up some control over its money |
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3. |
For each of the following, identify in which part of the |
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supply.Ó Is this statement true, false, or uncertain? |
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balance-of-payments account it appears (current |
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Explain your answer. |
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account, capital account, or method of financing) and |
*10. |
Why can balance-of-payments deficits force some |
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whether it is a receipt or a payment. |
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countries to implement a contractionary monetary |
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a. A British subjectÕs purchase of a share of Johnson & |
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policy? |
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Johnson stock |
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11. |
ÒBalance-of-payments deficits always cause a country |
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b. An AmericanÕs purchase of an airline ticket from |
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to lose international reserves.Ó Is this statement true, |
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Air France |
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false, or uncertain? Explain your answer. |
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c. The Swiss governmentÕs purchase of U.S. Treasury |
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bills |
*12. |
How can persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits |
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d. A JapaneseÕs purchase of California oranges |
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stimulate world inflation? |
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e. $50 million of foreign aid to Honduras |
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ÒInflation is not possible under the gold standard.Ó Is |
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f. A loan by an American bank to Mexico |
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this statement true, false, or uncertain? Explain your |
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g. An American bankÕs borrowing of Eurodollars |
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answer. |
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*4. |
Why does a balance-of-payments deficit for the United |
*14. |
Why is it that in a pure flexible exchange rate system, |
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States have a different effect on its international |
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the foreign exchange market has no direct effects on |
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reserves than a balance-of-payments deficit for the |
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the money supply? Does this mean that the foreign |
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Netherlands? |
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exchange market has no effect on monetary policy? |
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5. |
Under the gold standard, if Britain became more pro- |
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ÒThe abandonment of fixed exchange rates after 1973 |
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ductive relative to the United States, what would hap- |
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has meant that countries have pursued more inde- |
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pen to the money supply in the two countries? Why |
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pendent monetary policies.Ó Is this statement true, |
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would the changes in the money supply help preserve |
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false, or uncertain? Explain your answer. |
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a fixed exchange rate between the United States and |
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Britain? |
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*6. |
What is the exchange rate between dollars and Swiss |
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francs if one dollar is convertible into |
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ounce of |
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20 |
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C h a p t e r
21 Monetary Policy Strategy: The International Experience
PREVIEW
www.federalreserve.gov /centralbanks.htm
Features links to home pages for central banks around the world.
Getting monetary policy right is crucial to the health of the economy. Overly expansionary monetary policy leads to high inflation, which decreases the efficiency of the economy and hampers economic growth. The United States has not been exempt from inflationary episodes, but more extreme cases of inflation, in which the inflation rate climbs to over 100% per year, have been prevalent in some regions of the world such as Latin America, and have been very harmful to the economy. Monetary policy that is too tight can produce serious recessions in which output falls and unemployment rises. It can also lead to deflation, a fall in the price level, as occurred in the United States during the Great Depression and in Japan more recently. As we have seen in Chapter 8, deflation can be especially damaging to the economy, because it promotes financial instability and can even help trigger financial crises.
In Chapter 18 our discussion of the conduct of monetary policy focused primarily on the United States. However, the United States is not the source of all wisdom about how to do monetary policy well. In thinking about what strategies for the conduct of monetary policy might be best, we need to examine monetary policy experiences in other countries.
A central feature of monetary policy strategies in all countries is the use of a nominal anchor (a nominal variable that monetary policymakers use to tie down the price level such as the inflation rate, an exchange rate, or the money supply) as an intermediate target to achieve an ultimate goal such as price stability. We begin the chapter by examining the role a nominal anchor plays in promoting price stability. Then we examine three basic types of monetary policy strategyÑexchange-rate targeting, monetary targeting, and inflation targetingÑand compare them to the Federal ReserveÕs current monetary policy strategy, which features an implicit (not an explicit) nominal anchor. We will see that despite the recent excellent performance of monetary policy in the United States, there is much to learn from the foreign experience.
The Role of a Nominal Anchor
Adherence to a nominal anchor forces a nationÕs monetary authority to conduct monetary policy so that the nominal anchor variable such as the inflation rate or the money supply stays within a narrow range. A nominal anchor thus keeps the price level from growing or falling too fast and thereby preserves the value of a countryÕs
C H A P T E R 2 1 Monetary Policy Strategy: The International Experience 489
consistency problem in monetary policy by providing an expected constraint on discretionary policy. In the following sections, we examine three monetary policy strategiesÑ exchange-rate targeting, monetary targeting, and inflation targetingÑthat use a nominal anchor.
Exchange-Rate Targeting
Advantages of
Exchange-Rate
Targeting
Targeting the exchange rate is a monetary policy strategy with a long history. It can take the form of fixing the value of the domestic currency to a commodity such as gold, the key feature of the gold standard described in Chapter 20. More recently, fixed exchange-rate regimes have involved fixing the value of the domestic currency to that of a large, low-inflation country like the United States or Germany (called the anchor country). Another alternative is to adopt a crawling target or peg, in which a currency is allowed to depreciate at a steady rate so that the inflation rate in the pegging country can be higher than that of the anchor country.
Exchange-rate targeting has several advantages. First, the nominal anchor of an exchange-rate target directly contributes to keeping inflation under control by tying the inflation rate for internationally traded goods to that found in the anchor country. It does this because the foreign price of internationally traded goods is set by the world market, while the domestic price of these goods is fixed by the exchange-rate target. For example, until 2002 in Argentina the exchange rate for the Argentine peso was exactly one to the dollar, so that a bushel of wheat traded internationally at five dollars had its price set at five pesos. If the exchange-rate target is credible (i.e., expected to be adhered to), the exchange-rate target has the added benefit of anchoring inflation expectations to the inflation rate in the anchor country.
Second, an exchange-rate target provides an automatic rule for the conduct of monetary policy that helps mitigate the time-consistency problem. As we saw in Chapter 20, an exchange-rate target forces a tightening of monetary policy when there is a tendency for the domestic currency to depreciate or a loosening of policy when there is a tendency for the domestic currency to appreciate, so that discretionary, time-consistent monetary policy is less of an option.
Third, an exchange-rate target has the advantage of simplicity and clarity, which makes it easily understood by the public. A Òsound currencyÓ is an easy-to- understand rallying cry for monetary policy. In the past, this aspect was important in France, where an appeal to the Òfranc fortÓ (strong franc) was often used to justify tight monetary policy.
Given its advantages, it is not surprising that exchange-rate targeting has been used successfully to control inflation in industrialized countries. Both France and the United Kingdom, for example, successfully used exchange-rate targeting to lower inflation by tying the value of their currencies to the German mark. In 1987, when France first pegged its exchange rate to the mark, its inflation rate was 3%, two percentage points above the German inflation rate. By 1992, its inflation rate had fallen to 2%, a level that can be argued is consistent with price stability, and was even below that in Germany. By 1996, the French and German inflation rates had converged, to a number slightly below 2%. Similarly, after pegging to the German mark in 1990, the United Kingdom was able to lower its inflation rate from 10% to 3% by 1992, when it was forced to abandon the exchange rate mechanism (ERM, discussed in Chapter 20).
C H A P T E R 2 1 Monetary Policy Strategy: The International Experience 491
which dropped out of the ERM exchange-rate peg and adopted inflation targeting (discussed later in this chapter), had much better economic performance: economic growth was higher, the unemployment rate fell, and yet its inflation was not much worse than FranceÕs.
In contrast to industrialized countries, emerging market countries (including the so-called transition countries of Eastern Europe) may not lose much by giving up an independent monetary policy when they target exchange rates. Because many emerging market countries have not developed the political or monetary institutions that allow the successful use of discretionary monetary policy, they may have little to gain from an independent monetary policy, but a lot to lose. Thus, they would be better off by, in effect, adopting the monetary policy of a country like the United States through targeting exchange rates than by pursuing their own independent policy. This is one of the reasons that so many emerging market countries have adopted exchangerate targeting.
Nonetheless, exchange-rate targeting is highly dangerous for these countries, because it leaves them open to speculative attacks that can have far more serious consequences for their economies than for the economies of industrialized countries. Indeed, as we saw in Chapters 8 and 20, the successful speculative attacks in Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, and Argentina in 2002 plunged their economies into fullscale financial crises that devastated their economies.
An additional disadvantage of an exchange-rate target is that it can weaken the accountability of policymakers, particularly in emerging market countries. Because exchange-rate targeting fixes the exchange rate, it eliminates an important signal that can help constrain monetary policy from becoming too expansionary. In industrialized countries, particularly in the United States, the bond market provides an important signal about the stance of monetary policy. Overly expansionary monetary policy or strong political pressure to engage in overly expansionary monetary policy produces an inflation scare in which inflation expectations surge, interest rates rise because of the Fisher effect (described in Chapter 5), and there is a sharp decline in long-term bond prices. Because both central banks and the politicians want to avoid this kind of scenario, overly expansionary, time-consistent monetary policy will be less likely.
In many countries, particularly emerging market countries, the long-term bond market is essentially nonexistent. Under a flexible exchange-rate regime, however, if monetary policy is too expansionary, the exchange rate will depreciate. In these countries the daily fluctuations of the exchange rate can, like the bond market in United States, provide an early warning signal that monetary policy is too expansionary. Just as the fear of a visible inflation scare in the bond market constrains central bankers from pursuing overly expansionary monetary policy and also constrains politicians from putting pressure on the central bank to engage in overly expansionary monetary policy, fear of exchange-rate depreciations can make overly expansionary, time-consistent monetary policy less likely.
The need for signals from the foreign exchange market may be even more acute for emerging market countries, because the balance sheets and actions of the central banks are not as transparent as they are in industrialized countries. Targeting the exchange rate can make it even harder to ascertain the central bankÕs policy actions, as was true in Thailand before the July 1997 currency crisis. The public is less able to keep a watch on the central banks and the politicians pressuring it, which makes it easier for monetary policy to become too expansionary.