huntigton

anddiversityof organizationalsubunitsandbythenumberand diversityof functionsperformedby theorganizationsAutonomy.is perhapsthemostdifficultofthecriteriatopindown:it can,however,be measuredby thedistinctivenessofthenormsand values of theorganizationcomparedwiththoseof othergroups,by the personnelcontrols(in termsofcooptation,penetration,andpurging) existingbetweentheorganizationand othergroups,and bythedegreeto whichtheorganizationcontrolsitsownmaterialresources. Coherencemaybe measuredbytheratioofcontestedsuccessionsto totalsuccessions,bythecumulationor non-cumulationofcleavages amongleadersandmembers,bytheincidenceofovertalienationand dissentwithintheorganization,and,conceivably,byopinionsurveys oftheloyaltiesandpreferencesoforganizationmembers.

Experiencetellsus thatlevelsofinstitutionalizationdifferMeasur.- ingthatdifferencemaybe difficult,butitis notimpossibleOnly.by measuringinstitutionalizationwillwe be abletobuttressordisprove

hypothesesabouttherelationbetweensocial,economic,and demographicchanges,on theonehand,and variationsin politicalstruc-

ture,on theother.

III.MOBILIZATION VS. INSTITUTIONALIZATION:

PUBLIC INTERESTS, DEGENERATION, AND THE CORRUPT POLITY

MOBILIZATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Socialmobilizationand politicalparticipationarerapidlyincreas-

inginAsia,Africa,andLatinAmericaThese.processes,in turn,are directlyresponsibleforthedeteriorationof politicalinstitutions

theseareas.As Kornhauserhas conclusivelydemonstratedforthe Westernworld,rapidindustrializationand urbanizationcreatediscontinuitieswhichgiveriseto masssociety"The. rapidinfluxof largenumbersof peopleintonewlydevelopingurbanareasinvites massmovements.In"34areasandindustrieswithveryrapidindustrial growth,thecreationandinstitutionalizationofunionslag,andmass movementsarelikelyamongtheworkersAs. unionsareorganized, theyarehighlyvulnerabletooutsideinfluences theirearlystages. "The rapidinfluxoflargenumbersofpeopleintoa neworganiza-

tion(as well as a new area) providesopportunitiesformass-ori- entedelitesto penetratetheorganizationThis. is particularlytrue

duringtheformativeperiodsoforganizations,forat suchtimesexternalconstraintsmustcarrytheburdenof socialcontroluntilthe

34 WilliamKornhauser,The PoliticsofMassSociety(Glencoei959), I45.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

newparticipantshavecometointernalizethevaluesoftheorganization.""

So alsoin politicsRapid.economicgrowthbreedspoliticalinstability.36Politicalmobilization,moreover,doesnotnecessarilyrequire thebuildingoffactoriesevenmovementto thecitiesIt. mayresultsimplyfromincreasesin communications,whichcan stimulate majorincreasesaspirationsthatmaybe onlypartially,ifatall,satisfiedThe. resultis a "revolutionofrisingfrustrationsIncreases."37 in literacyand educationmaybringmorepoliticalinstabilityBy. Asianstandards,Burma,Ceylon,and theRepublicofKoreaareall highlyliterate,butno oneofthemis a modelof politicalstability. Nor doesliteracynecessarilystimulatedemocracy:withroughly75 percentliteracy,Cubawas thefifthmostliteratecountryin Latin America(rankingbehindArgentina,Uruguay,Chile,and Costa Rica),butthefirstto go Communist;so also Kerala,withone of thehighestliteracyratesin India,wasthefirstIndianstateto elect a CommunistgovernmentLiteracy,.38asDanielLernerhassuggested, "maybe dysfunctional-indeedaseriousimpediment-tomoderniza- tionin thesocietiesnowseeking(all toorapidly)to transformtheir institutions."39

Increasedcommunicationmaythusgeneratedemandsformore "modernity"thancanbe deliveredIt. mayalsostimulate reaction againstmodernityand activatetraditionalforcesSince.thepolitical arenaisnormallydominatedbythemoremoderngroups,itcanbring intothearenanew,anti-moderngroupsandbreakwhateverconsen- susexistsamongtheleadingpoliticalparticipantsIt.mayalsomobilizeminorityethnicgroupswhohadbeenindifferenttopoliticsbut whonowacquirea self-consciousnessanddividethepoliticalsystem alongethniclines.Nationalism,ithasoftenbeenassumed,makesfor nationalintegrationBut.in actuality,nationalismand otherforms of ethnicconsciousnessoftenstimulatepoliticaldisintegration,tear-

ingapartthebodypolitic.

Sharpincreases votingandotherformsofpoliticalparticipation can also havedeleteriouseffectson politicalinstitutionsIn. Latin

85Ibid., I46.

36 See MancurOlson, Jr.,"Rapid Growthas a DestabilizingForce,"Journalof EconomicHistory,xxvii (Decemberi963), 529-52;and BertF. Hoselitzand Myron

Weiner, "EconomicDevelopmentand Political Stabilityin India," Dissent,viii (Springi96i), I72-79.

87See Daniel Lerner,"Toward a CommunicationTheoryof Modernization,"in Pye,ed., Communicationsand PoliticalDevelopment,330ff.

38 Cf.Deutsch,AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,LV, 496.

89 Daniel Lerner,"The Transformationof Institutions"(mimeo.), i9.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Americasincethei930's, increasesin votingand increasesin political instabilityhavegonehandin hand."Age requirementswerelowered, propertyand literacyrequirementswere reducedor discarded,and theunscrubbed,unschooledmillionson thefarmswereenfranchised in thenameofdemocracyThey.weresweptintothepoliticallifeof therepublicsso rapidlythatexistingpartiescouldnotabsorbmanyof them,and theylearnedlittleaboutworkingwithintheexistingpolitical system."40The personalidentitycrisesof the elites,caughtbetweentraditionaland moderncultures,may createadditionalproblems:"In transitionalcountriesthepoliticalprocessoftenhas to bear to an inordinatedegreethestressesand strainsof peopleresponding to personalneedsand seekingsolutionsto intenselypersonalproblems."'"Rapid socialand economicchangecalls into questionexisting valuesand behaviorpatternsIt. thusoftenbreedspersonalcorruption.In some circumstancesthiscorruptionmay play a positive role in the modernizingprocess,enablingdynamicnew groupsto getthingsdonewhichwouldhavebeenblockedbytheexistingvalue systemand social structureAt. the same time,however,corruption underminestheautonomyand coherenceofpoliticalinstitutionsIt. is hardlyaccidentalthatin thei870's and i88o'sa highrateofAmerican economicdevelopmentcoincidedwitha low pointin Americangovernmentalintegrity.42

Institutionaldecay has become a common phenomenonof the modernizingcountries.Coups d'&tatand militaryinterventionsin politicsare one indexof low levelsof politicalinstitutionalization: theyoccurwherepoliticalinstitutionslack autonomyand coherence. Accordingto one calculation,eleven of twelvemodernizingstates outsideLatin Americawhichwere independentbeforeWorld War

II experiencedcoupsd'etator attemptedcoups afterWorld War II. Of twentystateswhichbecameindependentbetweenWorld War II and i959, fourteenhad coups or coup attemptsby i963. Of twentyfourstateswhichbecameindependentbetweeni960 and i963, seven experiencedcoups or attemptedcoups beforethe end of I963.43 InstabilityinLatinAmericawas lessfrequentearlyin thetwentiethcenturythanit was in themiddleof the centuryIn. the decade from

42See, in general,RonaldE. Wraithand Edgar Simpkins,Corruptionin Developing Countries(London i963).

43These figuresare calculatedfromthe data in theAppendixof Fred R. von der

Mehden,PoliticsoftheDevelopingNations(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.,1964).

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

408 WORLD POLITICS

Latin Americanrepublics28.7 per centof the time; in the decade fromI947 to i957, militarymenwerepresidents45.5 percentof thetime.44In theI930'S and i940's in countrieslikeArgentinaand

Colombia,militaryintervention politicsoccurredforthefirsttime in thiscenturySeventeen.of the twentyLatin Americanstatesexperiencedcoupsor coupattemptsbetweenI945 and i964, onlyChile, Mexico,and Uruguayhavingcleanrecordsof politicalstability.

In many statesthe declineof partyorganizationsis reflectedin the riseof charismaticleaderswho personalizepower and weaken institutionswhichmightlimitthatpower.The increasingdespotism of Nkrumah,forinstance,was accompaniedbya markeddeclinein theinstitutionalstrengthoftheConventionPeople'sParty.In Turkey, Pakistan,and Burma,theRepublicanPeople'sParty,MuslimLeague, and AFPFL deterioratedand militaryinterventioneventuallyensued. In partyorganizationsand bureaucracies,markedincreasesin corruptionoftenaccompaniedsignificantdeclinesin theeffectivenessof governmentalservicesParticularistic.groups-tribal,ethnic,religious- frequentlyreassertedthemselvesand furtherunderminedtheauthority and coherenceof politicalinstitutionsThe. legitimacyof postcolonialregimesamong theirown people was oftenless than that of the colonialregimesof the Europeans.Economistshave argued thatthegap betweenthelevelof economicwell-beingof theunderdevelopedcountriesand thatof highlydevelopedcountriesis widening as the absoluteincreasesand even percentageincreasesof the latterexceedthoseof theformerSomething.comparableand perhaps even more markedis occurringin the politicalfield.The level of politicalinstitutionalizationoftheadvancedcountrieshas,witha few exceptionssuch as France,remainedrelativelystable.The level of politicalinstitutionalizationof mostothercountrieshas declined.As a result,thepoliticalgap betweenthemhas broadened.In termsof institutionalstrength,manyif not mostof the new statesreached theirpeak of politicaldevelopmentat themomentof independence.

The differenceswhichmayexistin mobilizationand institutionalization suggestfourideal-typesof politics(see Table I). Modern, developed,civicpolities(the UnitedStates,the SovietUnion) have high levelsof both mobilizationand institutionalizationPrimitive. polities(suchas Banfield'sbackwardsociety)havelow levelsofboth. Containedpolitiesare highlyinstitutionalizedbut have low levelsof

44Computedfromfiguresin R. W. Fitzgibbon,"Armiesand Politicsin Latin America,"paper,7thRoundTable,InternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,Opatija, Yugoslavia,SeptemberI959, 8-9.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

mobilizationandparticipationThe. dominantpoliticalinstitutionsof containedpolitiesmaybe eithertraditional(e.g., monarchies)or modern(e.g.,politicalparties)If. theyaretheformer,suchpolities maywellconfrontgreatdifficultiesinadjustingto risinglevelsof socialmobilizationThe.traditionalinstitutionsmaywitherorcollapse, andtheresultwouldbea corruptpolitywitha highrateofparticipationbuta low levelof institutionalizationInthe.corruptsociety, politicsis,inMacaulay'sphrase,"allsailandno anchor."45Thistype ofpolitycharacterizesmuch,ifnotmost,ofthemodernizingworld. ManyofthemoreadvancedLatinAmericancountries,forinstance,

haveachievedcomparativelyhighindicesofliteracy,percapitanationalincome,and urbanizationBut.theirpoliticsremainsnotably underdevelopedDistrust.andhatredhaveproduceda continuinglow

levelofpoliticalinstitutionalization"There.isnogoodfaithinAmerica,eitheramongmenor amongnations,"Bolivaroncelamented.

"Treatiesare paper,constitutionsbooks,electionsbattles,liberty anarchy,andlifea tormentThe. onlythingonecan do in America

is emigrate."46Overa centurylater,thesamecomplaintwas heard: "Wearenot,ordo notrepresentarespectablenation. . . notbecause

wearepoor,butbecausewe aredisorganized,"arguedan Ecuadorian newspaper"With.a politicsofambushandofpermanentmistrust,one

fortheother,we . . . cannotproperlyorganize republic. . . and withoutorganizationwe cannotmeritor attainrespectfromother nations."47So longas a countrylikeArgentinaretains politicsof

coupandcountercoupanda feeblestatesurroundedbymassivesocial forces,it cannotbe consideredpoliticallydeveloped,no matterhow

withmodernpoliticalinstitutions,whilestillverybackwardinterms ofmodernizationIndia,.forinstance,is typicallyheldtobe theepit-

Good NeighborPolicy(New York i96i), 3i8.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

omeoftheunderdevelopedsocietyJudged.bytheusualcriteriaof modernization,itwasatthebottomoftheladderduringtheI950's: percapitaGNP of$72,8opercentilliterate,over8o percentofthe populationinruralareas,70percentoftheworkforceinagriculture, a dozenmajorlanguages,deepcasteand religiousdifferencesYet. intermsofpoliticalinstitutionalization,Indiawasfarfrombackward. Indeed,itrankedhighnotonlyin comparisonwithothermodernizingcountriesinAsia,Africa,andLatinAmerica,butalsoin comparisonwithmanymuchmoremodernEuropeancountriesA. welldevelopedpoliticalsystemhas strongand distinctinstitutionsto performboththe"input"andthe"output"functionsofpoliticsIndia. enteredindependencewithnotonlytwoorganizations,buttwohighly developed-adaptable,complex,autonomous,and coherent-institu- tionsreadytoassumeprimaryresponsibilityforthesefunctionsThe. CongressParty,foundedin i885, was one of theoldestand bestorganizedpoliticalpartiesin theworld;the IndianCivilService, datingfromthe earlynineteenthcentury,has been appropriately hailedas "oneofthegreatestadministrativesystemsof all time."48 The stable,effective,anddemocraticgovernmentofIndiaduringthe firstfifteenyearsofindependencerestedfarmoreonthisinstitutional inheritancethanit did on thecharismaof Nehru.In addition,the relativelyslowpaceofmodernizationandsocialmobilizationinIndia didnotcreatedemandsandstrainswhichthePartyandthebureaucracywereunabletohandleSo. longas thesetwoorganizationsmaintaintheirinstitutionalstrength,itis ridiculousto thinkof Indiaas politicallyunderdeveloped,nomatterhowlowherpercapitaincome orhowhighherilliteracyrate.

Almostno othercountrywhichbecameindependentafterWorld WarII was institutionallyaswellpreparedas Indiaforself-govern- ment.In countrieslikePakistanand theSudan,institutionalevolutionwasunbalanced;thecivilandmilitarybureaucraciesweremore

highlydevelopedthanthepoliticalparties,and the militaryhad strongincentivestomoveintotheinstitutionalvacuumon theinput

sideofthepoliticalsystemandtoattempttoperforminterestaggregationfunctionsThis.pattern,of course,has alsobeencommonin LatinAmericaIn. countrieslikeGuatemala,El Salvador,Peru,and

Argentina,JohnJ.Johnsonhas pointedout,themilitaryis "the country'sbestorganizedinstitutionand is thusin a betterposition to giveobjectiveexpressionto thenationalwill"thanarepartiesor

48 RalphBraibanti,"PublicBureaucracyand Judiciaryin Pakistan,"in LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracyand PoliticalDevelopment,373.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

interestgroups.49In a verydifferentcategoryis a countrylikeNorth Vietnam,which foughtits way into independencewith a highly disciplinedpoliticalorganizationbut whichwas distinctlyweak on the administrativeside.The Latin Americanparallelherewould be Mexico,where,as Johnsonputs it, "not the armed forcesbut the PRI is thebestorganizedinstitution,and thepartyratherthanthe armedforceshas been the unifyingforceat the nationallevel." In yeta fourthcategoryare thoseunfortunatestates,suchas theCongo, whichwerebornwithneitherpoliticalnoradministrativeinstitutions. Many of thesenew statesdeficientat independencein one or both typesof institutionshavealso beenconfrontedbyhighratesof social mobilizationand rapidlyincreasingdemandson the politicalsystem (see Table 2).

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC INTERESTS

A societywithweak politicalinstitutionslacksthe abilityto curb the excessesof personaland parochialdesires.Politicsis a Hobbesian worldof unrelentingcompetitionamong social forces-between man and man,familyand family,clan and clan,regionand region, class and class-a competitionunmediatedby more comprehensive politicalorganizationsThe. "amoralfamilism"of Banfield'svillage has itscounterpartsin amoralclanism,amoralgroupism,and amoral classismWithout.strongpoliticalinstitutions,societylacksthemeans ofdefiningand realizingitscommoninterestsThe. capacityto create politicalinstitutionsis thecapacityto createpublicinterests.

Traditionallythepublicinteresthasbeenapproachedinthreeways.50 It has been identifiedeitherwith abstract,substantiveideal values and normssuchas naturallaw, justice,or rightreason;or withthe

specificinterestofa particularindividual("L'etat,c'estmoi"), group, class (Marxism), or majority;or with the resultof a competitive

processamongindividuals(classicliberalism)or groups(Bentleyism).

49Johnson,Militaryand Society,143.

50See, in general,GlendonSchubert,The Public Interest(Glencoe i960); Carl J. Friedrich,ed., Nomos V: The Public Interest(New York I962); Douglas Price, "Theoriesof the Public Interest,"in LyntonK. Caldwell,ed., Politicsand Public

Aflairs(Bloomington,Ind.,I962), 141-60.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Theprobleminalltheseapproachesistoarriveata definitionwhich is concreteratherthannebulousand generalratherthanparticular.

Unfortunately,inmostcaseswhatis concretelacksgeneralityand

whatisgenerallacksconcretenessOne.partialwayoutoftheproblem is to definethepublicinterest termsoftheconcreteinterestsof

the governinginstitutionsA. societywithhighlyinstitutionalized governingorganizationsand proceduresis,in thissense,moreable

toarticulateandachieveitspublicinterests"Organized.(institutionalized) politicalcommunities,"asFriedrichargues,"arebetteradapted

toreachingdecisionsanddevelopingpoliciesthanunorganizedcommunities."51Thepublicinterest,thissense,isnotsomethingwhich

existsa prioriinnaturallaworthewillofthepeopleNor.isitsimply

whateverresultsfromthe politicalprocessRather.it is whatever strengthensgovernmentalinstitutionsThe. publicinterestis thein-

terestof publicinstitutionsIt.is somethingwhichis createdand

broughtintoexistencebytheinstitutionalizationofgovernmentorganizationsIn. a complexpoliticalsystem,manygovernmentalorganizationsandproceduresrepresentmanydifferentaspectsofthepub-

lic interestThe. publicinterestof a complexsocietyis a complex

matter.

We areaccustomedthinkofourprimarygoverninginstitutions

as havingrepresentativefunctions-thatis,as expressingtheinterests ofsomeothersetofgroups(theirconstituency)Hence,.we tendto forgetthatgovernmentalinstitutionshave interestsof theirown. Theseinterestsnotonlyexist;theyarealsoreasonablyconcreteThe. questions,"WhatistheinterestofthePresidency?WhatistheinterestoftheSenate?Whatis theinterestoftheHouseof Representa-

tives?WhataretheinterestsoftheSupremeCourt?"aredifficultbut notcompletelyimpossibleto answerThe. answerswouldfurnisha

fairlycloseapproximationof the "publicinterest"of the United States.Similarly,thepublicinterestof GreatBritainmightbe approximatedbythespecificinstitutionalinterestsoftheCrown,Cabinet,andParliamentIn. theSovietUnion,theanswerwouldinvolve

thespecificinstitutionalinterestsof thePresidium,Secretariat,and

CentralCommitteeoftheCommunistParty. Institutionalinterestsdifferfromtheinterestsof individualswho

arein theinstitutionsKeynes's.percipientremarkthat"In thelong run,wearealldead"appliestoindividuals,notinstitutionsIndividual. interestsarenecessarilyshort-runinterestsInstitutional.interests,how-

51Carl J.Friedrich,Man and His Government(New York i963), 150; italicsin original.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ever,existthroughtime:theproponentof theinstitutionhas to look to itswelfarethroughan indefinitefutureThis. considerationoften meansa limitingof immediategoals.The "truepolicy,"Aristotleremarked,"fordemocracyand oligarchyalike,is notonewhichensures thegreatestpossibleamountof either,butone whichwill ensurethe longestpossiblelifeforboth."52The officialwho attemptsto maximize power or othervalues in the shortrun oftenweakens his institutionin the long run. SupremeCourtjusticesmay,in terms of theirimmediateindividualdesires,wishto declarean act of CongressunconstitutionalIn. decidingwhetherit is in thepublicinterest to do so, however,presumablyone questiontheyshouldask themselvesis whetherit is in the long-terminstitutionalinterestof the SupremeCourtforthemto do so. Judicialstatesmenare thosewho, like JohnMarshallin Marburyvs. Madison,maximizethe institutionalpoweroftheCourtin sucha waythatitis impossibleforeither the Presidentor Congressto challengeit. In contrast,the Supreme Courtjusticesof the I930's came veryclose to expandingtheirimmediateinfluenceat the expenseof the long-terminterestsof the Courtas an institution.

The phrase"What'sgoodforGeneralMotorsis good forthecountry"containsat leasta partialtruth"What's.good forthePresidency is good forthecountry,"however,containsmoretruthAsk. anyreasonablyinformedgroupof Americansto identifythefivebestPresidentsand thefiveworstPresidentsThen. ask themto identifythe fivestrongestPresidentsand thefiveweakestPresidentsIf. theidentificationof strengthwithgoodnessand weaknesswithbadnessis not ioo per cent,it will almostcertainlynot be less than8o per cent. Those Presidents-Jefferson,Lincoln, the Roosevelts,Wilson-who expandedthepowersof theirofficeare hailedas thebeneficentpromotersof thepublicwelfareand nationalinterestThose. Presidents, suchas Buchanan,Grant,Harding,who failedto defendthepower oftheirinstitutionagainstothergroupsarealso thoughttohavedone lessgood forthecountryInstitutional.interestcoincideswithpublic interestThe. powerof thePresidencyis identifiedwiththegood of thepolity.

The public interestof the SovietUnion is approximatedby the institutionalinterestsof the top organsof the CommunistParty: "What's good for the Presidiumis good for the Soviet Union." Viewedin theseterms,Stalinismcanbe definedas a situationinwhich thepersonalinterestsoftherulertakeprecedenceovertheinstitution-

52 PolitiCS, 267.

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

414 WORLD POLITICS

alized interestsof theParty.Beginningin thelate i930'S Stalincon-

sistentlyweakenedtheParty.No PartyCongresswas held between i939 and1952. DuringandafterWorldWarII theCentralCommit-

teeseldommet.The Partysecretariatand Partyhierarchywereweakened by the creationof competingorgans.Conceivablythisprocess couldhaveresultedin thedisplacementofone setof governinginstitutionsby another,and some Americanexpertsand some Soviet leadersdid thinkthatgovernmentalorganizationsratherthanParty organizationswould becomethe rulinginstitutions Sovietsociety. Such,however,was neithertheintentnortheeffectof Stalin'saction. He increasedhispersonalpower,notthegovernmentalpower.When he died,his personalpowerdied withhim.The struggleto fillthe resultingvacuumwas won by Khrushchev,who identifiedhis interestswiththeinterestsofthePartyorganization,ratherthanbyMalenkov, who identifiedhimselfwith the governmentalbureaucracy. Khrushchev'sconsolidationof power markedthe reemergenceand revitalizationof theprincipalorgansof theParty.While theyacted inverydifferentwaysandfromdifferentmotives,Stalinweakenedthe Partyjustas GrantweakenedthePresidencyJust.as a strongPresidencyis in theAmericanpublicinterest,so also a strongPartyis in theSovietpublicinterest.

In termsof the theoryof naturallaw, governmentalactionsare legitimateto theextentthattheyare in accordwiththe"publicphilosophy."53Accordingto democratictheory,theyderivetheirlegitimacyfromtheextentto whichtheyembodythewill of thepeople. Accordingto theproceduralconcept,theyare legitimateif theyrepresenttheoutcomeof a processof conflictand compromisein which all interestedgroupshaveparticipatedIn. anothersense,however,the legitimacyof governmentalactionscan be soughtin the extentto whichtheyreflecttheinterestsof governmentalinstitutionsIn. contrastto thetheoryof representativegovernment,underthisconcept governmentalinstitutionsderivetheirlegitimacyand authoritynot fromtheextentto whichtheyrepresentthe interestsof the people orofanyothergroup,butfromtheextenttowhichtheyhavedistinct interestsof theirown apartfromall othergroups.Politiciansfrequentlyremarkthatthings"look different"aftertheyobtainoffice thantheydid whentheywerecompetingforofficeThis. differenceis a measureof theinstitutionaldemandsof officeIt. is preciselythis

53See WalterLippmann,The Public Philosophy(Boston I955), esp. 42, for his definitionof the publicinterestas "whatmen would choose if theysaw clearly, thoughtrationally,acteddisinterestedlyand benevolently."

This content downloaded from 92.242.58.11 on Thu, 20 Feb 2014 07:04:52 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions