huntigton

existent,theroleof thepartyis entirelydifferentfromwhat it is in thosepolitieswithinstitutionalcontinuityIn. such situations,strong partyorganizationis theonlylong-runalternativeto theinstabilityof a corruptor praetorianor mass societyThe. partyis not just a supplementaryorganization;it is insteadthe sourceof legitimacyand authorityIn. the absenceof traditionalsourcesof legitimacy,legitimacyis soughtin ideology,charisma,popularsovereigntyTo. be lasting, each of theseprinciplesof legitimacymustbe embodiedin a party.Insteadof thepartyreflectingthe state,the statebecomesthe creationof the partyand the instrumentof the party.The actions ofgovernmentare legitimateto theextentthattheyreflectthewill of thepartyThe. partyisthesourceoflegitimacybecauseitis theinstitutionalembodimentof nationalsovereignty,the popularwill, or the dictatorshipof the proletariat.

Where traditionalpoliticalinstitutionsare weak or non-existent, theprerequisiteof stabilityis at leastone highlyinstitutionalizedpoliticalparty.Stateswithonesuchpartyaremarkedlymorestablethan stateswhichlack sucha party.Stateswithno partiesor manyweak partiesare the least stable.Where traditionalpoliticalinstitutions are smashedby revolution,post-revolutionaryorderdependson the emergenceof one strongparty:witnessthe otherwiseverydifferent historiesof the Chinese,Mexican,Russian,and Turkishrevolutions. Wherenew statesemergefromcolonialismwithone strongparty,the problemis to maintainthe strengthof thatparty.In manyAfrican countriesthenationalistpartywas thesingleimportantmodernorganizationto existbeforeindependenceThe. party"was generallywell organized.The conditionsofthepoliticalstruggleand thededication of the top elite to the partyas the primeinstrumentof political changeled the eliteto give themajor portionof theirenergiesand resourcesto building a solid, responsiveorganizationcapable of disciplinedactionin responseto directivesfromthe top and able to ferretoutand exploitfeelingsofdissatisfactionamongthemassesfor politicalends."'"Afterindependence,however,thedominantpolitical partyisoftenweakenedbythemanycompetingdemandson organizationalresourcesA. markeddispersionofresourcesmeansa declinein the overalllevel of politicalinstitutionalization"Talents. thatonce were availableforthe crucialwork of partyorganization,"one observerhaswarned,"maynowbe preoccupiedwithrunninga ministry or governmentbureau.... Unless new sourcesof loyal organizational

7'William J.Foltz,"BuildingtheNewestNations:Short-RunStrategiesand LongRun Problems,"in Deutschand Foltz,eds.,Nation-Building,121.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

andadministrativetalentscanbe foundimmediately,theparty'sor- ganization-and,therefore,themajorlinkbetweentheregimeand themasses-islikelytobeweakened."72

Theneedforconcentrationappliesnotonlytotheallocationofresourcesamongtypesoforganizationsbutalsotothescopeoforganization.In manymodernizingcountries,thepoliticalleadersattempttoo muchtoofast;theytrytobuildmassorganizationswhentheyshould concentrate eliteorganizationsOrganizations.do nothaveto be largeto be effectiveand to playa crucialrole in the political process:theBolshevikPartyin 1917 is oneexample;theIndianCivil Service(whichnumberedonly1,157menatindependence)isanother. Overextensionofone'sresourcesin organization-buildingisas dangerousas overextensionofone'stroopsin a militarycampaign(The. strategichamletprogramin SouthVietnamis an exampleofboth.) Concentrationisa keyprincipleofpoliticsas wellas strategyThe. pressuresforbroadorganizationalsupport,however,seemto push towardstheall-inclusiveorganizationIn. hiseffortstocreate political structureto bolsterhismilitaryregimein Egypt,forinstance, NasserfirstcreatedtheLiberationRallyin I953, whichsooncameto havefrom5 to6 millionmembersThe. organizationwassimplytoo bigtobeeffectiveandtoachieveitspurposeAfter.theadoptionofa newconstitutionin i956, theLiberationRallywas replacedbythe NationalUnion,whichwasdesignedtobe theschoolofthenation and also to be universalin membership(exceptforreactionaries).

Againtheorganizationwastoobroadtobe effectiveHence.in i962, afterthebreakwithSyria,a neworganization,theArabSocialist Union,wasorganizedwiththeadviceoforganizationalandideologicalexpertsfromYugoslaviaIt. wasdesignedtobe a moreexclusive,

moretightlyorganizedbody,itsmembershiplimitedto io percent of thepopulationInevitably,.however,it also mushroomedin size, andaftertwoyearsithad5 millionmembersIn. a fourtheffort,early ini964 PresidentNasserreportedlyformedstillanothergrouplimited to only4,000 membersand calledthe"GovernmentParty,"which wouldformthecoreoftheArabSocialistUnion.The neworganizationwas to be designedbyNasser"to enforcea peacefultransfer ofpowerand a continuationofhispoliciesifanythinghappensto him."7"Whetherthisorganization,unlikeitspredecessors,becomes an institutionremainsto be seen.Its likelihoodof successdepends uponitslimitationinsize.

72Ibid., 123-24.

73WashingtonPost,February9, i964,p. A-i7.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Americansocialscientistshavedevotedmuchattentiontothecompetitivenessofpoliticalsystems,devisingvariouswaysofmeasuring thatcompetitivenessandclassifyingsystemsaccordingtotheirdegree ofcompetitivenessThe.74morepartieswhichexistwithina system, presumablythemorecompetitiveis.Yettheproliferationofparties usuallymeansthedispersionof organizationand leadershiptalents andtheexistenceofa largenumberofweakpartiesIf. sufficientre.

sourcesareavailabletosupportmorethanonewell-organizedparty, thisis all tothegood.Butmostmodernizingcountrieswillbe well

offiftheycancreatejustonestrongpartyorganizationIn. modernize ing systems,partyinstitutionalizationusuallyvariesinverselywith partycompetitivenessModernizing.stateswithmultipartysystems aremuchmoreunstableandpronetomilitaryinterventionthanmodernizingstateswithoneparty,withonedominantparty,orwithtwo partiesThe. mostunstablesystemsandthosemostpronetomilitary

SOURCE: Figuresare somewhatrevisedand adaptedfromthesimilartablein Fred R. von der Mehden,Politicsof the DevelopingNations (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.,

i964), 65.

interventionarethemultipartysystemsandtheno-partysystemsThe. weakinstitutionalizationofpartiesin themultipartysystemmakes thatsystemextremelyfragileThe. stepfrommanypartiesto no partiesandfromno partiestomanypartiesis an easyone.In their institutionalweakness,theno-partysystemandthemultipartysystem closelyresembleeachother.

74See JamesS. Coleman,in Almondand Coleman,eds.,Politicsof theDeveloping Areas,Conclusion;PhillipsCutright,"NationalPoliticalDevelopment:Its Measure, mentand Social Correlates,"in NelsonW. Polsby,RobertA. Dentler,and Paul A. Smith,eds.,Politicsand Social Life (Bostoni963), 569-82;von derMehden,Politics of theDevelopingNations,54-64.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND AMERICAN POLICY

The Bolshevikconceptofthepoliticalpartyis directlyrelevantto modernizingcountriesItprovides.a consciousandexplicitanswerto theproblemofmobilizationvs.institutionalizationThe.Communists activelyattemptto expandpoliticalparticipationAt. thesametime theyarethemostenergeticandintensecontemporarystudentsofde Tocqueville's"artofassociatingtogetherTheir."specialtyisorganization,theirgoalthemobilizationofthemassesintotheirorganizations. For themmobilizationand organizationgo handin hand."There areonlytwokindsofpoliticaltasks," leadingChineseCommunist theoristhassaid:"oneis thetaskofpropagandaandeducation,the otheristhetaskoforganization.The"75partyisinitiallyhighlyselect groupofthosewhohaveachievedtheproperdegreeofrevolutionary consciousnessIt.expandsgraduallyasitisabletowinthesupportand participationof othersPeripheral.organizationsand frontgroups providean organizationalladderforthegradualmobilizationand indoctrinationofthosewhoin duecoursebecomefull-fledgedparty membersIf. thepoliticalstruggletakestheformof revolutionary war,mobilizationoccurson a gradualterritorialbasisas villageafter villageshiftsin statusfromhostilecontrolto contestedarea to guerrillaareato basearea.The theoryis selectivemobilization;the politicalinvolvementof masseswho havenot reachedtheproper levelof revolutionaryconsciousnesscan onlybenefitreactionThe. "opportunist"Menshevik,Leninwarned,"strivesto proceedfrom thebottomupward,and,therefore,whereverpossibleand as faras possible,upholdsautonomismand 'democracy'. . ." The Bolshevik, on theotherhand,"strivestoproceedfromthetopdownward,and upholdsan extensionoftherightsandpowersofthecenterin relationtotheparts."76

Communistdoctrinethusrecognizestheneedtobalancemobilizationandorganizationand stressesthepartyas thekeyto political stabilityThe.Americanapproach,on theotherhand,tendstoignore therequirementsofpoliticalorganizationand to deprecatetheimportanceofpartyAmerican.attitudesarerootedin thesecondary,instrumentalroleofpartyin theAmericanconstitutionalsystemIn. addition,Americandistasteforpoliticsleadsto an emphasison the

75Ai Ssu-chi,quoted in FrederickT. C. Yu, "Communicationsand Politicsin CommunistChina,"in Pye,ed., Communicationsand PoliticalDevelopment,26i-62.

76 V. I. Lenin,One StepForward,Two StepsBack (The Crisisin Our Party),in CollectedWorks(Finebergand Jocheltrans.,London i96i), 396-97.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

outputaspectsof the politicalsystem.The stress,as Lucian Pye haspointedout,hasbeenon theefficientadministratorratherthanthe wilypolitician.77Aid missionsadvisegovernmentson administrative organizationand economicplanning,but seldomdo theyadvisepoliticalleaderson how to createa strongparty.To meettheproblems ofinterestaggregation,Americanshaveresortedtoa varietyofalternativesto politicalorganizationSome. Americanshave urgedthatthe military,as thestrongestorganizationin manymodernizingcountries, shouldassumea major role in the responsibilitiesof government.78 At timesAmericanpolicyhas reliedon individualpoliticalleaders, suchas Magsaysay,Diem,orAyubKhan. Alternatively,theAmerican governmenthas stressedadherencetoparticularstructuralforms,such as freeelections.

All of theseapproachesare doomed to failure.Neithermilitary juntasnor charismaticpersonalitiesnor freeelectionscan be a longtermsubstituteforeffectivepoliticalorganizationCharismatic.leaders are reluctantto substitutepartycontrolforpersonalcontrol.Military officersare usuallyevenmoreexplicitlyanti-partyThey. contrastthe venalpartypoliticsof the civilianswiththe honestdevotionto the nationof themilitaryMilitary.coups and militaryjuntasmay spur modernization,but theycannotproducea stablepoliticalorder.Insteadofrelyingon themilitary,Americanpolicyshouldbe directedto thecreationwithinmodernizingcountriesofat leastone strongnonCommunistpoliticalparty.If sucha partyalreadyexistsand is in a dominantposition,supportof thatpartyshouldbe the keystoneof policy.Where politicallife is fragmentedand many small parties exist,Americanbackingshould go to the strongestof the parties whose goals are compatiblewith ours.If it is a choicebetweena partyand a personality,choose the party:betterthe Baath than Nasser.Whereno partiesexistand the government(whethertraditional,military,or charismatic)is reasonablycooperativewith the UnitedStates,Americanmilitary,economic,and technicalassistance shouldbeconditioneduponthegovernment'smakingeffortstodevelop

astrongsupportingpartyorganization.

Severalyearsago GuyPaukerwarnedthat"Whatis mosturgently

77 Pye,Politics,Personalityand Nation Building,297-30I;

Implicationsof Social Change in Non-WesternSocieties"(M.I.T. CenterforInter-

nationalStudies,CambridgeI957, mimeo.), 69-80.

78 GuyJ.Pauker,"SoutheastAsia as a ProblemArea in theNextDecade," World Politics,xi (AprilI959), 325-45; Lucian W. Pye,"Armiesin theProcessof Political Modernization,"in JohnJ.Johnson,ed., The Role of theMilitaryin Underdeveloped

Countries(Princetoni962), 69-go.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

neededinSoutheastAsiatodayisorganizationalstrength.Organiza"79tionalstrengthis also themosturgentneedin southernAsia,the MiddleEast,Africa,andLatinAmericaUnless.thatneedismetwith Americansupport,thealternativesinthoseareasremain corruptpoliticalsystemora Communistone.

79Pauker,WorldPolitics,XI,343.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions