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differencein perspectivewhichlegitimizesthedemandswhichthe officeholdermakeson hisfellowcitizensThe. interestsofthePresident,forinstance,maycoincidepartiallyand temporarilyfirstwith thoseofonegroupandthenwiththoseofanotherBut.theinterest ofthePresidency,asNeustadthasemphasized,54coincideswiththat ofno oneelse.The President'spowerderivesnotfromhisrepresentationofclass,group,regional,orpopularinterests,butratherfrom thefactthatherepresentsnoneoftheseThe.Presidentialperspective isuniquetothePresidencyPrecisely.forthisreason,itisbotha lonely officeanda powerfulone.Itsauthorityisrootedin itsloneliness.
The existenceof politicalinstitutions(suchas thePresidencyor Presidium)capableof givingsubstanceto publicinterestsdistinguishespoliticallydevelopedsocietiesfromundevelopedones.The "ultimatetestofdevelopment,"asLucianPyehassaid,"isthecapacity ofa peopletoestablishandmaintainlarge,complex,butflexibleorganizationalforms."5"Theleveloforganizationinmuchoftheworld, however,is low."Exceptin Europeand America,"Banfieldnotes, "theconcertingofbehaviorin politicalassociationsandcorporateorganizationsis a rareandrecentthing."56The abilitytocreatepublic organizationsandpoliticalinstitutionsisinshortsupplyintheworld today.It is thisabilitywhich,aboveall else,theCommunistsoffer modernizingcountries.
DEGENERATION AND THE CORRUPT POLITY
Mostmodernizingcountriesarebuyingrapidsocialmodernization at thepriceofpoliticaldegenerationThis.processofdecayin politicalinstitutions,however,hasbeenneglectedoroverlookedin much oftheliteratureon modernizationAs. a result,modelsandconcepts whicharehopefullyentitled"developing"or"modernizing"areoften onlypartiallyrelevantto thecountriesto whichtheyare applied. Morerelevantin manycaseswouldbe modelsofcorruptor degeneratingsocieties,highlightingthedecayofpoliticalorganizationand theincreasingdominanceofdisruptivesocialforcesWho,.however, hasadvancedsucha theoryofpoliticaldecayora modelofa corrupt politicalorderwhichmightbeusefulin analyzingthepoliticalprocessesofthecountriesthatareusuallycalled"developing"?Perhaps themostrelevantideasarethemostancientones.The evolutionof
54See RichardE. Neustadt,PresidentialPower (New York i960), passim,butesp.
33-37, I50-51.
65 Pye,Politics,Personalityand NationBuilding,51.
58 EdwardC. Banfield,The MoralBasisofa BackwardSociety(Glencoe,Ill., I958),
7-9, I5ff.
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manycontemporarynew states,oncethecolonialguardianshave departed,has not deviatedextensivelyfromthePlatonicmodel. Independenceis followedbymilitarycoupsas the"auxiliaries"takeover.57 Corruptionbytheoligarchyinflamestheenvyof risinggroups.Conflictbetweenoligarchyand masseseruptsintocivilstrifeDemagogues. and streetmobspave the way forthe despot.Plato's descriptionof the means by whichthe despotappeals to the people,isolatesand eliminateshis enemies,and buildsup his personalstrengthis a far less misleadingguide to what has takenplace in Ghana and other new statesthanmanythingswrittenyesterday.58
Plato is one of thefewtheorists,ancientor contemporary,witha highlyexplicittheoryof politicaldegeneration.59The conceptof a "corruptsociety,"however,is a morefamiliarone in politicaltheory. Typicallyit refersto a societywhichlacks law, authority,cohesion, discipline,and consensus,whereprivateinterestsdominatepublicones, wherethereis an absenceof civicobligationand civicduty,where, in short,politicalinstitutionsareweakand socialforcesstrongPlato's. degeneratestatesare dominatedby variousformsof appetite:by force,wealth,numbers,and charisma."Those constitutions,"says Aristotle,"whichconsideronlythepersonalinterestof therulersare all wrongconstitutions,or perversionsof therightforms.""So also, Machiavelli'sconceptof thecorruptstate,in thewordsof one commentator,"includesall sortsof licenseand violence,greatinequalities ofwealthand power,thedestructionofpeaceand justice,thegrowth ofdisorderlyambition,disunion,lawlessness,dishonesty,and contempt forreligion."'Modernequivalentsof theclassicalcorruptsocietyare Kornhauser'stheoryof themasssociety(where,in theabsenceof institutions,elitesare accessibleto massesand massesare availablefor
57For commentson theshorttimelag betweenindependenceand the firstcoup, see DankwartA. Rustow,"The Militaryin MiddleEasternSocietyand Politics,"in SydneyN. Fisher,ed., The Militaryin the Middle East: Problemsin Societyand
Government(Columbus,Ohio, i963), I0.
58See, in general,The Republic,Book viii, and especiallythe descriptionof the despoticregime(Cornfordtrans.New, York I945), 29I-93.
59Perhapsthe closestcontemporarymodel comesnot froma social scientistbut froma novelist:William Golding.The schoolboys(newly independentelites) of The Lord of the Flies initiallyattemptto imitatethe behaviorpatternsof adults
(formerWesternrulers).Disciplineand consensus,however,disintegrateA. demagogic militaryleaderand his followersgain or coercethe supportof a majority. The symbolof authority(theconch) is broken.The voicesof responsibility(Ralph) and reason(Piggy) are desertedand harassed,and reasonis destroyedIn. the end, the naval officer(BritishMarineCommandos)arrivesjust in timeto save Ralph (Nyerere)fromthe "hunters"(mutinoustroops).
60 Politics,II2.
61 GeorgeH. Sabine,A HistoryofPoliticalThought(rev.edn.,New YorkI950), 343.
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mobilizationbytheelite)and Rapoport'sconceptof thepraetorian statewhere"privateambitionsarerarelyrestrainedbya senseofpublicauthority;[and]theroleofpower(i.e.,wealthandforce)ismaximized."62Typicalofthecorrupt,praetorian,masssocietiesis the violentoscillationbetweenextremedemocracyandtyranny"Where. thepre-establishedpoliticalauthorityishighlyautocratic,"saysKorn- hauser,"rapidandviolentdisplacementofthatauthoritybya democraticregimeis highlyfavorabletotheemergenceofextremistmass movementsthattendtotransformthenewdemocracyin anti-demo- craticdirections."63AristotleandPlatosawdespotismemergingout oftheextremesofmobrule.Rapoportfindsin Gibbonan aptsummaryof theconstitutionalrhythmsof thepraetorianstate,which "floatsbetweentheextremesofabsolutemonarchyandwilddemocracy."64Suchinstabilityisthehallmarkofa societywheremobilizationhas outruninstitutionalization.
IV. STRATEGIESOF INSTITUTIONALDEVELOPMENT
Ifdecayofpoliticalinstitutionsisa widespreadphenomenoninthe "developing"countriesandifa majorcauseofthisdecayisthehigh rateofsocialmobilization,itbehoovesus,as socialscientists,tocall a spadea spadeandtoincorporatethesetendenciesintoanygeneral modelofpoliticalchangewhichweemploytounderstandthepolitics oftheseareas.Ifeffectivepoliticalinstitutionsarenecessaryforstable and eventuallydemocraticgovernmentand if theyare also a preconditionof sustainedeconomicgrowth,it behoovesus, as policy analysts,to suggeststrategiesofinstitutionaldevelopmentIn. doing this,we shouldrecognizetwogeneralconsiderationsaffectingproba- bilitiesofsuccessininstitution-building.
First,thepsychologicalandculturalcharacteristicsofpeoplesdiffer markedlyandwiththemtheirabilitiesatdevelopingpoliticalinstitu- tions.Whereage-oldpatternsof thoughtand behaviorhaveto be changed,quiteobviouslythecreationofpoliticalinstitutionsisa far moredifficulttaskthanotherwise"The. TokugawaJapanesecould not,as did theChinese,putfamilyabovegovernment,"one expert
62 Kornhauser,Politicsof MassSociety,passim;David C. Rapoport,"Praetorianism: GovernmentWithoutConsensus"(Ph.D. dissertation,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley I959); and Rapoportin Huntington,ed., ChangingPatternsof MilitaryPolitics,72, wherethe quotationoccurs.
63 Kornhauser,PoliticsofMassSociety,I25.
64EdwardGibbon,The Declineand Fall oftheRomanEmpire(New York i899),
I, 235, quotedbyRapoportin Huntington,ed.,ChangingPatternsofMilitaryPolitics,
98.
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has observed"The. samuraiwas expectedto be loyalto hisofficial superiorfirst,hisfamilysecondIn. moresgenerallytheprimacyof theorganizationoverthepersonwas constantlyreiterated.""5This differencein Japaneseand Chineseattitudestowardauthorityundoubtedlyaccountsinpartfortheirdifferencesinmodernizationand developmentThe. Japanesepeacefullyandsmoothlycreatednewpoliticalinstitutionsandamalgamatedthemwitholdones.The weaknessof traditionalChinesepoliticalinstitutions, theotherhand, ledtofortyyearsofrevolutionandcivilwarbeforemodernpolitical institutionscouldbe developedand extendedthroughoutChinese
society.
Second,thepotentialitiesforinstitution-buildingdiffermarkedly fromsocietyto society,butin all societiespoliticalorganizationscan be built.InstitutionsresultfromtheslowinteractionofconsciouseffortandexistingcultureOrganizations,.however,aretheproductof
conscious,purposefuleffortThe. formsofthiseffortmayvaryfrom a MeijiRestorationa CommunistRevolutionBut.in eachcasea
distinctgroupofidentifiablepeoplesetaboutadaptingold organiza- tionsorbuildingnewones."Nation-building"hasrecentlybecomea
popularsubject,anddoubtshavebeenraisedaboutwhethernations canbe "built."66Thesedoubtshavea fairlysolidbasis.Nationsare onetypeofsocialforce,andhistoricallytheyhaveemergedoverlong periodsoftime.Organization-building,however,differsfromnation- buildingPolitical.organizationsrequiretimefordevelopment,but theydo notrequireas muchtimeas nationalcommunitiesIndeed,. mostofthosewhospeakofnation-buildingsuchplacesas tropical Africaseeorganization-buildingasthefirststepinthisprocessPolit.- icalpartieshavetobe weldedoutoftribalgroups;thepartiescreate governments;and thegovernmentsmay,eventually,bringintoexistencenationsMany.of thedoubtswhichpeoplehaveaboutthe possibilitiesofnation-buildingdonotapplytoorganization-building.
Givenourhypothesesabouttherelationof socialmobilizationto institutionalization,therearetwoobviousmethodsof furtheringstitutionaldevelopmentFirst,.anythingwhichslowssocialmobilizationpresumablycreatesconditionsmorefavorabletothepreservation andstrengtheningofinstitutionsSecondly,.strategiescanbedeveloped and applieddirectlyto theproblemofinstitution-building.
85 JohnWhitneyHall, "The Natureof TraditionalSociety:Japan,"in Ward and
Rustow,eds.,PoliticalModernizationin Japanand Turkey,I9.
86See Karl W. Deutschand WilliamJ.Foltz, eds.,Nation-Building(New York i963), passim,butespeciallythecontributionsofJosephR. StrayerandCarlJ.Friedrich.
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SLOWING MOBILIZATION
SocialmobilizationcanbemoderatedinmanywaysThree.methods are:toincreasethecomplexityofsocialstructure;tolimitorreduce communicationsinsociety;andtominimizecompetitionamongseg-
mentsofthepoliticalelite.67
In general,themorehighlystratifiedsocietyis and themore complicateditssocialstructure,themoregradualis theprocessof
politicalmobilizationThe. divisionsbetweenclassand class,occupationand occupation,ruraland urban,constituteaseriesof break-
waterswhichdividethesocietyandpermitthepoliticalmobilization ofonegroupat a time.On theotherhand,a highlyhomogeneous society,ora societywhichhasonlya singlehorizontallineofdivision
betweenan oligarchythathas everythingand a peasantrythathas nothing,ora societywhichis dividednothorizontallybutvertically intoethnicand communalgroups,has moredifficultymoderating theprocessofmobilizationThus,.mobilizationshouldbe slowerin Indiathanin thenewAfricanstateswherehorizontaldivisionsare weakandtribaldivisionsstrong,or in thoseLatinAmericancountrieswherethemiddlestrataare weakand a smalloligarchyconfrontsapeasantmass.A societywithmanyhorizontaldivisionsgains throughtheslowerentryofsocialgroupsintopoliticsIt. may,however,alsolosesomething thatpoliticalorganizations,whenthey
do develop,mayformalongclassand stratumlinesand thuslack theautonomyofmorebroadlybasedpoliticalorganizationsPolitical. partiesin countrieslike Chileand Swedenhavebeenlargelythe spokesmenfordistinctclasses;casteassociationsseemdestinedto playa significantrolein IndianpoliticsThe. disruptiveeffectsof politicalorganizationsidentifiedwithsocialstratamaybe reduced if otherpoliticalinstitutionsexistwhichappealto loyaltiesacross classor castelines.In Sweden,loyaltyto themonarchyand the Riksdagmitigatestheeffectsofclass-basedparties,andin Indiathe casteassociationsmust,in general,seektheirgoalswithinthemuch moreextensiveframeworkof theCongressPartyIn. mostsocieties, thesocialstructuremustbe largelyacceptedas given.Whereit is subjectto governmentalmanipulationand influence,mobilization
67These are not,of course,theonlywaysof slowingmobilizationMyron. Weiner, forinstance,has suggestedthatone practicalmethodis "localization":channeling politicalinterestsand activityaway fromthegreatissuesof nationalpoliticsto the moreimmediateand concreteproblemsof the villageand communityThis. is certainlyone motivebehindbothcommunitydevelopmentprogramsand "basicdemoc-
racies."
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willbe slowedbygovernmentpolicieswhichenhancethecomplexity of socialstratification.
The communicationsnetworkof a societyis undoubtedlymuch moresubjecttogovernmentalinfluenceRapid.gainsin someofthe mostdesiredareasofmodernization-suchasmassmediaexposure, literacy,and education-mayhaveto be purchasedat thepriceof
severelossesin politicalstabilityThis.is notto arguethatpolitical institutionalizationasvalueshouldtakeprecedenceoverall others:
ifthiswerethecase,modernizationwouldneverbe good.It is simplytoarguethatgovernmentsmustbalancethevalueswonthrough rapidincreasesin communicationsagainstthevaluesjeopardizedby lossesinpoliticalstabilityThus,.governmentalpoliciesmaybewisely directedtoreducingthenumberofuniversitygraduates,particularly thosewithskillswhicharenotin demandin thesocietyStudents. andunemployeduniversitygraduateshavebeena concerncommon tothenationalisticmilitaryregimein SouthKorea,thesocialistmilitaryregimein Burma,and thetraditionalmilitaryregimein Thailand.TheeffortsbyGeneralNe WininBurmatocutbackthenumberof universitygraduatesmaywellbe imitatedbyothergovernmentsfacingsimilarchallengesMuch.has beenmadeof theproblemscausedbytheextensionofthesuffrageto largenumbersofil-
literatesBut.limitedpoliticalparticipationbyilliteratesmaywell,as in India,be lessdangeroustopoliticalinstitutionsthanparticipation byliteratesThe. lattertypicallyhavehigheraspirationsand make moredemandson governmentPolitical.participationby illiterates, moreover,ismorelikelytoremainlimited,whereasparticipationby literatesis muchmorelikelyto snowballwithpotentiallydisastrous effectsonpoliticalstabilityA. governingelitemayalsoaffectthein-
tensityofcommunicationsand therateofpoliticalmobilizationby its policieson economicdevelopmentLarge,.isolatedfactories,as
Kornhauserhasshown,aremorelikelytogiverisetoextremistmovementsthansmallerplantsmorecloselyintegratedintothesurround- ingcommunitySelf."-interestpoliticalsurvivalmayleadgovern- ingelitestodecreasethepriorityofrapideconomicchange.
Theuncontrolledmobilizationofpeopleintopoliticsis alsoslowed byminimizingthecompetitionamongpoliticalelitesHence.mobilizationis likelytohavelessdisturbingeffectson politicalinstitutions
in one-partysystemsthanin two-partyor multipartysystemsIn. manynewstatesandmodernizingcountries,a vastgapexistsbetween themodernizedeliteandthetradition-orientedmass.If theelitedi-
68Kornhauser,Politicsof Mass Society,I50-58.
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videsagainstitself,itsfactionsappealtothemassesforsupportThis. producesrapidmobilizationofthemassesintopoliticsat thesame
timethatitdestroyswhateverconsensuspreviouslyexistedamongthe politicallyactiveon theneedformodernizationMobilization.frequentlymeansthemobilizationoftradition;modernpoliticsbecome
thevehicleoftraditionalpurposesIn. Burmaduringthefirstpartof thiscentury,the"generalpatternwasonein whichthemodernizers firstfelloutamongthemselveswhenevertheywereconfrontedwith
demandingchoicesofpolicy,and thentendedtoseeksupportfrom amongthemoretraditionalelements,whichin timegainedtheascendency."69In Turkeya roughbalancebetweenthemobilization ofpeopleintopoliticsand thedevelopmentof politicalinstitutions existedso longas theRepublicanPeople'sPartyretained political monopolyThe. consciousdecisionto permitan oppositionparty, however,broadenedthescopeof politicalcompetitionbeyondthe urban,Westernizedelite.The DemocraticPartymobilizedthepeasantsintopolitics,strengthenedforcesoftraditionalism,andbroke thepreviousconsensusThis.ledthepartyleaderstoattempttomaintainthemselvesinpowerthroughsemilegalmeansandtoinducethe armyto join themin suppressingtheRepublicanoppositionThe. army,however,was committedto modernizationand seizedpower ina coupd'etat,dissolvingtheDemocraticPartyandexecutingmany ofitstopleadersIn. due course,themilitarywithdrewfromdirect conductofthegovernment,anddemocraticelectionsled toa multipartysysteminwhichnopartyhasa clearmajorityThus.froma rela- tivelystableone-partysystem,Turkeypassedthrougha brieftwopartyeratomilitaryruleanda multipartysystem:thefamiliarsyndromeofstateswheremobilizationhasoutruninstitutionalizationIn. theprocess,notonlywerepoliticalinstitutionsweakened,butthetradi- tional-mindedwerebroughtintopoliticsin sucha wayas to create obstaclestotheachievementofmanymodernizinggoals.
CREATING INSTITUTIONS
"Dansla naissancedessocietescesontleschefsdesrepubliquesqui fontl'institution;etc'estensuitel'institutionqui formeleschefsdes republiques,"said Montesquieu.But70 in thecontemporaryworld, politicalleadersprefermodernizationto institution-building,and nomatterwholeadsmodernization,theprocessitselfgeneratescon-
69Pye,Politics,Personalityand NationBuilding,I I4.
70 Charlesde Secondat,Baron Montesquieu,Conside'rationssur les causes de la grandeurdes romainset de leur decadence,in Oeuvres,i (Paris i828), ii9-20.
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flictingdemandsandinducementswhichobstructthegrowthofpo-
liticalinstitutionsWhere.modernizationisundertakenbytraditional leadersworkingthroughtraditionalpoliticalinstitutions,theefforts ofthetraditionalleaderstoreformcanunleashand stimulatesocial forceswhichthreatenthe traditionalpoliticalinstitutionsTradi.- tionalleaderscanmodernizeandreformtheirrealms,but,wheresubstantialsocialelementsopposereform,theyhaveyetto demonstrate theycanputthroughreformswithoutunderminingtheinstitutions throughwhichtheyareworkingThe. problemis: howcanthetraditionalpoliticalinstitutionsbe adaptedto accommodatethesocial forcesunleashedby modernization?Historically,exceptforJapan, traditionalpoliticalinstitutionshavebeen adaptedto the modern worldonlywherea highdegreeofpoliticalcentralizationwas not requiredformodernizationandwheretraditional(i.e.,feudal)representativeinstitutionsretainedtheirvitality(as in GreatBritainand Sweden).If modernizationrequiresthecentralizationofpowerin a "reformmonarch"or"revolutionaryemperor,"itmeanstheweakeningor destructionofwhatevertraditionalrepresentativeinstitutions mayexistandthuscomplicatesstillfurthertheassimilationofthose socialforcescreatedbymodernizationThe. concentrationofpower alsomakesthetraditionalregime(liketheeighteenth-centuryFrench monarchy)morevulnerableto forcibleoverthrowThe. vulnerability ofa traditionalregimetorevolutionvariesdirectlywiththecapability oftheregimeformodernizationFor. traditionalrulers,theimperativesof modernizationconflictwiththeimperativesof institution-
building.
If thetraditionalpoliticalinstitutionsare weak,or if theyhave beendisplacedandsuppressedduringperiodsofcolonialrule,adaptationis impossibleIn. societieswhichhaveundergonecolonialrule, incubationcanserveas a substituteforadaptationUnfortunately,.the opportunityforincubationwasmissedinmostcolonialsocieties,with a fewprominentexceptionssuchas IndiaandthePhilippinesIncu.- bationrequiresa colonialadministrationwhichis willingtopermit and to contendwitha nationalistmovementformanyyears,thus
furnishingthetime,thestruggle,and theslowlyincreasingrespon-
sibilitywhicharetheingredientsofinstitution-buildingIngeneral,. however,colonialpowerstendtopostponeincubationforas longas possibleandthen,whentheyseeindependenceasinevitable,tobring
itaboutas quicklyas possibleConsequently,.mostofthestateswhich becameindependentthei950'S andi960's hadlittleopportunityto
incubatepoliticalinstitutionswhilestillundercolonialtutelage.
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Wheretraditionalpoliticalinstitutionsare weak,or collapse,or areoverthrown,authorityfrequentlycomesto restwithcharismatic leaderswhoattempttobridgethegapbetweentraditionandmodernitybya highlypersonalappeal.To theextentthattheseleadersare ableto concentratepowerin themselves,itmightbe supposedthat theywouldbe in a positionto pushinstitutionaldevelopmentand toperformtheroleof"GreatLegislator"or"FoundingFather."The reformof corruptstatesor thecreationof new ones,Machiavelli argued,mustbe theworkofonemanalone.A conflictexists,however,betweentheinterestsoftheindividualand theinterestsof institutionalizationInstitutionalization.ofpowermeansthelimitation ofpowerwhichmightotherwisebewieldedpersonallyandarbitrarily.
The would-beinstitution-builderneedspersonalpowerto createinstitutionsbuthe cannotcreateinstitutionswithoutrelinquishingpersonalpowerResolving.thisdilemmais noteasy.It canbe doneonly byleaderswhocombinerarepoliticalskillandraredevotiontopurpose.It was donebyMustafaKemalwho,foralmosttwodecades, managedtomaintainhisownpersonalpower,topushthroughmajor modernizingreforms,andtocreate politicalinstitutiontocarryon thegovernmentafterhisdeath.Atatiirkhasbeena consciousmodel formanycontemporarymodernizingleaders,butfew,ifany,seem likelytoduplicatehisachievement.
Themilitaryjuntaormilitarydictatorshipisanothertypeofregime commonin modernizingcountriesIt. too confrontsa distinctset ofproblemsintheconflictbetweenitsownimpulsestomodernization andtheneedsofinstitution-buildingThe.militaryofficerswhoseize powerin a modernizingcountryfrequentlydo so in reactionto the "chaos,""stalemate,""corruption,"and"reactionary"characterofthe civilianregimeswhichprecededthem.The officersareusuallypassionatelydevotedto measuresof socialreform,particularlythose whichbenefitthepeasantry(whoseinterestshavefrequentlybeen overlookedbytheanteriorcivilianregime)A. rationalisticapproach to societalproblemsoftenmakestheofficersmodernizerspar excellenceAt. thesametime,however,theyarefrequentlyindifferent orhostileto theneedsofpoliticalinstitution-buildingThe.military
typicallyassertthattheyhavetakenoverthegovernmentonlytemporarilyuntilconditionscanbe "cleanedup" andauthorityrestoredto a purifiedcivilianregimeThe.officersthusconfrontanorganizational dilemmaThey.caneliminateorexcludefrompoliticsindividualcivil- ianpoliticians,buttheyareill-preparedtomakefundamentalchanges inpoliticalprocessesandinstitutionsIf.theyturnbackpowerto the
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civilians,thesameconditionstowhichtheyoriginallyobjectedtendto reappear(Burma). If theyattemptto restoreciviliangovernmentand to continuein power as a civilianpoliticalgroup (Turkey,South Korea), theyopenthemselvesto thesesamecorruptinginfluencesand maypave theway fora secondmilitarytakeoverby a youngergenerationof colonelswho purgethe civilianizedgenerals,just as the generalshad earlierpurgedtheciviliansFinally,.ifthemilitaryleadersretainpowerindefinitely,theyneedtocreateauthoritativepolitical organizationswhichlegitimizeand institutionalizetheirpower.Concernwiththeirown personalauthorityand unfamiliaritywith the needsofpoliticalinstitution-buildingcreateproblemsinthefulfillment ofthistask.It is stilltooearlytosayforcertainwhatsortofauthoritativepoliticalinstitutions,if any,will be producedby regimesled by militaryofficerssuchas Nasserand AyubKhan.
THE PRIMACY OF PARTY
Charismaticleadersand militarychiefshave thushad littlesuccess in buildingmodernpoliticalinstitutionsThe. reasonliesin thenature of modernpolitics.In theabsenceof traditionalpoliticalinstitutions, theonlymodernorganizationwhichcan becomea sourceofauthority and whichcan be effectivelyinstitutionalizedis the politicalparty. The importanceof the politicalpartyin providinglegitimacyand stabilityin a modernizingpoliticalsystemvariesinverselywiththe institutionalinheritanceofthesystemfromtraditionalsocietyTradi.- tionalsystemsdo nothave politicalparties.Unlike bureaucracy,the partyis a distinctlymodernformofpoliticalorganizationWhere.traditionalpoliticalinstitutions(such as monarchiesand feudalparliaments)are carriedoverintothemodernera,partiesplay secondary, supplementaryrolesin thepoliticalsystemThe. otherinstitutionsare the primarysourceof continuityand legitimacyParties.typically originatewithinthe legislaturesand then graduallyextendthemselvesintosocietyThey.adaptthemselvestotheexistingframeworkof thepoliticalsystemand typicallyreflectin theirown operationsthe organizationaland proceduralprinciplesembodiedin that system. Theybroadenparticipationinthetraditionalinstitutions,thusadapting thoseinstitutionsto therequirementsofthemodernpolityThey.help makethetraditionalinstitutionslegitimatein termsofpopularsovereignty,buttheyarenotthemselvesa sourceoflegitimacyTheir. own legitimacyderivesfromthecontributionstheymake to thepolitical system.
Wheretraditionalpoliticalinstitutionscollapseor areweakor non-
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