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494 P A R T V International Finance and Monetary Policy
Box 1: Global
Argentina’s Currency Board
Argentina has had a long history of monetary insta- |
licÕs behavior. Furthermore, because the currency |
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bility, with inflation rates fluctuating dramatically and |
board did not allow the central bank to create pesos |
sometimes surging to beyond 1,000% a year. To end |
and lend them to the banks, it had very little capability |
this cycle of inflationary surges, Argentina decided to |
to act as a lender of last resort. With help from interna- |
adopt a currency board in April 1991. The Argentine |
tional agencies, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and |
currency board worked as follows. Under ArgentinaÕs |
the Interamerican Development Bank, which |
convertibility law, the peso/dollar exchange rate was |
lent Argentina over $5 billion in 1995 to help shore up |
fixed at one to one, and a member of the public can |
its banking system, the currency board survived. |
go to the Argentine central bank and exchange a peso |
However, in 1998 Argentina entered another reces- |
for a dollar, or vice versa, at any time. |
sion, which was both severe and very long lasting. By |
The early years of ArgentinaÕs currency board |
the end of 2001, unemployment reached nearly 20%, |
looked stunningly successful. Inflation, which had |
a level comparable to that experienced in the United |
been running at an 800% annual rate in 1990, fell to |
States during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The |
less than 5% by the end of 1994, and economic |
result has been civil unrest and the fall of the elected |
growth was rapid, averaging almost 8% at an annual |
government, as well as a major banking crisis and a |
rate from 1991 to 1994. In the aftermath of the |
default on nearly $150 billion of government debt. |
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Mexican peso crisis, however, concern about the |
Because the Central Bank of Argentina had no control |
health of the Argentine economy resulted in the pub- |
over monetary policy under the currency board sys- |
lic pulling money out of the banks (deposits fell by |
tem, it was unable to use monetary policy to expand |
18%) and exchanging pesos for dollars, thus causing |
the economy and get out of its recession. Furthermore, |
a contraction of the Argentine money supply. The |
because the currency board did not allow the central |
result was a sharp drop in Argentine economic activ- |
bank to create pesos and lend them to banks, it had |
ity, with real GDP shrinking by more than 5% in 1995 |
very little capability to act as a lender of last resort. In |
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and the unemployment rate jumping above 15%. |
January 2002, the currency board finally collapsed |
Only in 1996 did the economy begin to recover. |
and the peso depreciated by more than 70%. The |
Because the central bank of Argentina had no con- |
result was the full-scale financial crisis described in |
trol over monetary policy under the currency board |
Chapter 8, with inflation shooting up and an extremely |
system, it was relatively helpless to counteract the con- |
severe depression. Clearly, the Argentine public is not |
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tractionary monetary policy stemming from the pub- |
as enamored of its currency board as it once was. |
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(or their central banks) do not have to pay interest on their currency, they earn rev- |
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enue (seignorage) by using this currency to purchase income-earning assets such as |
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bonds. In the case of the Federal Reserve in the United States, this revenue is on the |
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order of $30 billion per year. If an emerging market country dollarizes and gives up |
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its currency, it needs to make up this loss of revenue somewhere, which is not always |
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easy for a poor country. |
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Study Guide |
As a study aid, the advantages and disadvantages of exchange-rate targeting and the |
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other monetary policy strategies are listed in Table 1. |
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C H A P T E R 2 1 Monetary Policy Strategy: The International Experience 497
Japan. The increase in oil prices in late 1973 was a major shock for Japan, which experienced a huge jump in the inflation rate, to greater than 20% in 1974Ña surge facilitated by money growth in 1973 in excess of 20%. The Bank of Japan, like the other central banks discussed here, began to pay more attention to money growth rates. In 1978, the Bank of Japan began to announce ÒforecastsÓ at the beginning of each quarter for M2 CDs. Although the Bank of Japan was not officially committed to monetary targeting, monetary policy appeared to be more money-focused after 1978. For example, after the second oil price shock in 1979, the Bank of Japan quickly reduced M2 CDs growth, rather than allowing it to shoot up as occurred after the first oil shock. The Bank of Japan conducted monetary policy with operating procedures that were similar in many ways to those that the Federal Reserve has used in the United States. The Bank of Japan uses the interest rate in the Japanese interbank market (which has a function similar to that of the federal funds market in the United States) as its daily operating target, just as the Fed has done.
The Bank of JapanÕs monetary policy performance during the 1978Ð1987 period was much better than the FedÕs. Money growth in Japan slowed gradually, beginning in the mid-1970s, and was much less variable than in the United States. The outcome was a more rapid braking of inflation and a lower average inflation rate. In addition, these excellent results on inflation were achieved with lower variability in real output in Japan than in the United States.
In parallel with the United States, financial innovation and deregulation in Japan began to reduce the usefulness of the M2 CDs monetary aggregate as an indicator of monetary policy. Because of concerns about the appreciation of the yen, the Bank of Japan significantly increased the rate of money growth from 1987 to 1989. Many observers blame speculation in Japanese land and stock prices (the so-called bubble economy) on the increase in money growth. To reduce this speculation, in 1989 the Bank of Japan switched to a tighter monetary policy aimed at slower money growth. The aftermath was a substantial decline in land and stock prices and the collapse of the bubble economy.
The 1990s and afterwards has not been a happy period for the Japanese economy. The collapse of land and stock prices helped provoke a severe banking crisis, discussed in Chapter 11, that has continued to be a severe drag on the economy. The resulting weakness of the economy has even led to bouts of deflation, promoting further financial instability. The outcome has been an economy that has been stagnating for over a decade. Many critics believe that the Bank of Japan has pursued overly tight monetary policy and needs to substantially increase money growth in order to lift the economy out of its stagnation.
Germany and Switzerland. The two countries that officially engaged in monetary targeting for over 20 years starting at the end of 1974 were Germany and Switzerland, and this is why we will devote more attention to them. The success of monetary policy in these two countries in controlling inflation is the reason that monetary targeting still has strong advocates and is an element of the official policy regime for the European Central Bank (see Box 2).
The monetary aggregate chosen by the Germans was a narrow one they called central bank money, the sum of currency in circulation and bank deposits weighted by the 1974 required reserve ratios. In 1988, the Bundesbank switched targets from central bank money to M3. The Swiss began targeting the M1 monetary aggregate, but in 1980 switched to the narrower monetary aggregate, M0, the monetary base.
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498 P A R T V International Finance and Monetary Policy
Box 2: Global
The European Central Bank’s Monetary Policy Strategy
The European Central Bank (ECB) has adopted a |
The ECBÕs strategy is somewhat unclear and has |
hybrid monetary policy strategy that has much in |
been subjected to criticism for this reason. Although |
common with the monetary targeting strategy previ- |
the 0Ð2% range for the goal of price stability sounds |
ously used by the Bundesbank but also has some ele- |
like an inflation target, the ECB has not been willing |
ments of inflation targeting. The ECBÕs strategy has |
to live with this interpretationÑit has repeatedly |
two key Òpillars.Ó First is a prominent role for mone- |
stated that it does not have an inflation target. On the |
tary aggregates with a Òreference valueÓ for the growth |
other hand, the ECB has downgraded the importance |
rate of a monetary aggregate (M3). Second is a |
of monetary aggregates in its strategy by using the |
broadly based assessment of the outlook for future |
term Òreference valueÓ rather than ÒtargetÓ in describ- |
price developments with a goal of price stability |
ing its strategy and has indicated that it will also |
defined as a year-on-year increase in the consumer |
monitor broadly based developments on the price |
price index below 2%. After critics pointed out that a |
level. The ECB seems to have decided to try to have |
deflationary situation with negative inflation would |
its cake and eat it too by not committing too strongly |
satisfy the stated price stability criteria, the ECB pro- |
to either a monetary or an inflation-targeting strategy. |
vided a clarification that inflation meant positive |
The resulting difficulty of assessing what the ECBÕs |
inflation only, so that the price stability goal should |
strategy is likely to be has the potential to reduce the |
be interpreted as a range for inflation of 0Ð2%. |
accountability of this new institution. |
The key fact about monetary targeting regimes in Germany and Switzerland is that the targeting regimes were very far from a Friedman-type monetary targeting rule in which a monetary aggregate is kept on a constant-growth-rate path and is the primary focus of monetary policy. As Otmar Issing, at the time the chief economist of the Bundesbank has noted, ÒOne of the secrets of success of the German policy of moneygrowth targeting was that ... it often did not feel bound by monetarist orthodoxy as far as its more technical details were concerned.Ó2 The Bundesbank allowed growth outside of its target ranges for periods of two to three years, and overshoots of its targets were subsequently reversed. Monetary targeting in Germany and Switzerland was instead primarily a method of communicating the strategy of monetary policy focused on long-run considerations and the control of inflation.
The calculation of monetary target ranges put great stress on making policy transparent (clear, simple, and understandable) and on regular communication with the public. First and foremost, a numerical inflation goal was prominently featured in the setting of target ranges. Second, monetary targeting, far from being a rigid policy rule, was quite flexible in practice. The target ranges for money growth were missed on the order of 50% of the time in Germany, often because of the BundesbankÕs concern about other objectives, including output and exchange rates. Furthermore, the Bundesbank demonstrated its flexibility by allowing its inflation goal to vary over time and to converge gradually to the long-run inflation goal.
2Otmar Issing, ÒIs Monetary Targeting in Germany Still Adequate?Ó In Monetary Policy in an Integrated World Economy: Symposium 1995, ed. Horst Siebert (TŸbingen: Mohr, 1996), p. 120.
C H A P T E R 2 1 Monetary Policy Strategy: The International Experience 499
When the Bundesbank first set its monetary targets at the end of 1974, it announced a medium-term inflation goal of 4%, well above what it considered to be an appropriate long-run goal. It clarified that this medium-term inflation goal differed from the long-run goal by labeling it the Òunavoidable rate of price increase.Ó Its gradualist approach to reducing inflation led to a period of nine years before the mediumterm inflation goal was considered to be consistent with price stability. When this occurred at the end of 1984, the medium-term inflation goal was renamed the Ònormative rate of price increaseÓ and was set at 2%. It continued at this level until 1997, when it was changed to 1.5 to 2%. The Bundesbank also responded to negative supply shocks, restrictions in the supply of energy or raw materials that raise the price level, by raising its medium-term inflation goal: specifically, it raised the unavoidable rate of price increase from 3.5% to 4% in the aftermath of the second oil price shock in 1980.
The monetary targeting regimes in Germany and Switzerland demonstrated a strong commitment to clear communication of the strategy to the general public. The money growth targets were continually used as a framework to explain the monetary policy strategy, and both the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank expended tremendous effort in their publications and in frequent speeches by central bank officials to communicate to the public what the central bank was trying to achieve. Given that both central banks frequently missed their money growth targets by significant amounts, their monetary targeting frameworks are best viewed as a mechanism for transparently communicating how monetary policy is being directed to achieve inflation goals and as a means for increasing the accountability of the central bank.
The success of GermanyÕs monetary targeting regime in producing low inflation has been envied by many other countries, explaining why it was chosen as the anchor country for the exchange rate mechanism. One clear indication of GermanyÕs success occurred in the aftermath of German reunification in 1990. Despite a temporary surge in inflation stemming from the terms of reunification, high wage demands, and the fiscal expansion, the Bundesbank was able to keep these temporary effects from becoming embedded in the inflation process, and by 1995, inflation fell back down below the BundesbankÕs normative inflation goal of 2%.
Monetary targeting in Switzerland has been more problematic than in Germany, suggesting the difficulties of targeting monetary aggregates in a small open economy that also underwent substantial changes in the institutional structure of its money markets. In the face of a 40% trade-weighted appreciation of the Swiss franc from the fall of 1977 to the fall of 1978, the Swiss National Bank decided that the country could not tolerate this high a level of the exchange rate. Thus, in the fall of 1978, the monetary targeting regime was abandoned temporarily, with a shift from a monetary target to an exchange-rate target until the spring of 1979, when monetary targeting was reintroduced (although not announced).
The period from 1989 to 1992 was also not a happy one for Swiss monetary targeting, because the Swiss National Bank failed to maintain price stability after it successfully reduced inflation. The substantial overshoot of inflation from 1989 to 1992, reaching levels above 5%, was due to two factors. The first was that the strength of the Swiss franc from 1985 to 1987 caused the Swiss National Bank to allow the monetary base to grow at a rate greater than the 2% target in 1987 and then caused it to raise the money growth target to 3% for 1988. The second arose from the introduction of a new interbank payment system, Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC), and a wideranging revision of the commercial banksÕ liquidity requirements in 1988. The result
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